Fangman v. Genuine Title, LLC

WATTS, J. This case involves a purported class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“the federal court”) against a settlement and title services company, various mortgage lenders, and alleged sham companies that were formed by the settlement and title services company, for allegedly engaging in a home mortgage kickback scheme in which the settlement and title services company, by itself and through the sham companies, provided cash pay ⁶⁸⁵ ments and marketing materials to mortgage brokers who referred clients to the settlement and title services company for settlement services. The federal court certified to this Court the following question of law: “Does Md.Code Ann., Real Prop. [ (1974, 2015 Repl.Vol.) (“RP”) ] § 14-127 imply a private right of action?” We answer the certified question of law “no” and hold that RP § 14-127 does not contain an express or implied private right of action, as neither RP § 14-127’s plain language, legislative history, nor legislative purpose demonstrates any intent on the General Assembly’s part to create a private right of action. BACKGROUND In a memorandum opinion accompanying the certification order, the federal court stated the following facts, 1 which we summarize. Edward J. Fangman and Vicki Fangman (collectively “the Fangmans”) seek to represent a class of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 individuals (collectively “Appellants”) who, from 2009 to 2014, retained Genuine Title, LLC (“Genuine Title”) for settlement and title services and utilized various lenders (collectively “the Lender Appellees”) (together with Genuine Title, “Appellees”) 2 for the purchase and/or refinancing of their ⁶⁸⁶ residences.

All Appellants allegedly used Genuine Title’s settlement and title services as a result of referrals from the Lender Appellees. All of the Lender Appellees are servicers of federally related mortgage loans. In the second amended complaint, 3 the Fangmans alleged that they and all other class members “were victims of an illegal kickback scheme” in which the Lender Appellees received unearned fees and kickbacks from Genuine Title and “sham companies” that were created by Genuine Title (collectively, “the Genuine Title Appellees”) for the purpose of distributing the kickbacks. 4 According to the second amended complaint, the Lender Appellees’ employees and/or agents received and accepted cash payments, free marketing materials, and other things of value from the Genuine Title Appellees in exchange for referring borrowers to Genuine Title for settlement and title services. 5 The Genuine Title Appellees and Lender Appellees allegedly concealed these payments from Appellants and failed to disclose the payments on Appellants’ HUD-1 settlement statements. Additionally, Appellants alleged that Genuine Title and the Lender Appellees ⁶⁸⁷ failed to disclose that Genuine Title was participating with referring loan officers/banks and with the Genuine Title Appellees, and also failed to disclose their affiliated business relationships.

As some point, regulators began to investigate the alleged scheme. Appellants alleged that, once the investigation began, Genuine Title drafted and back-dated sham title services agreements for the purpose of disguising cash payments as legitimate fees for alleged services provided. Appellants alleged that cash payments were not made in accordance with the fee schedule contained in the title services agreement. For example, in some instances, pursuant to the sham title services agreements, Genuine Title agreed to make cash payments to referring mortgage brokers for title services that were not actually performed.

Appellants alleged that, as a result of the kickback scheme, they were deprived of “kickback[-]free settlement services and process” and their settlement fees would have been “much lower” had the kickback scheme not been in place. On December 6, 2013, the Fangmans filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County an initial class action complaint against Genuine Title. Genuine Title then removed the case to the federal court. 6 On January 2, 2015, the Fangmans, along with thirty other Appellants, filed the first amended complaint on behalf of themselves and the alleged class, adding as defendants the Genuine Title Appellees and all but one of the Lender Appellees. On May 20, 2015, Appellants filed the second amended complaint, adding as a defendant one Lender Appellee and adding sixteen additional plaintiffs. 7 In the second amended complaint, Appellants alleged that the Genuine Title Appellees and Lender Appellees violated 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (a) and (b), part of the Real Estate Settlement ⁶⁸⁸ Procedures Act (“RESPA”); 8 RP § 14-127; and Md.Code Ann., Com.

Law (1975, 2013 Repl.Vol.) (“CL”) § 13-301, part of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. 9 In response to the second amended complaint, the Genuine Title Appellees and Lender Appellees filed in the federal court eleven separate motions to dismiss. On November 24, 2015, the federal court conducted a hearing on the motions to dismiss. 10 On December 9, 2015, the federal court issued a memorandum opinion in which the federal court, with one exception, 11 denied the motions to dismiss the RESPA claims, granted the motions to dismiss the Maryland Consumer Protection Act claims, and stayed the motions to dismiss the RP § 14-127 claims so that this Court could determine whether RP § 14-127 permits a private right of action. 12 As to the RP ⁶⁸⁹ § 14-127 claims, the federal court observed “that no Maryland state court decision has resolved the present issue,” and thus it was certifying the question of law to this Court, On the same day, December 9, 2015, the federal court issued a certification order and stayed Appellants’ claims as to RP § 14-127 in the federal court pending this Court’s response. DISCUSSION The Parties’ Contentions Appellants contend that RP § 14-127 provides an implied private right of action. Appellants argue that RP § 14-127 was enacted to protect a narrow class of individuals — namely, consumers of residential title and settlement services — and that Appellants are in that class for whose benefit RP § 14-127 was enacted; ie., they are consumers of residential title and settlement services.

Appellants assert that the injuries that they suffered — including overcharges, lack of impartiality in the referral, and a reduction of competition among settlement service providers — constitute the exact type of harm that RP § 14-127 was designed to prevent. Appellants maintain that RP § 14-127’s language focuses on, and RP § 14-127’s purpose is, the protection of consumers in real estate transactions involving land in Maryland. According to Appellants, implying a private right of action under RP § 14-127 is consistent with RP § 14-127’s language and purpose. Appellees 13 respond that there is no evidence that the General Assembly intended to create a private right of action ⁶⁹⁰ under RP § 14-127 and that there is no basis in law or fact for implying a private right of action.

Appellees contend that RP § 14-127 neither identifies a specific class of protected individuals nor confers a beneficial right on any specific class of individuals, let alone Appellants. Appellees argue that, on its face, RP § 14-127 does not confer any right at all, and instead is a broad prohibition on individuals who are involved in real estate transactions in Maryland from paying or receiving anything in exchange for settlement business. According to Appellees, RP § 14-127 simply prohibits a certain type of conduct and is designed to protect the public at large, not a narrow, specific class of individuals. Appellees assert that neither RP § 14-127’s plain language nor its legislative history supports the position that RP § 14-127’s purpose was to create a private right of action.

Appellees point out that, when RP § 14-127 was amended in 2010, the General Assembly was aware that RESPA provided a private right of action, yet chose not to provide a similar private right of action under RP § 14-127. Appellees maintain that RP § 14-127’s purpose is to criminalize certain conduct; in other words, according to Appellees, RP § 14-127 is a criminal statute with no private right of action. Standard of Review Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.

(1973, 2013 Repl.Vol.) (“CJP”) §§ 12-601 to 12-613, this Court has the power to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States ... if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.” CJP § 12-603. In considering a certified question of law, “this Court’s statutorily prescribed role is to determine only questions of Maryland law, not questions of fact____ [And], we confine our legal ⁶⁹¹ analysis and final determinations of Maryland law to the questions certified.” Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 681 , 756 A.2d 526, 531 (2000) (citations omitted). As to statutory interpretation, in Montgomery Cnty. v. Phillips, 445 Md. 55, 62-63 , 124 A.3d 188, 192 (2015), we stated that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General AssemblyL,]” explaining: [T]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning____When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.

In addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the General Assembly used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.... If the language of the statute is ambiguous, [ ] then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment under consideration .... If the true legislative intent cannot be readily determined from the statutory language alone, [] we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia — among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative ⁶⁹² rationality and legal effect of various competing instructions. (Citation and brackets omitted).

RP § 14-127 Unabridged, RP § 14-127 currently provides: (a) Definitions. — (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) “Consideration” includes: (i) Afee; (ii) Compensation; (iii) A gift, except promotional or advertising materials for general distribution; (iv) A thing of value; (v) A rebate; (vi) A loan; or (vii) An advancement of a commission or deposit money. (3) “License” has the meaning stated in § 10-101 of the Insurance Article. (4) “Residential real estate transaction” means a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 2602 and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.2 .

(5) “Title insurance producer” has the meaning stated in § 10-101 of the Insurance Article. (b) Scope of section. — This section does not prohibit: (1) The payment of a commission to a title insurance producer who has a license; or (2) The referral of a real estate settlement business or a professional fee arrangement between attorneys, if the referral or professional fee arrangement does not violate § 17-605 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. (c) Payment or receipt of consideration prohibited. — (1) A person who has a connection with the settlement of real estate transactions involving land in the State may not pay ⁶⁹³ to or receive from another any consideration to solicit, obtain, retain, or arrange real estate settlement business. (2) A person may not be considered to be in violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection solely because that person is a participant in an affiliated business arrangement, as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 2602 , and receives consideration as a result of that participation as long as that person complies with 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (c)(4), 12 C.F.R. § 1024.15 , and Appendix D to 12 C.F.R. Part 1024.

(d) Compliance with federal law regarding disclosure. — A person who offers settlement services in connection with residential real estate transactions involving land in the State shall comply with 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (c)(4), 12 C.F.R. § 1024.15 , and Appendix D to 12 C.F.R. Part 1024, as applicable, regarding disclosures of affiliated business arrangements, as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 2602 . (e) Violation; penalties. — A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fíne not exceeding $1,000 or both. (f) Separate violations. — Each violation of this section is a separate violation. Implied Private Rights of Action In Baker v. Montgomery Cnty., 427 Md. 691, 708-11 , 50 A.3d 1112, 1122-23 (2012), we discussed in detail how to assess whether a State statute contains an implied private right of action, stating: A private cause of action in favor of a particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs does not exist simply because a claim is framed that a statute was violated and a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs was harmed by it.

Rather, the issue is a matter of statutory construction.... The U.S. Supreme Court fashioned the prevailing test for determining whether a statute contains implicitly a private cause of action: ⁶⁹⁴ In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted[?] Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or. to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2087-88 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26, 36 (1975) (internal citations omitted). This Court utilized the Cort test in Erie Ins [.] Co [. v. Chops], 322 Md. [79,] 90-91, 585 A.2d [232,] 237 [ (1991) ], which dealt with a Maryland statute.... Touche Ross [& c v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 , 99 S.Ct. 2479 , 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979) ] emphasized that the central inquiry remains whether the legislative body intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. Courts discern ... whether a private cause of action was intended by analyzing the language of the statute to identify its purpose and intended beneficiaries, reviewing the statute’s legislative history, and determining whether the statute provides otherwise an express remedy.

As a result, in a case in which neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals a legislative intent to create a private right of action for the benefit of the plaintiff, we need not carry the Cort v. Ash inquiry further. Thus, our analysis begins with the language of the statute at hand and whether it confers a beneficial right upon a particular class of persons. If a statute’s language provides a right to a particular class of persons, there is a strong inference that the legislature intended the statute to carry an implied cause of action. Conversely, that inference becomes attenuated when the statute is framed as a general prohibition or a command to a governmental entity or other group or confers a generalized benefit.

For example, in Cannon [v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 , 693 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 1946 , 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979),] the Supreme Court listed several statutory schemes that conferred a right on a class ⁶⁹⁵ of persons and created an implied private cause of action: “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof,” “no person shall be denied the right to vote,” and “employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively.” (Internal quotation marks, footnote, brackets, and most citations omitted) (last ellipsis in original). 14 To reiterate, in assessing whether a State statute contains an implied private right of action, we are concerned with three specific inquiries: (1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted? (2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? (3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? Baker, 427 Md. at 709 , 50 A.3d at 1122 ; see also Scull v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C., 435 Md. 112, 122 , 76 A.3d 1186, 1191 (2013).

This Court has applied the three-factor test from Cort in several cases to determine whether an implied private right of action existed. For example, in Erie Ins. Co., 322 Md. at 91-92, 83, 585 A.2d at 238, 233, we held that there was no express or implied private right of action under Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol.) (“TR”) § 17-106(b), which provided: “After July 1, 1983, each insurer or other provider of required security immediately shall notify the [Motor Vehicle] Administration [ (“the MVA”) ] of only those terminations or other lapses that are final and occur within the first 6 months of any required security issued to or provided for a resident of this State.” In Erie Ins.

Co., 322 Md. at 81, 585 A.2d at 233, a husband and wife, the Chopses, were injured in an automobile ⁶⁹⁶ accident that occurred in West Virginia; the accident was solely the fault of Carol Iser (“Iser”), who was driving a vehicle that she owned and that was registered in Maryland. At the time of the accident, Iser’s vehicle was uninsured because, two months prior to the accident, Erie Insurance Company (“Erie”) had cancelled Iser’s automobile liability insurance policy for nonpayment of the premium. See id. at 81-82, 585 A.2d at 233. Despite the lack of insurance, the Chopses sued Erie, alleging that Erie was liable because it had breached the duty that it owed under TR § 17-106(b) to notify the MVA that it had cancelled Iser’s automobile liability insurance policy.

See Erie Ins. Co., 322 Md. at 82, 585 A.2d at 233. In the trial court, the Chopses argued that Erie’s violation of TR § 17-106(b) made it liable as though Iser’s automobile liability insurance policy had not been cancelled or, alternatively, that Erie’s violation of TR § 17-106(b) was evidence of negligence that was a proximate cause of the Chopses’ damages. See Erie Ins.

Co., 322 Md. at 82, 585 A.2d at 233. Following a trial, the Chopses were granted judgment against Erie; Erie appealed; and, before the case was considered by the Court of Special Appeals, this Court issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion. See id. at 82, 585 A.2d at 233. Upon review, we determined that, because Erie did not notify the MVA until forty days after it cancelled Iser’s policy, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Erie had failed to notify the MVA of the cancellation of Iser’s policy within the time required by TR § 17 — 106(b), which required immediate notification.

See Erie Ins. Co., 322 Md. at 83-84, 585 A.2d at 234. Nonetheless, this Court held that the duty that was imposed on Erie by TR § 17-106(b) was not a “tort duty” because TR § 17-106(b) “did not create a legally cognizable duty running from Erie to all persons who might thereafter suffer economic damage by reason of involvement in an accident with an uninsured motorist upon Erie’s failure to give immediate notice to the MVA of the termination of coverage.” Erie Ins. Co., 322 Md. at 86, 585 A.2d at 235.

We also held that the General Assembly “did not intend to create a new cause of action imposing strict liability on an insurer who ⁶⁹⁷ failed to give immediate notice of cancellation to the MVA.” Id. at 86, 585 A.2d at 285. As to the latter holding, applying the test set forth in Cort , we explained: Although the Chops[es] may properly be said to be within the class of persons in whose favor [TR § 17-106(b) ] was intended, it seems equally apparent that the principal focus of the uninsured motorist laws is for the general protection of the public. Additionally, while permitting recovery by the [Chopses] would not be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, we do not believe such a broad extension of existing laws is necessary to properly implement the legislation. We note that the [General Assembly] has provided other remedies for those who are involved in accidents with uninsured motorists, including the requirement of uninsured motorist coverage in every automobile liability policy issued, sold, or delivered in this State, and the establishment of a fund for payment of claims arising out of accidents with uninsured motorists occurring in this State.

Finally, as we have noted, the [General Assembly] did not expressly or impliedly establish the sanction sought by the [Chopses], even though the [General Assembly] has done so in other related matters involving insurance. Erie Ins. Co., 322 Md. at 91-92, 585 A.2d at 238 (citations omitted). Indeed, as to TR § 17-106(b)’s legislative history, we stated that TR § 17-106(b) and other related statutes sought “to insure that there w[ould] be at least minimum limits of financial responsibility in the event [that] an accident [ ] occurred,]” and that “the principal risk against which [TR § 17-106(b) was] directed [was] the risk of economic loss, and not the risk of personal injury.” Erie Ins.

Co., 322 Md. at 87, 585 A.2d at 236. We stated that there was “no suggestion that the [General Assembly] intended the application of a strict sanction [that] it did not spell out” in TR § 17-106(b); thus, we concluded that, in light of TR § 17-106(b)’s legislative history, “no such sanction should be implied[.]” Erie Ins. Co., 322 Md. at 90, 585 A.2d at 237. ⁶⁹⁸ As another example, in Baker, 427 Md. at 697-98, 699-700 , 50 A.3d at 1115, 1117 , we held that there was no express or implied private right of action under TR § 21-809(j), 15 which provided: “If a contractor operates a speed monitoring system on behalf of Montgomery County, the contractor’s fee may not be contingent on the number of citations issued or paid.” In Baker, 427 Md. at 695-96 , 50 A.3d at 1114 , certain local governments of Montgomery County, including Montgomery County itself, established speed cameras, which recorded, among many others, the plaintiffs traveling in their vehicles at least ten miles per hour over posted speed limits on certain roads. The local governments issued citations to the plaintiffs, each carrying a maximum civil penalty of $40.

See id. at 696 , 50 A.3d at 1114 . The plaintiffs paid the penalties and then filed a complaint against the local governments, asserting that the local governments’ contracts with the speed monitoring system contractor, ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc. (“ACS”), violated TR § 21-809(j). See Baker, 427 Md. at 696 , 50 A.3d at 1114-15 . The trial court concluded that the local governments, not ACS, operated the speed cameras within the meaning of TR § 21-809(j), and that, in any event, TR § 21-809(j)applied only to Montgomery County, not the other local governments.

See Baker, 427 Md. at 696 , 50 A.3d at 1115 . The trial court also concluded that, even if ACS operated the speed cameras, TR § 21-809(j) did not contain a private right of action to support the plaintiffs’ tort claims. See Baker, 427 Md. at 696 , 50 A.3d at 1115 . The trial court further concluded that the plaintiffs had waived their ability to file a complaint when they voluntarily paid the penalties; accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in the local governments’ favor.

See id. at 696 , 50 A.3d at 1115 . The plaintiffs appealed; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed; and this Court granted certiorari. See id. at 696, 50 A.3d at 1115 . We affirmed, holding in relevant part that TR § 21-809(j) did “not provide an express or implied private cause of action ⁶⁹⁹ in tort” for two reasons: (1) TR § 21-809(j) “is a general welfare statute that does not benefit a particular class of persons, let alone” the plaintiffs; and (2) TR § 21-809(j) “provides a remedy in the District Court for challenging speed monitoring system citations.” Baker, 427 Md. at 697 , 50 A.3d at 1115 .

We explained that these two reasons, “combined with the lack of supporting legislative history endorsing an implied private right of action, established] that [TR] § 21 — 809(j) does not create a private cause of action.” Baker, 427 Md. at 697-98 , 50 A.3d at 1115 . In so concluding, we applied the three factors set forth in Cort. See Baker, 427 Md. at 711-15 , 50 A.3d at 1123-26 . As to whether the plaintiffs were members of a class for whose benefit TR § 21 — 809(j) was enacted, we determined that TR § 21 — 809(j) was “framed as a prohibitive command and d[id] not confer rights on a class of persons” and did not “unmistakably focus on a particular class of persons who benefit from it.” Baker, 427 Md. at 711-12 , 50 A.3d at 1123-24 (citation, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, TR § 21-809(j)’s legislative history “fail[ed] to reveal an intent to benefit a particular class of persons.” Baker, 427 Md. at 712 , 50 A.3d at 1124 . We stated that, even if the General Assembly had intended TR § 21-809(j) “to benefit recipients of citations, issued according to speed monitoring systems established pursuant to the statutory scheme, whether it intended also that [TR] § 21 — 809(j) create an implied private cause of action [was] a separate issue.” Baker, 427 Md. at 712 , 50 A.3d at 1124 . As to TR § 21-809’s purpose, we concluded that TR § 21-809(j) “create[d] rules and procedures for Montgomery County (and perhaps its municipalities) to operate a speed monitoring system” and established “a remedy for challenging a speed monitoring system citation.” Baker, 427 Md. at 713 , 50 A.3d at 1124 . TR § 21 — 809(j) did not expressly provide a private right of action, and instead set forth provisions under which citation recipients could challenge the citation on the basis that the local government had violated TR § 21 — 809(j).

See Baker, 427 Md. at 713 , 50 A.3d at 1124-25 . Finally, as to TR § 21-809’s legislative history, we determined that the legisla ⁷⁰⁰ tive history failed to reveal any intent on the General Assembly’s part to create an implied private right of action. See Baker, 427 Md. at 714 , 50 A.3d at 1125 . We concluded by explaining: [T]he lack of discernible legislative intent to create an implied cause of action in the plain language and structure of the statute, its legislative history, or some other legitimate and reliable source cements the conclusion that the [General Assembly], in enacting [TR] § 21-809, did not contemplate an implied private cause of action.

Our conclusion is reinforced by the assumption that legislative bodies know how to “salt the mine” for the enablement of implied private causes of action. Baker, 427 Md. at 714-15 , 50 A.3d at 1126 (citations omitted). More recently, in Scull, 435 Md. at 115 , 76 A.3d at 1187 , we held that there was no implied private right of action under the Maryland Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) Act, Md.Code Ann., Health-Gen. (“HG”) §§ 19-701 to 19-735, where an HMO member has been billed by a health care provider for a covered service.

In particular, HG § 19-710(p) of the HMO Act prohibited a health care provider from billing an HMO member for amounts beyond those that were provided in the HMO’s plan, a practice commonly known as “balance billing,” providing: “A health care provider or any representative of a health care provider may not collect or attempt to collect from any subscriber or enrollee any money [that is] owed to the health care provider by a[n HMO that has been] issued a certificate of authority to operate in this State.” Scull, 435 Md. at 119-20 , 76 A.3d at 1190 . In Scull, id. at 115, 76 A.3d at 1187-88 , the plaintiff, an HMO member, visited Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. (“GCM”) for a knee x-ray, and nearly a year later, GCM sent the plaintiff a bill for $121 for the x-ray. The plaintiff sued GCM, alleging that the bill from GCM was “an illegal attempt to ‘balance bill’ an HMO member in violation of State law.” Id. at 116-17 , 76 A.3d at 1188 .

In the first count of the complaint, the plaintiff sought judicial recognition of an implied private right of action under HG § 19-710(p). See Scull, 435 Md. at 117 , 76 A.3d at 1188 . ⁷⁰¹ GCM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted; the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and the trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. See id. at 117 , 76 A.3d at 1188-89 . The plaintiff appealed; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed; and this Court granted certiorari.

See id at 118, 76 A.3d at 1189 . We held, in pertinent part, “that there is not an implied private right of action under the HMO [Act].” Id. at 118 , 76 A.3d at 1189 . We began our analysis by observing that the HMO Act did not provide an express private right of action for an HMO member who was allegedly harmed by a violation of the prohibition against balance billing; thus, we turned to whether there was an implied private right of action. See id. at 121 , 76 A.3d at 1191 .

We then applied and analyzed the three factors set forth in Cort in the context of the HMO Act. See Scull, 435 Md. at 122-24 , 76 A.3d at 1191-92 . As to whether the plaintiff was a member of the class for whose benefit HG § 19-710(p) was enacted, we stated that, on its face, HG § 19-710(p) “strongly suggested] an intent to protect a specific class of persons, namely enrollees and subscribers of HMOs, from the practice of balance billing.” Scull, 435 Md. at 122 , 76 A.3d at 1191 . Thus, as an HMO member, the plaintiff was a member of the class that was intended to be protected by HG § 19-710(p).

Scull, 435 Md. at 122 , 76 A.3d at 1191 . Nonetheless, despite the plaintiffs being a member of the class that was intended to be protected by HG § 19 — 710(p), we concluded that the legislative intent and statutory scheme or purpose militated against implying a private right of action. Scull, 435 Md. at 122-24 , 76 A.3d at 1191-93 . As to legislative intent to create or deny a remedy, we reiterated that there was nothing expressly in HG § 19-710(p) concerning a private right of action for a violation of the prohibition against balance billing; and, we further concluded that “nothing in the text of the balance billing prohibition in HG § 19 — 710(p) suggested] that the [General Assembly] believed that it was creating a new cause of action on behalf of HMO subscribers against health care providers — as opposed to creating a structure to ⁷⁰² foster HMO plans.” Scull, 435 Md. at 122 , 76 A.3d at 1191-92 .

We also observed that HG § 19-710(p)’s legislative history was “devoid of any mention of an intent to create a private cause of action on behalf of patients against health care providers”; ie., the legislative history was silent on the matter. Scull, 435 Md. at 122-23 , 76 A.3d at 1192 (footnote omitted). Finally, as to the statutory scheme and legislative purpose, we explained: [T]he statutory scheme largely concerns the structure and operation of [HMO]s, not the billing practices of health care providers. In that sense, the statute is intended to confer a general benefit on the public at large by providing a foundation for a particular form of health care coverage.

The [HMO] Act is primarily focused on the operation and regulation of an HMO and its relationship with the providers that serve its members. Notably, the explicit private cause of action that does appear in the [HMO] Act is on behalf of a health care provider against an HMO that fails to carry out the HMO’s obligations under the [HMO] Act. While the prohibition against balance billing of HMO members is an important part of the overall scheme, the [HMO] Act provides for its enforcement through “hold harmless” contract provisions required by [the HMO Act]. And there is already in place a cause of action for a patient to obtain relief for violations of unlawful billing practices[, namely, under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.] Id. at 123-24 , 76 A.3d at 1192 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, we held “that an HMO member does not have an implied private right of action under the HMO [Act] with respect to a violation of the balance billing prohibition.” Id. at 124 , 76 A.3d at 1192 (footnote omitted). Analysis Returning to the instant case, we hold that RP § 14-127 does not provide an express or implied private right of action. As stated above, RP § 14-127(c)(1) prohibits “[a] person who has a connection with the settlement of real estate transactions involving land in the State” from “pay[ing] to or ⁷⁰³ receiving] from another any consideration to solicit, obtain, retain, or arrange real estate settlement business.” Nothing within RP § 14-127 generally, or RP § 14-127(c)(1) specifically, expressly provides a private right of action for anyone who is allegedly harmed by a violation of RP § 14 — 127(c)(1). Thus, the key question in this case — indeed, the question that the federal court certified to this Court — is whether RP § 14-127 contains an implied private right of action.

We hold that it does not, as neither RP § 14-127’s plain language, legislative history, nor legislative purpose demonstrates any intent on the General Assembly’s part to create a private right of action. Class As to whether Appellants are members of the class for whose benefit RP § 14-127 was enacted, RP § 14-127(c)(1) provides that “[a] person who has a connection with the settlement of real estate transactions involving land in the State may not pay to or receive from another any consideration to solicit, obtain, retain, or arrange real estate settlement business.” On its face, RP § 14-127(c)(1) does not specifically identify a class for whose benefit it was enacted. Nonetheless, there is a group who could receive the benefit of RP § 14-127 — consumers of residential and commercial settlement services. 16 In other words, RP § 14-127(c)(1) could ⁷⁰⁴ inure to the benefit of consumers or members of the public who use residential and commercial settlement services because the prohibition in RP § 14-127(e)(1) could theoretically keep costs down by eliminating hidden costs and excess fees that may be associated with the solicitation, obtainment, or arrangement of real estate settlement business. As consumers of settlement services, Appellants are members of a class that would conceivably benefit from RP § 14-127, although there is no evidence that RP § 14-127 was designed specifically to protect consumers of settlement services.

Our conclusion that RP § 14 — 127(c)(1) inures to the benefit of consumers of residential and commercial settlement services is consistent with an opinion from the Maryland Attorney General concerning whether RP § 14-127’s predecessor, Md.Code Ann., Art. 27 (“Art.27”), § 465A, had been preempted by the revised Regulation X of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. In the opinion, the Maryland Attorney General stated: Although we are not aware of any legislative history bearing on the purpose of [Art. 27, § 465A], it is evidently intended to prevent a real estate broker, for example, from having a financial incentive to steer a purchaser of real property to a particular provider of settlement services. Presumably, the General Assembly perceived that the purchaser would be better served if advice about settlement services was free of such bias. 78 Md. Op. Atty.

Gen. 86, 86-87 (1993), available at https:// www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/1993/78oag86.pdf [https:// perma.cc/DA5N-7YEN] (emphasis added). Stated otherwise, the Maryland Attorney General also found no specific class of individuals intended to be protected by RP § 14-127, but opined that purchasers — i.e., consumers — of settlement services would receive the benefit of RP § 14-127 by receiving settlement services free of bias. Nevertheless, we reiterate that RP § 14-127 does not expressly provide a right to a particular class of persons. For example, the prohibition in RP § 14 — 127(c)(1) is not phrased ⁷⁰⁵ along the lines of “all consumers of settlement services have the right to have kickback-free settlement services.” Cf.

Baker, 427 Md. at 711 , 50 A.3d at 1123 (“[T]he Supreme Court listed several statutory schemes that conferred a right on a class of persons and created an implied private cause of action: ‘All citizens of the Ünited States shall have the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof,’ ‘no person shall be denied the right to vote,’ and ‘employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively.’ ” (Citation and brackets omitted) (ellipsis in original)). Rather, RP § 14-127(c)(1) contains a general prohibition — namely, that persons connected “with the settlement of real estate transactions involving land in the State may not pay to or receive from another any consideration to solicit, obtain, retain, or arrange real estate settlement business.” And, RP § 14-127(c)(1) appears to confer only, as a result of the prohibition, a generalized benefit that inures to consumers of settlement services. See Baker, 427 Md. at 710-11 , 50 A.3d at 1123 (“If a statute’s language provides a right to a particular class of persons, there is a strong inference that the [General Assembly] intended the statute to carry an implied cause of action. Conversely, that inference becomes attenuated when the statute is framed as a general prohibition or a command to a governmental entity or other group or confers a generalized benefit.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Significantly, RP § 14-127 does not mention, let alone identify, consumers or the public in general as a class who benefits from the provisions of the statute. In any event, as we stated in Baker, 427 Md. at 708-09 , 50 A.3d at 1122 , “[a] private cause of action in favor of a particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs does not exist simply because a claim is framed that a statute was violated and a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs was harmed by it.” (Citation omitted). Rather, the question of whether a private right of action exists is a matter of statutory construction. See id. at 709 , 50 A.3d at 1122 .

As such, although Appellants are in a class of individuals who arguably receive the benefit of RP § 14-127, we still must examine RP § 14-127’s plain language, ⁷⁰⁶ legislative history, and legislative scheme/purpose to determine whether the General Assembly intended to create a private right of action under RP § 14-127. See Baker, 427 Md. at 710 , 50 A.3d at 1123 (“Courts discern legislative intent whether a private cause of action was intended by analyzing the language of the statute to identify its purpose and intended beneficiaries, reviewing the statute’s legislative history, and determining whether the statute provides otherwise an express remedy.” (Citations omitted)); see also Scull, 435 Md. at 122-24 , 76 A.3d at 1191-92 (Although concluding that the plaintiff was a member of the class for whose benefit the statute at issue was enacted, we also analyzed legislative intent and purpose before concluding that no implied private right of action existed.). Legislative History I Intent As to whether there is any indication of legislative intent, either explicit or implicit, to create or deny a private right of action, we conclude that RP § 14-127’s legislative history fails to reveal any intent on the General Assembly’s part to create a private right of action, either expressly or impliedly. As stated above, nothing in RP § 14-127’s plain language expressly provides a private right of action for anyone allegedly harmed by a violation of the prohibition in RP § 14-127(c)(1).

Thus, we look to RP § 14-127’s legislative history to determine whether an implied private right of action exists. RP § 14-127’s predecessor, Art. 27, § 465A, was enacted in 1967; on June 1, 1967, Article 27, § 465A became effective. See 1967 Md. Laws 1662 -63 (Vol.II, Ch. 756, H.B.1075); 78 Md. Op. Atty.

Gen. at 86 (“This prohibition was enacted as Chapter 756 of the Laws of Maryland 1967 in essentially” the same form as it existed in 1993.). The purpose for enacting Art. 27, § 465A was stated as follows: AN ACT to add new Section 465-A to Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 Edition), titled “Crimes and Punishments,” subtitle “Real Estate Settlements,” to follow immediately after Section 465 thereof, prohibiting the payment by any person, firm, or corporation to any other ⁷⁰⁷ person, firm, or corporation connected with the settlement of a real estate transaction affecting land situated and lying in this State, of any fee or other consideration to obtain any real estate settlement or real estate settlement business prohibiting the receipt of any such fee or thing of value for such purpose; CREATING CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS FROM THIS ACT and providing penalties for violation of such provisions. 1967 Md. Laws 1662 (Vol.II, Ch. 756, H.B.1075) (capitalization in original). Although not part of Art. 27, § 465A’s legislative history, a series of newspaper articles published in 1967 and 1968 provides some context to the circumstances leading up to Art. 27, § 465A’s enactment. Apparently, a real estate settlement and title insurance scandal occurred in Montgomery County and Prince George’s County “in which more than 70 home owners face[d] the possibility of double mortgages against their property as a result of misuse of settlement funds by title lawyers.” Bart Barnes, Md. Bar Now Asks for Rapid Revision of Title Escrow Laws, The Washington Post, Times Herald, Mar. 9, 1967, at C2.

In response, then-State Insurance Commissioner Norman Polovoy proposed a three-bill package that “would make title insurance companies financially liable for any misuse of funds changing hands in real estate settlements, outlaw kickbacks from lawyers to brokers steering business their way[,] and require lawyers to explain to home buyers the difference between mortgage title insurance, protecting only the lender, and home owners title insurance.” Id.; see also Staff Writer, Escrow Bills Advance at Annapolis, The Washington Post, Times Herald, Mar. 17, 1967, at B1. The House Banking and Insurance Committee endorsed all three bills. See Sandy Royner, Polovoy Bill Gains in Part, The Sun, Mar. 16, 1967, at C12; Staff Writer, supra, at B1. Thereafter, House Bill 1075, outlawing kickbacks, was enacted as Art. 27, § 465A.

See 1967 Md. Laws 1662 -68 (Vol.II, Ch. 756, H.B. 1075). An article dated February 1, 1968 noted, however, that “a stronger measure that failed to pass in the 1967 General Assembly” would be reintroduced, namely, a “bill [that] would ⁷⁰⁸ hold title insurance companies liable for defalcations by their ‘approved attorneys.’ ” Peter A. Jay, Proposed Realty-Closing Controls Hit, The Washington Post, Times Herald, Feb. 1, 1968, at B5. 17 A “Report of the Committee to Study the Problem of Delayed Disbursements of Real Estate Settlements,” included in the Report of the 72nd Annual Meeting of the Maryland State Bar Association (1967 Md. State Bar Ass’n Transaction Report, at 211-13), provided a fuller report on the three bills, stating: As a result of defalcations by various attorneys handling real estate settlements in which buyers and sellers of real property in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties lost well over $1,000,000, a large number of bills were introduced in the 1967 Session of the General Assembly dealing with various aspects of the problem. The State Insurance Commissioner ... prepared for introduction three bills known as House Bills 1073, 1074, and 1075____The three bills, which came to be known as the “Polovoy Package”, would attempt to solve the problem in the following manner: H.B. 1073 provided that[,] whenever a title insurance company shall issue a policy of insurance insuring the title to such property for the benefit of any mortgagee, the title company or the title attorney shall, prior to the disbursement of the settlement funds, notify the mortgagor of his right to purchase insurance insuring title to the property for his benefit and of the cost of such insurance. Substantially similar proposed legislation was included