Dorsey v. Wroten

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Harold H. Dorsey, the appellant, appeals from an order refusing to set aside an unenrolled consent decree and the ³⁶⁰ granting of a petition to enforce the decree by the Circuit Court for Carroll County. We find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s petition to set aside the decree; we reverse. On February 7, 1975, the appellant entered into a contract with the appellees, Paul M. and Patricia L. Wroten, for the sale of a parcel of land, owned by the appellant, in Carroll County, Maryland.

As a part of the contract, the appellant further agreed to construct a house. Due to a dispute between the appellant and the developers of the subdivision, which contained the subject property, over a restrictive covenant, a conflict arose between the appellant and appellees concerning completion and possession of the house under construction. As a result of this, a Bill of Complaint for Specific Performance was filed in the Circuit Court for Carroll County by the appellees. Appellant answered this bill of complaint and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied.

The case was set for trial on February 23, 1976. When the case was called, the attorneys for each side approached the bench and requested a “settlement type conference” in the judge’s chambers. After it was explained to him that the attorneys were attempting to work out a settlement, the trial judge stated that there were no other cases scheduled for the remainder of the day so the lawyers could confer with their clients and attempt to work out a settlement; if one could not be reached, then they could return to the courtroom and try the case. Each attorney conferred with his client individually.

After the discussion with his attorney, the appellant maintained reservations about the settlement. Appellant and his attorney met with the attorney for the appellees. There is a discrepancy in the testimony as to whether the appellant actually agreed to the final settlement, but the trial judge found that he did, which we accept. At approximately 12:00 p.m., the lawyers met a second time with the trial judge and informed him that a final settlement had been reached.

The trial judge requested that a consent decree be prepared and presented to him. At 3:15 p.m. the appellant informed his attorney that he would ³⁶¹ not agree to a consent decree. Counsel for the appellant met a third time with the trial judge and informed him that the appellant no longer agreed to a settlement. The trial judge stated that he considered the matter settled and that he would sign the “consent” decree when it was presented.

On February 26,1976, the “consent” decree was signed. It is well established that courts will look with favor on compromise or settlement of lawsuits in the interest of efficient and economical administration of justice and the lessening of friction and acrimony. Chertkof v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 550 , 248 A. 2d 373 (1968). While a settlement agreement is subject to the general rules of contract such as the adequacy of consideration, a consent decree adds a critical element to the contractual act — judicial conclusiveness.

Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 170 , 274 A. 2d 339 (1971). A consent decree is entered under the eye and with the sanction of the court and should be considered a judicial act not open to question or controversy in a collateral proceeding. State, ex. rel. Cox v. Maryland Electric Railways Co., 126 Md. 300, 304 , 95 A. 43 (1915).

The only question that can be raised concerning a consent decree is whether in fact the decree was entered by consent. Prince George’s County v. Barron, 19 Md. App. 348, 349 , 311 A. 2d 453 (1973). In Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 24 , 166 A. 599 (1933), the Court of Appeals refused to grant a motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the decree was a consent decree