Edwards Systems Technology v. Corbin

ELDRIDGE, Judge. In this case, the petitioners contend that the combined operation of Prince George’s County anti-discrimination ordinances and a state statute violates Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. The state statute, Maryland Code (1957, 2003 RepLVol.), Art. 49B, § 42, authorizes, in three Maryland counties, the enforcement of local anti-discrimination ordinances by causes of action in the circuit courts. I. The facts of this case, which are not in dispute, were set forth in the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals as follows: “Appellant, Cynthia Corbin, is a black female.

On March 11, 1996, she was hired by EST [Edwards Systems Technology, Inc.] as a Service Agreement Sales Specialist. On December 30, 1996, Corbin was promoted to the position of Operations Manager for EST’s Services Division’s Washington, D.C.branch.[ 1 ] “While Corbin held the position of Operations Manager, appellee Anderson, a white male, was employed as EST’s ²⁸² District Manager. Corbin lodged numerous complaints to Anderson and his superiors about alleged discriminatory practices and about Anderson’s billing and contract-letting practices. “In August 1997, Anderson informed Corbin that EST would demote her to the position of Service Agreement Sales Specialist. Anderson further noted that he would take the position that she would be forced to vacate.

Consequently, Corbin contacted the Regional Manager, who confirmed that the company was demoting Anderson because he was unable to perform the duties of District Manager in a satisfactory manner. The demotions became effective in late February 1998. Corbin assumed the position of Customer Service Specialist and Anderson became the Operations Manager for the Services Division’s Washington, D.C. branch. “Corbin alleges that from February 1998 to March 1999, Anderson consistently assigned his duties as Operations Manager to her. As a result, tensions continued to rise between the two parties and Corbin informed the Branch Manager and his supervisors that she was doing the brunt of Anderson’s work and should be reassigned to the position. “Corbin further alleges that on February 19, 1999, she approached Anderson to inquire as to what employees would be attending an upcoming trade show.

Despite the fact that, as a member of the sponsor organization, she requested to attend, Anderson did not respond. “Subsequently, on February 25,1999, the day of the trade show, at approximately 8:20 a.m., Anderson entered Cor-bin’s office to ask her for a trade show video. As Anderson was exiting the office, he stopped to ask if Corbin was planning on attending the trade show that day. Corbin informed Anderson that she did not plan on attending because he had not responded to her request to attend and as a result she did not obtain a ticket. Anderson insisted that she did not need a ticket to enter, but Corbin insisted ²⁸³ otherwise.

Anderson then threw a ticket in Corbin’s direction, voiced his displeasure with Corbin, and left. “Corbin subsequently walked to Anderson’s office to return the ticket and inform him that she would not be attending. Corbin claims that as she left the office Anderson followed her and began shouting at her. Anderson continued to follow Corbin into her office and continued to yell. Corbin further alleged ... that Anderson slammed his fist on her desk and attempted to prevent her from leaving the office.

Despite his presence, Corbin did leave the office. Anderson followed so Corbin returned to her office and locked the door. She then telephoned Corporate Headquarters to report the incident.” Corbin filed a six-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, asserting claims against Edwards Systems and Anderson, and seeking money damages. In the first three counts, Corbin alleged that Edwards Systems violated Division 12, § 2-185, et seq. of the Prince George’s County Code (1999), and specifically §§ 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 which define and prohibit discrimination in employment. 2 Count one claimed that Edwards Systems demoted Corbin because of her race and sex, and count two alleged harassment and discrimination based on race and marital status.

Count ²⁸⁴ three stated that the employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation for a disability. Corbin’s asserted causes of action against Edwards Systems, encompassed by the first three counts, were based upon the state statute, Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 42, coupled with §§ 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code. 3 The remaining three counts initially alleged “common law” causes of action against Anderson. Count four was based upon an alleged civil assault; count five asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress, and count six charged “racial harassment.” On April 10, 2000, both defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. They argued that counts one, two, and three should be dismissed, because they were predicated on the combined operation of Art. 49B, § 42, and the local anti-discrimination law, and that this combined operation violated Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution as applied in McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12 , 570 A.2d 834 (1990).

In addition, the ²⁸⁵ defendants maintained that count two failed to state a claim against Edwards Systems for harassment and discrimination based on marital status. Finally, they asserted that counts three through six failed to state a claim. After the filing of Corbin’s opposition to the motion to dismiss and the submission of several memoranda, the Circuit Court held a hearing on October 6, 2000. During the hearing, Corbin “withdrew” count three.

Corbin also stated that count six, setting forth an alleged cause of action for “racial harassment,” was against both Edwards Systems and Anderson and was based on the same statutory provisions as counts one and two. The Circuit Court at the hearing decided that counts four, five, and six would be dismissed for failure to state a claim, although the dismissal of count six would be with leave to amend. Corbin requested that the dismissal of count four be with leave to amend, but the court denied this request. The Circuit Court also dismissed counts one, two, and six on the ground that Art. 49B, § 42, coupled with the local anti-discrimination ordinances, violated Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.

The dismissal of counts one and two was also with leave to amend, in order for the plaintiff to allege discrimination claims under federal law if she chose to do so. The determinations made at the October 6th hearing were recorded on a separate document that day and were thereafter duly entered on the docket. Nevertheless, there was no appealable final judgment at that time because of the leave to amend counts one, two, and six. Makovi v. Sherwi-Williams Co., 311 Md. 278, 281-282 , 533 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1987), and cases there cited.

Within ten days of the October 6, 2000, determinations, Corbin filed in the Circuit Court a motion to reconsider the dismissals of counts one, two, and six, and to reconsider the denial of leave to amend with regard to count four. At about the same time, the defendants removed the case from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The case was docketed in the United States District Court on October 16, ²⁸⁶ 2000. The defendants also filed an opposition to Corbin’s motion for reconsideration.

Next, on December 26, 2000, the United States District Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for further proceedings in the latter court, holding that “the case was wrongly removed from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.” The plaintiff Corbin decided not to amend her complaint, and on April 16, 2001, the circuit judge signed an “Order” denying Corbin’s motion to reconsider and effectively terminating the action in the Circuit Court. The order was filed and entered on the docket on April 17, 2001. Thereafter, Corbin took a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the dismissal on state constitutional grounds of counts one, two, and six, and challenging the trial judge’s denial of leave to amend with respect to count 4. The Court of Special Appeals, agreeing with Corbin’s arguments, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

The intermediate appellate court held that Art. 49B, § 42, coupled with the Prince George’s County anti-discrimination ordinances, did not violate Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, and that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing counts one, two, and six on the ground that the above-mentioned statutes violated the Constitution. In addition, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court abused its discretion by refusing leave to amend count four of the complaint. 4 ²⁸⁷ The defendants filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the single issue of whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the'cause of action authorized by Art. 49B, § 42, combined with the Prince George’s County anti-discrimination ordinances, did not violate Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. The certiorari petition did not present any other constitutional or non-constitutional issues, and did not challenge the Court of Special Appeals’ decision regarding leave to amend count four of the complaint. The plaintiff Corbin did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari presenting any additional issues.

We granted the petition, Edwards Systems v. Corbin, 372 Md. 429 , 813 A.2d 257 (2002), and shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 5 II. Before addressing the petitioners’ argument based on Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, it would be useful to review the constitutional background and the case on which the petitioners chiefly rely, McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, supra, 319 Md. 12 , 570 A.2d 834 . Prince George’s County is a chartered home rule county under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. In McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, involving a Montgomery County ordinance, ²⁸⁸ we set forth the history and purpose of Article XI-A as follows ( 319 Md. at 16-17 , 570 A.2d at 835-836 ): “Article X1-A was proposed by Ch. 416 of the Laws of Maryland of 1914 and ratified by the voters on November 2, 1915.

The Article, known as the Home Rule Amendment, enabled counties, which chose to adopt a home rule charter, to achieve a significant degree of political self-determination. Its purpose was to transfer the General Assembly’s power to enact many types of county public local laws to the Art. XI-A home rule counties. See generally, e.g., Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 316 Md. 332, 344 , 558 A.2d 724 (1988); Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381, 384 , 470 A.2d 345 (1984); Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 342 , 435 A.2d 425 (1981); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 597-598 , 415 A.2d 255 (1980). As the Court explained in State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 422 , 137 A. 39, 41 (1927) (emphasis supplied): ‘The wisdom of incorporating in the organic law of the state such provisions as are contained in this article had been urged for a number of years prior to its adoption, the reasons assigned by its proponents being that a larger measure of home rule be secured to the people of the respective political subdivisions of the state in matters of purely local concern, in order that there should be the fullest measure of local self-government, and that these local questions should thus be withdrawn from consideration by the General Assembly, leaving that body more time to consider and pass upon general legislation, and to prevent the passage of such legislation from being influenced by what is popularly known as “log-rolling”; that is, by influencing the attitude and vote of members of the General Assembly upon proposed general laws by threatening the defeat or promising the support of local legislation in which a particular member might be peculiarly interested.’ “Sections 1 and 1A of Article XI-A empower Baltimore City and the counties of Maryland to adopt a charter form of local government.

Section 2 directs the General Assembly ²⁸⁹ to provide a grant of express powers for charter home rule counties. The General Assembly followed that directive and enacted the Express Powers Act by Ch. 456 of the Laws of Maryland of 1918, codified as Code (1957, 1987 RepLVol.), Art. 25A. Section 3 of Article XI-A provides (emphasis supplied): ‘From and after the adoption of a charter by the City of Baltimore, or any County of this State, as hereinbefore provided, the Mayor of Baltimore and City Council of the City of Baltimore or the County Council of said County, subject to the Constitution and Public General Laws of this State, shall have full power to enact local laws of said city or county ... upon all matters covered by the express powers granted as above provided.... ’ “Article XI-A ‘does not constitute a grant of absolute autonomy to local governments.’ Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, 283 Md. 48, 56 , 388 A.2d 523, 529 (1978). This Court’s decisions and the above-quoted passage make it clear that the Home Rule Amendment limits the ...

County Council to enacting ‘local laws’ on matters covered by the Express Powers Act.” “In prohibiting the General Assembly from enacting public local laws for Baltimore City and charter home rule counties on subjects covered by the Express Powers Act, Section 4 of Article XI-A states that ‘[a]ny law so drawn as to apply to two or more of the geographical subdivisions of this State shall not be deemed a Local Law, within the meaning of this Act.’ As this Court has pointed out, ‘[ajpart from that limitation, [Article XI-A] attempts no definition of the distinction between a local law and a general law, but leaves that question to be determined by the application of settled legal principles to the facts of particular cases in which the distinction may be involved.’ Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 260 , 183 A. 534, 537-538 (1936).” For more recent discussions concerning Article XI-A, see Piscatelli v. Board of Liquor License Commissioners, 378 Md. ²⁹⁰ 623, 633-634, 837 A.2d 931, 937-938 (2003); Holiday v. Montgomery County, 377 Md. 305, 313-319 , 833 A.2d 518 (2003); H.P. White v. Blackburn, 372 Md. 160, 167-171 , 812 A.2d 305 (2002); Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 504-514 , 801 A.2d 148 (2002); Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 579 , 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001). McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, supra, concerned the validity of a Montgomery County ordinance which created a new circuit court cause of action by one who had been discriminated against in violation of the Montgomery County Code. Robert Fowler, a manager of a McCrory Corporation store in Montgomery County, alleged that McCrory harassed and thereafter constructively discharged him in retaliation for his refusal to implement McCrary’s alleged discriminatory hiring practices. Fowler filed, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, an action against McCrory under, inter alia, § 27-20(a) of the Montgomery County Code, which created a new circuit court cause of action to remedy the violation of the local anti-discrimination ordinances.

Section 27-20(a) of the Montgomery County Code, which had been enacted by the Montgomery County Council, authorized the recovery of money damages without any statutory limitations, or an injunction, or “other civil relief, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” Fowler sought to recover over $1.8 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The McCrory case was removed from the Circuit Court to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The federal court subsequently certified to this Court questions concerning the validity, under both state public general law and under the Maryland Constitution, of § 27-20(a) of the Montgomery County Code which created the cause of action. After emphasizing in McCrory that Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution authorized chartered county councils to enact only “local laws,” we turned to the issue of whether § 27-20(a) of the Montgomery County Code was a “local law” within the meaning of Article XI-A. We initially pointed out that “[s]everal decisions by this Court illustrate that laws, ²⁹¹ which may appear to be local in form, might not constitute ‘local laws’ under Article XI-A.” McCrory, 319 Md. at 18 , 570 A.2d at 837 .

The McCrory opinion continued: “ ‘[A] law is not necessarily a local law merely because its operation is confined ... to a single county, if it affects the interests of the people of the whole State.’ ” Ibid., quoting Gaither v. Jackson, 147 Md. 655, 667 , 128 A. 769, 773 (1925). See also Holiday v. Montgomery County, supra, 377 Md. at 319 , 833 A.2d at 526-527 , where the Court recently stated that, if a chartered county ordinance “substantially affects persons and entities outside of [the] County,” then “it is not a local law and is facially unconstitutional under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.” The McCrory opinion then pointed out, 319 Md. at 20 , 570 A.2d at 838 , that chartered counties could enact anti-discrimination ordinances, could authorize adjudicatory administrative proceedings to enforce such ordinances, and could provide for traditional judicial review actions to review the administrative decisions. Nevertheless, the McCrory Court held that the creation of “new” judicial causes of action “encroaches upon an area which heretofore had been the province of state agencies. In Maryland, the creation of new causes of action in the courts has traditionally been done either by the General Assembly or by this Court under its authority to modify the common law of this State.” Ibid.

The Court stated that ( 319 Md. at 20-21 , 570 A.2d at 838 ) “ § 27-20(a) of the Montgomery County Code affects ‘matters of significant interest to the entire state’ and cannot qualify as a ‘local law’ under Article XI-A. “A contrary holding would open the door for counties to enact a variety of laws in areas which have heretofore been viewed as the exclusive province of the General Assembly and the Court of Appeals. For example, could a county ordinance authorize in the circuit court and the District Court negligence actions in which contributory negligence would not be a bar? Could a county ordinance provide for breach of contract suits upon ‘contracts’ not supported by consideration, or where the parol evidence rule is inapplica ²⁹² ble? We believe that the answer is ‘no.’ These, and many-other legal doctrines, are matters of significant interest to the entire State, calling for uniform application in state courts.

They are not proper subject matters for ‘local laws.’ ” Shortly after the McCrory decision, this Court in Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 319 Md. 440, 444 , 573 A.2d 32, 33 (1990), held that an ordinance enacted by the Howard County Council, similar to the ordinance involved in McCrory, and “authorizing an independent action in law or equity in the Circuit Court for Howard County,” was not a “local law” and thus violated Article XI-A of the Constitution. See also H.P. White v. Blackburn, supra, 372 Md. at 167-171 , 812 A.2d at 309-311 , holding that a Harford County ordinance, authorizing a circuit court action to recover damages, by a plaintiff who has been discriminated against in violation of the Harford County Code, was not a “local law” and therefore was invalid under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. In response to the decisions in the McCrory and Sweeney cases, the General Assembly enacted Art. 49B, § 42. As previously quoted, supra, n. 3, § 42 provides that, in Montgomery, Prince George’s, and Howard Counties, “a person who is subjected to an act of discrimination prohibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil action against the person who committed the alleged discriminatory act for damages, injunctive relief, or other civil relief.” Subsection (b)(1) of § 42 states that the action “shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which the alleged discrimination took place” and “not later than 2 years after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act.” 6 ²⁹³ Sections 2-186(a)(3) and 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, quoted earlier, supra, n. 2, prohibit discrimination in employment in Prince George’s County. “Discrimination” is broadly defined as acting, failing to act, or delaying any action, “because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age (except as required by State or federal law), occupation, familial status, marital status,” etc. Section 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code begins by stating that “[n]o employer in the County shall discharge or refuse to hire any person, or act against any person with respect to compensation or other terms and conditions of employment ... because of discrimination.” The language “[n]o employer in the County” may be ambiguous "with regard to discriminatory acts outside of Prince George’s County by employers with a presence in the County. 7 If §