Darling v. State

⁴⁴⁰ Shaw Geter, J. Deshaune Darling, appellant, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County of first-degree premeditated murder; conspiracy to commit first-degree murder; second-degree murder; first-degree assault; conspiracy to commit first-degree assault; second-degree assault; wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun; use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence; kidnapping; and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. 1 Appellant presents the following five questions on appeal, which we have slightly rephrased: I. Did the suppression court err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from two motor vehicles?

II

Did the trial court err when it admitted into evidence a letter purportedly written by appellant while he was an inmate at the detention center because it was not properly authenticated?

III

Did the trial court err when it admitted into evidence a cell phone service receipt because it was not properly authenticated and constituted inadmissible hearsay?

IV

Did the trial court err when it admitted “other crimes” evidence? V. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm. FACTS The State’s theory of prosecution was that appellant and an accomplice murdered Radames Guzman either in revenge for providing information about appellant to the police or to ⁴⁴¹ prevent Guzman from testifying against appellant in a subsequent trial.

The State’s evidence was circumstantial and came primarily, from evidence seized from two vehicles; the decomposed body of Guzman; and the testimony of Jessie Jo Stewart, a drug addict who bought drugs from appellant. The defense’s theory was that Stewart, killed Guzman to curry favor with appellant. The defense presented no testimonial evidence. In the summer of 2011, Guzman, a confidential informant for the Delaware State police, made several controlled drug buys from appellant.

Based on those buys, a search warrant was issued and executed for appellant’s home in Dover, Delaware. Appellant was arrested, released on bond, but then “disappeared” and failed to appear for trial. Roughly three years later, on the night of August 2, 2014, Guzman was last seen by his family leaving his house in Delaware. About three weeks later, on August 24th, his partially decomposed and buried body was found in a wooded area near Linkwood and Red Mill Roads in Dorchester County.

Guzman’s wrists were bound behind his back with duct tape, and he had three gunshot wounds to the back of his head. He was identified by his fingerprints. A subsequent medical examination revealed that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was homicide. An investigation into Guzman’s Facebook account and cell phone usage revealed that he was last in contact with a woman named Jessie Jo Stewart.

The police interviewed her on September 2, but she told the police that she did not know Guzman or what had happened to him. Two days after that interview, police set up a covert surveillance at appellant’s home, located at 309 Prior Avenue in Salisbury. A van was parked in the driveway and a Lexus on the street; both vehicles were associated with appellant. Police officers saw appellant leaving his home in the van.

They followed him and eventually stopped the vehicle. He was taken into custody, and the van was towed to a Maryland State Police Barrack. Pursuant to a search warrant, two black ski ⁴⁴² masks and a cell phone service receipt were seized from the vehicle. After appellant’s arrest, a police canine unit made a positive alert for drugs on the Lexus.

The Lexus was also towed to a Maryland State Police Barrack where it was searched pursuant to a search warrant. The executing officer observed that the car and trunk were “very clean” and noted that as soon as the door of the car and trunk were opened he was “overwhelmed” by the “strong odor of cleaning material[.]” He found what appeared to be several spots of dried blood in the trunk—on the molding, interior lid, trunk mat, and side wall. Swabs of the suspected blood were collected, pursuant to an additional search warrant obtained by the officers. DNA analysis on the swabs showed that the blood was from either Guzman or a brother based on DNA swabs taken from Guzman’s mother and father. 2 DNA found on one of the ski masks matched appellant’s DNA.

Stewart entered into a plea agreement with the State in which she agreed to plead guilty to a charge of kidnapping and testify truthfully at appellant’s trial, and in exchange the State would recommend a sentence of eight years. Stewart testified that she was a long-time drug addict and had known appellant, who supplied her with drugs, for about a year prior to the murder. She paid for the drugs with money, if she had it, or with sex. Stewart testified that appellant asked her to look up Ra-dames Guzman, who she did not know, on the internet and arrange to meet him.

She found Guzman on Facebook, and they agreed to meet on the evening of August 2; she told appellant about the arrangement. Messages from Guzman’s and Stewart’s Facebook accounts corroborated her account and were admitted into evidence. On August 2, appellant picked up Stewart and drove her to the Royal Farms store in Easton to obtain a car he had arranged for her to use to pick up Guzman. Once at the store, ⁴⁴³ they met three people in a gold Grand Marquis.

Video footage from the store’s surveillance cameras was introduced into evidence. Stewart entered the Grand Marquis and drove the three occupants to a nearby house where they got out. She then drove to Delaware to meet Guzman. During the trip, she was in cell phone contact with appellant.

After picking up Guzman, she drove to a Royal Farms store in Felton, Delaware and texted appellant while she was in the bathroom. Photographs from the store’s video surveillance corroborated Stewart’s and Guzman’s presence at the store with a Grand Marquis around 11:30 p.m. They then left the store and drove to the Cambridge area of Maryland, during which she was in cell phone contact with appellant. At some point, a car, which she later learned was appellant’s Lexus, pulled up behind her on a deserted, back road and flashed its headlights.

She stopped the car she was driving and got out. As she did so, she was shoved to the ground, but saw two men wearing ski masks and all black clothing. One of the men held a gun in his hands. Both of the men pulled Guzman, who was screaming, out of the car.

One man hit Guzman in the face with the gun, and both men hit Guzman all over with their fists. The men duct taped Guzman’s hands and ankles and put him in the back seat of appellant’s Lexus. The men then pulled up their masks and she recognized appellant and another man, whom she had seen before but did not know his name. Stewart followed the Lexus to another deserted, back road where the men placed Guzman in the trunk of the Lexus.

They then drove to a migrant camp where appellant sold drugs for several hours. Stewart followed appellant back to Easton where they dropped off the Grand Marquis at the house where she had earlier left the three occupants. She then got into the Lexus with appellant and the other man. Appellant drove to the Royal Farms store in Easton.

Video footage from the store’s surveillance cameras shows Stewart and appellant at the store around 3:00 a.m. The video footage also shows appellant pumping gas and then walking to the rear of his car where he leans over as if to listen to noise from inside of the trunk. ⁴⁴⁴ Appellant then drove Stewart to her home in Cambridge, during which time she heard “kicking in the trunk.” Before she got out of the car, appellant asked for her cell phone, which she gave to him. Cell phone records from the number on the cell phone receipt found in the van in which appellant was arrested show that between 4:07 a.m. and 4:50 a.m., that cell phone was in the area where Guzman’s body was later found. The next day Stewart went to Walmart and bought a new phone with money appellant had given her.

Photographs from the Walmart surveillance video support Stewart’s testimony and show her walking out of Walmart with the phone on August 3 around 7:00 a.m. Stewart admitted that she had not been honest in her first interview with the police on September 2. She explained that she was scared—appellant had threatened her and her family. Her second interview with the police, roughly two weeks later, on September 17, was played for the jury and more closely followed her trial testimony.

Stewart’s testimony was corroborated, in part, by the testimony of Tytina Williams, her boyfriend Gary Barham, and their friend Donnie Eisman. They testified that on the afternoon of August 2, they drove in Eisman’s car to Salisbury, Maryland where Barham bought drugs from appellant, who was driving a Lexus. An arrangement was made to meet later so appellant could borrow Eisman’s car. That night the three drove to the Royal Farms store in Easton where appellant pulled up in his Lexus with a woman inside.

The woman got in the passenger seat of Eisman’s car, and they drove to Bar-ham’s house. The three got out of the car, and the woman drove off. During the early morning hours of the next day, the woman drove the car back to the house. At the same time, appellant drove up in his Lexus with a man known to Barham as “Terrell” sitting in the passenger seat.

The woman exited Eisman’s car and got into the back seat of the Lexus, which then left. Following appellant’s arrest, he was held at the Wicomico County Detention Center. On January 21, 2015, the detention ⁴⁴⁵ center seized a letter from the outgoing mail addressed to appellant’s fiancée and signed by appellant. A scanned copy was sent to the State’s Attorney’s Office.

An expert in the field of handwriting analysis compared exemplars of appellant’s handwriting to the scanned letter and concluded that she “was virtually certain that the letter was written” by appellant. In the letter, appellant admitted that he knew Guzman and knew that he had acted as a drug informant against him. Appellant wrote that Stewart killed Guzman as a “surprise” for him and he “didn’t have anything to do with it.” He wrote that Stewart had asked him about borrowing someone’s car to carry out the surprise. Appellant made arrangements for her to borrow a friend’s car, and sometime that night, she showed him her “surprise”—she opened the trunk and he saw Guzman lying inside.

We will provide additional facts as needed to address the questions raised. DISCUSSION I. Appellant argues that the suppression court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from two vehicles associated with him—a Dodge van and a Lexus sedan. Appellant makes several arguments but mostly focuses on two: the police did not possess reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stop of the van or to engage in a canine search of the Lexus. The State disagrees, as do we.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the record at the suppression hearing is the exclusive source of facts for our review. State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439 (2003). We extend great deference to the fact finding of the suppression judge and accept the facts as found, unless clearly erroneous. Id.

(citation omitted). A factual finding cannot be clearly erroneous if there is any competent evidence to support the finding below. Hoerauf v. State, 178 Md.App. 292, 314 , 941 A.2d 1161 (2008) (citing Fuge v. Fuge, 146 ⁴⁴⁶ Md.App. 142, 180, 806 A.2d 716 , cert. denied, 372 Md. 430 , 813 A.2d 258 (2002)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this case, the State.

Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282 , 753 A.2d 519 (2000). Nevertheless, we must make our own independent constitutional appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case. Haley v. State, 398 Md. 106, 131 , 919 A.2d 1200 (2007) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress the evidence found in a Dodge van and Lexus sedan.

Testifying for the State at the ensuing suppression hearing was appellant’s fiancée and four police officers: Detective Jordan Banks and Deputy J.C. Richardson, Wicomico County Sheriffs Office, and Trooper Kenny Moore and Detective Sergeant Chasity Blades, Maryland State Police Department. Around 7:00 a.m. on September 4, 2015, Detective Banks set up a covert surveillance at 306 Prior Avenue in Salisbury where appellant and his fiancée lived. Detective Banks was instructed to advise other officers in the area when appellant, who had outstanding warrants, left the home. Sometime after 9:00 a.m., Detective Banks saw appellant exit the home and drive off in the green Dodge van that had been parked in the driveway of the home.

Detective Banks maintained surveillance of the van until it was observed by Trooper Moore, who then fell in behind it. Trooper Moore testified he had been ordered to take appellant into custody based on two outstanding warrants. Trooper Moore testified that he made telephone calls the day before and that morning and confirmed that the two warrants were still valid. He testified that he did not attempt to arrest appellant at his home because of the presence of others and information that appellant may be armed.

While following the van, Trooper Moore observed the van drive 35 miles per hour in a posted 25-mile per hour zone and then 40 miles per hour in a posted 30-mile per hour zone. The trooper activated his emergency equipment, the van stopped, ⁴⁴⁷ and the trooper pulled his police car in behind it. The trooper exited his car and when he was about halfway to the van from his car, appellant “floored it” and drove off. The trooper ran back to his police car and gave pursuit.

During the ensuing 20-minute chase involving several other police officers, the van reached speeds of 20 to 30 miles per hour over the speed limit; ran stop signs and stop lights; caused damage to cars as they sought to get out of the way; crossed two median strips; and went against the flow traffic. Appellant also called 911 during the chase and said he was armed and threatened suicide. During the pursuit, Trooper Moore also observed appellant holding a black nylon holster and saw appellant’s “right hand going down to his lap” while he changed positions in his seat. The chase ended when appellant stopped the van in front of a store.

The police approached the van, pulled appellant from it, and arrested him. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, drugs were recovered from appellant’s person. The van was then towed to a Maryland State Police Barrack where, pursuant to a search warrant, a handgun, a holster, and several other items were seized from the van. After appellant was arrested, Deputy Richardson was dispatched to appellant’s home to perform a canine scan for narcotics of a 1997 Lexus.

The deputy testified that when he arrived at 10:48 a.m., he saw Detective Sergeant Blades standing near the Lexus, which was parked on the street in front of appellant’s home. Deputy Richardson’s dog, Diablo, alerted to the presence of drugs at the passenger side door of the car. As a result of the positive alert, the Lexus was towed to a Maryland State Police Barrack where Trooper Moore, pursuant to a search warrant, conducted a search of the Lexus for drugs. During the search, the trooper noticed what appeared to be dried blood.

The trooper stopped the drug search and transferred the case to the homicide unit. Appellant argued that the police had insufficient information to justify the stop of the van and the canine search of the Lexus. The suppression court disagreed and denied the motion ⁴⁴⁸ to suppress as to both vehicles. Crediting the officers’ testimony, the court ruled that the police were justified in stopping the van for several reasons: twice it was observed traveling over the posted speed limit; the police had a valid arrest warrant for appellant; and by calling 911 and stating he had a gun and would use it, appellant was a danger to himself and the public.

As to the Lexus, the court stated that while “much [has been] made of the timing” of the canine scan and when the car was towed, the court found that the scan had been completed before it was on the tow truck because the scan report was completed at 10:48 a.m. and the tow truck left at 11:04 a.m. The van On appeal, appellant argues that the suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress the items found in the van because the police lacked probable cause to stop the van prior to the high speed police chase. 3 Specifically, appellant argues that Trooper Moore’s “pacing” of the van could not justify the stop of the van for speeding because it was not an “objective” measurement. He also argues that the two arrest warrants could not justify the stop because the Delaware “capias” 4 document was unsigned and the Dorchester County warrant was stale as it was issued in 2012. The State contends that appellant’s arguments are meritless because the Fourth Amendment was not implicated—there was no seizure because, after the police initiated the traffic stop, appellant “ ‘immediately floored it’ ” and fled the area. ⁴⁴⁹ The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against unreasonable government searches and seizures.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). From its plain language, the Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures; just unreasonable searches and seizures. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). “Reasonableness” is determined by balancing “the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. (citations omitted).

Although a traffic stop does implicate the Fourth Amendment, no violation occurs when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle stopped has violated a traffic law and the officer temporarily detains the vehicle “ ‘to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with intent to issue a citation or warning.’ ” State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 609 , 826 A.2d 486 (2003)(quoting Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999)(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996))). “Probable cause” is a non-technical conception that would justify the belief by a reasonable person that a crime has been or is being committed. Johnson v. State, 356 Md. 498, 504-05 , 740 A.2d 615 (1999). It requires “less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion.” Williams v. State, 188 Md.App. 78, 90-91 , 981 A.2d 46 (quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 411 Md. 742 , 985 A.2d 539 (2009). In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a seizure requires “either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” (emphasis in Hodari).

Whether conduct constitutes submission to police authority depends on “the totality of the circumstances!!]” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , ⁴⁵⁰ 417, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). “[W]hat may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262 , 127 S.Ct. 2400 , 168 L.Ed.2d 182 (2007). Courts have held that a temporary halt of a car by the police that then drives off does not amount to a seizure. See United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218-219 (2nd Cir. 2007)(classifying Baldwin’s actions in stopping his car, when approached by a police vehicle operating its emergency equipment, but then speeding off before the officers reached his car, as a momentary stop that did not constitute submission to police authority, and therefore, Baldwin was not seized within meaning of the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1222 , 128 S.Ct. 1324 , 170 L.Ed.2d 135 (2008); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C.Cir.1994)(the defendant who initially stopped his car but who then drove off quickly before the officer even reached the car, was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). We agree.

Accordingly, because appellant never submitted to the assertion of authority by the police when he drove off as the police were approaching the van, he was never seized, and therefore, there is no Fourth Amendment violation. Even if we were to believe that the van was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it stopped, we would find that the stop of the van was justified for two reasons. First, appellant had two outstanding warrants. Even if, as appellant alleges, the “capias” was unsigned and the Dorchester County warrant was issued in 2012, they both could justify the stop of the van because Trooper Moore testified that he called the day before and the day of the stop and confirmed that the warrants were still active.

See Ott v. State, 325 Md. 206, 215 , 600 A.2d 111 (“[A]n officer may make an arrest on the strength of a warrant, the existence of which has been certified to him by other officers in his depart ⁴⁵¹ ment[.]”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 904 , 113 S.Ct. 295 , 121 L.Ed.2d 219 (1992). Thus, we agree with the State that the stop of the van was based on probable cause, or at a minimum, on the good faith belief of Trooper Moore that the warrants for appellant’s arrest were current and valid. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule remedy does not apply where an officer’s reliance on a warrant is objectively reasonable)(citations and footnote omitted). Second, Trooper Moore testified that he twice paced the van traveling ten miles over the speed limit in two different zones—traveling 35 miles per hour in a 25-mile per hour zone on North Division Street and 40 miles per hour in a 30-mile per hour zone on Eastern Shore Drive.

See Md. Code Ann., Transp. Art. § 21-801.1 (stating that a posted maximum speed limit is the maximum lawful speed). An officer may initiate a traffic stop, even if pretextual, when the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic law has been violated. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 819 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 .

This is because the “subjective motivations” for conducting a traffic stop are irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. Smith v. State, 214 Md.App. 195, 201 , 75 A.3d 1048 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 436 Md. 330 , 81 A.3d 459 (2013). Contrary to appellant’s argument, “pacing” a vehicle to measure its speed is an objectively reasonable basis to determine whether a vehicle has violated traffic laws. Cf.

State v. Harding, 196 Md.App. 384, 389 , 9 A.3d 547 (2010) (finding “no issue” regarding the legality of a traffic stop where an officer “paced” a car traveling 50 miles per hour in a 35-mile per hour zone.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 826 , 132 S.Ct. 118 , 181 L.Ed.2d 42 (2011). The Lexus Although appellant’s argument regarding the Lexus is at best confusing, it seems that he believes that the seizure of the Lexus was illegal, in part, because the scan occurred after the Lexus was seized and placed on the towing bed. Specifically, he argues that the suppression court’s finding that Detec ⁴⁵² tive Richardson completed the canine scan at 10:48 a.m. was clearly erroneous. We do not find clearly erroneous the suppression court’s finding that the scan took place before it was loaded for towing for several reasons.

First, Deputy Richardson testified that when he arrived to perform a canine scan of the Lexus, it was parked on the street. Second, Detective Sergeant Blades testified that she was present during the canine scan, that the tow truck was called “shortly after the scan was positive,” and that the Lexus was not on “the rollback when the dog scan was done[.]” Notwithstanding the somewhat confusing testimony of Deputy Richardson that he was dispatched at 10:48 a.m., arrived at 10:48 a.m., and the detective’s incident report that suggests that the scan was completed at 10:48 a.m., the suppression court’s found that the scan took place before the Lexus was loaded on the tow truck. Therefore, even if the suppression court was clearly erroneous in finding that Deputy Richardson completed the canine scan at 10:48 a.m., this finding was irrelevant because, the court’s finding that the Lexus was placed on the tow truck after the scan was completed was not clearly erroneous. Further, the seizure of the Lexus was valid based on the positive canine scan.

The Court of Appeals has held that a canine search of a car during a routine traffic stop is not a search or a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554 , 581-82 & n.20, 774 A.2d 420 (2001). The decision in Wilkes was based on the holdings in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 , 104 S.Ct. 1652 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984)(the opening of a damaged cardboard box in which a private freight carrier employee observed a white powdery substance does not constitute a search within meaning of the Fourth Amendment) and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)(a canine “sniff’ of luggage in a public place does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the investigative technique is so narrow—the manner of the search is minimally intrusive and the content of the informa ⁴⁵³ tion revealed by the procedure is limited). Based on the above, we hold that a canine scan of an empty car in a public area does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

Cf. United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 551 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1152 , 116 S.Ct. 1538 , 134 L.Ed.2d 643 (1996)(stating that a dog sniff of a car parked on a public street or alley does not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1526 (10th Cir. 1993)(holding that random and suspicionless dog sniff of vehicles in motel parking lot was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 , 477 (5th Cir. 1982)(stating that dog sniffs of vehicles on a public parking lot of a school are not a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment); Dowty v. State, 363 Ark. 1 , 210 S.W.3d 850, 854-55 (2005)(dog scan of a an empty car parked in a restaurant parking lot does not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment); State v. McMillin, 23 Kan.App.2d 100 , 927 P.2d 949, 951-53 (1996)(holding that the dog sniff of vehicle parked in public parking lot did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Garcia, 195 Wis.2d 68 , 535 N.W.2d 124, 126-27 (App. 1995)(holding that the dog sniff of the exterior of a car parked in motel parking lot is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy around the air space of a car in a public parking lot).

Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated during the canine scan of the Lexus, and once the dog alerted to the presence of drugs, the police had probable cause to seize and search the car. See State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 146 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002)(stating that the law is settled that a positive canine scan for the presence of contraband provides probable cause for a search and seizure), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1140 , 124 S.Ct. 1036 , 157 L.Ed.2d 951 (2004). Additionally, throughout appellant’s arguments as to both vehicles he suggests that the police used the pretext of a drug investigation to cover up for what was a homicide investigation that lacked probable cause. Whether or not the seizure of the vehicles was pretextual is not relevant because, as explained ⁴⁵⁴ above, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred in the seizing of the vehicles.

See also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). Lastly, appellant argues that the suppression court erroneously found that the police recovered 20 grams of cocaine during a search of the van. State Trooper Moore testified at the suppression hearing that drugs were recovered from appellant’s person following a search incident to arrest. He did not specify an amount.

Although defense counsel asked Trooper Moore on cross-examination several questions regarding the subsequently obtained search warrant for the Lexus, the warrant, in which it was written that the police recovered 20 grams of suspected cocaine from appellant’s person following his arrest, was apparently not admitted into evidence. Even if the court’s findings in this regard were clearly erroneous, the findings were irrelevant because the seizure of the Lexus was based on the positive canine sniff, not on the drugs recovered from appellant following his arrest.

II

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence a letter he purportedly wrote while an inmate at the Wicomico County Detention Center. Specifically, appellant argues that the State’s handwriting expert’s opinion, that she was “virtually certain” that the letter was written by appellant, was not sufficient to authenticate the letter because “absolute certainty” was required. The State responds that appellant is wrong. We agree.

Prior to trial, defense counsel moved in limine to exclude from admission at trial a letter purportedly written by appellant. At a subsequent hearing, a Wicomico