Daughtry v. Nadel

Wanda Daughtry, et al. v. Jeffrey Nadel, et al., No. 1814, September Term, 2019. Opinion by Fader, C.J. MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST — FORECLOSURES — TIME FOR PROCEEDINGS; LIMITATIONS AND LACHES There is no statute of limitations that applies to foreclosure actions. JUDGMENT — MERGER AND BAR OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND DEFENSES — IDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION IN GENERAL The circuit court was correct in finding that an action to reform a subordination agreement was not the same cause of action as a foreclosure action for the purposes of res judicata. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAEF19-08709 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1814 September Term, 2019 WANDA DAUGHTRY, ET AL. v. JEFFREY NADEL, ET AL.

Fader, C.J., Kehoe, Berger, JJ. Opinion by Fader, C.J. Filed: December 16, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-12-16 16:24-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk More than 70 years ago, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]here is no Statute of Limitations in Maryland applicable to foreclosure of mortgages.” Cunningham v. Davidoff, 188 Md. 437, 442 (1947). Wanda and Nathaniel Daughtry, the appellants, contend that Cunningham is no longer good law; that the three-year statute of limitations in § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (Repl. 2020) now applies to mortgage foreclosures; and that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County therefore erred in denying their motion to dismiss a foreclosure action that was initiated more than three years after they defaulted on their mortgage loan.

The Substitute Trustees who brought the foreclosure action,1 the appellees, contend that Cunningham remains the law of Maryland. The circuit court agreed with the Substitute Trustees, as do we. We also hold that res judicata did not bar the foreclosure action. Accordingly, we will affirm.

BACKGROUND The Daughtrys are the record owners of residential property located in Prince George’s County (the “Property”). In 2007, the Daughtrys borrowed $918,900.00 from Liberty Mortgage Corporation to refinance the Property, evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a deed of trust containing a power-of-sale provision (the “2007 Deed of Trust”). In 2012, the Daughtrys defaulted on the loan. In November 2015, a trustee acting on behalf of the then-current holder of the note filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against Capital One National 1 The Substitute Trustees are Jeffrey Nadel, Scott Nadel, Daniel Menchel, and Doreen Strothman, on behalf of MTGLQ Investors, LP.

Association, which also held a lien secured by the Property, and the Daughtrys.2 The trustee sought: (1) reformation of a subordination agreement that misidentified a deed of trust in favor of Capital One as being superior to the 2007 Deed of Trust; and (2) a declaration that the 2007 Deed of Trust created an enforceable lien against the Property. In April 2017, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the trustee, ordered that the subordination agreement be reformed, and issued a declaratory judgment that the 2007 Deed of Trust created an enforceable lien against the Daughtrys’ interest in the Property.3 The Daughtrys noted an appeal but later voluntarily dismissed it. In December 2018, the servicer of the loan secured by the 2007 Deed of Trust sent the Daughtrys a notice of intent to foreclose on the Property. The notice stated that the loan was nearly six-and-a-half years past due and in default.

In February 2019, more than six years after the initial default, the noteholder appointed the Substitute Trustees to foreclose on the property. The following month, the Substitute Trustees initiated this foreclosure action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. After mediation failed, the Daughtrys filed a motion to dismiss or stay the foreclosure action, in which they contended, as relevant here, that the statute of limitations and res judicata barred the action. 2 The litigation was initiated by Wilmington Savings Fund Society, d/b/a Christiana Trust, as Trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2013-7 (“Stanwich”). In October 2016, before judgment was entered in that lawsuit, the note and deed of trust were assigned to Wilmington Savings Fund Society, d/b/a Christiana Trust, as Trustee for Normandy Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2016-1 (“Normandy”).

The parties do not dispute that Stanwich and Normandy are predecessors in interest of current lienholder MTGLQ Investors. 3 The court entered judgment by default against Capital One, which apparently did not appear to defend against the reformation claim. 2 The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. The Daughtrys filed this timely appeal pursuant to § 12-303(3)(iii) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. DISCUSSION I. NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES DIRECTLY TO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES. “Foreclosure cases do not neatly fit the ordinary model of civil litigation[.]” Huertas v. Ward, ___ Md. App. ___, No. 2929, Sept. Term 2018, 2020 WL 6326657 , at ⁵ (Oct. 27, 2020). “A foreclosure action under a power of sale ‘is intended to be a summary, in rem proceeding,’” the “primary object of [which] is to determine the rights of all persons as to their interests in the subject property.” Huertas, 2020 WL 6326657 , at ⁵ (quoting Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Neal, 398 Md. 705, 726 (2007)). A foreclosure case is thus initiated not by filing a complaint, but by filing an “order to docket.” Huertas, 2020 WL 6326657 , at ⁵ (citing Md. Rule 14-207(a)(1)).

A borrower or other interested person may challenge the right to proceed with a foreclosure sale by filing a motion to stay the sale and dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 14-211. Bates v. Cohn, 417 Md. 309, 318 (2010). In such a motion, the borrower “petition[s] the court for injunctive relief, challenging ‘the validity of the lien or . . . the right of the [lender] to foreclose in the pending action.’” Id. at 318-19 (quoting Md. Rule 14-211(a)(3)(B)); see also Neal, 398 Md. at 729 (stating that “an injunction under [the predecessor to Rule 14-211] to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust entreats a trial court to exercise its equitable powers”). If no motion is filed, the sale may proceed, subject to later ratification by the court pursuant to Rules 14-215 and 14-305. 3 Here, the Daughtrys filed a timely motion to stay or dismiss the foreclosure sale initiated by the Substitute Trustees pursuant to Rule 14-211.

The Daughtrys’ primary contention was and is that the foreclosure sale is barred by the three-year statute of limitations in § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The crux of the Daughtrys’ argument is that Chapter 592 of the 2014 Laws of Maryland exempted mortgage foreclosure actions from the 12-year statute of limitations contained in § 5-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and, in doing so, subjected such actions to the blanket three-year statute of limitations in § 5-101. Because the Substitute Trustees brought this foreclosure action more than three years after they defaulted on their loan, the Daughtrys argue, it is barred by the statute of limitations. The Substitute Trustees respond that there has never been a statute of limitations applicable to mortgage foreclosures in Maryland and that Chapter 592 did not create one.

Based on the plain language of the act, as confirmed by legislative history, we agree with the Substitute Trustees. In focusing on whether Chapter 592 exempted mortgage foreclosure actions from the 12-year statute of limitations, the Daughtrys overlook a more important question, which is whether such actions were ever subject to that statute of limitations—or any statute of limitations—in the first place. Because they were not, the exemption enacted by Chapter 592 had no effect on mortgage foreclosure actions. In Cunningham v. Davidoff, the Court of Appeals held unequivocally that no statute of limitations applies to mortgage foreclosure actions in Maryland. 188 Md. 437, 442 (1947).

The Daughtrys argue that Cunningham is no longer good law and point to three legal developments to support that contention: (1) the adoption of §§ 5-101 and 5-102 of 4 the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article in 1973 as part of code revision; (2) the merger of law and equity in 1984; and (3) Chapter 592 of the 2014 Laws of Maryland. After discussing Cunningham, we will review those other developments, looking primarily to determine if any of them superseded the Court of Appeals’ decision in Cunningham by applying a statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions. We conclude that none of them did. A. Cunningham v. Davidoff In Cunningham, the Court of Appeals addressed “the legal status of a mortgage over twenty years old, upon which nothing has been paid on account of principal or interest since its execution.” 188 Md. at 440 .

The mortgagor did not deny that he had not made payments on the mortgage, but argued that enforcement of the mortgage was time-barred. Id. at 439 . The Court identified three possible time limitations that might apply: (1) statute of limitations; (2) laches; and (3) the “twenty year period which governs in actions at law, when the requisite elements are present, in the cases of prescriptive title.” Id. at 440-41 . First, the Court concluded that “[t]here is no Statute of Limitations in Maryland applicable to foreclosure of mortgages” because mortgage foreclosure is an equitable remedy.

Id. at 442 . Second, the Court observed that although ordinarily “[a]n equity court deals with stale claims through the doctrine of laches,” that doctrine “is not applicable to proceedings brought to enforce an old or stale mortgage.” Id. Mortgage foreclosures, the Court held, “are exceptions to usual equity proceedings regarding stale claims.” Id. Third, the Court concluded that mortgages were subject to the presumption of payment applicable to actions at law—and by analogy in equity—if the “mortgage is over twenty years old” and there 5 has been no payment of principal or interest during that time.4 Id. at 442-43, 445 .

Even that presumption, however, could be overcome by proof that the mortgage had not been satisfied, id. at 443-44 , and if the presumption “is rebutted[,] there is no legal obstacle to the foreclosure of such a mortgage,” id. at 445 . As of 1947, therefore, it was clear that no statute of limitations applied to mortgage foreclosure actions in Maryland. We turn next to the developments the Daughtrys contend altered that established law. B. The Adoption of §§ 5-101 and 5-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Did Not Apply a Statute of Limitations to Mortgage Foreclosure Actions.

One of the first articles of the Maryland Code to emerge from the code revision process was the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, first enacted in 1973. 1973 Md. Laws First Special Session, ch. 2, § 1; see Hon. Alan M. Wilner, Blame It on Nero: Code Creation and Revision in Maryland (1994), available at 4 As the Court observed in Cunningham, this 20-year period originated in the Statute of James. 188 Md. at 442 . The Statute of James I, enacted by Parliament in 1623, “provided specific lengths of time for numerous real property and personal actions. It explicitly tolled these limitation periods for infancy, insanity, imprisonment, coverture, and absence from the realm, but was silent concerning ignorance.

This statute is the model for statutes of limitation adopted by American legislatures.” Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 917, 926 (1992). The time limitations in the Statute of James I applied only to claims at law. Id. The specific limitation applicable to enforcement of mortgages was the 20-year period applicable to a cause of action seeking the right of entry.

Cunningham, 188 Md. at 442 . In 1959, the General Assembly enacted Article 66, § 30A of the Maryland Code, which codified a “presumption of payment” if “more than twenty years have elapsed since the maturity of the mortgage or deed of trust,” rebuttable by proof of nonpayment. As discussed further below, that statute, as subsequently amended, is currently codified in § 7-106(c) of the Real Property Article. 6 http://aomol.msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/html/history.html. Included in that new article, as pertinent here, were §§ 5-101 and 5-102.

Section 5-101, now and as originally enacted, establishes a three-year statute of limitations applicable to a “civil action at law” “unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” Section 5-102, now and as originally enacted, establishes a 12-year statute of limitations applicable to certain “specialties,” including any “[p]romissory note or other instrument under seal” and any “[c]ontract under seal.” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-102(a)(1), (5). From its inception, § 5-101 has been expressly limited in application to a “civil action at law.” Foreclosure proceedings are not actions at law because they are “equitable in nature.” Neal, 398 Md. at 728 ; see also Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 309 (2007) (“Mortgage foreclosure is an equitable remedy in Maryland.”). The plain language of the statute thus does not extend to mortgage foreclosure actions.

That plain language interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history of the provisions, as set forth by the Court of Appeals in Tipton v. Partner’s Management Company, 364 Md. 419 (2001). In Tipton, the Court explored in some detail the derivation of §§ 5-101 and 5-102, based largely on the report of the Governor’s Commission to Revise the Annotated Code (the “Commission”) and revisor’s notes included with the newly enacted provisions. The issue in Tipton concerned whether the General Assembly’s adoption of §§ 5-101 and 5-102 had changed the statute of limitations applicable to actions seeking to recover back rent pursuant to leases that were under seal from three years to 12 7 years.5 Id. at 425. The Court thus undertook to determine whether the General Assembly had intended to alter that statute of limitations through the code revision process.

In reviewing the legislative history, the Court first examined § 1 of former Article 57, which was the predecessor to § 5-101. Tipton, 364 Md. at 436-42 . With origins dating back to 1715, Article 57, § 1 had established a three-year statute of limitations applicable to a list of specific actions at law.6 Tipton, 364 Md. at 436 . The Commission believed, however, that listing the actions to which the three-year statute applied had led to confusion, in part because some of the listed causes of action were “either obsolete or 5 Before the adoption of the new Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, actions “brought to recover rent in arrear, reserved under any form of lease,” were expressly included among a list of actions subject to the three-year statute of limitations.

Tipton, 364 Md. at 437 (quoting Md. Code Art. 57, § 1 (1957, 1972 Repl.)) (emphasis removed). As explained below, in adopting § 5-101, the General Assembly abandoned the list of actions covered in favor of a blanket three-year limitations period applicable in the absence of any other specified limitations period. In an argument that was the flip side of that posed by the Daughtrys, the appellees in Tipton argued that because actions to recover rent were no longer identified specifically as being subject to the three-year limitations period, such actions were subject to the 12-year statute of limitations in § 5-102 if they were based on “contracts under seal.” Tipton, 364 Md. at 427 . 6 The list of actions subject to the three-year statute of limitations, as it existed before code revision, included: All actions of account, actions of assumpsit, or on the case, except as hereinafter provided, actions of debt on simple contract, detinue or replevin, all actions for trespass for injuries to real or personal property, all actions for illegal arrest, false imprisonment, or violation of the twenty-third, twenty-sixth, thirty-first and thirty-second articles of the Declaration of Rights, or any of them, or of the existing, or any future provisions of the Code touching the writ of habeas corpus or proceedings thereunder, and all actions, whether of debt, ejectment or of any other description whatsoever, brought to recover rent in arrear, reserved under any form of lease, whether for ninety-nine years renewable forever, or for a greater or lesser period, and all distraints issued to recover such rent[.] Md. Code, Art. 57, § 1 (1957, 1972 Repl.). 8 obscure” and in part because “some modern statutory causes of action which do not fit within the old forms of action” could inadvertently have been enacted without “specific statutes of limitation.” Tipton, 364 Md. at 440 (quoting Commission Report at 41). The Commission determined that converting to “a blanket three year limitation” would help to “avoid confusion.” Id.

Notably, although the Commission acknowledged that the adoption of a blanket limitations period was a substantive change to existing law, it nonetheless believed that a three-year statute of limitations was in keeping with the longstanding intent of the General Assembly “to cover all causes of action existing in 1729 when this section was enacted, subject to certain exceptions.” Id. at 441 (quoting revisor’s note accompanying the original § 5-101). The Court thus concluded that the “clear intent” of the General Assembly in adopting § 5-101 was “to cover the causes of action that it had been the intent of the legislature to cover with Article 57 section 1, just in a more simplistic form.” Tipton, 364 Md. at 441-42 . The Court also explored the General Assembly’s intent in adopting the new § 5-102 to replace its predecessor, former Article 57, § 3, which had provided a list of specialties subject to a 12-year statute of limitations.7 See Tipton, 364 Md. at 438, 444 . The Court 7 Before code revision, former Article 57, § 3 provided: No bill, testamentary, administration or other bond (except sheriffs’ and constables’ bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute merchant, or of the staple or other specialty whatsoever, except such as shall be taken for the use of the State, shall be good and pleadable, or admitted in evidence against any person in this State after the principal debtor and creditor have been both dead twelve years, or the debt or thing in action is above twelve years’ standing; provided, however, that every payment of interest and every payment on the principal upon any single bill or other specialty shall suspend the operation of this section as to such bill or speciality for 9 observed that the Commission’s report to the General Assembly stated explicitly that the proposed § 5-102 made no substantive changes to the scope of actions covered by the 12-year statute of limitations.8 Id. at 444.

The Court ultimately concluded that in adopting new §§ 5-101 and 5-102, the General Assembly had not intended to make any change to the limitations period applicable to actions to collect rent owed under leases, whether or not under seal. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the Court found it especially notable that while “[t]he Commission’s report clearly establishes that any substantive changes would be explained in the report or in the revisor’s notes,” those sources contained no suggestion that the Commission had intended to alter the limitations period applicable to leases. Id. at 444-45.

The Court’s analysis of the legislative history in Tipton confirms that the General Assembly did not extend a statute of limitations to foreclosure actions. First, in adopting § 5-101, the General Assembly did not intend to expand the scope of the three-year statute of limitations except to apply it to “some modern statutory causes of action which do not three years after the date of such payment; saving to all persons who shall be under the aforementioned impediments of infancy or insanity of mind the full benefit of all such bills, bonds, judgments, recognizance, statute merchant, or of the staple or other specialties, for the period of six years after the removal of such disability. Md. Code, Art. 57, § 3 (1957, 1972 Repl.). 8 Although the Commission made no substantive changes to the 12-year statute of limitations applicable to specialties, it suggested that the General Assembly “may wish to consider whether there is any valid reason for having a longer limitations period simply because an instrument is executed under seal.” Tipton, 364 Md. at 444 (quoting Commission Report at 41-42). The General Assembly has since amended § 5-102— including, as we will discuss, through Chapter 592 of the 2014 Laws of Maryland—but it has not abolished the 12-year limitations period applicable to most specialties. 10 fit within the old forms of action.” Id. at 440 (quoting Commission Report at 41).

That does not apply to equitable mortgage foreclosure actions, which are neither statutory nor of modern origin. Second, in adopting § 5-102, the General Assembly did not intend to expand the scope of the 12-year statute of limitations at all. Third, neither the Commission Report nor the revisor’s notes identify any intent to effect a substantive change to Maryland law by extending a statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions. In sum, the adoption of §§ 5-101 and 5-102 in 1973 did not abrogate Cunningham.

C. The Merger of Law and Equity Did Not Apply a Statute of Limitations to Mortgage Foreclosure Actions. The Daughtrys also claim general support for their contentions from the merger of law and equity in 1984. In doing so, the Daughtrys misapprehend the effect of the merger. The Court of Appeals merged law and equity in Maryland in 1984 by the adoption of Rule 2-301, which provides: “There shall be one form of action known as ‘civil action.’” The Rules Committee note to Rule 2-301 states that the effect of the merger “is to eliminate distinctions between law and equity for purposes of pleadings, parties, court sittings, and dockets.” (Emphasis added).

Accordingly, Rule 2-301 requires that all complaints, regardless of the form of relief sought, “take the same form,” and provides that “demands for relief of all types may be combined into one complaint.” Hon. Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 310 (5th ed. 2019). However, this does not mean that distinctions between actions at law and actions in equity have been abolished. To the contrary: While traditional equitable and legal relief remain available, as historically developed, relief from both traditions is now sought through 11 a single action — a civil action.

Of course, the historical nature of the claim is still important in determining what defenses may be asserted. For example, the merger of law and equity does not mean that laches may be asserted as a defense to a legal claim. Id.; see also, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 , 297 n.6 (1986) (stating that although the merger abolished the distinction between different courts, “it does not avoid the occasional necessity of identifying the character and historical genesis of each claim for purposes of determining entitlement to jury trial, extent of jurisdiction, application of particular principles, or the like”); Smith v. Gehring, 64 Md. App. 359, 370-71 (1985) (stating that the merger of law and equity did not erase distinctions between legal and equitable defenses because the identified purposes for the change “do not extend to the elimination of distinctions between what defenses may be available to a legal claim as opposed to an equitable claim”). Notably for our purposes, the distinction between law and equity remains particularly relevant in identifying applicable defenses, including with respect to the differing application of statutes of limitations and laches.

See, e.g., Spaw, LLC v. City of Annapolis, 452 Md. 314, 360 (2017) (“Laches is an equitable defense asserting an inexcusable delay by the suitor in asserting its right without necessary reference to duration.”); Lamone v. Schlakman, 451 Md. 468, 484 (2017) (declining to apply statute of limitations “[b]ecause the action [before us is] an equitable one” (quoting Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery County, 446 Md. 490, 509 (2016))); State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 479 (2014) (applying laches to equitable claims seeking to halt redevelopment project); Neal, 398 Md. at 729 (holding that “the venerated equity 12 doctrine of clean hands . . . is applicable in foreclosure proceedings”); Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668 (2005) (holding that a petition seeking to invalidate an election “is barred as a matter of law by the common law doctrine of laches”); Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 379 Md. 669, 703 (2004) (holding that in distinguishing whether an action sounds in law or in equity for purposes of identifying the applicable limitations period, “the determination is dependent upon the remedies sought”); Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 645-46 (2001) (observing that although “there is a relationship between laches and the statute of limitations, . . . the statute does not govern” (emphasis in original)); Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel County, 338 Md. 75, 81 (1995) (applying laches in determining whether to enjoin an ordinance); Mitchell v. Yacko, 232 Md. App. 624, 641 (2017) (applying the clean hands doctrine in “hold[ing] that a party cannot institute a foreclosure upon forged documents”); LaSalle Bank v. Reeves, 173 Md. App. 392, 405 (2007) (holding that “despite the merger of law and equity, the doctrine of laches is very much alive, and that statutes of limitations serve, generally, as a guideline to the application of laches, rather than as a complete abrogation of the doctrine”). The Daughtrys suggest that we should read the Court of Appeals’ pre-merger decision in Cunningham as limited to holding that the statute of limitations could not be raised in an equity court, and that it therefore no longer applies because “Maryland no longer has equity courts.” As we have discussed, however, the decision in Cunningham was not so limited and the merger of law and equity did not erase distinctions between defenses to actions sounding at law and those sounding in equity. 13 The merger of law and equity therefore did not effect any change in the defenses applicable to a mortgage foreclosure action and, therefore, did not supersede Cunningham. D. Chapter 592 of the 2014 Laws of Maryland Did Not Apply a Statute of Limitations to Mortgage Foreclosure Actions. The Daughtrys have not called our attention to any other legal development between 1947 and 2014 that would have extended a statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions, nor have we identified any.

That brings us to Chapter 592 of the 2014 Laws of Maryland, on which the Daughtrys primarily rely. The Daughtrys contend that Chapter 592 carved mortgage foreclosure actions out of the 12-year statute of limitations in § 5-102, thereby necessarily subjecting them to the three-year blanket statute of limitations in § 5-101. A fatal flaw in their argument, however, is that the 12-year statute of limitations never applied to mortgage foreclosure actions in the first place. For that reason alone, the Daughtrys’ contention fails.

Nonetheless, we will proceed to address the Daughtrys’ more specific arguments about Chapter 592. 1. Statutory Construction “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly.” Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 481 (2017) (quoting Wagner v. State, 445 Md. 404, 417 (2015)). “[T]o determine [the General Assembly’s] purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.” Peterson v. State, 467 Md. 713, 727 (2020) (quoting Bellard, 452 Md. at 481 ). In interpreting a statute’s plain language, we must “read 14 the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Berry v. Queen, 469 Md. 674, 687 (2020) (quoting Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 551 (2017)).

In doing so, “[o]ur inquiry is not confined to the specific statutory provision at issue on appeal. Instead, ‘[t]he plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.’” Berry, 469 Md. at 687 (internal citation and some quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. State, 467 Md. 362, 372 (2020)). The Court of Appeals recently has used different formulations to describe how a statutory construction analysis should proceed if the plain language of a statute is unambiguous. One formulation is: When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s intent.

If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. . . . If there is no ambiguity in the language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends. Peterson, 467 Md. at 727 (quoting Bellard, 452 Md. at 481 (in turn, quoting Wagner, 445 Md. at 417-19 (in turn, quoting Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 661-63 (2006)))). In other formulations, the Court has observed that “[w]hile not necessary in every instance, we often find it prudent to scrutinize the legislative history to confirm that our interpretation of the statute’s plain language accords with the legislature’s intent.” Berry, 469 Md. at 687 -88 (citing Neal v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch.

Comm’rs, 467 Md. 399 , 415- 16 (2020) and In re S.K., 466 Md. 31 , 50 (2019)); see also Aleman v. State, 469 Md. 397 , 15 421 (2020) (in describing statutory construction generally, stating that after examining statutory text, a court will “typically review the legislative history to confirm conclusions or resolve ambiguities”). Although these formulations may at first blush seem contradictory, we think they are reconcilable according to the following principles: (1) faced with a truly unambiguous statute,9 a court is neither required to consider, nor prohibited from considering, legislative history;10 and (2) whether to consider legislative history to confirm a court’s interpretation of a truly unambiguous statute is left to the discretion of the court. Factors that may affect the court’s decision to review legislative history may include the relative degree of clarity of the language; the relative degree of clarity of the legislative purpose; the degree to which the plain language interpretation promotes the apparent legislative purpose, as opposed to merely does not conflict with it; whether any of the parties have called the court’s attention 9 We use the phrase “truly unambiguous statute” to emphasize that some statutes that might initially appear to be unambiguous are, in fact, ambiguous when considered in the context of the statute as a whole, the broader statutory scheme, or the apparent “purpose, aim or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Berry, 469 Md. at 687 (quoting Johnson, 467 Md. at 372 ). 10 Most of the Court’s formulations of statutory construction analysis that discuss the use of legislative history in construing unambiguous statutes identify the purpose of doing so as “to confirm” the Court’s interpretation of the plain meaning. See, e.g., Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113 (2018) (“Even in instances ‘when the language is unambiguous, it is useful to review legislative history of the statute to confirm that interpretation and to eliminate another version of legislative intent alleged to be latent in the language.’” (quoting State v. Roshchin, 446 Md. 128, 140 (2016))).

In general, the cases do not say what happens if the legislative history contradicts, rather than confirms, the plain meaning of the statute. In Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505 (1987), however, the Court rejected the unambiguous, plain language interpretation of the statute in deference to the equally unambiguous legislative history that demonstrated a legislative mistake. Id. at 520 . 16 to allegedly contradictory legislative history; the novelty or importance of the question; and logic and common sense. 2. Chapter 592 of the 2014 Laws of Maryland Chapter 592 contains seven sections: • Section 1 amended § 5-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which established a 12-year statute of limitations for certain specialties, including promissory notes and contracts made “under seal,” to exempt from the 12-year statute of limitations “[a] deed of trust, mortgage, or promissory note that has been signed under seal and secures or is secured by owner- occupied residential property, as defined in § 7-105.1 of the Real Property Article.” • Section 2 added § 7-105.13 of the Real Property Article11 to: o (1) permit “a secured party or an appropriate party in interest,” after final ratification of the auditor’s report following a foreclosure sale of owner-occupied residential property, to “file a motion for a deficiency judgment if the proceeds of the sale, after deducting all costs and expenses allowed by the court, are insufficient to satisfy the debt”; o (2) require that any motion for a deficiency judgment “be filed within 3 years after the final ratification of the auditor’s report”; and o (3) make a motion for a deficiency judgment “the sole post- ratification remedy available to a secured party or party in interest for breach of a covenant contained in a deed of trust, mortgage, or promissory note that secures or is secured by owner-occupied residential property.” • Section 3, which is uncodified, provided that § 1 “shall be construed to apply prospectively to any cause of action that arises on or after the effective date of this Act,” except as provided in § 4. • Section 4, which is uncodified, provided “that any cause of action to collect the unpaid balance due on a deed of trust, mortgage, or promissory note that 11 This section was renumbered as Real Property § 7-105.17 by Chapter 93 of the 2019 Laws of Maryland. 17 has been signed under seal and secures or is secured by residential property that was owner-occupied residential property at the time the property was transferred with the unpaid balance that arises before July 1, 2014” and was not already time-barred “must be filed within 12 years after the date the action accrues or before July 1, 2017, whichever occurs first.” • Section 5, which is uncodified, provided that § 2 was “to apply prospectively to any motion for a deficiency judgment that is filed on or after the effective date of this Act,” except as provided in § 6. • Section 6, which is uncodified, provided that any motion for a deficiency judgment in a case where an auditor’s report received final ratification before July 1, 2014 and was not already time-barred “must be filed within 3