Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Department

ELDRIDGE, J. This Court issued a writ of certiorari in the instant case primarily to review a Court of Special Appeals’ holding that a government agency and government officials were entitled, under the so-called “collateral order doctrine,” to prosecute an immediate appeal from interlocutory trial court orders overruling the defenses of sovereign immunity and public official immunity. We shall hold that such interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, and we shall overrule the collateral order doctrine holding of State v. Hogg, 311 Md. 446 , 535 A.2d 923 (1988), upon which the Court of Special Appeals relied. I. The petitioner Eura Dawkins instituted this tort action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Police Department, the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City, Baltimore City Police Officer Casper J. Miller, and “one unidentified ⁵⁵ Baltimore City Police Officer.” The complaint, as amended, contained five counts sounding in negligence, negligent supervision, assault, battery, and violation of the plaintiff Dawkins’s state constitutional rights protected by Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 1 Since the present appeal was taken from orders denying motions to dismiss the plaintiffs amended complaint, the pertinent facts are those set forth in the amended complaint. The amended complaint, after identifying the plaintiff, the defendants, and the defendants’ asserted responsibilities, contained, inter alia, the following allegations: “5.

On or about September 20, 1997, in the Fells Point section of Baltimore City, the Plaintiff was grievously injured as a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts of the Defendant Miller and/or an Unidentified Police Officer, who at all relevant times were acting in the scope of their employment, as set forth hereinafter. “6. On the above date, the Plaintiff, in the company of her brothers, sisters and others traveled to Fells Point for the purpose of going to a dance club. “7. Upon leaving the club at or about closing time a brother of the Plaintiff exchanged words with a police officer with respect to an incident which had occurred a short time earlier when the brother had been sprayed in the eyes with pepper spray by a police officer. “8. The exchange became heated and, ultimately, led to the arrest of several members of the Plaintiffs family. “9.

While the incident was unfolding the Plaintiff at all times maintained an orderly demeanor and did not in any way impede or obstruct the officers present in the performance of their duty. Despite this fact, for reasons unknown to the Plaintiff, the Defendant Miller and/or the Unidenti ⁵⁶ fied Police Officer, without any cause or justification, maliciously, with ill will and the desire to inflict injury upon the Plaintiff, approached from the rear, placed his koga stick against the neck of the Plaintiff and, with great force, flung the Plaintiff to the ground. “10. The Plaintiff immediately felt great pain in the area of her neck and promptly sought medical care for her injuries. “11. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants as alleged aforesaid the Plaintiff has suffered extensive medical treatment, including, but not limited to, medical appointments, physical therapy and surgery for the fusion of two vertebrae in her neck.

Plaintiff suffered extreme fear. She has suffered extreme shock to her nerves and nervous system. She has incurred medical expenses in the past, present and future. She has suffered a loss of earnings and earning capacity.

She has endured extreme pain and suffering and has suffered continuing mental distress as a direct and proximate result of being attacked without provocation by the Defendant Miller and/or the Unidentified Police Officer. “12. All of the injuries, losses and damages of the Plaintiff were caused solely by the negligent and/or intentional acts of the Defendant Miller and/or the Unidentified Police Officer, Defendant Police Department and/or Commissioner’s agent, servant or employee without any negligence of the Plaintiff contributing thereto. “13. On information and/or belief, the Unidentified Police Officer had previously engaged in the use of excessive force against citizens, which fact was known, or should have been known by supervisory officials of the defendant Police Department and/or Commissioner who notwithstanding such actual or imputed knowledge, did not take such action as would have been taken by a reasonably competent Police Department and/or Commissioner acting under the same or ⁵⁷ similar circumstances. Had such action been taken, the injuries to the Plaintiff would not have occurred.” The plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages.

On June 2, 2000, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore filed a motion to dismiss which was granted shortly thereafter. 2 Subsequently, at different times, the three remaining identified defendants filed numerous motions to dismiss which were all denied. The motions were primarily based on claims of “sovereign” immunity, “governmental” immunity, and public official immunity. A “standard track scheduling order” was filed in February 2001. Nevertheless, the defendants, on March 23, 2001, filed a notice of appeal from orders of March 7, 2001, denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Thereafter, proceedings in the Circuit Court were stayed. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion filed on August 2, 2002, held that the March 7, 2001, interlocutory orders were appealable under the collateral order doctrine as applied in State v. Hogg, supra, 311 Md. 446 , 535 A.2d 923 . On the merits, the intermediate appellate court vacated the Circuit Court’s orders denying the motions to dismiss and instructed the Circuit Court “to enter judgments in favor of the appellants on all claims.” The plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which this Court granted. Dawkins v. Baltimore Police, 372 Md. 132 , 812 A.2d 288 (2002).

II

Although the parties have chiefly briefed and argued the merits of the tort action, we shall not reach any of the ⁵⁸ issues relating to the merits. The Circuit Court’s orders were not appealable, and the Court of Special Appeals erred by-entertaining the appeal. As the Court of Special Appeals and the parties have acknowledged, the Circuit Court’s orders denying motions to dismiss were not appealable as a final judgment terminating the case in the trial court and were not appealable interlocutory orders under Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, or under any other statute. The orders were appealable only if they fell within the collateral order doctrine.

A recent opinion by this court, In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 633-634 , 820 A.2d 587, 591 (2003), explained the collateral order doctrine as follows: “The ‘collateral order doctrine “treats as final and appeal-able a limited class of orders which do not terminate the litigation in the trial court.” ’ Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 476 , 540 A.2d 805, 807 (1988), quoting Public Service Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 206 , 477 A.2d 759, 762 (1984). The doctrine is a very limited exception to the principle that only final judgments terminating the case in the trial court are appealable, and it has four requirements. As summarized by Judge Wilner for the Court in Pittsburgh Corning v. James, 353 Md. 657, 660-661 , 728 A.2d 210, 211-212 (1999), ‘[w]e have made clear, time and again, as has the United States Supreme Court, that the collateral order doctrine is a very narrow exception to the general rule that appellate review ordinarily must await the entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims against all parties. It is applicable to a “small class” of cases in which the interlocutory order sought to be reviewed (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.

See Peat & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 ⁵⁹ Md. 86, 92, 394 A.2d 801, 804 (1978); Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213 , 406 A.2d 922, 925 (1979); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999).’ See In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 327 , 783 A.2d 673, 686 (2001), where Judge Cathell for the Court recently emphasized: ‘The four elements of the test are conjunctive in nature and in order for a prejudgment order to be appeal-able and to fall within this exception to the ordinary operation of the final judgment requirement, each of the four elements must be met.’ See also Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259, 266-267 , 747 A.2d 1199, 1203 (2000). “Furthermore, in Maryland the four requirements of the collateral order doctrine are very strictly applied, and appeals under the doctrine may be entertained only in extraordinary circumstances. Pittsburgh Corning v. James, supra, 353 Md. at 666, 728 A.2d at 214 ; Shoemaker v. Smith, supra, 353 Md. at 169, 725 A.2d at 563 ; Bunting v. State, supra, 312 Md. at 482 , 540 A.2d at 809 .” In State v. Hogg, supra, 311 Md. at 455-457 , 535 A.2d at 927-928 , this Court, for the first time, held that an interlocutory trial court order rejecting a sovereign immunity defense asserted by a state government agency was immediately ap-pealable under the collateral order doctrine. 3 The Court relied on the fourth requirement or element of the collateral order doctrine, namely that, if the state agency were required to stand trial, its claim of immunity from suit would be “effectively unreviewable” in an appeal from a final judgment. 311 Md. at 456 , 535 A.2d at 928 . The Court explained (ibid.): “From the standpoint of being ‘effectively unreviewable’ the erroneous rejection of sovereign immunity in bar of a claim is similar to the erroneous denial of the protection against standing trial for the second time which is embraced in the privilege against former jeopardy. In that instance, an order denying a double jeopardy defense is immediately ⁶⁰ appealable.

See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).” The Hogg opinion also relied upon Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 , 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), in which the Supreme Court, as a matter of federal court appellate procedure, held that interlocutory orders rejecting immunity defenses asserted by the President of the United States and the Attorney General of the United States were immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the orders would be “ ‘effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,’ ” 311 Md. at 456 , 535 A.2d at 928 , quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, supra, 472 U.S. at 527 , 105 S.Ct. at 2816 , 86 L.Ed.2d at 425 . Within a few months after the decision in State v. Hogg, supra, this Court began to place major limitations upon Hogg ‘s collateral order holding. Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472 , 540 A.2d 805 (1988), involved an interlocutory ruling which, if erroneous, would have resulted in preventing a criminal defendant’s trial and in requiring a dismissal of the charges. In this respect, the ruling was very similar to an order denying a double jeopardy defense.

The defendant Bunting argued that