Lawrence v. State

Neal Lawrence, IV v. State of Maryland, No. 32, September Term, 2020. Opinion by Getty, J. CRIMINAL LAW – PROHIBITION ON WEARING, CARRYING, OR TRANSPORTING A HANDGUN – MENS REA Relying on the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court of Appeals held that Md. Code (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol.), Crim. Law (“CR”) § 4-203(a)(1)(i) sets forth a strict liability offense.

Thirty-three years ago, in Lee v. State, this Court determined that the predecessor statute to CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) imposed strict liability for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person. 311 Md. 642 (1988). Where the language of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) is substantially unchanged from its predecessor, the Court of Appeals held that the statute’s plain language, statutory structure, and legislative history all support the Lee Court’s holding. In light of the Supreme Court’s longstanding presumption that criminal statutes include mens rea as an element, the Court declined to overlook the General Assembly’s clear intent by reading a “knowingly” mens rea into the statute. Moreover, the Court determined that, in the thirty-three years since Lee has been decided, the General Assembly has acquiesced to the Court’s holding in that case.

Thus, in checking its statutory interpretation of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) against the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Maryland case law involving “public welfare offenses,” the Court declined to depart from stare decisis. Circuit Court for Harford County Case No. 12-K-17-001269 Argued: February 4, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 32 September Term, 2020 ______________________________________ NEAL LAWRENCE, IV V. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Getty, J. Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act ______________________________________ (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-08-10 Filed: August 10, 2021 11:13-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case involves the statutory interpretation of § 4-203 of the Criminal Law Article, which sets forth Maryland’s prohibition on “wear[ing], carry[ing], or transport[ing] a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person[.]”1 We are tasked with determining whether the General Assembly intended for its enactment, which does not include language indicating mens rea, to set forth a strict liability offense. Thirty- three years ago, in Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642 (1988), this Court unanimously and unequivocally held that the predecessor statute to CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) imposed strict liability for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person.2 Although short, the Lee Court’s analysis determined that the plain language and legislative history of Article 27, § 36B(b) both pointed to one conclusion—that the General Assembly intended to create a strict liability offense by wholly omitting mens rea as an element of the offense. As part of Maryland’s code revision, the General Assembly enacted the Criminal Law Article in 2002.

Article 27, § 36B(b) was recodified as CR § 4-203(a) but the language remained substantially unchanged from the wording analyzed by the Lee Court. The General Assembly subsequently amended the statute eight times without altering the language of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i). Relying on the doctrine of stare decisis, which ordinarily requires this Court to adhere to its precedent, we hold that the General Assembly intended for CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) to set forth a strict liability offense. While we recognize the Supreme Court’s longstanding presumption that criminal offenses contain mens rea as an 1 Md. Code (2002, 2021 Repl.

Vol.), Crim. Law (“CR”) § 4-203(a)(1)(i). 2 Of course, this prohibition was subject to the exceptions in Article 27, § 36B(c). See Lee, 311 Md. at 658 n.7; Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 36B(b), (c). element, the text, structure, and legislative history of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) preclude us from reading a “knowingly” mens rea into the statute.

Moreover, in declining to amend the statutory language in the thirty-three years since Lee was decided, the General Assembly has acquiesced to this Court’s holding in that case. Where CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) is neither unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor in conflict with Maryland law outlining strict liability “public welfare offenses,” we are unconvinced that an exception to the doctrine of stare decisis applies here. Thus, because Lee is still good law, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and interpret CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) as setting forth a strict liability offense. BACKGROUND A. The Arrest.

In the early morning hours of July 29, 2017, Maryland State Police Trooper Nicolas Urbano (“Trooper Urbano”) responded to the report of a red Nissan Altima stopped in the middle of Route 152 near Interstate 95 in Harford County. Upon arriving at the stopped vehicle, Trooper Urbano observed that the engine was running, the brake lights were activated, and the driver’s side window was open. Trooper Urbano approached the vehicle and noticed that an unresponsive male was sitting in the driver’s seat. Trooper Urbano first tried to speak to the unresponsive male through the open driver’s side window, but he did not respond.

Trooper Urbano then yelled for the male to wake up, however, he remained unresponsive. This prompted Trooper Urbano to shake the individual’s shoulder and 2 administer a sternum rub.3 The male did not respond. Trooper Urbano then opened the driver’s side door, put the car in park, and administered a second sternum rub. At trial, Trooper Urbano identified the male in the driver’s seat of the Nissan as Neal Lawrence, IV and testified that Mr. Lawrence regained consciousness after the second sternum rub.

As Mr. Lawrence regained consciousness, Trooper Urbano “observed what appeared to be the handle or back of a handle of a handgun.” Trooper Urbano explained that the handgun was located “kind of in between [Mr. Lawrence’s] legs in the center of the driver’s seat but on the floorboard.” Trooper Urbano ordered Mr. Lawrence out of the car and, after assisting him from the driver’s seat, placed him in handcuffs. Trooper Urbano patted down Mr. Lawrence’s clothing for weapons and, according to his testimony, he immediately noticed the odor of alcohol. At this time, Mr. Lawrence told Trooper Urbano that he was travelling from his house in Baltimore to his girlfriend’s house in Edgewood. Having removed Mr. Lawrence from the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs, Trooper Urbano then “went back to the vehicle and secured the handgun that was under the driver’s seat on the floorboard.” Trooper Urbano testified that, after removing the handgun from the vehicle, he removed the magazine from the handgun and observed that it contained four bullets. 3 Trooper Urbano testified that a “sternum rub” is a technique that involves using your knuckles to “rub the sternum or bone area between the breast.” It is used to cause “discomfort” that “usually wakes” an unconscious subject.

See also Garlick v. Cty. of Kern, 167 F. Supp. 3d 1117 , 1127 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“A sternum rub is a technique used to wake people from unconsciousness by applying pressure with the knuckles to the sternum.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 3 While conducting his investigation, Trooper Urbano also attempted to determine whether Mr. Lawrence owned the Nissan. Trooper Urbano testified that, during his investigation, he conducted a search in the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database that allowed him to access records from the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”).4 Based on MVA records found in the NCIC database, Trooper Urbano determined that Mr. Lawrence owned the vehicle.5 At the conclusion of Trooper Urbano’s investigation, he placed Mr. Lawrence under arrest and drove him to the State Police Barracks in Bel Air. After arriving at the State Police Barracks, Trooper Urbano conducted a full search of Mr. Lawrence’s person and found “crack cocaine rocks inside one of [Mr. Lawrence’s] socks.” Mr. Lawrence consented to a battery of field sobriety tests, from which Trooper Urbano determined that Mr. Lawrence was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled dangerous substance. Trooper Urbano’s conclusion was confirmed later that morning when, while Mr. Lawrence was in custody, police officers administered an Intoximeter test that registered a blood alcohol concentration of .13.6 4 The NCIC database is a computer system “through which licenses, vehicle registrations, and outstanding warrants are checked[.]” Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 469 (2006). 5 However, on cross-examination, defense counsel presented Trooper Urbano with a “temporary registration card” from the time of the arrest and a “permanent registration card” that both named Isis England as the registered owner of the vehicle. 6 “An Intoximeter is the instrument officers use to determine the alcohol concentration of suspected drunk drivers.” Portillo Funes v. State, 469 Md. 438 , 456 n.4 (2020) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Smith, 458 Md. 677 , 683 n.5 (2018)).

The legal limit for the blood alcohol concentration of a motorist in Maryland is .08. Id. at 456. 4 Mr. Lawrence waived his Miranda7 rights and admitted that he had smoked “crack” a few hours before he was found unresponsive by Trooper Urbano. When asked about the handgun found in the vehicle, Mr. Lawrence stated that it was not his and “denied knowing anything about” it. Based on Trooper Urbano’s investigation and Mr. Lawrence’s admissions, the State charged Mr. Lawrence with possession of ammunition by a disqualified person; possession of a regulated firearm by a disqualified person; wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person; possession of cocaine; driving under the influence of alcohol; and driving while impaired by a controlled and dangerous substance.

B. The Trial and Appeal. 1. The Jury Instruction. Mr. Lawrence stood trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County and, at the close of evidence, his counsel objected to the State’s requested jury instruction on the wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun charge. The jury instruction sought by the State read: The defendant is charged with the crime of carrying [or] transporting a handgun upon their person.

In order to convict the defendant, the State must prove: (1) That the defendant, wore, carried, or transported a handgun that was within his reach and available for his immediate use. A handgun is a pistol, revolver, or other firearm, capable of being concealed on or about the person, and which is designed to fire a bullet by the explosion of gunpowder.[8] 7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 8 The pattern jury instruction for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person, Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 4:35.2, provides: The defendant is charged with the crime of carrying a handgun. In order to convict the defendant, the State must prove: that the defendant wore, 5 Mr. Lawrence’s counsel objected to the instruction and argued that it incorrectly disposed of the mens rea—knowledge—required to convict under this charge: There doesn’t seem to be any requirement for the person to even know they have the firearm on their person. When I say on the person, it doesn’t have to be on the person.

It can be apparently transported somewhere in a vehicle and under the definition still be technically on your person. So, I guess you could have a gun in your car or someone could secret a small gun in your jacket and you could be convicted without any knowledge at all merely because the gun, in fact, was there without any scienter or mens rea on your part of criminal intent. The gun in this case is a regulated firearm. . . . To have that firearm it has to be knowingly possessed.

There is a definition for possessed, which the possession is similar to that in the other instruction of being within your reach or grasp. So, you have a regulated firearm, you have to have knowledge, but if that same regulated firearm is in your car arguably you don’t have to have knowledge, which makes no sense. Additionally, there are bullets in the firearm and under the definition of ammunition it again indicates that you have to have knowledge and possess it. So, you can have a firearm in your car that you don’t know about, you can’t be convicted on the bullets in the firearm because there you have to have knowledge . . . but seemingly you could be convicted on a [firearm] which is . . . in your car that you don’t know about under the definition, which makes no sense.

So, that is my objection. I just don’t think the instruction could possibly be correct. The trial court disagreed and overruled the objection: THE COURT: I understand. . . . [I]f we were talking about a situation where we were trying to craft an instruction that did not or was not addressed in the pattern, I think we would have to spend a little bit more time on this. But carried, or transported a handgun that was within his or her reach and available for his or her immediate use.

A handgun is a pistol, revolver, or other firearm, capable of being concealed on or about the person, and which is designed to fire a bullet by the explosion of gunpowder. Maryland State Bar Ass’n, Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 4:35.2 (2d ed., 2020 Supp.) (cleaned up). The pattern instruction is the same today as it was during Mr. Lawrence’s trial. 6 when we have a pattern instruction, I am generally not going to deviate from that pattern absent there being some compelling argument particularly citing case law which would support such a position. I believe you indicated when we were back in chambers that you were not aware of any case law on point that would address the issue. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. THE COURT: So, since we are dealing with a pattern jury instruction, I’m not going to edit[] that in any way, shape or form.

Whether that is an issue that should be addressed by the legislature, I’ll leave that to somebody else to decide, but it seems to me it is creating a distinction between a general intent and a specific intent crime. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But in both instances you have an intent. I’m saying you can’t have an intent when you have no knowledge. But I understand the Court’s position. 2. The Verdict and Motion for a New Trial.

The trial court propounded the State’s requested pattern jury instruction for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person. The jury returned a split verdict and acquitted Mr. Lawrence of possession of ammunition and possession of a regulated firearm by a disqualified person. The jury convicted Mr. Lawrence of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person; possession of cocaine; driving under the influence of alcohol; and driving while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance. Mr. Lawrence timely moved for a new trial and argued that the trial court improperly ignored the mens rea element of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun by propounding the State’s requested jury instruction.

In a hearing on Mr. Lawrence’s motion for a new trial, the trial court denied the motion from the bench and explained why it did not add “knowledge” as a required element of the crime: 7 All right. The Court did have some pause because of the very recent decision in Williams versus State[9] from the Court of Appeals that deals with the issue of where a pattern instruction was wrong. Of course, it is often hammered home to judges that you can’t go wrong with using the pattern instructions. But, of course, as Williams indicates that is not always true because sometimes the pattern instructions are wrong.

But the difference between Williams and this case is that in Williams, as I read it, the pattern instruction did not properly set forth the elements that are established in the statute and in the present case the statute very clearly sets forth two separate elements of the two types of offenses or actually there are five total options under Section 4-203. The two that are applicable here are wear, carry or transport a handgun whether concealed or open on or about the person. The State’s position, and the Court agrees, that that [sic] is the crime, the nature of the crime that the Defendant was charged with and which was instructed to the jury in which the jury found the Defendant guilty of. The second option there is wear, carry or knowingly transport a handgun whether concealed or open in a vehicle, and that clearly contains the knowingly element in that count, but given that the indictment in this case is for wear, carry or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person, the Court concludes that the instruction that I gave which does not include the element of scienter is the proper instruction to give in this case.

The trial court sentenced Mr. Lawrence to a five-year term of imprisonment with all but two years suspended. Of that sentence, three years were attributable to the wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun conviction. Mr. Lawrence received credit for 355 days of time served and was sentenced to an additional eight-year term of imprisonment for violating the conditions of his probation. 3. The Appeal.

Mr. Lawrence appealed his conviction on the handgun charge to the Court of Special Appeals and challenged whether “the lower court err[ed] in failing to instruct the jury, as 9 Williams v. State, 462 Md. 335 (2019). 8 requested, that Mr. Lawrence could not be convicted of carrying or transporting a handgun about his person absent knowledge of the presence of that weapon[.]” Lawrence v. State, No. 319, Sept. Term, 2019, 2020 WL 4015838 , at ¹ (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 16, 2020). In an unreported opinion filed on July 16, 2020, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court and held that “knowledge” is not an element of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person. Id. at ⁷.

Mr. Lawrence filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on October 6, 2020, to answer the following question: Is wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about one’s person a strict liability crime? Lawrence v. State, 471 Md. 101 (2020). For the reasons below, we answer that question in the affirmative and hold that the trial court did not err in propounding the State’s requested jury instruction. Although this Court and the Supreme Court disfavor omitting mens rea as an element of criminal statutes, the doctrine of stare decisis compels us to interpret the statutory elements of Md. Code (2002, 2021 Repl.

Vol.), Crim. Law (“CR”) § 4-203(a)(1)(i) as omitting mens rea. Based on the plain text of the statute, our previous holding in Lee, and the General Assembly’s acquiescence to that decision, we hold that “knowledge” is not an element of the crime charged. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review. 9 We review a trial court’s decision to propound or not propound a proposed jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. Stabb v. State, 423 Md. 454, 465 (2011) (citing Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 (1997)). The discretion given to trial judges is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Where the decision or order is a matter of discretion it will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.

Id. (quoting In re Don Mc., 344 Md. 194, 201 (1996)). We accordingly “consider the following factors when deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a request for a particular jury instruction: (1) whether the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law; (2) whether it was applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) whether it was fairly covered in the instructions actually given.” Id. (citing Gunning, 347 Md. at 348 ).

Matters of statutory interpretation are questions of law; therefore, we interpret the meaning of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) de novo. Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Maryland Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 460 Md. 667, 680 (2018). As the Court of Special Appeals aptly stated below, our ultimate goal “is to determine whether the jury instruction correctly identified the elements of the statutory crime.” Lawrence, 2020 WL 4015838 , at ⁶. B. Did the General Assembly Intend for CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) to be a Strict Liability Crime? Whether the trial judge below abused his discretion in propounding the State’s requested jury instruction, which omitted “knowledge” as an element of wearing, carrying, 10 or transporting a handgun on or about the person, turns on the statutory interpretation of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i).

See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994)) (“Whether a criminal statute requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly is a question of congressional intent.”). Specifically, we are tasked with determining whether the General Assembly intended to include scienter, or mens rea, as an element of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person. This Court’s process of statutory interpretation is well-defined, and “[our] primary goal is to ascertain the purpose and intention of the General Assembly when they enacted the statutory provisions.” United Bank v. Buckingham, 472 Md. 407, 423 (2021) (quoting Town of Forest Heights v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 463 Md. 469, 478 (2019)). CR § 4-203 prohibits five acts related to wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun and provides: (a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person may not: (i) wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person; (ii) wear, carry, or knowingly transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, in a vehicle traveling on a road or parking lot generally used by the public, highway, waterway, or airway of the State; (iii) violate item (i) or (ii) of this paragraph while on public school property in the State; (iv) violate item (i) or (ii) of this paragraph with the deliberate purpose of injuring or killing another person; or (v) violate item (i) or (ii) of this paragraph with a handgun loaded with ammunition.

(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that a person who transports a handgun under paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection transports the handgun knowingly. 11 CR § 4-203(a) (emphasis added).10 The statute also contains nine exceptions to the prohibited acts listed above. See CR § 4-203(b). 1. The Parties’ Contentions. Mr. Lawrence asks this Court to read into the statute a requirement that the State prove “knowledge” as an element of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i).11 In arguing that the General Assembly has always intended for “knowledge” to be an element of subparagraph (a)(1)(i), Mr. Lawrence raises several points.

He first relies on the text and posits that the General Assembly’s use of transitive verbs, i.e. “wear,” “carry,” and “transport,” suggests that the legislative intent of subparagraph (a)(1)(i) was to punish only affirmative acts that are carried out knowingly. Mr. Lawrence then asserts that the statute’s legislative history and the Supreme Court’s general distaste for eliminating mens rea as an element of criminal statutes bolster his preferred interpretation. Lastly, Mr. Lawrence makes several arguments as to why this Court should depart from its reasoning in Lee v. State, which held that the predecessor statute to CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) was a strict liability offense. 311 Md. 642 (1988). Mr. Lawrence contends that Lee is inconsistent with both Maryland and Supreme 10 At the time Mr. Lawrence was charged with violating CR § 4-203, subsection (a)(1) only contained four subparagraphs.

In 2018, the General Assembly amended CR § 4-203(a)(1) to include a fifth prohibition, subparagraph (v). CR § 4-203(a)(1)(v) prohibits violating “item (i) or (ii) of this paragraph with a handgun loaded with ammunition” and is not at issue in this case. 11 For ease of reading, we sometimes refer to the subsections and subparagraphs of CR § 4-203 directly as such, i.e., “subparagraph (a)(1)(i).” To be clear, all references to subsections or subparagraphs relate to CR § 4-203. 12 Court case law, and that interpreting CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) as a strict liability offense brings its constitutionality into question. On the other hand, the State argues that the text of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) unambiguously disposes of a mens rea requirement and creates a strict liability offense for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person. The State maintains that the General Assembly’s decision to include “knowingly” as an element of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(ii) fortifies its conclusion that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the predecessor statute to CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i)—which aimed to stem widespread gun violence in the 1970s—was to create a strict liability offense.

In response to Mr. Lawrence’s argument that Lee was wrongly decided and is incompatible with subsequent case law, the State asks this Court to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. The State sets forth that Lee does not fall under an exception that would urge the Court to abandon its previous holding and that attaching strict liability to CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i) is compatible with both this Court’s and the Supreme Court’s understanding of strict liability in the criminal context. 2. Lee v. State. This is not the first time that we have considered whether the General Assembly intended to attach strict liability to wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about the person.

In Lee v. State, this Court was presented with almost the exact issue that we face here: “Does the Maryland statute prohibiting the carrying of a handgun require knowledge of the presence of the handgun[?]” 311 Md. at 646 . 13 At that time, the predecessor statute to CR § 4-203—Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 36B(b)—contained similar language12 to the current statute: Any person who shall wear, carry or transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, upon or about his person, and any person who shall wear, carry or knowingly transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, in any vehicle traveling upon the public roads . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person is knowingly transporting the handgun . . . . Lee, 311 Md. at 647 (quoting Article 27, § 36B(b)). Article 27, § 36B(b) was enacted by the General Assembly in 1972 when it passed emergency legislation proposed by Governor Marvin Mandel to provide more stringent penalties against those who illegally carried handguns on the streets of Maryland.

See Senate Bill 205, 1972 Leg., 375th Sess. (Md. 1972); House Bill 277, 1972 Leg., 375th Sess. (Md. 1972). The bill was signed into law by Governor Mandel as 1972 Md. Laws, ch. 13 “to make unlawful, generally regulate, and provide penalties for the wearing, carrying, or transporting of handguns[.]” Senate Bill 205, 1972 Leg., 375th Sess.

(Md. 1972); see also Bill File to S.B. 205 (1972).13 12 The Maryland Code was recodified in 2002 and Article 27, § 36B became § 4-203 of the Criminal Law Article. See 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26. The Revisor’s Note for CR § 4-203 states that “[t]his section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 36B(b) and (c).” Id. 13 While the legislative history for bills enacted prior to 1976 is often scarce, in this case, an extensive bill file for the 1972 handgun legislation exists in the Department of Legislative Services’ library. Blue v. Prince George’s Cty., 434 Md. 681 , 694 n.18 (2013) (“It is typically difficult to locate legislative history in Maryland for bills enacted prior to 1976, when the Department of Legislative Reference began to systematically preserve bill files for each session.

The Department did, however, compile a special bound volume of the bill files for the 1972 handgun legislation, which has been retained in the State Law Library.”). 14 Prior to the General Assembly’s enactment of Article 27, § 36B, its prohibition on illegal handguns fell within the more general provisions of Md. Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 36(a). The prohibition on dangerous weapons, including handguns, in § 36(a) was originally enacted by the General Assembly in 1886 and provided: Every person not being a conservator of the peace entitled or required to carry such weapon as a part of his official equipment, who shall wear or carry any pistol, dirk-knife, bowie-knife, slung-shot [sic], billy, sand-club, metal knuckles, razor or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind whatsoever, (penknives excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall carry or wear any such weapon openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned not more than six months in jail or the House of Correction. 1886 Md. Laws, ch. 375. That language remained substantively unchanged until 1972, albeit prescribing an enhanced $1,000 fine and maximum three-year term of imprisonment: Every person who shall wear or carry any pistol, dirk knife, bowie knife, switchblade knife, sandclub, metal knuckles, razor, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever (penknives without switchblade excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such weapon openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars or be imprisoned in jail, or sentenced to the Maryland Department of Correction for not more than three years[.] Article 26, § 36(a) (1971 Repl.

Vol.). The General Assembly’s creation of a provision that separately—and more stringently—punished wearing, carrying, or transporting handguns was, as is eminently clear from the multitude of amendments made to Senate Bill 205, part of a contentious legislative process. One such amendment, the inclusion of the word “knowingly” to the provision involving vehicular transportation, was the focus of the Lee Court’s analysis in 15 determining whether wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun was a strict liability offense. The Court first looked to the plain language of Article 27, § 36B(b) and unequivocally held that the statute “create[d] strict liability for the wearing or carrying of a handgun about one’s person.” Lee, 311 Md. at 647 .

Although the Court’s reasoning in Lee was grounded in the plain language of Article 27, § 36B(b), it also determined that the legislative history supported its interpretation that the General Assembly intended to create a strict liability offense: The scienter requirement applies only to vehicular transportation of a handgun and was inserted “so that a person who shows that he was not aware that his vehicle was transporting a handgun will not incur penalties.” Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 69 , 512 A.2d 358, 369 (1986). This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the legislative bill by which § 36B(b) was proposed provided for strict liability without any knowledge requirement as to wearing, carrying and transporting. The “knowledge” requirement for transporting was inserted by amendment. See Acts of 1972, ch. 13.

The addition of a scienter requirement specifically for vehicular transport underscores the corresponding omission of that requirement for wearing and carrying handguns. Id. The Lee Court went no further in reconciling the language of the statute with the legislature’s purpose in enacting § 36B(b). Neither the bill file for Senate Bill 205 nor the language of the bill explicitly indicate the General Assembly’s intent in amending the statute to include the word “knowingly” before the vehicular transportation provision in § 36B.

In the end, however, the Court construed the omission of language indicating a mens rea requirement and the General Assembly’s subsequent amendment adding the word 16 “knowingly” before “transport” as dispositive of the General Assembly’s intent in affixing strict liability to “wearing and carrying handguns.” Id. We recognize that the direct lineage between CR § 4-203 and Article 27, § 36B(b), puts our decision today up against the doctrine of stare decisis. We address this issue below. However, because this is the first time that this Court has interpreted the more recently enacted CR § 4-203, we first offer our own statutory analysis. 3.

Statutory Analysis. Our statutory analysis begins “with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates [our] interpretation[.]” Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113 (2018) (quoting Schreyer v. Chaplain, 416 Md. 94, 101 (2010)). “We read the ‘statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Buckingham, 472 Md. at 423 (quoting Town of Forest Heights, 463 Md. at 478 ). In contrast to Article 27, § 36B(b), CR § 4-203 provides two distinct modalities that are the focus of our statutory inquiry. Subparagraph (a)(1)(i), which was the only violation of CR § 4-203 charged by the State in this case, prohibits “wear[ing], carry[ing], or transport[ing] a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person[.]”14 CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i).

As is evident from 14 We are fully aware that the handgun found under Mr. Lawrence’s car seat could have also been charged as a violation of CR § 4-203(a)(1)(ii), which specifically applies to handguns worn, carried, or transported in a vehicle and prescribes a general intent “knowingly” mens rea. Because of the proximity of the handgun to Mr. Lawrence’s person, an argument can be made that the handgun was “on or about” his person because it was stored in a way that made it available for immediate use. However, our decision today in no way expands the scope of the term “on or about” in CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i). 17 the text, the General Assembly did not expressly include an element requiring that the State prove mens rea. Compare this with CR § 4-203’s second modality, in which the General Assembly included “knowingly” as a required element of “wear[ing], carry[ing], or knowingly transport[ing], a handgun, whether concealed or open, in a vehicle traveling on a road or parking lot generally used by the public, highway, waterway, or airway of the State[.]” CR § 4-203(a)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).

Mr. Lawrence asks that we read a “knowingly” mens rea into the statute’s first modality even though it contains no language indicating a mens rea element. Mr. Lawrence’s argument relies on the definitions of the terms used by the General Assembly in CR § 4-203(a)(1)(i), i.e. “wear, carry, or transport[.]” “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Buckingham, 472 Md. at 423 (Fangman v. Genuine Title, LLC, 447 Md. 681, 691 (2016)). “Wear,” according to Merriam Webster, means “to bear or have on the person[.]” Wear,