Parker v. State

HOLLANDER, J. This case comes before us for the second time. Following a trial in 2007, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Omar Parker, 1 appellant, of second degree assault, in violation of Md.Code (2002, 2005 Supp.), § 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article (“C.L.”), and retaliation for testimony, in violation of C.L. § 9-303. 2 The court initially sentenced appellant to five years’ incarceration for second degree assault and, pursuant to C.L. § 9-303(c)(2), to a concurrent term of twenty years for “retaliation for testimony.” The court dated both sentences from February 17, 2006, the date of appellant’s arrest. This Court subsequently affirmed appellant’s convictions but vacated his sentence for retaliation and remanded for a new sentencing for that offense. See Parker v. State, 185 Md.App. 399, 404 , 970 A.2d 968 (2009) (“Parker I”).

On October 20, 2009, the circuit court imposed a term of five years’ incarceration for retaliation, commencing on July 2, 2009, the date when the Maryland Division of Correction (“DOC”) released appellant with respect to his assault conviction and transferred him to the Baltimore City Detention Center (“BCDC”). At the resentencing, the circuit court did not award appellant any credit for the time he had served from his arrest on February 17, 2006, until his transfer to BCDC on July 2, 2009. Appellant’s second appeal followed. He presents one question: “Did the circuit court err in failing to give Mr. Parker ⁴⁷⁵ credit against his five year sentence for witness retaliation for the time he served between February 17, 2006, and July 1, 2009?” For the reasons set forth below, we shall vacate and remand for resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 This matter is rooted in an incident that occurred on November 29, 2005, when appellant threatened Kya Hicks •with a gun. See Parker I, 185 Md.App. at 403-09 , 970 A.2d 968 . Appellant was convicted on June 4, 2007. At the initial sentencing proceeding on July 26, 2007, the court said: Well Mr. Parker, also know [sic] as Mr. Anderson, there’s no question that you’re an intelligent man a well spoken man but you clearly have no insight into your behavior.

You have no remorse. You’ve no desire to change. You have a serious drug history and the basis of this case [sic] strikes at the very heart of the criminal justice system. Intimidation of witnesses undermines everything that the criminal justice system stands for.

So as far as this court’s concerned, its [sic] this kind of case which is the most serious case that we face in our society today. Accordingly, in Parker I the court imposed a sentence of five years’ incarceration for second degree assault and a concurrent term of twenty years for retaliation. The court inquired as to “the start date,” and defense counsel responded, “February 17, 2006.” The court said: “I will date that sentence from ... February 17, 2006.” ⁴⁷⁶ Appellant lodged his first appeal on August 16, 2007.

He argued, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in sentencing him to an enhanced term of twenty years for witness retaliation, because the jury was never asked to determine whether the retaliation related to a drug crime or a crime of violence, as required for an enhanced twenty-year sentence under C.L. § 9 — 303(c)(2). 4 Parker I, 185 Md.App. at 409-13 , 970 A.2d 968 . In an Opinion filed on May 7, 2009, the Parker I Court agreed. Id. at 415 , 970 A.2d 968 . Therefore, the Court vacated the sentence for retaliation and remanded for resentencing under C.L. § 9 — 303(c)(1). 5 Id. at 421, 970 A.2d 968 .

As to the retaliation conviction, the trial court held a second sentencing hearing on October 20, 2009, at which the State asked the court “to impose a five-year sentence,” which was the maximum allowed under the circumstances. The State was silent as to whether the sentence should be consecutive or concurrent. The following exchange is pertinent: ⁴⁷⁷ [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, given the opinion from the Court of Special Appeals and all the surrounding case law, given the fact that he’s already given 20 years, I’m going to submit. THE COURT: So you’re not asking for less than five years? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: No. Defense counsel indicated to the court that appellant “was released from the Division of Correction and sent to the jail on July the 2nd.” 6 The following colloquy ensued: THE COURT: All right.

Well, given the fact that the court viewed this case as such a serious violation, since it was one of the first matters in which there was testimony that there was retaliation for testifying, and since the Court of Special Appeals indicated that — that because the jury was not instructed to find that the retaliation had occurred in connection with a felony, that the court could not enhance the penalty. And the court had given Mr. Parker the 20 years as the enhanced penalty. Therefore, the court, in this case, ... as per the instructions of the Court of Special Appeals with regard to the limits, this court feels that five years is the appropriate sentence. And I will give the defendant five years, and I’ll date it from July 2nd, 2009 to give him credit for all time that he’s served on this charge---- [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: So, Your Honor, for clarification, so his sentence is going to be [sic] begin on the date that he was actually transferred from the Division of [Corrections?

THE COURT: Yes. Yes. ⁴⁷⁸ [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: ... My client is concerned that the credit would go back to, I believe, it’s February of 2006. THE COURT: I asked him when he was transferred to the Baltimore City Jail, and you just told me July 2nd.

So that’s the day it’s [sic] going to get because he was serving a sentence on the assault in the second degree. Although if he was still at the Division of Correction, my sentence with regard to retaliation would be consecutive to that sentence. Because he completed that sentence [for assault], then I’m willing to give him credit for all the time he’s been held at the City Jail pending sentencing in this matter. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m going to object then. Because under the case law he can’t be given a consecutive anyway [sic].

He’s been in, he served pretrial from— THE COURT: I’m not giving him a consecutive sentence. I’m giving him five years and I’m dating it from July 2nd 2009. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred by failing to credit him for the time he served between his arrest on February 17, 2006, and his release to the BCDC on July 1, 2009, a total of 1,281 days. 7 According to appellant, he served that time for the initial sentences of five years for assault and a concurrent term of twenty years for retaliation.

Therefore, appellant maintains that, pursuant to Md.Code (2001, 2007 Supp.), § 6-218 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“C.P.”), he ⁴⁷⁹ is entitled to credit on the new retaliation sentence for all the time he previously spent in custody on that sentence. The State insists that C.P. § 6-218(d) applies here. In its view, the court was not required to grant appellant credit for the time he served in connection with his first sentencing. We pause to review the relevant statutory provisions.

C.P. § 6-218, titled “Credit against sentence for time spent in custody,” provides, in part: 8 (b) In general. — (1) A defendant who is convicted and sentenced shall receive credit against and a reduction of the term of a definite or life sentence, or the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence, for all time spent in the custody of a correctional facility, ... or other unit because of: (i) the charge for which the sentence is imposed; or (ii) the conduct on which the charge is based. (2) If a defendant is in custody because of a charge that results in a dismissal or acquittal, the time that would have been credited if a sentence had been imposed shall be credited against any sentence that is based on a charge for which a warrant or commitment was filed during that custody. (3) In a case other than a case described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the sentencing court may apply credit against a sentence for time spent in custody for another charge or crime. (c) Credit when prior sentence set aside. — A defendant whose sentence is set aside because of a direct or collateral attack and who is reprosecuted or resentenced for the same crime or for another crime based on the same transaction shall receive credit against and a reduction of the term of a ⁴⁸⁰ definite or life sentence, or the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence, for all time spent in custody under the prior sentence, including credit applied against the prior sentence in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.

(d) Credit when one of multiple sentences set aside. — A defendant who is serving multiple sentences, one of which is set aside as the result of a direct or collateral attack, shall receive credit against and a reduction of the remaining term of a definite or life sentence, or the remaining minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence, for all time spent in custody under the sentence set aside, including credit applied against the sentence set aside in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. (e) Credit awarded at sentencing. — (1) The court shall award the credit required by this section at the time of sentencing. (2) After having communicated with the parties, the court shall tell the defendant and shall state on the record the amount of the credit and the facts on which the credit is based. In addition, Md.Code (2006 Repl.

Vol., 2007 Supp.), § 12-702 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) is relevant. It provides, in part: Sentences following appeals. (a) Remand for sentence; mandatory credit for time served. — If an appellate court remands a criminal case to a lower court in order that the lower court may pronounce the proper judgment or sentence, the lower court shall deduct from the term of the new sentence the time served by the defendant under the previous sentence from the date of his conviction. If the previous sentence was a statutory maximum sentence, the lower court also shall give credit for any period of incarceration prior to the previous sentence, if the incarceration was related to the offense for which the sentence was imposed. ⁴⁸¹ (b) Remand for sentence or new trial; limitations on increases in sentences. — If an appellate court remands a criminal case to a lower court in order that the lower court may pronounce the proper judgment or sentence, or conduct a new trial, and if there is a conviction following this new trial, the lower court may impose any sentence authorized by law to be imposed as punishment for the offense.

However, it may not impose a sentence more severe than the sentence previously imposed for the offense unless: (1) The reasons for the increased sentence affirmatively appear; (2) The reasons are based upon additional objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant; and (3) The factual data upon which the increased sentence is based appears as part of the record. Appellant argues that C.P. § 6-218(c) “clearly applies” to this case, because his sentence was set aside as a result of a direct appeal, and he was then resentenced for the same offense, i.e., witness retaliation. Looking to the plain language of C.P. § 6-218, he asserts: [Sjubsection (c) applies to someone “whose sentence is set aside because of a direct or collateral attack and who is reprosecuted or resentenced for the same crime or for another crime based on the same transaction,” while subsection (d) applies to a person “who is serving multiple sentences, one of which is set aside as the result of a direct or collateral attack.” [C.P.] § 6-218(c) & (d) (emphasis added). Both subsections refer to a sentence that is “set aside.” That the legislature used the italicized language in subsection (c) but not in subsection (d) strongly suggests that it did not intend (d) to apply to someone who was resentenced for the same crime or based on the same transaction.

In other words, (c) applies when a conviction or sentence is vacated and the person is subsequently resentenced for the same crime or another based on the same transaction, whereas (d) applies when a sentence is ⁴⁸² vacated but the defendant is not resentenced for that crime or another based on the same transaction. Noting that, since February 17, 2006, he was in custody on both the assault and retaliation convictions, appellant insists that he was entitled to “ ‘receive credit against and a reduction of the term of ” the new five-year sentence “ ‘for all time spent in custody under the prior sentence.’ ” (Citing C.P. § 6-218(c)). He adds: The judge’s refusal to start the new five year sentence for retaliation on February 17, 2006, or to give Mr. Parker credit against this sentence for the 1,281 days he spent in custody between February 17, 2006, and July 1, 2009, deprived Mr. Parker of credit to which he was entitled under § 6-218(c). Appellant underscores that C.P. § 6-218(c) refers “to a resentencing for a particular crime,” while § 6-218(d) begins with the phrase “[a] defendant who is serving multiple sentences.” He posits: There is nothing in subsection (c) that expressly limits its applicability to cases in which the defendant was sentenced on only one count.

Its plain language makes clear that it applies here. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of any reason why the legislature would give a person resentenced for the same crime credit for time served only when there were no other sentences. Even if subsection (d) applies, Parker maintains that “it would still require that Mr. Parker receive credit for the time he [initially] spent in custody on the witness retaliation charge.” He asserts: [Subsection (d) ] commands, in pertinent part, that a defendant “shall receive credit against and a reduction of the remaining term of a definite ... sentence ... for all time spent in custody under the sentence set aside.” § 6-218(d). The “remaining term” in this case is the five year term the lower court imposed on resentencing.

Under subsection (d), the court was required to give him credit against that five ⁴⁸³ year term for the time spent in custody on the previous witness retaliation sentence. Noting that the “judge expressly denied that she was giving Mr. Parker a consecutive sentence,” appellant complains: If she had [imposed a consecutive sentence], this would have been an unlawful increase in his sentence. Compare State v. Sayre, 314 Md. 559, 562 [ 552 A.2d 553 ] (1989) (holding that “[w]hen a sentence is changed from concurrent to consecutive, it is increased in length”) with [C.J.] § 12-702(b) (providing, with exceptions not implicated here, that when an appellate court remands a case to a lower court for resentencing, the lower court “may not impose a sentence more severe than the sentence previously imposed for the offense”); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 [ 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ] (1969). Even if the court was entitled to impose a consecutive sentence for retaliation, however, appellant maintains that he “already served time in custody on the retaliation charge [from February 17, 2006 until July 1, 2009,] and therefore would be entitled to credit for it under [C.P.] § 6-218(c) and [C.J.] § 12-702(a).” Finally, appellant maintains that, “to the extent that the statutory language is ambiguous on this issue, the rule of lenity requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant and against the State.” The State counters that C.P. § 6-218(d) “specifically applies to instances where ‘one of multiple sentences’ is set aside.” It posits: “Subsection (d) on its face applies to instances of multiple sentences.... ” Noting that “Subsection (d) is silent as to credit for time served,” and that it “does not mention re-sentencing at all,” the State maintains that the “issue of credit for time served on other charges [is] discretionary under subsection (b)(3).” As to C.P. § 6-218(c), the State asserts: “Subsection (c) mandates giving credit for time served on that single sentence if and when a sentence is reimposed for that charge, which is entirely consistent with the purpose of § 6-218.” (Emphasis ⁴⁸⁴ in original.) In its view, if appellant were allowed to receive credit for the time he served on the original sentence, he would receive “double” credit, in contravention of the intention of the Legislature and the Court of Appeals.

It posits: “The law is not meant to allow inmates to ‘bank’ time ... or receive double credit for time served.” According to the State, “[b]y applying subsection (c) to cases where there were multiple sentences, judges would be forced to impose de facto concurrent sentences at resentencing. Parker’s interpretation essentially mandates ‘double time.’ ” The State adds: Parker’s attempt at forcing a subsection (d) case into subsection (c) ... would contribute nothing toward [the legislative goal of] avoiding “dead time”; as the time he spent in jail on his assault conviction was not “dead.” It would, however, essentially tie the hands of the judge at resentencing, which was never the purpose of the statute. Further, the State maintains that there “is no Constitutional or statutory bar to imposing a new sentence [on appellant] which runs consecutive to his prior sentence.” In its view, C.J. § 12-702(b) “expressly allows a court to impose any legal sentence after remand, while requiring ‘objective information’ and ‘affírmative[ ] reasons’ before allowing an increase in the sentence on remand.” Therefore, it claims that the sentencing court was entitled to begin Parker’s sentence for witness retaliation on July 2, 2009. The State also argues: [T]here is an overarching element of common sense involved in allowing the sentencing court to shape the sentence it feels is appropriate.

Parker seeks, essentially, a windfall from an inadvertent error of the sentencing court in what was a case of first impression. [Parker I,] 185 Md.App. at 414 [ 970 A.2d 968 ]. This is precisely the sort of gamesmanship the Supreme Court [has] rejected____ It is painfully evident that had the sentencing court been aware, at the time Parker’s initial sentence was passed, that it was limited to a five-year maximum on the charge of witness intimi ⁴⁸⁵ dation, Parker’s sentences would not have been made concurrent. Section 6-218(d) of the Criminal Procedure Article leaves it to the trial court’s discretion as to whether a defendant should be given credit for time served on a different charge. Section 12-702 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does not affect the imposition of a new sentence on a different charge, which is the case here.

In response, appellant posits: If the lower court had originally sentenced Mr. Parker to five years for assault and a consecutive fifteen years for witness retaliation (instead of five years for assault and a concurrent twenty years for witness retaliation), he would not have been serving his sentence for witness retaliation while he was serving his sentence for assault, and therefore would not be entitled to credit for that time against his new sentence for witness retaliation. But, appellant insists that when the court initially sentenced him to concurrent terms, the court “gave him double credit for the time he was serving.” He argues: “Applying subsection (c) to cases with multiple sentences would not require judges to impose de facto concurrent sentences at resentencing; it would merely require that judges give defendants credit against the new sentence for the time they served on the prior sentence.” Parker argues: Assuming arguendo that the judge lawfully could and actually did make the witness retaliation sentence consecutive at the resentencing, § 6-218 would still require that the court give him credit against the consecutive sentence for the time he had already served on the previous sentence. Even if a court could change a sentence from concurrent to consecutive on remand, the State can point to no statute that would permit a court to deprive Mr. Parker of the credit to which he was entitled under § 6-218. ⁴⁸⁶ II. Appellant makes a somewhat veiled challenge to the imposition of a consecutive sentence on remand. 9 The State argues in its brief that the court lawfully imposed a consecutive sentence on remand.

Therefore, we turn first to the question of whether, on remand, the court imposed a consecutive sentence and, if so, whether it was permitted to do so if the original sentence for retaliation was concurrent to the assault sentence. “The term ‘sentence’ is defined as ‘[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.’ ” Carter v. State, 193 Md.App. 193, 209 , 996 A.2d 948 (2010) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (9th ed. 2009)). See also Resper v. State, 354 Md. 611 , 620, 732 A.2d 863 (1999) (adopting the definition of “sentence” in Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)); Ridgeway v. State, 140 Md.App. 49, 61 , 779 A.2d 1031 (2001) (“A ‘sentence’ is defined as ‘the fine, probation or incarceration imposed to punish, rehabilitate or deter a convicted criminal defendant.’ ”) (citation omitted), aff'd, 369 Md. 165 , 797 A.2d 1287 (2002). A court may “make a sentence concurrent with or consecutive to any other unsuspended actual sentence of confinement that then exists.” Wilson v. Simms, 157 Md.App. 82, 97 , 849 A.2d 88 (citing State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 592 , 640 A.2d 1104 (1994)), cert. denied, 382 Md. 687 , 856 A.2d 723 (2004). Although the sentencing judge said she was “not giving [Parker] a consecutive sentence,” we believe that the retaliation sentence was consecutive.

First, the judge declared that the sentence began on July 2, 2009, a date after appellant had completed his sentence for assault. Moreover, the court stated: “[I]f he was still at the Division of Correction, my ⁴⁸⁷ sentence with regard to retaliation would be consecutive to that sentence.” It is well settled that “ ‘a sentencing judge is vested with virtually boundless discretion,’ ” so as “to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing — punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.” Smith v. State, 308 Md. 162, 166 , 517 A.2d 1081 (1986) (citation omitted). See Jones v. State, 414 Md. 686, 693 , 997 A.2d 131 (2010); Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 199 , 772 A.2d 273 (2001). Nevertheless, [tjhere are ... some restrictions placed upon the judge presiding at the sentencing proceeding.

A sentence cannot violate any constitutional requirements such as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; the sentencing judge cannot be motivated by prejudice, ill-will or any other impermissible considerations; and the sentence itself cannot exceed any limitation set by statute. Smith, 308 Md. at 169 , 517 A.2d 1081 ; see Jones, 414 Md. at 693 , 997 A.2d 131 . Under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), a trial court is empowered to “correct an illegal sentence at any time.” See Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466 , 918 A.2d 506 (2007) (an illegal sentence is “limited to those situations in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself; ie., there either has been no conviction warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is intrinsically and substantively unlawful”); Parker I, 185 Md.App. at 415 , 970 A.2d 968 ; Ingram v. State, 179 Md.App. 485, 510 , 947 A.2d 74 (2008). But, a court ordinarily “may not increase the sentence” after it is imposed.

State v. Sayre, 314 Md. 559, 560 , 552 A.2d 553 (1989). 10 ⁴⁸⁸ The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against “multiple punishments for the same offense/” and “is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In Pearce , the Supreme Court determined that “the constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense.” Id. at 718-19 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 . It explained that if a defendant is reconvicted after a new trial, the time already served “must be returned — by subtracting [the time served] from whatever new sentence is imposed.” Id. at 719 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 . The Court said: Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.

And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitu ⁴⁸⁹ tional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.

Id. at 725-26 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Of import here, a resentencing is regarded as a sentencing. Jones, 414 Md. at 694 , 997 A.2d 131 . Notably, at a resentencing, “the sentencing court must approach its task as if no sentence had ever been imposed.” Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 193 , 297 A.2d 696 (1972).

Accord Jones, 414 Md. at 694 , 997 A.2d 131 . Therefore, the “trial court is charged ... with ‘exercising its sentencing discretion’ as if the sentencing was occurring for the first time.” Jones, 414 Md. at 694 , 997 A.2d 131 (citation omitted). There is no absolute prohibition on an increased penalty at a resentencing or after a new trial. In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the Supreme Court recognized that the presumption of vindictiveness in Pearce did not apply when a guilty plea was set aside, and the trial court imposed a more severe penalty after a full trial than it had previously imposed pursuant to the initial guilty plea.

See also Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 369 , 772 A.2d 1240 (2001); Hagez v. State, 131 Md.App. 402, 423 , 749 A.2d 206 , cert. denied, 359 Md. 669 , 755 A.2d 1140 (2000). In Trimble v. State, 90 Md.App. 705 , 603 A.2d 899 (1992), the appellant was convicted, inter alia, of first degree murder, for which he was sentenced to death. Id. at 707 , 603 A.2d 899 . Trimble was also sentenced to concurrent and consecutive life sentences plus seventy years on his remaining counts.

Id. The death sentence was vacated on appeal. Id. On remand, the trial court imposed a life sentence, consecutive to all previous sentences.

Id. Trimble again appealed, arguing “that a death sentence is a concurrent sentence and that replacing it with a consecutive life sentence on remand is an illegal increase in the sentence.” Id. This Court disagreed and affirmed Trimble’s sentences. 11 Id. ⁴⁹⁰ The Trimble Court “view[ed] each sentence, singly, not the totality of the sentences, when determining the legality of a sentence.” Id. at 708 , 603 A.2d 899 . It said: “[A] life sentence with the possibility of parole, even if consecutive, is less severe a punishment than life without parole and is in no way the equivalent of death.” Id.

Moreover, the Court noted that “a judge has virtually boundless discretion in sentencing and may impose any sentence not in violation of constitutional requirements or statutory limits, or motivated by ill-will, prejudice, or other impermissible considerations.” Id. at 709 , 603 A.2d 899 (citing Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 604 , 556 A.2d 236 (1989)). The Court explained, Trimble, 90 Md.App. at 709 , 603 A.2d 899 : “This judicial power includes the determination of whether a sentence will be consecutive or concurrent, with the same limitations.” Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 70 , 400 A.2d 419 (1979) (citations omitted). “[T]he power of the judge to impose consecutive sentences ensures that a person who commits separate and distinct violations of the law receives separate and distinct punishments.” Id. Since appellant alleges a violation of a statutory limit only, and the sentence in this case was lawfully imposed within the statutory limits, we hold that the judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing appellant to life imprisonment consecutive to the sentences previously imposed, for the heinous crime of first degree murder. McRoy v. State, 54 Md.App. 516 , 458 A.2d 1262 , cert. denied, 297 Md. 109 (1983), is also informative.

There, the defendant was convicted of first and second degree rape, as well as battery. Id. at 516, 458 A.2d 1262 . The trial court merged the two lesser convictions into the conviction for first degree rape and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. 12 Id. at 517 , 458 A.2d 1262 . This Court subsequently vacated the first degree rape conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence, but upheld the second degree rape conviction.

Id. Therefore, the Court remanded for resentencing on the ⁴⁹¹ second degree rape conviction. Id. On remand, appellant was sentenced to twenty years, consecutive to three life sentences he had since received for unrelated convictions.

Id. The trial court gave appellant credit for the 562 days he had already served for the first degree rape conviction. Id. at 518 , 458 A.2d 1262 . McRoy appealed again, arguing that by changing his shorter sentence to a consecutive sentence, the court had improperly increased his sentence.

Id. at 517 , 458 A.2d 1262 . We disagreed and affirmed. Id. This Court stated: “[A] life imprisonment sentence for the first degree rape conviction was lessened by the twenty-year sentence imposed for the second degree rape conviction.” Id. at 518 , 458 A.2d 1262 .

Quoting State v. White, 41 Md.App. 514, 515 , 397 A.2d 299 (1979), we said, 54 Md.App. at 518 , 458 A.2d 1262 : “A judge must relate the sentence he imposes to the status quo at the moment of sentencing. He may deal with the present or the past as concrete reality. He may make his sentence concurrent with or consecutive to whatever other sentence then exists, either 1) actually being served or 2) in suspension but with ever-present potentiality for the lifting of that suspension.” In explaining the decision to affirm, the McRoy Court said, id. at 518-19 , 458 A.2d 1262 : Because the twenty-year sentence was an original sentence and not a resentencing it was within [the court’s] discretion to impose the sentence consecutive to the two other sentences. As the life imprisonment sentence for the first degree rape conviction was no longer valid, the sentence for the second degree rape conviction stood last in the batting order behind the two other life sentences.

See State v. White, supra, 41 Md.App. at 518 [ 397 A.2d 299 ].... The twenty-year sentence was not a replacement for the original life sentence imposed for the first degree rape conviction. There was no error committed in the sentencing of appellant. Although the order in which appellant must serve his ⁴⁹² sentences has been changed, he has not been prejudiced nor has his punishment been enhanced.

The State relies on Ridgeway, supra, 140 Md.App. 49 , 779 A.2d 1031 . Although Ridgeway is instructive, it is of limited use, because Ridgeway’s appeal relied upon Maryland Rule 4-345. In Ridgeway, the trial court erroneously imposed three consecutive ten-year sentences for three counts of first degree assault, yet the jury had only convicted the defendant of reckless endangerment. The clerk’s office notified the trial court of the error and the court recalled the parties three hours after the sentencing.

Pursuant to a former version of Maryland Rule 4-345, 13 the court then struck the three ten- ⁴⁹³ year sentences and imposed three five-year consecutive sentences for each count of reckless endangerment. On appeal to this Court, Ridgeway argued that his sentence was unlawful, because the court’s action had the effect of increasing a sentence of zero on the reckless endangerment counts to a sentence of five years. 140 Md.App. 49 , 779 A.2d 1031 . We disagreed, id. at 60-61, 779 A.2d 1031 : The record itself is clear: the trial judge erred in sentencing appellant for crimes he did not commit (or at least was acquitted of) while, at the same time, failing to sentence him for crimes he did commit. Moreover, his intention to impose a sentence in connection with each of the three children who had been endangered by the shotgun blasts is unambiguously set forth in the sentencing transcript.

After separately naming each child and identifying the assault count associated with that child, the court imposed a separate sentence. In imposing sentence, the trial judge made it plain that appellant’s conduct amounted to a criminal act against each of the three children, and he intended to impose a separate and consecutive sentence with respect to each child. In rejecting Ridgeway’s double jeopardy claim, we reasoned, id. at 64, 779 A.2d 1031 : [T]he Supreme Court has cautioned against permitting those convicted of a crime from using the Double Jeopardy Clause to avoid sentencing or, in other words, turning sentencing into “a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.” Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 [ 67 S.Ct. 645 , 91 L.Ed. 818 ] (1947). In Bozza , the issue before the Court was whether the “fact that the petitioner has been twice before the judge for sentencing and in a federal place of detention during the five-hour interim” constituted double jeopardy.

Id. at 166 [ 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Holding that it did not, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection of the “‘doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is established, by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment altogether, because the court committed an ⁴⁹⁴ error in passing sentence.’ ” Id. at 166 [ 67 S.Ct. 645 ] (quoting In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 260 [ 14 S.Ct. 323 , 38 L.Ed. 149 ] (1894)). We agree. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Ridgeway, 369 Md. at 171 , 797 A.2d 1287 .

In distinguishing former Md. Rule 4-345(b), regarding modification or reduction of sentences, from Rule 4-345(a), the Court stated, id.: “The sentences for the three first degree assault convictions were illegal and properly vacated pursuant to subsection (a) of [both the former and current] Rule 4-345.” As the Court explained, the resentencing occurred to correct an illegal sentence because “the trial court erroneously sentenced the petitioner for crimes for which he was not convicted ...” Id. at 171, 173 , 797 A.2d 1287 . The State also relies on United States v. Moreno-Henandez, 48 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1151 , 115 S.Ct. 2598 , 132 L.Ed.2d 844 (1995). Moreno-Hernandez was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to transport aliens (count 1), two counts of transporting aliens (counts 2 and 3), and being an alien found in the United States after a felony conviction and subsequent deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (b)(1) (count 4). Id. at 1113.

Each term of imprisonment was to be served concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release on each count, also concurrent. Id. at 1114. With regard to count 4, Moreno-Hernandez was initially sentenced to 125 months under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (b)(2). Id.

The statute carried a maximum penalty of fifteen years if the predicate felony is an “aggravated” felony. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government did not prove that the prior felony was an “aggravated felony.” Id. at 1114 n. 1. Therefore, it remanded for resentencing under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (b)(1), which carried a maximum penalty of five years. Id. at 1114.

On remand, the court resentenced Moreno-Hernandez under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (b)(1). Id. But, based on the sentencing guidelines, the court “ordered his sentence on that count to be served consecutively to, rather than concurrently with, the 60- ⁴⁹⁵ month concurrent sentences imposed on counts 1-3.” Id. Nevertheless, Moreno-Hernandez’s overall sentence for all four counts was decreased from 125 months to 120 months.

Id. Again, Moreno-Hernandez appealed. He contended, inter alia, that the court improperly changed the concurrent sentence to a consecutive sentence. Id. at 1113.

Rejecting that claim, the Ninth Circuit stated, 48 F.3d at 1116 : A resentencing mandate from an appellate court ... does away with the entire initial sentence, and authorizes the district court to impose “any sentence which could lawfully have been imposed originally.” Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d [26, 29 (9th Cir.1964) ] (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838, 842 [ (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 902 , 75 S.Ct. 226 , 99 L.Ed. 708 (1954) ]). In the latter case, double jeopardy is not implicated. A defendant has no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which he places in issue by direct appeal, so long as he has not completed serving the valid portion of the sentence. United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1461 (9th Cir.1987).

Because, in this case, the district court resentenced Moreno-Hernandez in accordance with our mandate, and not pursuant to [Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (“Correcting or Reducing a Sentence”)], the court was free to reconsider the entire “sentencing package” and to restructure the sentences to run consecutively. See United States v. Jenkins, 884 F.2d 433, 441 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that on remand after vacation of sentence, the district court should have an opportunity to reconsider the entire “sentencing package”, not only the unlawful portion)[, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1005 , 110 S.Ct. 568 , 107 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) ]. Further, the court said, id. at 1117: The district court’s resentencing order that the sentence on count 4 run consecutively to the concurrent sentences on counts 1-3 does not violate our remand.

In that remand we did not limit the overall sentence the district court could impose, nor did we circumscribe the manner in which the ⁴⁹⁶ court could apply the Sentencing Guidelines. We simply directed the district court to limit its sentence on count 4 to the five-year maximum prescribed by section 1326(b)(1). Moreno-Hernandez’s argument that our previous remand precluded the district court from imposing a consecutive sentence completely ignores [United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”), 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 5G1.2(d) (“Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction”) ]. That section is specifically designed to provide for consecutive sentences whenever, as was the case here, the sentencing range determined from the defendant’s combined offense level exceeds the maximum sentence permitted on the count of conviction that carries the highest statutory maximum.

See United States v. Joetzki, 952 F.2d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir.1991). Because Moreno-Hernandez had previously been deported after conviction for an aggravated felony, he was subject, under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(2), to an enhanced sentencing range of 100-125 months on count 4. The maximum possible sentence for that count, however, and for each of the other counts on which Moreno-Hernandez was convicted, is only five years. The district court therefore acted within its authority in requiring Moreno-Hernandez to serve his sentence on count 4 consecutively to his sentences on counts 1-3.

This resulted in an overall sentence of 120 months, which is within the 125-month upper limit of the guidelines range for count 4 when enhanced under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(2). The cases discussed above lead us to agree with the State that, on remand, the court was entitled to impose any sentence it could have lawfully imposed under C.L. § 9-303(c)(l), including a consecutive sentence. As in Moreno-Hernandez, 48 F.3d at 1116 , the trial “court was free to reconsider the entire ‘sentencing package’ and to restructure the sentences to run consecutively.” A consecutive five-year sentence, in lieu of a twenty-year concurrent sentence, was not an illegal increase in sentence under the circumstances of this case. ⁴⁹⁷ Our resolution of this issue, however, leaves open the question of whether appellant was entitled to any credit against that consecutive five-year sentence.

III

We turn to the issue of whether the sentencing court erred by failing to credit appellant for the time he spent in custody before the resentencing. We consider two discrete periods: 1) the period from appellant’s arrest to the initial sentencing, i.e., his pretrial detention; and 2) the period from the imposition of the original sentence to the time of resentencing. Stated otherwise, the question is whether a judge who initially imposed a concurrent sentence for an offense, with credit from the date of arrest, and changes it, on remand, to a consecutive sentence, must nonetheless award credit for the period of pretrial detention, awarded at the first sentencing, as well as the time served while the sentence was concurrent (i.e., before the remand). As we have seen, each side presented cogent arguments in support of its respective positions.

In considering the subject of awarding credits after remand, R.D. Hursh, “Right to Credit for Time Served under Erroneous or Void Sentence or Invalid Judgment of Conviction Necessitating New Trial,” 85 A.L.R.2d 1283 (1954), is informative. Hursh explained, 35 A.L.R.2d 1283 , § 2 (footnotes omitted): In cases dealing with resentencing necessitated by the invalidity of the original sentence, but not involving a new trial between the first and second sentence, the courts are not in agreement on the question whether time served under the first sentence is to be credited against time served under the second. In some jurisdictions, allowance of such credit is provided for by statute. In jurisdictions lacking such a statute, what appears to be the modern (and, it is submitted, the better) view is that such an allowance is proper.

But in a substantial number of cases the contrary view has been approved; in some of these decisions the courts have limited their rulings to cases in which the ⁴⁹⁸ invalid judgment is void (reasoning that in such a situation there is, in law, no imprisonment), while in others it has been commented that such an allowance is a matter for the legislature and beyond the power of the judiciary. Hursh also addressed “the question whether one who has served in prison under a sentence is entitled to have time so served credited where, because the original sentence was invalid, it is necessary that he be resentenced” without a new trial. 35 A.L.R.2d 1283 , § 5. He argues that the “modern (and the better) view ... is that such an allowance is proper.” 35 A.L.R.2d 1283 , § 5. However, Hursh does not address the more confounding situation where a defendant is serving multiple concurrent sentences, only one of which is vacated, and whether credit must be granted for time served if, on remand, the vacated sentence is made consecutive.

To resolve this thorny question, which involves construing C.J. § 12-702(a), as well as C.P. § 6-218(c) and (d), the well settled principles of statutory interpretation guide our analysis. The interpretation of a statute is a judicial function. Zimmer-Rubert v. Bd. of Educ., 179 Md.App. 589, 606 , 947 A.2d 135 (2008), aff'd, 409 Md. 200 , 973 A.2d 233 (2009); see Salomon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 307 , 841 A.2d 858 (2004); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson, 164 Md.App. 540, 568 , 884 A.2d 157 (2005), aff'd, 395 Md. 172 , 909 A.2d 694 (2006).

Determining the meaning of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novo review. See Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452 , 879 A.2d 1111 (2005); Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688 , 861 A.2d 727 (2004). “ ‘The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.’ ” Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006) (citation omitted); see Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20 , 918 A.2d 470 (2007); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore City, 387 Md. 1, 11 , 874 A.2d 439 (2005); see also Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. 328, 337 , 987 A.2d 60 (2010) (“ ‘In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to ⁴⁹⁹ discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision ....’”) (quoting People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 351 , 969 A.2d 971 (2009)).

We are guided in this endeavor by the statutory text. Reier v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 397 Md. 2, 26 , 915 A.2d 970 (2007); Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484 (2004). In our effort to effectuate the Legislature’s intent, we give the words of a statute their ordinary and usual meaning. Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274-75 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010); City of Baltimore Dev.

Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 318 , 910 A.2d 406 (2006); Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning and Plumbing, Inc. v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336, 350 , 783 A.2d 691 (2001). If the language is clear and unambiguous, we ordinarily “need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173 , 935 A.2d 699 (2007); see Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 184 Md.App. 240, 249 , 964 A.2d 733 , cert. granted, 409 Md. 44 , 972 A.2d 859 (2009). In addition, “an interpretation should be given to the statutory provisions that does not lead to absurd consequences.” Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, 404 Md. 560, 571-72 , 948 A.2d 11 (2008). Further, we construe the statute as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, to the extent possible, reconciled and harmonized.

Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Harder & Adkins, LLC, 412 Md. 308, 315 , 987 A.2d 48 (2010); Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist, 380 Md. 195, 204 , 844 A.2d 406 (2004); see Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. 440, 462 , 869 A.2d 822 (“ ‘[W]e do not read particular language in a statute in isolation or out of context [but construe it] in light of the Legislature’s general purpose and in the context of the statute as a whole.’ ”) (Citation omitted), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 823 , 126 S.Ct. 359 , 163 L.Ed.2d 67 (2005). If “ ‘reasonably possible’ ” we read a statute “ ‘so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless,’ ” Del Marr v. Montgom ⁵⁰⁰ ery County, 169 Md.App. 187, 207 , 900 A.2d 243 (2006) (citations omitted), aff'd, 397 Md. 308 , 916 A.2d 1002 (2007), or “superfluous or redundant.” Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222 , 804 A.2d 426 (2002); see Collins, supra, 383 Md. at 691, 861 A.2d 727 ; Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 551 , 814 A.2d 469 (2002). In Gilmer v. State, 389 Md. 656, 668 , 887 A.2d 549 (2005), the Court reiterated: “ ‘When there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute, the statute is ambiguous.’ ” (Citation omitted). See Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 662 , 911 A.2d 1245 (2006) (a statute is ambiguous “when there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387 , 835 A.2d 1221 (2003).

If the language of the statute is ambiguous, then the court “may employ all the resources and tools of statutory construction” to ascertain its meaning, “including legislative history, prior case law, and statutory purpose.” Reier, 397 Md. at 27 , 915 A.2d 970 (internal citations omitted); see Kelly, supra, 397 Md. at 419-20, 918 A.2d 470 (If a statute’s language is ambiguous, “we will resolve any ambiguity in light of the legislative history, caselaw, and statutory purpose”); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000) (noting that even when the language of a statute is plain, we may confirm our construction of it by reference to its legislative history). Moreover, when faced with an ambiguous statute, “ ‘courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration].’ ” Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174 , 680 A.2d 1052 (1996) (citation omitted). Therefore, if a statute is ambiguous, an appellate court may consider “ ‘the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.’ ” Briggs v. State, 413 Md. 265, 275 , 992 A.2d 433 (2010) (quoting Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel ⁵⁰¹ County Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135 , 747 A.2d 625 (2000)) (internal quotations and citation