Prince George's County v. Meininger

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal the appellant, Prince George’s County, Maryland (County), attempts to overturn an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Taylor, J.) which reversed a decision of the District Council of the County denying the appellees’ application for a special exception for a gasoline station. The appellees, Loretta B. Meininger, Donald Meininger and Shirley Meininger, filed their application for a special exception with the District Council on January 9, 1970, pursuant to §§ 28.11 and 28.317 of the County Zoning Ordinance. 1 The subject property is located on the northeast corner of U. S. Route 1 and Indian Lane in College Park, Maryland, and contains approximately 36,451 square feet. The property is currently zoned C-2 (general commercial).

The appellees emphasized that their operation would be a multi-pump “gasoline selling place,” distinguished from other service stations in that there would be no service bays as they do not intend to perform any repair service. There would be an automatic car wash and they aspired to a 24 hour, around-the-clock operation. Prince George’s County Code, Appendix B, “Zoning,” Vol. 1 § 28.2 entitled “General Provisions” provides: “A special exception may be granted when the council finds that: “ (a) The proposed use is in harmony with the purpose and intent of the General Plan for the physical development of the district, as embodied ¹⁵⁰ in this ordinance and in any master plan or portion thereof adopted or proposed as part of said General Plan. “ (b) The proposed use will not affect adversely the health and safety of residents or workers in the area and will not be detrimental to the use and/or development of adjacent properties or the general neighborhood.” And § 28.317 (o) of the Zoning Ordinance, states: “(o) In addition to the General Provisions of Section 28.2 of this Ordinance, the District Council must make the following findings that the proposed use: (1) will have no detrimental effects on vehicular and pedestrian traffic; (2) is necessary to the public in the surrounding area; and (3) must not restrict the availability or upset the balance of land usage in the area for other trades and commercial uses. (Adopted 12-10-68.)” After a public hearing before the District Council held on March 18, 1970, the Council denied the appellees’ application stating in its written decision of July 14, 1970: “It is apparent that this section of Baltimore Avenue is abundantly supplied with filling stations.

We have not been shown that another station is necessary to the people in the surrounding area. * * * We are not able to say that the proposed use will not adversely affect the health and safety of residents or workers in the area and will not be detrimental to the use and/or development of adjacent properties or the general neighborhood. * * * “To grant this application may well upset, if not already upset, the balance of land usage in the area.” ¹⁵¹ The appellees ensuing petition for reconsideration was also denied by the District Council on August 18, 1970. The Meiningers filed a timely appeal from the Council’s decision in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in which they alleged that the Council’s denial of their application and the accompanying findings of fact and conclusions were unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence and furthermore were against the weight of the evidence presented at the public hearing. They requested that the circuit court reverse the District Council on the basis that the denial of their application was arbitrary and capricious. The circuit court was disposed to agree with the appellees and in one part of its opinion stated: “The record is replete with substantial evidence to show that the applicants assumed the burden and showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed use would not have an adverse affect on health and safety, nor be detrimental to adjacent properties, or the general neighborhood.

The applicants further showed by a preponderance of the evidence a need of the station to the people in the surrounding area.” [Emphasis supplied.] The lower court made an unfortunate choice of language in its opinion when in judging the correctness of the decision of the District Council, it did so by viewing its action in light of the preponderance of evidence rule, finding that the petitioner had, by a preponderance of the evidence, presented sufficient facts to justify the granting of the special exception. Even were we to assume, arguendo, that what the lower court meant was that the evidence in the record supporting the granting of the special exception was so conclusive as to have rendered the question of the denial of the special exception not fairly debatable (cf. Agneslane, Inc. v. Lucas, 247 Md. 612, 615 , 233 A. 2d 757 (1967)), we would ¹⁵² still have to disagree with its assessment of the evidence. For the lower court to have been correct in its holding it would have had to have found, and the record would have had to have shown, “that the action of the District Council was unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence, and therefore, was arbitrary and capricious.” Board v. Oak Hill Farms, 232 Md. 274, 284-285 , 192 A. 2d 761 (1963). See also Rockville Fuel v. Board of Appeals, 257 Md. 183, 191 , 262 A. 2d 499 (1970); Deen v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, 240 Md. 317, 323-324 , 214 A. 2d 146 (1965); Montgomery County v. Merlands, Inc. 202 Md. 279, 292 , 96 A. 2d 261 (1953).

A review of the testimony in the case at bar persuades us that there was sufficient evidence in