Maryland case law › Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers

Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers

201 Md. 603 (1987) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: AffirmedDelaplaine✓ Good law
HoldingThe Patuxent Oyster Company, a partnership engaged in oyster farming and packing, sought to enjoin the Department of Tidewater Fisheries and its enforcement officers from arresting its employees for dredging oysters on leased ground without culling them in accordance with the cull law.

Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit was instituted in the Circuit Court for Calvert County by Allan A. Sobers, Linwood T. Sobers and William R. Woodfield, individually and trading as Patuxent Oyster Company, a partnership engaged in oyster farming and packing, to enjoin the Department of Tidewater Fisheries of Maryland and its enforcement officers, Bernace P. Bowen and Roy Rafter, from arresting any of their employees while engaged in dredging oysters on the ground leased by the State to complainants and from interfering with the harvesting of oysters because of alleged violation of the cub law. The bib of complaint alleged that the leased ground under the Patuxent River was not a natural oyster bar but had been made productive by the planting of seed oysters; that their oysters had grown to marketable size and were ready for sale on the wholesale market, but their contracts of sale could not be filled unless they could continue to harvest the oysters. The bib then alleged that defendants had informed complainants that they intended to apply the cub law against them, warning them that unless all empty oyster shells dredged up were 607 immediately returned to the river bottom where dredged, their employees doing the dredging would be arrested; and, in accordance with that policy, one of their employees was arrested.

The bill finally alleged that it had never been the policy of the State to apply the cull law to oysters taken from leased ground; that complainants had been advised by counsel that the law did not apply to them; and that its enforcement against them would prevent them from harvesting their oysters and cause them irreparable loss. Defendants filed a demurrer alleging that the cull law applied to complainants and could be legally enforced against them. The Court overruled the demurrer and granted a temporary injunction. Defendants thereupon answered the bill, and the Court, after hearing testimony, entered a decree making the injunction permanent.

From that decree defendants appealed to this Court. This controversy arises from the fact that Maryland has two different methods of regulating oyster culture. One is the regulation of natural oyster bars. The State defines the areas of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries which produce a natural growth of oysters in quantities sufficient to justify the public in resorting to those bars for a livelihood upon paying a nominal license fee.

On these natural bars the State supplements the production of oysters by planting shells and seed oysters to make these bars more profitable for the oystermen. The cull law, originally enacted in 1880 for the purpose of increasing the production of oysters on the natural bars, provided briefly that “all oysters taken from any of the waters of this State shall be culled upon their natural bed or bar.” Laws 1880, ch. 198, sec. 40. That law was re-enacted in 1945, Laws 1945, ch. 929, sec. 4, and partly re-enacted in 1947, Laws 1947, ch. 604, Code 1951, art. 66C, sec. 652. It now provides as follows: “ (a) Merchantable and Unmerchantable Oysters.

All oysters taken from any of the waters of this State, either with scoops, dredges or any similar instruments, or tongs or rakes, shall be 608 culled upon their natural bed or bar whence taken, and all shells shall be returned to the bed or bar from which they were taken, and all oysters whose shells measure less than three inches in length, measuring from hinge to mouth, whether attached to a marketable oyster or not, shall be included in said culling and replaced upon said bed or bar as taken; and when oysters measuring less than three inches are adhering so closely to the shell of a marketable oyster as to render removal impossible without destroying the small oysters, then such oysters, including the marketable oyster or oysters shall be returned to the bed or bar from which they were taken; and the culling of oysters taken as aforesaid required by this section shall be actually made and completed before such oysters are thrown or deposited in the hold or bottom of any boat. “(b) Possession and Transportation of Unculled Oysters. It shall be unlawful for any person to have oysters in his possession which contain more than five percent. (5%) of shells and oysters less than three inches from hinge to mouth * * *. “(c) Extent of Cull Law. All the provisions of this subtitle relating to the inspection and culling of oysters and the imposition of penalties for the violation of the cull law shall apply to oysters in the shell found anywhere within the State, whether afloat or ashore, and whether said oysters have been caught within the waters of this State or shipped or brought into Maryland from other states.” While the cull law increased the production of oysters temporarily, the natural oyster beds continued to be depleted, and in 1906 B. Howard Haman, member of the Baltimore bar, advocated a new system of oyster culture on barren bottoms.

He drafted a bill which was 609 passed by the Legislature and approved by Governor Warfield on April 2, 1906. Fourth Report, Shell Fish Commission of Maryland (1912), 287, 288. The Haman Act created the Board of Shell Fish Commissioners of Maryland, and directed the Commission to lease, in the name of the State of Maryland, to residents of Maryland parcels of land beneath the waters of the State for the purpose of oyster culture. No person was permitted to acquire more than 10 acres within the limits of any county or more than 100 acres in any other place.

The terms of the leases were for 20 years. The annual rent was $1 per acre for each of the first two years; $2 per acre for the third year; $3 per acre for the fourth year; $4 per acre for the fifth year, and $5 per acre during the remainder of the term. The Act provided that, except in four particulars, the relation of landlord and tenant should have all the incidents attaching to that relation as it existed under the laws of Maryland. The Act expressly provided that the lessee should have “exclusive ownership of and title to all oysters planted by him or existing on the land leased,” and that he could take such oysters “in any manner and at such times as may be desired by the holder of such land as allowed by the existing laws of this State.” Laws 1906, ch. 711, secs. 84, 98, 105, 109, 112.

In 1941 the Legislature created the Commission of Tidewater Fisheries and conferred upon it general supervisory power, regulation and control over the fish, crabs, terrapin, oysters, clams and other shellfish within the bounds of tidewater. Laws 1941, ch. 508, Code 1951, art. 66C, secs. 6, 7; Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487, 493 , 64 A. 2d 547 . Defendants relied heavily upon a dictum in the opinion of this Court in Windsor v. State, 103 Md. 611, 618 , 64 A. 288, 291 , 12 L. R. A., N. S., 869. In that case the defendant was tried on the charge of violating the cull law by having in his possession oysters containing more than 5 per cent of shells and oysters measuring less than 2% inches from hinge to mouth.

He pleaded 610 that the oysters had been taken from beds belonging to private owners. On June 15, 1906, the Court held that the cull law was applicable to oysters taken from areas appropriated by private planters as well as to oysters taken from natural bars. Judge Pearce made the following statement in the opinion: “If oysters taken from private lots are not required to be culled, then under the operation of the Haman Law, the natural beds and bars might, and almost surely would, be depleted of young oysters, to be planted upon private lots, and which could be sold as merchantable oysters, whenever the greed or necessity of the private planter might incline him to such course.” We are unwilling to accept that dictum as a precedent. The defendant had been tried, convicted and sentenced before the Haman Act was passed.

In 1829 the Legislature had authorized any citizen of Maryland to appropriate any barren area, not exceeding one acre, for bedding or sowing oysters. Laws 1829, ch. 87. In 1865 the Legislature authorized any landowner to appropriate not more than five acres of contiguous water. Laws 1865, ch. 181, sec. 22.

The provisions of the Haman Act, however, were entirely different from the provisions of the prior statutes. We now have the opportunity to examine not only that Act, but also many amendments which have been made to it during the past 47 years. We do not overlook the statement in the cull law that its provisions apply to “oysters in the shell found anywhere within the State.” It was in view of that positive language that we held in Christy v. Clark, 195 Md. 66 , 72 A. 2d 718 , that the cull law, making it unlawful to possess oysters which contain more than 5 per cent of shells or measure less than 8 inches from hinge to mouth, may be applied to oysters caught in another State and brought into Maryland, even though they had been taken from privately planted beds. We considered that, since Maryland has no particular interest in the methods of private oyster culture in other States, the source from which the oysters came was immaterial. 611 It is important, however, to keep in mind that the meaning of the plainest language in a statute may be controlled by the context, and if the language is fairly susceptible of more than one construction, the Court may seek the legislative intention by considering the facts of contemporary history, the prior state of the law, and the particular evil, abuse or defect which the statute was designed to correct and the remedy which was intended.

The statute should then be so construed that all of its parts harmonize with its general scheme to effectuate the legislative purpose. Pittman v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 180 Md. 457 , 25 A. 2d 466 ; Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 125, 126 , 48 A. 2d 754 ; City of Baltimore v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514 , 50 A. 2d 804 ; Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615 , 65 A. 2d 299 ; United States v. Union Pacific R.

This is a preview of Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers. About 50% of the opinion remains. Read the complete opinion in RecordCite.