Dixon v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services

³⁸⁸ HOLLANDER, J. Melvin James Dixon, appellant, was seriously injured on May 4, 2004, when he fell into a ventilation shaft while on a prison work detail at the Maryland House of Correction in Jessup, a Division of Correction (“DOC”) facility operated by the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the “Department”), appellee. To recover for the injuries he suffered, Dixon filed a tort suit in October 2004 against the Department and M & M Welding and Fabricators, Inc. (“M & M”), a company doing work under contract with the Department. 1 The Department and M & M filed motions for summary judgment. On August 29, 2005, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County dismissed the suit as to M & M, with prejudice. However, the court denied appellee’s motion.

Then, in an order entered on June 29, 2006, the court granted the Department’s motion in limine to exclude all evidence in support of appellant’s claim, and also granted its renewed motion for summary judgment. The court determined that, under Maryland Code (1999, 2006 Supp.), § 10-308(c) of the Correctional Services Article (“C.S.”), appellant was only entitled to pursue his claim for compensation against the Sundry Claims Board (the “Sundry Board” or “Board”). Appellant poses two questions on appeal, which we quote: 1. Is the Sundry Claims Board the exclusive remedy by which a prison inmate can seek compensation for serious personal injuries caused by the negligence of the prison staff and of a private contractor employed by the prison? [ 2 ] 2.

Did the Trial Court err when it granted the Defendant’s Motion in Limine on the morning of trial, thereby ³⁸⁹ overruling two prior decisions of the same Court, both of which denied the Defendant the exact relief it sought in its Motion in Limine? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm. I. STATUTORY SCHEME To understand the facts and issues, we begin with a review of the relevant statutory schemes. Title 10 (“State Correctional Facilities”), Subtitle 3 (“Sundry Claims Board”) of the Correctional Services Article governs the procedure for the filing of a claim by a DOC inmate to recover for work-related injuries sustained while incarcerated.

Article 10, Subtitle 3 provides, in part: § 10-301. Definitions. (a) In general. — In this subtitle the following words have the meanings indicated. (b) Board. — “Board” means the Sundry Claims Board.

(c) Permanent partial disability. — “Permanent partial disability” has the same meaning given under Title 9, Subtitle 6, Part IV of the Labor and Employment Article. (d) Permanent total disability. — “Permanent total disability” has the same meaning given under Title 9, Subtitle 6, Part V of the Labor and Employment Article. § 10-302. Established. There is a Sundry Claims Board in the Department. § 10-304.

Administration of benefits. The Board shall administer benefits as provided under this subtitle to an individual who, while an inmate in the Patuxent Institution, the Baltimore City Detention Center, or a correctional facility in the Division of Correction: (1) was engaged in work for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by a correctional facility; and (2) sustained a permanent partial disability or permanent total disability: ³⁹⁰ (1) as a result of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of work for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by a correctional facility; and (ii) that incapacitated the individual or materially reduced the individual’s earning power in that type of work. (Emphasis added.) § 10-305. Filing a claim.

(a) Right to file. — (1) An injured inmate may file a claim for compensation against the State under this subtitle with the Board. (2) The Board may receive original papers representing a claim even if the State has not appropriated money to pay the claim. (b) Time to file. — -An injured inmate shall file a claim with the Board by the later of: (1) 12 months after being released from the correctional facility; or (2) 24 months after the date of injury. (c) Record keeping. — The Board shall file and properly designate each claim by number, short title, or both.

(Emphasis added.) 3 § 10-308. Claim payments. (a) Determination of compensation. — In determining what compensation, if any, to allow a claimant, the Board shall consider: (1) the good faith of the claimant; (2) the possibility that the alleged injury was self-inflicted or not accidental; (3) the extent and nature of the injury; (4) the degree of disability; (5) the period of disability or incapacity for other work; and ³⁹¹ (6) the ordinary earning power of the claimant. (b) Governor to include money in the State budget. — (1) The Governor shall include money to pay a claim that is approved by the Board in the State budget for the fiscal year that follows the fiscal year in which the Board approves the claim.

(2) The Board shall pay to the claimant or the claimant’s representative any compensation approved by the Board and included in the State budget. (c) Exclusive remedy. — The compensation authorized under this subtitle is the exclusive remedy against the State for a claim that falls within the jurisdiction of the Board.... (Emphasis added.) § 10-309. Judicial review.

(a) Right to judicial review by claimant. — (1) A claimant aggrieved by a final determination of the Board may file a petition for judicial review in the circuit court of the county where the injury occurred or where the claimant resides. (2) The Board may be a party to the action. (b) Decision by circuit court. — The circuit court may: (1) affirm the Board’s determination; (2) reverse or modify a determination it finds to be arbitrary or unreasonable; or (3) remand the case and direct the Board to consider the matter further or make additional findings of fact. (c) Appeal to Court of Special Appeals. — The claimant or the Board may appeal a decision of the circuit court to the Court of Special Appeals.

The Prisoner Litigation Act (“PLA”) is codified in Title 5, Subtitle 10 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) of the Maryland Code (2006 RepLVol.). It governs the filing of civil actions by prisoners. C.J. § 5-1001 provides, in part: ³⁹² § 5-1001. Definitions.

(b) Administrative remedy. — (1) “Administrative remedy” means any procedure for review of a prisoner’s complaint or grievance, including judicial review, if available, that is provided by the Department, the Division of Correction, or any county or other municipality or political subdivision, and results in a written determination or disposition. (2) “Administrative remedy” includes a proceeding under Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article or Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the Correctional Services Article. (d) Conditions of confinement. — “Conditions of confinement” means any circumstance, situation or event that involves a prisoner’s custody, transportation, incarceration, or supervision. C.J. § 5-1003 states: § 5-1003.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies. (a) In general. — (1) A prisoner may not maintain a civil action until the prisoner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies for resolving the complaint or grievance. (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, an administrative remedy is exhausted when the prisoner has pursued to completion all appropriate proceedings for appeal of the administrative disposition, including any available proceedings for judicial review. (3) Judicial review following administrative consideration shall be the exclusive judicial remedy for any grievance or complaint within the scope of the administrative process, unless the prisoner’s complaint or grievance was found to be meritorious and monetary damages were not available through the administrative remedy available to the prisoner.

(b) Proof. — (1) When a prisoner files a civil action, the prisoner shall attach to the initial complaint proof that administrative remedies have been exhausted. (2) The attachment shall include proof: ³⁹³ (i) That the prisoner has filed a complaint or grievance with the appropriate agency; (ii) Of the administrative disposition of the complaint or grievance; and (iii) That the prisoner has appealed the administrative disposition to the appropriate authority, including proof of judicial review, if available. (3) On receipt of a prisoner’s initial complaint that does not have attached to it proof that the prisoner has fully exhausted the administrative remedies available, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice and grant the prisoner reasonable leave to amend the complaint and to provide the proof necessary to demonstrate that the prisoner has fully exhausted the administrative remedies. (c) Dismissal. — A court shall dismiss a civil action if the prisoner filing the action has not completely exhausted the administrative remedies.

In turn, C.S. Title 10, Subtitle 2, referred to in the PLA, pertains to the “Inmate Grievance Office” (“IGO”). C.S. § 10-206 provides: § 10-206. Submission of complaint to Inmate Grievance Office. (a) Authorized. — Subject to subsection (b) of this section, if an individual confined in a correctional facility in the Division of Correction, otherwise in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, or confined in the Patuxent Institution has a grievance against an official or employee of the Division of Correction or the Patuxent Institution, the individual may submit a complaint to the Office within the time and in the manner required by regulations adopted by the Office.

(b) Exhaustion of remedies. — If the Division of Correction or the Patuxent Institution has a grievance procedure applicable to the particular grievance of an individual described in subsection (a) of this section and the Office considers the procedure to be reasonable and fair, the ³⁹⁴ Office, by regulation, may require that the procedure be exhausted before submission of a complaint to the Office. C.S. §§ 10-207 and 10-208 govern hearings conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings in regard to complaints that are “not found to be wholly lacking in merit on [their] face.... ” C.S. § 10-210(a) states: § 10-210. Judicial review. (a) Exhaustion of remedies. — A court may not consider an individual’s grievance that is within the jurisdiction of the Office or the Office of Administrative Hearings unless the individual has exhausted the remedies provided in this subtitle.

II

FACTUAL SUMMARY On August 19, 2004, appellant, through counsel, filed with the Sundry Board a form captioned “Claim for Compensation,” seeking to recover “for an injury resulting in [his] disability[.]” Dixon indicated that, on May 4, 2004, he sustained injuries “arising out of and in the course of his employment,” while he was on a prison work detail in the PreRelease Unit of the Maryland House of Correction. Appellant averred that he “fell feet first into a ventilator shaft on the prison grounds.” As a result, he “shattered” both ankles, broke the tibia'and fibula bones in both of his legs, and also broke several ribs. According to appellant, he was unable to work as a result of his injuries, which he characterized as “[p]ermanent.” At the time of the accident, appellant earned “$.90” per day as compensation for his work. The Sundry Board acknowledged receipt of appellant’s claim in a letter dated September 1, 2004.

It also notified appellant that a hearing would be scheduled in regard to the matter. On October 22, 2004, while appellant’s claim was pending with the Sundry Board, appellant filed his “Complaint” in the circuit court against the Department and M & M. He alleged that, at the time of his accident, M & M was performing services for the Department “under contract.” He asserted ³⁹⁵ that M & M “was conducting maintenance work on the large ventilator shafts, the openings for which were located in the area where [appellant] was working.” Further, appellant alleged that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of individuals employed by the Department and M & M, for which he sought damages of $500,000. In particular, appellant alleged: 15) When work had been completed at the end of the day on May 4th, 2004, [appellant] and another inmate were directed by an employee of the Department to pick up and move one of the large fans which had been used during that day to pump hot air out of the ventilation shaft. 16) [Appellant] and the other inmate lifted the fan and as [appellant] took the first step toward carrying the fan back to a truck as directed by employees of the House of Correction, he was caused to fall straight down into an open ventilation shaft. 18) Prior to being told to pick up and move the ventilation fans, neither [appellant] nor the other inmate was ever told, either by employees of the Department or by employees of M & M that the ventilation shaft directly under the fan did not have the proper cover in place. 19) As a result, [appellant] had no way of knowing that when he lifted the fan, he was, in effect, lifting the cover off of the ventilation shaft into which he ultimately fell. Both M & M and the Department filed motions for summary judgment. 4 In its memorandum of law, the Department argued that, because appellant “was injured while engaged in work for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by DOC,” and because appellant alleges “permanent injuries,” his “exclusive remedy against the ...

Department ... is the compensation authorized by the Sundry Claims statutes and regulations.” (Citation omitted.) The Department explained that appellant satisfied “the statutory criteria [under C.S. ³⁹⁶ § 10-304] to be eligible to file a claim” with the Sundry Board; therefore, under C.S. § 10-308(c), he was limited to seeking a' remedy from that Board. Appellee added that because the statute provided for an “exclusive remedy for compensation,” the circuit court had “no jurisdiction” to consider appellant’s tort action against the Department. In his response, appellant acknowledged that he initially “filed a claim for medical reimbursement with the Board.” Moreover, Mr. Dixon maintained that he “has suffered and will continue to suffer pain, permanent impairment, loss of earning capacity and other non-economic damages.” In his view, however, C.S. § 10-308 did not provide compensation for “the non-economic aspects of an injured inmate’s claim.” Although appellant conceded that C.S. § 10-308(e) provides an exclusive remedy “for claims which fall within the jurisdiction of the Board,” he argued that there had “been no determination” by the Board that his claim fell within the Board’s jurisdiction. The Board scheduled a hearing on appellant’s claim for Júne 17, 2005.

However, neither appellant nor his lawyer appeared on that date. The circuit court’s record includes a letter to the Sundry Board, dated July 15, 2005, in which appellant’s counsel informed the Board that “[i]t was [his] intention to dismiss this [administrative] claim prior to the hearing date.” Appellant’s counsel did not advise the Board of the pending tort suit, however. By order dated July 20, 2005, the Sundry Board “denied and dismissed” appellant’s claim for compensation. The order indicated that a hearing had been scheduled for June 17, 2005; that appellant and his counsel had been advised of the “date, time and location” in a letter mailed on May 12, 2005; and neither appellant nor his counsel appeared for the scheduled hearing.

Further, the order indicated that the Board had attempted to contact appellant’s counsel, but “[n]o return call was received; nor was there any other communication received from either [appellant] or his attorney.” Therefore, the Board “presumed that [appellant] had abandoned his case,” ³⁹⁷ and concluded that the claim was “moot.” To our knowledge, appellant did not challenge that ruling. On July 28, 2005, the Department filed a “Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities” in support of its motion for summary judgment, advising of the Sundry Board’s dismissal of appellant’s claim. It attached the administrative order as well as appellant’s letter to the Board of July 15, 2005. In addition, the Department claimed that appellant’s responses to the Department’s requests for admissions “show[ed] that [appellant’s] claim filed with the Sundry Claims Board satisfied the statutory jurisdictional requirements of the Board.” In particular, the Department referred the court to the Department’s “Request for Admission No. 7,” which appellant admitted.

It stated: Request for Admission No. 7: On May 4, 2004 at the time [appellant] was injured, [appellant] was an inmate at a correctional facility of the Division of Correction engaged in work for which [appellant] was receiving wages of a stipulated sum of money at the rate of ninety cents ($0.90) a day paid by the Division of Correction correctional facility, that [appellant] sustained a permanent disability as a result of personal injuries arising out of and in the course of work for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by the Division of Correction correctional facility, that [appellant’s] injuries incapacitated [appellant] and that [appellant’s] injuries were accidental. Moreover, the Department reiterated that C.S. § 10-308(e) provided appellant’s sole remedy to obtain compensation from the Department for his injuries. It posited: “The purpose of § 10-308(c) was to create an exclusive monetary benefits program for such injured inmates.” The Department further explained that the “intended result” of the statute “was to provide inmates with some limited work experience,” while also “limiting] ... the State’s financial compensatory exposure for inmates injured while so working.” ³⁹⁸ In a related contention, the Department argued that appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLA. Citing C.J. § 5 — 1003(a)(1) and (b)(1), the Department asserted: “A prisoner, before he or she files a civil action, must fully exhaust all administrative remedies for resolving their complaint or grievance ... and must attach to the complaint in the civil action proof that the remedies have been exhausted.” Moreover, the Department asserted: “Administrative remedies which must be exhausted under the PLA specifically include those available under the IGO procedure____” The Department referred to C.S. § 10-206, asserting that “a person confined to an institution of the Division of Correction who has a grievance or complaint against an official or employee of the Division or the Patuxent Institution may submit the grievance to the Inmate Grievance Office.” According to the Department, “a court may not consider an inmate’s grievance that is within the jurisdiction of the IGO unless the inmate has exhausted the remedies provided in the subtitle governing the IGO.” See C.S. § 10-210(a).

(Emphasis in original.) In sum, the Department maintained that appellant “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by voluntarily abandoning and dismissing his claim filed with the Sundry Claims Board.” It also maintained that because the Complaint “purport[ed] to state a claim, by [appellant] as a prisoner, for damages allegedly resulting from the negligent acts of Division of Correction employees,” appellant’s claim fell “within the jurisdiction of the IGO, and, under the PLA, [appellant] was required to exhaust his remedy available in that forum, including judicial review. ” (Emphasis in original.) According to the Department, appellant’s “explanation that he was not presented with or given information about a grievance procedure to pursue about his injuries does not constitute an exception to the PLA’s exhaustion requirement.” 5 ³⁹⁹ In his opposition, appellant asserted: “He did not have to exhaust any administrative remedies prior to filing his Complaint in this Court.” As to the Sundry Board, appellant disputed the Department’s contention that, under C.S. § 10-308(c), filing a claim with the Board was his exclusive remedy. Although Dixon conceded that the statute had been amended to include “an exclusivity provision,” he maintained that “the original intent of the legislation was to provide monetary benefits to those inmates who were working at a job other than their assigned task within a correctional facility!)]” Moreover, citing C.S. § 10-305(a), Dixon argued that the administrative process was optional, not mandatory, because “the legislature has decreed that an injured inmate may file a claim for compensation against the State under this subtitle with the Board.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, argued appellant, “an injured inmate does not have to file a claim with the Sundry Claims Board.” He insisted that, if an “injured inmate ... chooses not to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Sundry Claims Board ... he is free to pursue other avenues of redress for his injuries.” Appellant continued: “If every inmate were forced to file a claim with the Sundry Claims Board for any injury received while working in a correctional institution, an entire segment of the population would be disenfranchised from access to the Court system.” To illustrate, noted Dixon, “an individual who is working and who is injured and who files a workers’ compensation claim, still has the right to pursue, through the Courts, any third party who may have been involved in causing the injury.” Thus, appellant claimed: “An inmate must have the right, even in light of the Sundry Claims Board statute, to elect to file suit in the Circuit Court for damages.” Further, appellant pointed out that he “was ordered by prison personnel to file a claim with the Sundry Claims Board ⁴⁰⁰ when he was injured.” He maintained that because his “claim [with the Board] was dismissed prior to adjudication ... the exclusivity provision did not attach to him.” He asked the court to “determine his status as though his claim had never been filed,” and to “find that [appellant was] free to pursue the ... case to its conclusion.” Dixon stated: The exclusivity provision contained in Section 10-308(c) is tolled if, and only if, an injured inmate files a claim with the Board, thereby submitting himself to its jurisdiction and is awarded compensation. In short, if an injured inmate is paid by the Board, this case is over and he cannot go any further in pursuit of any monetary damages. However, the converse of that proposition is also true.

That is, if an inmate chooses not to file a claim with the Board, which is his right, under the statute, the exclusivity provision does not apply. If no claim is filed or if the claim is dismissed before compensation is paid, the Board is divested of jurisdiction. Referring to C.S. § 10 — 308(b), appellant also argued: It seems clear that the legislature did not expect that there would be a large number of claims filed with the Sundry Claims Board. In subsection (b) the legislature chose not to even fund the Board.

In that rare occasion when an award of compensation is determined to be appropriate, then and only then, does the[ ] Governor need to include money in the next year’s budget to pay the claim. Obviously, an onslaught of compensable claims was not contemplated when this statute was enacted. In addition, appellant maintained that “the Department’s reliance upon the PLA is misplaced,” because it “should not be construed to require an inmate such as Mr. Dixon, who is injured by the negligence of employees of the Department, to follow or to exhaust any administrative remedies prior to filing his Circuit Court complaint for damages.” According to appellant, because he “was not complaining about anything having to do with his conditions of confinement,” as that term is defined in C.J. § 5-1001(d) of the PLA, that statute was inapplicable. ⁴⁰¹ In support of his contention that the IGO grievance procedure did not apply to his negligence claims, appellant posited that the IGO “was not created, nor is it in existence, to address an inmate’s bodily injuries caused by the negligence of the Department of Corrections.” Instead, argued appellant, the IGO was “designed to redress internal grievances against officials or employees of the DOC.” Dixon added: “It is only when an inmate is alleging deprivation of some constitution[al] or legal right that he must follow and exhaust the administrative procedures which are laid out in the PLA and in the enabling legislation for the Inmate Grievance Office.” The court held a motions hearing on August 29, 2005 (Harris, J.). 6 At the hearing, appellant’s counsel proffered that appellant did not have a cause of action against M & M. Dixon’s lawyer explained that he had determined that “[t]here was absolutely no responsibility on [M & M’s] part to prepare the site where this accident occurred or to clear up the site where the accident occurred.” Counsel for M & M added: “I just want to make sure the dismissal is with prejudice.” Thereafter, the court granted the “verbal dismissal motion ... with prejudice as to” M & M. The court then heard argument on the Department’s motion. By agreement of the parties, the court granted the Department’s motion for partial summary judgment as to damages, limiting appellant’s potential recovery to the amount set forth in the statutory cap.

But, the court denied the Department’s motion in all other respects. In particular, it agreed with appellant that the language in C.S. § 10-305(a) indicated that filing a claim with the Board was permissive, and thus was not appellant’s exclusive remedy. The court said: Very simply stated, the Sundry Claims is optional, it is not mandatory. I think that is a pretty easy procedure.

The one [issue] that caused me a little difficulty in the beginning ⁴⁰² was whether or not [appellant] had exhausted his administrative remedies, particularly the Inmate Grievance Office. [I]t would make no sense to me that someone other than an inmate would have to go through that procedure. And again, I stated the example of someone who is injured shortly before they have completed their sentence and they are released with a full three year statute of limitations at their option and available to them, would have to at some point ... go back and go though the Inmate Grievance Office to pursue their claims. So I don’t think that is applicable in this particular case. So, they are the reasons that I am going to deny the motion.

On September 8, 2005, the Department filed a “Motion for Reconsideration,” challenging the court’s ruling that filing a claim with the Board was merely an “optional remedy.” It reiterated that, under C.S. § 10-808, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter, and urged the court to grant its motion for summary judgment. Appellee submitted numerous documents pertaining to the legislative history of the “exclusive remedy provision” set forth in C.S. § 10-308(c), which was added by amendment in 1993. 7 The Department argued: From the legislative history ... it is clear that the purpose of the 1993 exclusive remedy amendment was to make the Sundry Claims Board the exclusive remedy for an individual seeking compensation against the State for injuries suffered on the job while a prisoner in the Division of Correction, Patuxent Institution or the Baltimore City Detention Center. From the legislative history, there is no basis to support [appellant’s] interpretation of the statutory language that [appellant] had the choice of filing a tort claim ⁴⁰³ against the State in court instead of having only the Board as a remedy against the State. Prior to the 1993 amendment, there was no law prohibiting an injured inmate from filing both a tort claim and a claim with the Board and from receiving compensation from both remedies.

The purpose of the 1993 exclusive remedy legislation was to make the Board the exclusive remedy against the State and to foreclose the remedy of a tort claim. Moreover, the Department took issue with the court’s “decision that there was no sense in requiring exhaustion of the IGO because [appellant] was no longer an inmate.” The Department pointed out that, under C.S. § 10-305(b), 8 appellant was “not yet foreclosed from refiling a claim with the Board even though he is now no longer a Division of Correction prisoner, as he has under that statute until as late as May 3, 2006 to refil[e].” But, it also noted that, “while still an inmate for ten months after his injuries, [appellant] never filed any grievance with the IGO alleging his injuries were caused by the negligence of state correctional employees, and the time for filing such a grievance expired after 30 days from the date of the Mary [sic] 4, 2004 injuries.” 9 On September 22, 2005, appellant’s counsel filed correspondence with the court in response to the Department’s “Motion for Reconsideration.” 10 He argued that the legislation discussed by the Department did not apply to appellant because, “as a technical point, there has never been an allegation in this case that [appellant] was incapacitated in the performance of ⁴⁰⁴ work within the prison itself[.]” Dixon’s lawyer also addressed the various documents appended to the Department’s motion. With respect to the Fiscal Note, he asserted that “the aim” of the legislation “was to save the State money by disallowing claims which had previously been filed under the Tort Claims Act and to shepherd all claims to the miserly Sundry Claims Board.” 11 Dixon’s counsel reiterated that C.S. § 10-305 “contains the permissive language ‘may[.]’ ” He explained: With all of the input that [appellee’s counsel] cites, the legislature did not see fit to make the filing of a claim with the Sundry Claims Board mandatory. If it has [sic] chosen to do so, it would have been evident from the fact that the word “may” would have been changed to the word “shall.” This did not occur and we can only surmise that it was the legislative intent to allow alternative forms of redress for prisoner injuries which were caused by the negligence of the Department.

The exclusivity provision only applied to inmates who actually took their claim all the way through to compensation. Once paid, they were barred from pursuing any other remedies. We all agree, that had Mr. Dixon actually received compensation from the Sundry Claims Board, the suit that is currently pending in your Court would be barred. With respect to the IGO, appellant’s counsel repeated that appellant “had no complaint about his conditions of confinement.” Therefore, he maintained that the procedure for filing a complaint with the IGO was not applicable. 12 On September 23, 2005, the court entered an order denying the Department’s motion for reconsideration.

Trial was scheduled for June 27, 2006. ⁴⁰⁵ On June 7, 2006, the Department filed a “Motion in Limine of Defendant Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services.” Referring to the arguments more fully expounded in its previous memoranda, the Department asked the court to preclude appellant from offering any evidence in support of his claim on the grounds that: (1) filing a claim with the Board was appellant’s “exclusive monetary remedy” and (2) appellant had “failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him through the Inmate Grievance Office[.]” Specifically, the Department asked the court to exclude: (1) all evidence and testimony on behalf of [appellant’s] claims that [appellant’s] injuries were the result of [the Department’s] and its employees’ negligence on May 4, 2004, or in the alternative, to exclude (2) all evidence and testimony concerning or related to [appellant’s] claimed permanent disability, ongoing physical limitations and ongoing pain and suffering, and to instruct the parties, counsel and witnesses during the trial of this action not to mention, refer to, question, attempt to convey or suggest to the jury in any manner that [appellant] has incurred any permanent disability, ongoing physical limitation or ongoing pain and suffering as the result of his injuries incurred on May 4, 2004. In his response, appellant argued that the Department’s requested relief was “barred by the doctrine of res judicata, ” because “the precise issue raised in the Motion in Limine has been raised previously and has been adjudicated....” (Emphasis in original.) Accordingly, he asked the court to deny the motion. On June 27, 2006, the parties convened for a hearing on the Department’s motion in limine. In its oral ruling, the court (Femia, J.) looked to the exclusive remedy language in C.S. § 10-308, stating: [W]hat is the compensation authorized under this Subtitle?! ] An injured inmate may file a claim for compensation.

That’s the only compensation authorized in this Subtitle. ⁴⁰⁶ I read it as saying “The compensation authorized in [C.S.] 10-305 is the exclusive remedy against the State” ... that’s a very narrow finding, but that’s the finding I’m going to make in granting the motion in limine. In light of the court’s evidentiary ruling, the Department orally renewed its motion for summary judgment. The court said: I ... will grant [appellee’s] motion for summary [judgment] ... on the grounds that by my [ruling on the] motion in limine I have denied [appellant] the ability to proceed with evidence in this case. He therefore has nothing to proceed with as a matter of law.

I rule in favor of ... the State of Maryland.[ 13 ] III. DISCUSSION 14 A. Appellant contends that “filing a claim with the Sundry Claims Board was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a civil suit” in circuit court. According to Dixon, the circuit court’s initial ruling, to the effect that filing a claim with the Board is “permissive” and not mandatory, “was correct in all respects.” As a result, argues Dixon, he was not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing his action in circuit court. Dixon also asserts that, upon investigation, his attorney claims to have “learned that the Sundry Claims Board would not provide monetary compensation to [appellant] for the horrific injuries which he had received in May, 2004.” 15 For that reason, he initiated the tort action in circuit court. ⁴⁰⁷ Moreover, appellant insists that C.S. § 10-308(c) is inapplicable, because “[t]he requirements contained in the Sundry Claims Board legislation” were not met.

He explains that the Board pays benefits “to an inmate who ‘sustained a permanent partial disability or permanent total disability ... [t]hat incapacitated the individual or materially reduced the individual[’]s earning power in that type of work,’ ” but in this case “[t]here is no allegation that Mr. Dixon was incapacitated or that his earning power in the type of work that he was doing when he was injured was materially reduced.” (Citation omitted.) To the contrary, argues appellant, “his allegations are that the negligence of the individuals involved left him with serious personal injuries which may or may not, at the time the suit was filed, have been determined to be permanent.” Looking to “the clear and unambiguous exclusive remedy language in the statute,” the Department rejects Dixon’s