Edward W. McCready Memorial Hospital v. Hauser

CHASANOW, Judge. I. In 1976, the General Assembly enacted the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute (the Statute) in response to explosive growth in medical malpractice claims and the resulting effect on health care providers’ ability to obtain malpractice insurance. Chapter 235 of the 1976 Acts of Maryland; see generally K. Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland’s Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U.BaltL.Rev. 74 (1980) (describing evolution of Statute and assessing its early effectiveness). “[T]he general thrust of the Act [is] that medical malpractice claims be submitted to arbitration as a precondition to court action” where the potential claim exceeds the district court’s concurrent jurisdiction. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 278-79 , 385 A.2d 57, 60 (1978); see also Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91 , 447 A.2d 860, 865 (1982); Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-2A-02(a). 1 The ⁵⁰¹ basic procedures for initiating and maintaining a claim under the Statute are clear and simple.

The Statute requires that a person with a medical malpractice claim first file that claim with the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO). § 3-2A-04(a). Thereafter, the plaintiff must file a certificate of qualified expert (expert’s certificate) attesting to a defendant’s departure from the relevant standards of care which proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(i). In general, the Statute mandates that the HCAO dismiss, without prejudice, any claim where the plaintiff fails to file an expert’s certificate within 90 days, § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(i), unless the plaintiff obtains one of three statutory extensions of the time to file an expert’s certificate: § 3-2A-04(b)(5), 2 § 3-2A-05(j), 3 and § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii). At issue in the instant case is the interpretation and application of the latter provision, § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii).

II

On March 14, 1990, five days before the statute of limitations on their claim was to run, Maxine Hauser and her husband John filed a claim with the HCAO against Dr. Christjon J. Huddleston, Dr. Gregory N. Thompson, and the Edward W. McCready Memorial Hospital (the Defendants), as required by § 3-2A-04(b)(l) of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute. The Hausers alleged that Dr. Huddleston and Dr. Thompson negligently diagnosed her condition, allowing a cancerous tumor to go untreated which ultimate ⁵⁰² ly resulted in the loss of a portion of her left lung. The claim further alleged that McCready Hospital, as Dr. Huddleston’s employer, was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Although their claim was timely filed, the Hausers failed to file an expert’s certificate with the HCAO within 90 days as required by § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(i), which provides: “(b) Filing and service of certificate of qualified expert. — Unless the sole issue in the claim is lack of informed consent: (1X0 Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, a claim filed after July 1, 1986, shall be dismissed, without prejudice, if the claimant fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert with the Director attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury, within 90 days from the date of the complaint.

The claimant shall serve a copy of the certificate on all parties to the claim or their attorneys of record in accordance with the Maryland Rules.” After the 90-day filing period expired on June 13, 1990, all the Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Each Defendant asserted that the Hausers failed to file a timely expert’s certificate. On July 3, 1990, 111 days after filing their claim, the Hausers responded to the motions to dismiss. They did not file an expert’s certificate; they did, however, request a 90-day extension under § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii), which provides: “(ii) In lieu of dismissing the claim, the panel chairman shall grant an extension of no more than 90 days for filing the certificate required by this paragraph, if: 1.

The limitations period applicable to the claim has expired; and 2. The failure to file the certificate was neither willful nor the result of gross negligence.” The Hausers alleged that the statute of limitations had run and that their failure to file the expert’s certificate was ⁵⁰³ neither willful nor a result of gross negligence. The Hausers did not seek a “good cause” extension under § 3-2A-04(b)(5) or § 3-2A-05(j) or otherwise allege that “good cause” existed for an extension. The HCAO did not take any immediate action on this request, but scheduled a hearing on October 9, 1990.

Following the hearing on October 17, 1990 (217 days after filing the claim), the Panel Chair dismissed the Hausers’ claims for failure either to file an expert certification or request an extension within the initial 90-day period following the filing of their claim. At the time the Panel issued its ruling, the Hausers still had not filed the required certificate. The Hausers filed a notice rejecting the orders and findings of the Panel Chair and instituted an action in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County to nullify those orders and findings, asserting claims identical to those brought before the HCAO. The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the Hausers failed to arbitrate their claims before the HCAO by their failure to file an expert’s certificate.

In response, the Hausers contended that § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii) created a mandatory extension for filing an expert’s certificate and that the Panel Chair therefore erred in failing to grant their request for such an extension. The circuit court, Judge Richard D. Warren, granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Hausers’ action. In doing so, Judge Warren essentially interpreted § 8-2A-04(b)(l)(ii) as providing a mandatory and automatic 90-day extension. Based on this interpretation, Judge Warren ruled that the Hausers had already received their required 90-day extension because the Panel did not dismiss their claim until thirty-seven days after the total 180-day period provided for in the Statute.

The judge concluded that the Hausers did not comply with the Statute since, even by the time of the HCAO hearing on the motion to dismiss, they had not filed the required expert’s certificate. The Hausers appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court. The Court of Special Appeals ⁵⁰⁴ agreed that the 90-day extension under § 3 — 2A—04(b)(l)(ii) was mandatory where the statute of limitations had run and where the claimants’ failure to file was not willful or grossly negligent.

The intermediate appellate court held, however, that the circuit court erred in ruling that the Hausers had already received their 90-day extension and that the extension period ran during the Panel Chair’s inaction on the extension request. Instead, the intermediate court decided that the Hausers had never received a 90-day extension. Although the court held that the extension was mandatory, it reasoned that the second 90-day period could not have commenced until the Hausers received notice of the Panel’s decision granting their motion for an extension. The court held that, until that time, the Hausers had no obligation to file an expert’s certificate.

We granted certiorari to address this matter of statutory , construction. 328 Md. 35 , 612 A.2d 897 (1992).

III

The issue before this Court concerns the interpretation of the 90-day extension provided by § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii). In undertaking the task of interpreting, we are guided by the rule that “[i]n construing a legislative enactment the fundamental judicial task is to determine and effectuate the legislature’s intent____” Scheve v. Shudder, 328 Md. 363, 371 , 614 A.2d 582, 586 (1992). To achieve this goal, “the words of the statute are to be given their ordinary and natural import ... since the language of the statute is the primary source for determining legislative intent.” Revis v. Maryland Auto. Ins.

Fund, 322 Md. 683, 686 , 589 A.2d 483, 484 (1991) (citations omitted). In addition, “a provision contained within an integrated statutory scheme must be understood in that context and harmonized to the extent possible with the other provisions of the statutory scheme.” Balto. Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 305 Md. 145, 157 , 501 A.2d 1307, 1313 (1986) (citations omitted). ⁵⁰⁵ A. The Defendants contend that the Court of Special Appeals erred in not following Robinson v. Pleet, 76 Md. App. 173 , 544 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 313 Md. 689 , 548 A.2d 128 (1988).

At issue in Robinson was the timing of a request for a “good cause” extension to file an expert’s certificate under § 3-2A-04(b)(5). As in this case, the claimant in Robinson filed her claim with the HCAO just before the expiration of the statute of limitations, but failed to file either the required expert’s certificate or a request for an extension before the 90-day period expired. As a result, the panel chair granted a defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the then-existing version of § 3-2A-04(b)(l) required dismissal of a claim where claimants did not file an expert’s certificate or request an extension of the time to file within 90 days of initiating a claim. 4 In upholding the circuit court, the Court of Special Appeals touched upon the interrelationship of § 3-2A-04(b)(l) and a § 3-2A-04(b)(5) extension.

That court expressed its interpretation of that interrelationship as follows: “Subsection (b)(1) (which states that the certificate must be filed within 90 days) and subsection (b)(5) (which gives a claimant the right to request an extension) can be construed consistently if (b)(5) simply gives a claimant the right to request an extension before the expiration of the 90 day period. If such a request is not made and granted, then dismissal is mandatory under (b)(1) for noncompliance with the statute.” (Emphasis in original). Id. at 183, 544 A.2d at 5-6 . From this, the Defendants assert that under Robinson , the Hausers were required to request an extension under § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii) within the ⁵⁰⁶ initial 90-day filing period.

They reason that since the Hausers failed to do so, the Hausers were not entitled to an extension. We do not now express an opinion as to the viability of Robinson and the time frame in which a claimant must request an extension under § 3-2A-04(b)(5). This issue need not be decided in the instant case. 5 Nevertheless, we note that the Defendants’ reliance on Robinson is misplaced. The issue in Robinson was the timing of a request for a “good cause” extension under § 3-2A-04(b)(5), not an extension under § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii).

In fact, Robinson not only predated § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii), the provision at issue in the instant case, but the General Assembly enacted the provision at issue here in response to Robinson. Robinson construed § 3-2A-04(b)(l) as mandating that a panel chair dismiss a claim for failing to file a timely expert’s certificate, without first giving the claimant an opportunity to rectify the defect. This result was potentially harsh where the statute of limitations had run because such claimants were time barred from refiling their claims, despite the fact that the claims may have been meritorious and timely when filed. The legislative response to Robinson was swift.

In the very next legislative session, H.B. 766 was introduced and directly addressed Robinson’s holding. Not only does the Bill File for H.B. 766 contain a copy of Robinson v. Pleet, but H.B. 766 initially sought to change paragraph (b)(l)’s mandatory dismissal provision to a discretionary one. See Bill Analysis, H.B. 766, 1989 Session (stating that the proposed bill “authorizes, rather than requires, a claim to be dismissed if the claimant fails to file, within 90 days from the date of the complaint, a certificate of a qualified ex- ⁵⁰⁷ pert____”) (Emphasis added). The bill approved by the House Judiciary Committee provided: “FOR the purpose of providing that dismissal, without prejudice, of a claim filed in the Health Claims Arbitration Office is discretionary if the claimant fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert under certain circumstances; ... 3-2A-04.

(b) Unless the sole issue in the claim is lack of informed consent: (1) A claim filed after July, 1, 1986, shall MAY be dismissed without prejudice, if the claimant fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert with the Director ... within 90 days from the date of the complaint....” [The underlined portions indicate proposed amendments to the bill, and those with strikeouts indicate proposed deletions from the bill.] This suggested amendment of § 3-2A-04(b)(l) was hotly contested and subsequent versions of the bill vacillated as to whether the dismissal of a claim should be mandatory or discretionary where the claimant failed to file an expert’s certificate within the stipulated 90 days. See Bill File, H.B. 766 (1989) (containing several drafts whose proposed wording of amended paragraph (b)(1) alternated between “shall” and “may”). The enacted version of the bill was a compromise. It left the mandatory language of paragraph (b)(1) intact as