Edmondson v. Brady

Collins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the refusal of Judge Joseph Sherbow of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City to grant the appellant, Dorsey Edmondson, a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury of Baltimore City on three indictments, each containing four counts, charging him respectively with breaking an out-house with the intent to commit a felony therein, violation of the Rogue and Vagabond Statute, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. He pleaded not guilty.

The docket entries do not show what disposition was made of the third count of each indictment. He was found not guilty by the Court on the first and fourth counts of each indictment and guilty on the second count of each indictment. He was sentenced, on July 24, 1942, to one year on each indictment, the sentences to run consecutively. On September 19, 1944, he was indicted by the Grand Jury of St. Mary’s County for unlawfully escaping from the Maryland House of Correction, Leonardtown Road Camp.

On September 22, 1944, at a jury trial, he was found guilty of that charge and sentenced to an additional term of three years, to begin at the expiration of the three sentences given him on July 24, 1942. ⁹⁹ In his petition for writ of habeas corpus he contests the validity of his commitments under both the rogue and vagabond and the escape charges. He assigns as error: (1) That his arrests on all charges were illegal. (2) That he was illegally held in the State of Pennsylvania and illegally returned to the State of Maryland. (3) That there were no witnesses who testified against him on the rogue and vagabond charges.

(4) That he was put in jeopardy three times for the same offense. (5) That he should have been tried under 18 U. S. C. A., Section 408'e, known as the “Fugitive Felon Act,” rather than for the crime of escape. (6) That he was denied witnesses at his trial. (7) That he was not permitted to select his own jury at his trial in St. Mary’s County. 1 and 2.

After final judgment of conviction, the jurisdiction of the Court rendering the judgment, cannot be questioned on the grounds that the accused was brought before it in an improper manner. In the case of Rigor v. State, 101 Md. 465 , 61 A. 631 , 4 Ann. Cas. 719, the accused was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and sentenced to the Maryland Penitentiary. While in the penitentiary, he was taken to the Criminal Court of Baltimore City on a writ of habeas corpus to plead to an indictment charging him with assault with intent to kill. He questioned the right of the Criminal Court of Baltimore City to try him during the time he was serving the sentence imposed'by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

He was found guilty in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City and sentenced to an additional term in the Maryland Penitentiary, this term to start at the expiration of the sentence he was then serving. Chief J udge McSherry, in disposing of Rigor’s contention, that he should not have been brought in the Baltimore City Court on the writ of habeas corpus, said at page 473 of 101 Md., at page 634 of 61 A.: “After final judgment of conviction the jurisdiction of the court cannot be ¹⁰⁰ questioned by an inquiry into the manner in which the accused was brought before it; and this is true even though the prisoner had been kidnapped and forcibly brought before the court from a foreign jurisdiction. [Ex parte Ah Men], 77 Cal. [198], 202, [ 19 P. 380 , 11 Am. St. Rep. 263 ]. So in Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. [700], 708, 8 S. Ct. 1204 , 32 L. Ed. 283 , the Supreme Court declared that the jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment is found is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is brought before it.

The Criminal Court of Baltimore City had jurisdiction of the offense charged against the plaintiff in error by the grand jury of Baltimore City, and when the accused was brought into that court the court acquired jurisdiction over him, and after he was put upon trial and was convicted and sentenced, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be questioned by an inquiry into the manner in which he was brought before it.” It was further said in the case of Sheehan v. Huff, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 391, 142 F. 2d 81 : “Counsel for petitioner, appointed by this court to represent him on appeal, has filed a persuasive brief. It admits that the Supreme Court has decided that jurisdiction in a criminal case is not impaired by the fact that the accused was brought before the court in an unlawful manner, but urges these decisions should not be followed. We believe, however, that the question is so well settled that it cannot be reopened here. Mahon v. Justice, 1888, 127 U. S. 700 , 8 S. Ct. 1204 , 32 L. Ed. 283 ; Lascelles v. [State of] Georgia, 1893, 148 U. S. 537 , 13 S. Ct. 687 , 37 L. Ed. 549 ; Pettibone v. Nichols, 1906, 203 U. S. 192 , 27 S. Ct. 111 , 51 L. Ed. 148 , 7 Ann. Cas. 1047.” 3.

On a writ of habeas corpus the Court cannot question the guilt or innocence of the petitioner or inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence offered at the trial to prove his guilt. Bernard v. Warden, 187 Md. 273 , 49 A. 2d 737 ; Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341 ,