Earle v. Gunnell

BISHOP, Judge. Steven Earle (Earle), the plaintiff below, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Washington County (Corderman, J.) granting the appellees’, the State and Robert Gunnell (Gunnell), motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. We discern three issues from the appellant’s brief. The first two of these issues are similar to those addressed by the Court of Appeals this term in McCullough ⁶⁵⁰ v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602 , 552 A.2d 881 (1989) (holding that “a Maryland prison inmate, seeking monetary damages for personal injuries resulting from a correctional officer’s alleged tortious conduct, which occurs in one of the institutions covered by the Inmate Grievance Commission statute, must file a complaint with and exhaust his remedies before the Commission prior to bringing a common law tort action.”).

We rephrase Earle’s first two issues in the terms used by the Court of Appeals in McCullough: I. “[Wjhether a Maryland prison inmate, seeking monetary damages [from the State] for personal injuries resulting from a correctional officer’s alleged tortious conduct, which occurs in one of the institutions covered by the Inmate Grievance Commission statute, must file a complaint with and exhaust his remedies before the Commission prior to bringing a ... [claim under the Maryland Tort Claims Act].” McCullough, 314 Md. at 605, 606 , 552 A.2d 881 . II. “[W]hether a Maryland prison inmate, seeking monetary damages for personal injuries resulting from a correctional officer’s alleged tortious conduct, which occurs in one of the institutions covered by the Inmate Grievance Commission statute, must file a complaint with and exhaust his remedies before the Commission prior to bringing ... a [cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ]”. McCullough, 314 Md. at 605, 606 , 552 A.2d 881 .

III

Whether appellant alleged facts sufficient to raise a constitutional claim against appellee, Gunnell, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . FACTS On February 20, 1985, Earle, an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown, was attacked in his cell and stabbed repeatedly by two fellow inmates. As a result of this incident, Earle filed a two-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Washington County. Count I was brought pursuant to Title 42, U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that Gunnell, in his capacity as a State correctional officer, had violated Earle’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process ⁶⁵¹ Rights; Count II alleged a negligence claim against the State under the Maryland Tort Claims Act.

The State and Gunnell responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss both counts, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on both counts. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment 1 on Count I on the ground that Earle’s allegation against Gunnell stated, at most, a claim for mere negligence and, therefore, was insufficient as a matter of law to support a § 1983 action for deprivation of due process. The court also granted the motion to dismiss Count II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Earle’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedy provided by the Inmate Grievance Commission, Md.Ann. Code art. 41, § 4-102.1(7) (1986 & Supp.1988) formerly § 4-1104(7 ). 2 We first dispose of Earle’s complaints regarding the court’s disposition of Count II. I. Tort Claims Act (Count II) Appellant’s first issue was answered by the Court of Appeals this term in the case of McCullough v. Wittner, in ⁶⁵² which the Court held that a prison inmate, who had filed a common law tort action for monetary damages for personal injuries resulting from a correctional officer’s alleged tortious conduct at the Maryland House of Correction, was required to first exhaust his administrative remedies provided under § 4-102.1.

Although Earl’s complaint was instituted under the Maryland Tort Claims Act rather than, as in McCullough , under the common law, this difference is irrelevant to the applicability of the Court’s rationale. The holding in McCullough is based on the Court’s conclusion that the Inmate Grievance Commission has statutory authority to consider “any grievance or complaint [filed by an inmate] against any officials or employees of the Division of Corrections----” § 4-102.1(d), and until that administrative remedy is exhausted, “no court shall entertain ... [the] complaint----” 4-102. l(i). Accordingly, we hold that a Maryland prison inmate, seeking monetary damages from the State for personal injuries resulting from a correctional officer’s alleged tortious conduct, which occurs in one of the institutions covered by the Inmate Grievance Commission statute, must file a complaint and exhaust his remedies before the Commission, before proceeding with a claim under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. The disposition of appellant’s first issue does not end our discussion of the circuit court’s dismissal of Count II of the complaint sub judice.

As the Court held in McCullough : Under circumstances like these, where a plaintiff has both an administrative remedy and an independent judicial action, and the administrative agency’s jurisdiction is deemed primary, it is appropriate for the trial court to retain, for a reasonable period of time, jurisdiction over the independent judicial action pending invocation and exhaustion of the administrative procedures. McCullough v. Wittner, at 612, 552 A.2d 881 . Accordingly, that portion of the circuit court’s ruling which dismissed Count II of the complaint is reversed in order that the trial court “retain, for a reasonable period of time, jurisdiction ⁶⁵³ over the independent judicial action pending ... exhaustion of the administrative procedures.” Id. at 613 , 552 A.2d 881 . II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I) The circuit court and the parties assumed, without having raised the issue, that exhaustion of the administrative remedy provided by § 4-102.1 is not a prerequisite to bringing an action under § 1983.

Although this issue was not raised below, this Court is free to decide it sua sponte on appeal. Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 787 , 506 A.2d 625 (1986). While the failure to invoke and exhaust an administrative remedy does not ordinarily result in a trial court’s being deprived of fundamental jurisdiction, nevertheless, because of the public policy involved, the matter is for some purposes treated like a jurisdictional question. Consequently, issues of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies will be addressed by this Court sua sponte even though not raised by any party.

See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Mass Transit, 294 Md. 225, 232 , 449 A.2d 385 (1982); Sec. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Wilson, supra, 286 Md. [639] at 645, 409 A.2d 713 [1979]. The question as to whether state administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to proceeding with a § 1983 action was previously decided by this Court in Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n v. Crawford, 59 Md.App. 276 , 475 A.2d 494 (1984), aff'd 307 Md. 1 , 511 A.2d 1079 (1986). We held in that case that “Crawford was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the [Md. Nat’l Cap.

P. & P.] Commission prior to instituting her § 1983 action in the Circuit Court____” Judge Alpert explained for the Court that this holding was necessitated by a series of Supreme Court decisions which rejected the argument that ⁶⁵⁴ a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the plaintiff has not exhausted State administrative remedies: In Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 , 102 S.Ct. 2557 , 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), the Supreme Court expressly held that “exhaustion of State remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” Id. at 516, 102 S.Ct. at 2568 . The Court did not treat the issue as one of first impression. Rather, the Patsy decision was an affirmation of the principles set out in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 , 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435 , 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). Speaking through Justice Douglas, the McNeese Court stated that “relief under [§ 1983] may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a remedy.” Id. at 671, 83 S.Ct. at 1435 .

This is so because “[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.” Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 , 81 S.Ct. 473, 482 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)). Id. [59 Md.App.] at 290, 475 A.2d 494 . See also Marker v. Talley, 502 A.2d 972, 976, 977 (Del.Super.1985); Bungs Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Tp., 206 N.J.Super. 432 , 502 A.2d 1198, 1216 (1985); O’Connors v. Helfgott, 481 A.2d 388, 391 (R.I.1984).

The soundness of our reasoning in Crawford was brought into question by the discussions of the courts of several other states which considered this issue and concluded that the holding in Patsy does not affect actions brought in State courts. E.g., Bartschi v. Chico Community Mem. Hosp., 137 Cal.App.3d 502, 508 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 61 (1982); State ex. rel. Basham v. Med.

Licensing Bd., 451 N.E.2d 691, 694 (Ind.App.1983). These courts properly contend that “[t]he [Patsy ] decision rests heavily on the paramount role assigned by Congress to the Federal courts to protect the [constitutional] rights guaranteed by section 1983.” Bartschi, 137 Cal.App.3d at 508 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 61 ⁶⁵⁵ (emphasis in original). As the Supreme Court reasoned in Patsy : The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to throw open the doors of the United States courts to individuals who were threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights ... and to provide these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. 102 S.Ct. at 2561 (citations omitted, emphasis added); and also in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 , 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1222 , 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974): When federal claims are premised on [§ 1983] — as they are here — we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights. (emphasis added).

Our own Court of Appeals, in reviewing Crawford , expressed some doubt that the holding in Patsy actually affects § 1983 actions which are brought in State courts. Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court, commented in dicta: While Patsy involved a § 1983 action brought in a federal court, the majority of state court decisions since Patsy have taken the position that the Patsy holding is applicable to a state court § 1983 action. See, e.g., Beitel v. Board of School Com’rs of Mobile, 419 So.2d 242, 245 (Ala.App.1982); Logan v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 136 Cal.App.3d 116, 124 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 878 (1982); Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, 194 Conn. 677, 690 , 485 A.2d 1272, 1279 (1984); Fetterman v. University of Conn., 192 Conn. 539, 549 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984);....

Of course, as we recently emphasized in County Exec., Prince Geo’s County v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 454 , 479 A.2d 352 (1984), “when an action is brought in a state court to enforce rights or claims under federal law, the Suprema ⁶⁵⁶ cy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that federal law and policy be applied by the state court.” Consequently, if Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 intended that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be a prerequisite to bringing an action under that federal statute, regardless of the judicial forum, then the “Maryland policy” concerning invocation and exhaustion of administrative remedies would be immaterial, and the Patsy holding would be fully applicable to state court § 1983 actions. The defendants and amici argue, however, that the congressional intent in § 1983, that state administrative remedies need not be invoked or exhausted, was aimed solely at federal court actions, and that Congress did not have such intent with regard to state court § 1983 actions. They contend that the legislative history and reasoning relied on by the Supreme Court in the Patsy opinion related only to federal court suits under § 1983. In the present case, we need not and do not reach this argument because there was no violation of any applicable state law primary jurisdiction or exhaustion requirement. 307 Md. 12 -15, 511 A.2d 1079 .

Apparently, as this quoted language indicates, the Court was not thoroughly convinced by our reasoning in Crawford that Congress intended that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be a prerequisite to bringing an action under § 1983 in state courts. We believe that this issue may be resolved by reference to the second, independent leg of the Patsy holding which involves the congressional intent in the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Section 1997e, which is a component of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. provides a mechanism whereby “courts” can stay a § 1983 action, filed by either a state or federal prisoner, for up to 90 days “in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are avail ⁶⁵⁷ able,” § 1997e(a)(l), 3 but such a stay is available only if the administrative remedy meets certain specific minimum standards listed in § 1997e relating to time constraints, fairness, etc. 4 The legislative history of this section indicates that Congress hoped to employ their Fourteenth Amendment powers through § 1997e to remove unnecessary burdens on the life and liberty of State prisoners by encouraging the States to “develop high quality grievance resolution systems ... [and thereby] encourage resolution of problems by the persons involved in the prison administration ... [in order to] develop a sensitivity that may have otherwise been lacking.” S.Rep. No. 416, 96th Cong, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 787, 816.

The congressional intent to encourage State prison reforms is explicit and there can be little doubt that this policy would be hindered if the state courts were to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies which do not meet the minimum standards set by § 1997e. Therefore, in enacting § 1997e Congress must have intended that exhaus ⁶⁵⁸ tion of State administrative procedures should not inhibit a § 1983 action, regardless of the forum (State or Federal), except where the administrative grievance procedure satisfies the strict § 1997e guidelines. 5 Although this § 1983 action was brought in the State and not the Federal courts, we are required to enforce the congressional intent underlying § 1997e because “when an action is brought in a state court to enforce rights or claims under federal law, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that federal law and policy be applied by the state court.” County Exec., Prince Geo’s County v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 454 , 479 A.2d 352 (1984). Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Crawford that, regardless of the judicial forum, exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action under § 1983; the provisions of Art. 41 § 4-102.1(7) notwithstanding. 6 We qualify this holding by noting that exhaustion of the administrative procedures under a future version of Art. 41 § 4-102 might be required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e if, at some point, that section is amended ⁶⁵⁹ such that a court is able to conclude that the Maryland law complies with the minimum standards for inmate grievance procedures established by § 1997e. HI Constitutional Claim (Count I) The circuit court judge ruled, by way of granting the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, 7 that Gunnell’s conduct was insufficient to stand as the basis for a § 1983 suit.

The court concluded that Gunnell’s actions, as described in Earle’s affidavit, amounted to mere negligence and, therefore, “did not approach the sort of abusive government conduct necessary to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause.” We agree. ⁶⁶⁰ Maryland Rule 2-501(e),