Maryland case law › Eakle v. Reynolds

Eakle v. Reynolds

54 Md. 305 (1880) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: AffirmedRobinson, J.✓ Good law
HoldingThis was a bill in equity to set aside a deed of gift made by John Reynolds to his nephew, John Henry Reynolds, on the grounds that the donor was incompetent to make a valid deed or contract and that the deed was obtained by fraud and undue influence.

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This bill is filed to set aside a deed of gift made by John Reynolds to his nephew, John Henry Reynolds. The undisputed facts show that the donor was unmarried and over seventy years of age, and in an extremely feeble condition of health. At the time of the execution of the deed he was, and for several months prior thereto had been, confined to his room, suffering great bodily pain from an attack of dropsy, and from the effects of which he shortly afterwards died.

He had three sisters living, two of whom were poor and in needy circumstances, and nieces and nephews of two sisters deceased and one deceased brother. 307 In November, 1818, he made three wills, in each of which he gave legacies to his sisters and other relatives, varying in amount from ten to twelve thousand dollars ; and in each of which he left his nephew, John Henry Reynolds, executor and residuary legatee. In December following, he made an assignment to the said John Henry, of certain personal property, embracing horses, cattle, crops and farming implements ; and on the 13th of January he made the deed now assailed, by which he conveyed to the donee, subject to a life estate in the donor, a tract of land containing two hundred and sixty acres, and valued at twelve to fifteen thousand dollars. The property belonging to him, and not embraced in the assignment of December, and the deed now in question, was altogether insufficient to pay the legacies under his will. The bill charges that the donor was incompetent to make a valid deed or contract, and that the deed of January 13th was obtained by fraud and undue influence practiced and exercised by tbe donee.

A good deal was said in argument about the relations existing between the donor and donee, and it was insisted that they were of such a character as to bring this case within the well recognized principles of a Court of equity, as applicable to gifts between persons standing in a confidential and fiduciary relation to each other. The proof, however, does not in our opinion justify this contention. It does show that the donee was the favorite nephew of the donor, that he had lived with his uncle from his earliest childhood, and that the most affectionate relations existed between them. It shows also, that for several years prior to the deed, the donee had occasionally transacted business for tbe donor, and that he had during the last sickness of his uncle, the general management of the farm.

But it shows also, that this was done under the general directions of the donor. 308 It does not show that the relation was such as to imply dominion or control either over the property ox person of the donor. On the contrary, it was a relation which one might naturally expect to arise from near kinship and mutual affection. At the same time we deem it proper to say that in view of this close and intimate relation, the age and infirmity of the donoi’, the nature and character of the gift, the fact that in each of the three wills just preceding the deed in question, the donor recognized his sisters and other relatives as objects of his bounty, a Court cannot be too vigilant and cautious in considering the proof, and in determining whether the gift was the free, voluntary and intelligent act of the donor. We come now to consider the proof upon which the deed of January 13th is assailed; and first in regard to the capacity of the donor to make a valid deed or contract.

Quite a number of witnesses, not less than ten, most of whom had known the donor intimately for years, do not hesitate to say that in their opinion, he was at the time of the execution of this deed, incapable of making a valid contract, or an intelligent disposition of his property. The reasons upon which this opinion is founded, are not, it is true, in some cases very satisfactory, being, to some extent at least, based upon his great bodily infirmities and sufferings. It would extend this opinion far beyond what is necessary, to review in detail the testimony of the several witnesses on this subject; but if the case rested solely upon their testimony, we should be obliged to say that the deed in question was not the act of an intelligent and capable person. But against this, we have the testimony of not less than twenty witnesses, the friends and neighbors of the donor,. who had known him for a long number of years, who saw him frequently during his last illness, both before and subsequent to the execution of the deed, all of whom say 309 that although broken down by disease, and suffering great bodily pain, the donor was in the possession of his faculties, and fully competent to execute a deed or contract.

They detail, too, conversations with Kim during this time on a variety of subjects, in regard to business matters, current news of the day, farming, crops, &c., all of which show conclusively that whatever may have been his bodily infirmities, his mind was clear. And in addition to these, we have the testimony of Mr. Syester, who had been for years hi's legal adviser, who prepared the three wills in November, and the deed now in question, and to whom the donor assigned the reasons which induced him to make the several changes in his will, and the reasons by which he was influenced and governed in making the deed of 13th January. It is unnecessary to state in detail the conversation between Mr. Syester and the donor; it shows, however, that the latter was in the full possession of his faculties and understood thoroughly the

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