State v. Krikstan

State of Maryland v. Keith Krikstan, No. 18, September Term, 2022 CHILD ABUSE – SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR – ACT THAT INVOLVES SEXUAL EXPLOITATION – SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE – Supreme Court of Maryland* held that evidence was sufficient to support substitute teacher’s conviction for child sexual abuse based on teacher’s in-school discussion with minor about teacher’s anger or jealousy over minor’s affection for another adult man amidst teacher’s ongoing sexual exploitation of minor outside of school, via electronic and telephone communications. Teacher’s in-school discussion with minor of his anger or jealousy regarding minor’s affection for another adult man constituted act that involved sexual exploitation, where teacher had established unquestionably sexually exploitative relationship with minor outside of school, and teacher’s in-school conduct related to, affected, or was part of out-of-school sexual exploitation of minor. Supreme Court of Maryland held that evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that teacher’s expression of anger or jealousy to minor in school related to, affected, or was part of out- of-school exploitation of minor, fulfilling requirement that State show teacher engaged in act that involved sexual exploitation while having permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of minor. *At the time of oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland was named the Court of Appeals of Maryland. At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland.

The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. Circuit Court for Charles County Case No. C-08-CR-18-000694 Argued: December 6, 2022 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* No. 18 September Term, 2022 ______________________________________ STATE OF MARYLAND v. KEITH KRIKSTAN ______________________________________ Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould Eaves Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Hotten, Eaves, and Battaglia, JJ., dissent. Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. ______________________________________ 2023-02-27 14:09-05:00 Filed: February 27, 2023 Gregory Hilton, Clerk *At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland.

The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. In Maryland, a criminal statute governing child sexual abuse prohibits, among other things, a “person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor” from causing “sexual abuse to the minor.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol.) (“CR”) § 3-602(b)(1).

For conviction under the statute, the person must have care, custody, or responsibility for supervision of the minor at the time the person engages in “an act that involves” sexual exploitation of the minor. CR § 3- 602(a)(4)(i). In this case, we must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of Keith Krikstan, Respondent, for sexual abuse of a minor. The issue is whether Krikstan engaged in acts that involved sexual exploitation of the minor at a time that he had responsibility for the minor’s supervision.

At bottom, this case raises the question of whether, for purposes of the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a conviction under CR § 3-602, the in-person conduct of an adult who has responsibility for the supervision of a minor and is indisputably sexually exploiting the minor by electronic communications at times when the person does not have responsibility for the minor’s supervision should be viewed in isolation, or whether the in-person conduct should be assessed in the context of other known sexually exploitative acts. In this case, 30-year-old Krikstan, a substitute teacher, was charged with sexual abuse of a minor after his out-of-school sexually exploitative relationship with A.G.,1 a 12- year-old middle school student, came to light. Krikstan, who worked on-and-off as a 1 In accordance with Maryland Rule 8-125(b)(1), the minor is referred to by her initials. substitute teacher at A.G.’s middle school, engaged in a sexually exploitative relationship with the 12-year-old student through cell phone text messages, an electronic messaging application, and video chats outside of class. Krikstan first met A.G. when he was teaching as a substitute in her seventh-grade science class.

Krikstan began texting A.G., quickly becoming what she considered “more than” a friend. Krikstan professed his love for A.G., doing so over 100 times. Krikstan asked to see A.G.’s “butt,” either clothed or bare. A.G. sent photos of her buttocks, sometimes bare, to Krikstan 10 to 15 times.

According to A.G., Krikstan showed her part of his penis on several occasions when they video chatted. In other conversations, Krikstan discussed his desire to have sex with A.G. After a few weeks of these communications, A.G. told Krikstan that she was interested in a 21-year-old man named Joey.2 Krikstan became upset, told A.G., among other things, that he had “loved” her but was “done[,]” and wished her a “great life with Joey.” A.G. testified that Krikstan “was mad at” her and that he sent her a message through Snapchat telling her the things above. A.G. saved the message because parts of it made her “feel good.” In the midst of this emotional turmoil, Krikstan returned to A.G.’s school as a substitute teacher and discussed with her his negative feelings about her having expressed an attraction to the 21-year-old man. Specifically, Krikstan substitute taught A.G.’s math class.

Once there, Krikstan gave A.G. a late pass to stay after math class. After class, while A.G. was still in the classroom, Krikstan conveyed to her that he was mad and upset with her because of her feelings for the other adult man. 2 At trial, A.G. testified that Joey was 21 years old and did not go to her school, and that she knew him “[t]hrough a haunted house that [she] work[ed] at.” -2- After this conversation at school, Krikstan resumed sexually exploiting A.G. regularly, by telephone and electronically outside of school hours, telling her that he loved her and wanted to have sex with her. These electronic communications were often intensely romantic and graphically sexual. One exchange involved Krikstan instructing A.G. how to masturbate using a pillow, which she did, and afterward Krikstan messaged the 12-year-old that he had visualized her “riding a cock.” None of the explicitly romantic or sexual exchanges occurred at school.

Approximately two months after Krikstan substitute taught A.G.’s math class, Krikstan again elected to substitute teach one of A.G.’s classes after another conflict about A.G’s feelings for the other man and emotional conversations with A.G. That day, another student reported to a school official the nature of the relationship between Krikstan and A.G., and Krikstan was later arrested. Krikstan was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor. Despite the circumstances of the numerous sexually exploitative acts by Krikstan through electronic communications that preceded him expressing his anger to A.G. about her attraction to another man in school after her math class, and that his sexual exploitation of A.G. continued after the conversation in school, the Appellate Court of Maryland3 reversed his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, theorizing that he had not “said or implied anything sexual” in his conversation with the minor in school. Keith Krikstan v. State, No. 2279, Sept. Term, 2019, 2022 WL 1284081 , at ¹, ⁶ (Md. App. Ct. Apr. 29, 3 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland.

The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. -3- 2022). The State contends that the Appellate Court of Maryland erred because the in-school conversation after A.G.’s math class involved the sexual exploitation outside of school, providing sufficient evidence for conviction. The State relies on our definition of an act that “involves” sexual exploitation as an act “relating to” such exploitation, Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 419 , 722 A.2d 887, 896 (1999) (cleaned up), and argues that the in- school conversation was a continuation of a discussion that arose in the exploitative relationship and related to sexual exploitation, as a 30-year-old teacher expressed jealousy to a 12-year-old about her affection for another adult man. Krikstan contends that the Appellate Court of Maryland properly vacated his conviction because there was insufficient evidence that he was responsible for A.G.’s supervision at any time that his sexually exploitative conduct occurred.

This is so, Krikstan argues, because the State did not present sufficient specific evidence of his intention with respect to the in-school conversation after math class, or the content of the conversation or how the conversation benefited him. Against this background, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support Krikstan’s conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602. We conclude that to support a conviction under CR § 3-602, where a person has sexually exploited a minor through electronic communications at a time that the person did not have care, custody, or responsibility for the supervision of the minor, there must be a showing that the person engaged in an act that related to, affected, or was a part of the out-of-school sexual exploitation of the minor when the person had care, custody, or responsibility for -4- supervision of the minor. The occurrence of sexual exploitation outside of the perpetrator’s time of responsibility for supervision of the minor may be used to establish child sexual abuse under CR § 3-602, but there must be a showing that the perpetrator engaged in an act relating to, affecting, or that was a part of the sexual exploitation while the perpetrator was responsible for the care, custody, or supervision of the minor.

That the act at issue relates to, affects, or is a part of sexual exploitation of the minor need not be shown through direct evidence; rather, the showing may be accomplished though evidence that permits a rational trier of fact to find that the act is related to the sexual exploitation of the minor. In addition, the act taken while the person is responsible for the care, custody, or supervision of the minor need not be of a sexual or criminal nature. It is enough that the act relates to, affects, or is a part of the sexual exploitation of the minor. Our holding today flows directly from Degren, 352 Md. at 419 , 722 A.2d at 896 , a case in which we affirmed a conviction for child sexual abuse under Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 27, § 35C (a predecessor to CR § 3-602), and in doing so considered the meaning of the phrase “involves sexual molestation or exploitation” and explained that the word “involves” “connotes a broad sense of inclusion, such as an act relating to sexual molestation or exploitation.” (Citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 617 (10th ed.) (“defining ‘involve’ as ‘to engage as a participant’ or ‘to have an effect on’ and ‘involved’ as ‘being affected or implicated’”)) (emphasis in original). Our conclusion is also consistent with our holding in Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587, 622-23 , 69 A.3d 1066, 1087-88 (2013), in which we discussed that sexual exploitation is not limited to incidents involving physical contact and can include a wide range of behavior. In Walker, id. at 622 , -5- 69 A.3d at 1087 , we explained that: Our review of Maryland case law leads us to several conclusions about [CR] § 3-602. The statute . . . can encompass a wide range of behavior that need not, in itself, be criminal.

Child sexual abuse can be committed as part of a single act or a series of actions and it is not necessary that the defendant physically touch the child in order to commit the crime. The context in which the abuse occurs matters and failing to act to prevent abuse can be criminal. Finally, exploitation requires that the defendant “took advantage of or unjustly or improperly used the child for his or her own benefit.” (Quoting Degren, 352 Md. at 426 , 722 A.2d at 900 ) (emphasis in original). In this case, the evidence demonstrated that Krikstan’s in-school conduct fell squarely within the meaning of the language of the statute providing that sexual abuse means an act that involves either sexual molestation or exploitation of a minor, regardless of whether physical injuries occur or not.

In the classroom after math class, Krikstan discussed with A.G. his anger and demonstrated jealousy over her attraction to another adult man. At the time of the in-school interaction, A.G. had already informed Krikstan of her attraction to the other man in the context of a sexually exploitative relationship conducted through electronic communications, and Krikstan had already expressed his anger about the other adult man while communicating with A.G. during the existing out- of-school sexually exploitative relationship. And, after the in-school display of anger, Krikstan continued the out-of-school sexual exploitation, which included emotionally charged electronic communications about whether A.G. loved Krikstan or the other man. A rational juror could easily have found that Krikstan’s reiteration in the classroom of his angry, jealous reaction to A.G.’s feelings for another man related to, affected, or was a part of the ongoing sexual exploitation of A.G. outside of school.

By returning to the -6- classroom as her substitute teacher and discussing his anger with A.G. at school, Krikstan continued his sexual exploitation of the minor by conveying the same anger and jealousy that he had demonstrated earlier in an exploitative electronic communication, when he said he had “loved” her but was “done” with her. After his in-school demonstration of anger and jealousy about the other adult man, Krikstan resumed sexually exploiting A.G. outside of the classroom, including by sending her messages about the other adult man and, among other things, causing her to engage in acts of masturbation. Under these circumstances, a rational fact-finder could readily have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Krikstan’s expression of anger in the classroom about the other adult man was related to or affected the out-of-school sexually exploitative relationship and, indeed, was a part of or constituted a continuation of the exploitative relationship, given that Krikstan expressed the same sentiments in school that he had earlier in an inappropriate electronic communication and that he resumed the same type of sexually exploitative electronic communications with A.G. after the classroom conversation as he had engaged in with her before. Under the language of the statute and our case law, it was not necessary for Krikstan specifically to say or imply anything sexual during the classroom conversation.

The legislative history of the statute indicates an intent by the General Assembly that the statute be interpreted broadly to include a wide range of conduct and to protect children. With these principles and the evidence presented at trial in mind, it is clear that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have found that Krikstan’s in-school acts met the definition of conduct involving sexual exploitation of a minor. -7- Upon concluding that the evidence is more than sufficient to support Krikstan’s conviction, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland. BACKGROUND Krikstan was charged with sexual abuse of a minor and related offenses. The material facts are essentially undisputed.

Krikstan was 30 years old when he met A.G. while substitute teaching in her seventh-grade science class. A.G. was 12. A.G. testified that during that class, in autumn of 2017, Krikstan asked her what a 12-year-old friend of hers “had told [A.G.] about him.” A week later, Krikstan texted A.G., after receiving her phone number from the same 12-year-old friend, whom A.G. described as her best friend. According to A.G., after about a week of daily “[n]ormal conversation” by text between the two, Krikstan asked for her school schedule so that he could “keep an eye out” for her, which A.G. shared.

Shortly thereafter, at Krikstan’s request, Krikstan and A.G. began to communicate via Snapchat, a phone-based messaging application on which messages, photos, and videos can be sent, but will automatically disappear if they are not affirmatively saved. Early in their interactions, Krikstan told A.G. that he “loved” and “wanted to be with” A.G.’s 12-year-old best friend, from whom he had gotten A.G.’s number. However, within a few weeks of communicating, Krikstan was telling A.G. that he loved her, and she said the same back to him. A.G. testified that their relationship at the time was one of “[f]riends with benefits” because she and Krikstan “were doing more than what friends would normally do.” A.G. estimated that Krikstan told her that he loved her over 100 times. -8- Via Snapchat, Krikstan asked to see the 12-year-old’s “butt,” either clothed or bare.

A.G. responded but did not send a photo, because she “knew it was wrong.” When Krikstan asked again later the same day, A.G. sent a photo. She did so because Krikstan’s request “felt forceful,” and “[h]e had asked before and then asked again, so it felt like [she] had to.” In explaining her decision to send the photo, A.G. testified that she “loved” Krikstan and that she felt that if she did not send the picture, she “would lose him” as “[a] person that would be there for [her].” Thereafter, A.G. sent photos of her buttocks, sometimes clothed, sometimes bare, to Krikstan 10 to 15 times, sometimes at his request and sometimes not. In addition, Krikstan began to communicate with A.G. nightly on FaceTime, an application on which video calls can be made via phone or computer; these video calls usually took place late at night or in the early morning hours after midnight. A.G. testified that, during these conversations, Krikstan showed her part of his penis via FaceTime 15 to 20 times.

After two-and-a-half to three weeks of Krikstan communicating with her, A.G. told him that she was interested in a 21-year-old man named Joey. A.G. testified that Krikstan “got upset.” Krikstan sent her a message through Snapchat indicating that A.G. had “lost” two people “who really loved” her, and A.G. responded that she had caused him and herself “pain” that she “didn’t want to feel again[.]” Krikstan then sent A.G. the following message through Snapchat: Well I can’t speak for him Bc who knows if he really did but I can speak for me . . . I loved u so much u were the highlight and the reason I got up Bc I couldn’t wait to talk to u to spend all day talking to u to making u smile that beautiful smile looking at ur beautiful eyes and gorgeous lips I would of and almost did risk everything just to kiss u to hold u u were my dream and it -9- then just turned into a nightmare. Just like that.

Fuck it I’m done Take care and hope u have a great life with Joey (Ellipsis in original). A.G. testified that she saved the above message in part because “what he said” made her “feel good[,]” as Krikstan called her “beautiful” and “was saying all these sweet things[.]” After the Snapchat message in which Krikstan told A.G. he was “done[,]” Krikstan substituted in A.G.’s math class.4 This occurred after the time that they had discussed Joey and A.G.’s feelings for him. During her testimony, when asked whether Krikstan substitute taught her math class “during the time period about when [she] had told him about Joey” and they “were arguing about Joey[,]” A.G. responded “[y]es.” When asked whether the Snapchat conversation in which Krikstan stated he was “done” occurred in “the days 4 Krikstan was a short-term substitute teacher in Charles County, where A.G.’s middle school was located. Substitute teachers can view the available opportunities for substitute teaching via an online portal, where they can select which opening (based on school, time, and class) they wish to fill.

A substitute in possession of a particular student’s schedule could seek to substitute for teachers on the student’s schedule, because of the available information about each opening. According to the record in this case, Krikstan elected to substitute teach at A.G.’s middle school four times during the course of the sexually exploitative relationship before his arrest: October 16, 2017, October 17, 2017, November 15, 2017, and January 11, 2018. Other than the January 11, 2018 class, the record does not reveal the date on or time at which Krikstan elected to substitute teach on the dates chosen. Although A.G. testified that Krikstan spoke with her first in her science class in November, this would have been one of the October dates, and Krikstan’s substitution in her math class was on November 15, 2017, not in December as A.G. recalled.

That A.G. apparently advanced the dates by one month does not affect our analysis because A.G.’s testimony about the timeline was consistent otherwise, and she described the events in question in relation to Krikstan’s substitutions in her science and math classes, and, on January 11, 2018, in her reading class. - 10 - leading up to math class or . . . after math class[,]” A.G. responded “[b]efore.” When Krikstan taught A.G.’s math class, Krikstan gave her a pass so that she could be late to the following class. Rather than go to her next class, A.G. stayed in the classroom talking to him about Joey and how Krikstan was mad and upset about the situation. At trial, when the prosecutor asked whether Krikstan expressed his feelings to her after class, A.G. responded: “Yes[,]” but she could not remember the specifics of what he said. A.G. testified that her impression was that Krikstan “was mad at [her] because [she] told him about Joey.” The prosecutor asked: “So you guys are in math class, you stay after.

You’re having this communication with him regarding him being upset about Joey, right?” and A.G. responded, “Yes.” A.G. testified that at the conclusion of the conversation in the classroom, she was not sure whether the issue was resolved and that Krikstan did not say whether he wanted to see her again. From A.G.’s perspective, Krikstan was “mad” at her and would not talk to her. After the interaction in the classroom, Krikstan resumed communicating with A.G. and telling her that he loved her. This included numerous intensely emotional and sexual electronic exchanges.

For example, on one occasion, Krikstan instructed A.G. to masturbate using a pillow, which she did. A discussion followed in which Krikstan took credit for teaching A.G. to masturbate with a pillow, as opposed to a different method, and advised that he fantasized about the 12-year-old “riding a cock.” Krikstan stated that he “should stop talking to” A.G. because he was “corrupting” her and stated that he was “turning [her] into such a bad girl[.]” Krikstan stated he “love[d A.G.]’s dirty little slut side” and responded “God that’s so hot” to A.G.’s message indicating that she did not know - 11 - she had such a side. In three or four additional conversations, between November and January, they talked about having sex with each other. All these exchanges happened at night, outside of school.

A.G. testified that she called Krikstan “Daddy” in a message on Snapchat with a heart emoji next to it because he told her before Christmas of 2017 to call him that. In an exhibit that was admitted into evidence by the State, in a Snapchat exchange, Krikstan told A.G. that she could call him “Keith” “[o]r daddy whichever [she] prefer[red.]” A.G. responded: “Daddy.” A.G. also testified that she called Krikstan “Babe” as a nickname at a point in which her feelings were that she loved him. After Krikstan had substituted in A.G.’s math class, he chose to return as a substitute teacher in A.G.’s reading class on January 11, 2018. This occasion also followed a “fight about Joey” and intense exchanges between A.G. and Krikstan concerning their relationship.

In these interactions, Krikstan shared feelings of being rejected by A.G. because of her affection for Joey, prompting A.G. to reiterate her love and affection for Krikstan. For example, according to an Apple iPhone Logical Extraction Report that was entered into evidence, on January 8, 2018, A.G. told Krikstan, “You’re perfect, amazing, handsome, loving, caring, I can’t find anything better, even Joey[.]” In the same message, A.G. wrote to Krikstan: I can’t be mad at you. I can’t hate you. I can ALWAYS love you.

There’s nothing in this world that can stop any of those feelings. I love you too much to let you go. I don’t want to say goodbye. I want you to stay for as long as you can, forever and always!

On the same day, Krikstan messaged A.G.: “U love him[.] It’s cool with me[.] I - 12 - knew it from beginning[.]” A.G. responded, “I do love you, and I’m going to admit, maybe not as much as I love him, but I still love yo[u].” An Apple iPhone Event Log entered into evidence shows that, over the next two days, Krikstan and A.G. engaged in FaceTime calls and sent additional text messages to each other. In one message sent on the night of January 10, 2018, before FaceTime calls, A.G. told Krikstan: “Fine but I’m only listening bc I don’t feel like losing you!” It was after these exchanges that Krikstan returned to substitute teach A.G.’s reading class. While Krikstan was substitute teaching on January 11, 2018, another student reported to a school official the nature of the relationship between Krikstan and A.G., leading to Krikstan’s arrest.5 In April 2019, a jury convicted Krikstan of sexual abuse of a minor. On January 7, 2020, the Circuit Court for Charles County imposed a sentence of 25 years of incarceration, with all but 9 years suspended, to be followed by 5 years of supervised probation.

Krikstan timely noted an appeal. Opinion of the Appellate Court of Maryland On April 29, 2022, the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s 5 A recorded police interview of Krikstan conducted on January 11, 2018 was entered into evidence at trial. During the interview with a detective, Krikstan characterized his relationship with A.G. as “just friendship.” Regarding the conversation after math class, Krikstan stated: “She came to me one time [] after class because . . . she had a crush on like a 21-year-old and her mom axed it. She was upset about it, so . . . she came and talked to me about it.” When the detective asked what advice Krikstan gave A.G. about the situation, Krikstan said: “Pretty much just try and stay -- you know, you don’t want none of that stuff. . . .

He’s too old for you.” Krikstan also told the detective that he had not spoken with A.G. before that conversation and that none of the messages or photos he exchanged with A.G. were “X-rated” or inappropriate. At trial, in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that portions of Krikstan’s responses during the interview were false and constituted consciousness of guilt. - 13 - judgment, holding “that the evidence was not sufficient to support the judgment of conviction for sexual abuse of a minor under” CR § 3-602. See Krikstan, 2022 WL 1284081 , at ¹. The Appellate Court relied on our holding in Wicomico Cnty.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. B.A., 449 Md. 122 , 141 A.3d 208 (2016), to narrow the question facing it to whether Krikstan had temporary responsibility for supervision of the minor6 at a time “when he engaged in sexually exploitative conduct.” Krikstan, 2022 WL 1284081 , at ⁶. The Appellate Court stated that the parties seemed to agree that Krikstan had temporary responsibility for supervision of the minor when he was a substitute teacher in her class. See id.

However, the Appellate Court reasoned, Krikstan’s responsibility for supervision of the minor ended with the school day and did not extend to the moments in time when he engaged in sexually exploitative conduct. See id. The Appellate Court disagreed with the State’s argument that Krikstan “made sexual-in-nature comments when he talked with [the minor] personally during and immediately following the classes when he was a substitute teacher, while on school grounds and in the classroom.” Id. The Appellate Court held that, to fit the definition of sexual exploitation, the acts in question need not be physical but must be “sexual,” which can be either explicit or “merely have a ‘sexual undertone.’” Id.

(citation omitted). The Appellate Court held that the State presented no evidence that Krikstan “said or implied anything sexual” when he spoke with the minor at school during and after class. Id. The Appellate Court stated that “[t]he 6 In the Appellate Court of Maryland’s opinion, see Krikstan, 2022 WL 1284081 , at ¹ n.1, and the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the minor is referred to as “N.,” rather than her actual initials or name. - 14 - discussion about [the minor]’s feelings toward another man does not, without more, qualify as a sexual conversation.” Id.

The Appellate Court was unpersuaded by the State’s argument that Krikstan’s decision to serve as the minor’s substitute teacher and his conversations with her at school constituted “grooming.” Id. at ⁷. The Appellate Court explained that Maryland “jurisprudence regarding the phenomenon of ‘grooming,’ particularly as it relates to child abuse, is not very well developed.” Id. at ⁶. In light of this limited jurisprudence, the Appellate Court expressed uncertainty whether “grooming” could satisfy CR § 3- 602(a)(4)(i). Krikstan, 2022 WL 1284081 , at ⁷.

But the Appellate Court decided that it did not need to resolve the question, because it found no evidence of “grooming” by Krikstan. Id. For these reasons, the Appellate Court held that there was not sufficient evidence that Krikstan’s conduct in school constituted sexual exploitation. See id. at ⁸.

In a concurring opinion, the Honorable Christopher B. Kehoe explained that, from his perspective based on the legislative history of the criminal child abuse statute, a “historical accident” had led to the conclusion that “Krikstan’s otherwise fully-warranted conviction for sexual abuse of a minor must be reversed[.]” Id. (Kehoe, J., concurring). Judge Kehoe explained that, in Maryland, early child abuse statutes emerged to supersede the common law exemption from liability for assault and battery applicable to parents and custodians disciplining children. See id. at ⁸-9 (Kehoe, J., concurring).

The goal, wrote Judge Kehoe, “was not to decriminalize assaults and batteries on children by individuals who were neither parents nor custodians; rather the statute established enhanced penalties for those who had a duty to care for and protect children.” Id. at ⁹ (Kehoe, J., concurring) - 15 - (citation omitted). Judge Kehoe stated that, when the General Assembly added protections against sexual abuse of children, it built on this framework, while leaving in place the requirement that the perpetrator be a parent, custodian, or individual otherwise responsible for the care or supervision of a child. See id. (Kehoe, J., concurring).

But, Judge Kehoe observed that because there was no “common law counterpart to the statutory offense of sexual abuse of a minor child[,]” CR § 3-602 establishes in the first instance “penalties for those who have a special duty to protect children in their care” rather than enhanced penalties for people who have such a duty, and creates no penalties for people who do not have care, custody, or responsibility for the supervision of children. Krikstan, 2022 WL 1284081 , at ⁹ (Kehoe, J., concurring). Judge Kehoe stated that, as such, the statute’s scope is limited, letting perpetrators like Krikstan off the hook. See id.

(Kehoe, J., concurring). Judge Kehoe explained that “language that was intended to expand protection to children in 1963 and in 1976[] now operates to limit the protections that the law affords to children from forms of sexual abuse and exploitation” that were unforeseen decades ago. Id. (Kehoe, J., concurring).

Judge Kehoe suggested that the General Assembly consider amending the statute to address this problem. See id. (Kehoe, J., concurring). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On June 15, 2022, the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following two issues: 1.

Was the evidence sufficient to find that a 30-year-old substitute teacher engaged in an act inside of school hours that “involves” sexual exploitation, where he specifically opted to substitute in the class of a 12-year-old student - 16 - and while still in the classroom expressed his jealousy about the 12-year- old’s attraction to another man, given that he was engaging in a sexually exploitative relationship by way of electronic communications with this same student outside of school? 2. Was the evidence sufficient to find that the substitute teacher’s acts and statements in class constituted grooming the 12-year-old, and does such grooming “involve” sexual exploitation where a sexually exploitative relationship is conducted outside of school? On August 25, 2022, we granted the petition. See State v. Krikstan, 481 Md. 2 , 281 A.3d 718 (2022).

DISCUSSION7 The Parties’ Contentions The State contends that the evidence at trial was sufficient for a rational juror to find that Krikstan engaged in an act during school hours that “involved” sexual exploitation. The State argues that the act was Krikstan’s discussion, at school, with the minor of his jealousy of the other man to whom she was attracted, in the context of the ongoing sexually exploitative relationship. The State asserts that, if Krikstan took any act in the classroom, which included an act “related to, affected by, or having an effect on” the existing sexual exploitation, the act falls within the meaning of an act involving sexual exploitation. (Emphasis omitted).

The State urges this Court to conclude that the in-person conversation after math class involved sexual exploitation because the conversation related to or had the effect of emotional manipulation related to ongoing sexual exploitation. The State asserts 7 Given our holding as to question one, we need not address question two concerning whether Krikstan’s actions at school constituted grooming and were sufficient on that ground to support a conviction under CR § 3-602. - 17 - that not only was the in-school conversation a continuation of the existing exploitation, but also it involved sexual exploitation on its own, as the conversation consisted of a 30-year- old teacher expressing jealousy to a 12-year-old about her affection for another adult man. The State argues that Krikstan “received a personal benefit from the manipulative pressure he applied in th[e classroom] conversation in terms of continuing or furthering his exploitative relationship with A.G.” Krikstan responds that the Appellate Court of Maryland properly vacated his conviction because the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that he was temporarily responsible for the supervision of A.G. at any time that sexually exploitative conduct occurred. Krikstan asserts that the conversation after math class about the other man cannot support a conviction for sexual abuse.

Krikstan characterizes the State’s description of the conversation as an expression of “jealousy” as inaccurate because A.G. testified only that Krikstan was “mad” at her because she told him about Joey without further elaboration. Krikstan argues that because the State did not present specific evidence of his intention with respect to the in-school conversation, we cannot ascribe an intention to the conduct. Although acknowledging that, taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence demonstrated his communications outside of school with A.G. were sexually exploitative, Krikstan contends that, just as in B.A., his in-school actions “could not reasonably be interpreted as facilitating” those communications. Krikstan contends that our holding in B.A., in which we affirmed an administrative law judge’s finding that where a martial arts instructor had engaged in sexually exploitative conduct with a student via remote communications, the instructor’s in-class conduct did - 18 - not constitute sexual exploitation under the Family Law Article, lends significant support for his position.

Krikstan asserts that his interpretation of CR § 3-602 is confirmed by changes that the General Assembly made in 2017 expanding the scope of the parallel Family Law statute, which was the subject of B.A., but not CR § 3-602. Krikstan observes that the General Assembly amended the Family Law Article’s definition of child sexual and non-sexual abuse to cover abuse by people “who, because of [their] position or occupation, exercise[] authority over the child.” (Cleaned up) (alterations in original). For Krikstan, because the same change was not made to CR § 3-602, this means that the General Assembly was unwilling to expand the scope of criminal liability for child sexual abuse. In addition, Krikstan argues that the rule of lenity applies and that the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland should be affirmed on that basis.

Standard of Review When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and assess whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Walker, 432 Md. at 614 , 69 A.3d at 1082 (quoting Rivers v. State, 393 Md. 569, 580 , 903 A.2d 908, 915 (2006)) (internal quotations mark omitted). Our role is not to review the record in a manner that would constitute a figurative retrial of the case. See id. at 613 , 69 A.3d at 1082 . This results from the unique position of the fact-finder to view firsthand the evidence, hear the witnesses, and assess credibility.

See id. at 614 , 69 A.3d at 1082 . As such, “we do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” Id. at 614 , 69 A.3d at 1082 (cleaned up). Our deference to reasonable - 19 - inferences drawn by the fact-finder means we resolve conflicting possible inferences in the State’s favor, because “[w]e do not second-guess the jury’s determination where there are competing rational inferences available.” Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 183 , 999 A.2d 986, 991 (2010). In contrast, statutory interpretation is a question of law, and, thus, our review of the meaning of a statute is de novo.

See Lawrence v. State, 475 Md. 384, 398 , 257 A.3d 588, 596 (2021). Analysis Statutory Framework CR § 3-602(b) prohibits sexual abuse of a minor by certain categories of people. The statute provides that “[a] parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor may not cause sexual abuse to the minor.” CR § 3-602(b)(1). Although the language “responsibility for the supervision of a minor” is not defined in the statute, we have determined that “a school teacher has responsibility for the supervision of children in connection with [the teacher’s] academic duties.” Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 324 , 396 A.2d 1054, 1063-64 (1979).

Normally, such responsibility ends when the student leaves school grounds. See Anderson v. State, 372 Md. 285, 294 , 812 A.2d 1016, 1022 (2002). However, a teacher’s responsibility for supervision of a child can continue away from school, such as when based on the implied consent of the parents to “any reasonable assistance that a teacher may provide to assure the child’s return home from school[,]” provided that there is no “temporal break” in the teacher-student relationship. Id. at 294 , 812 A.2d at 1022 (citation omitted).

In other - 20 - words, if there is a temporal break in the teacher-student relationship, the teacher’s responsibility for supervision of the minor ends. CR § 3-602(a)(4)(i) defines “sexual abuse” as “an act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation of a minor, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.” Neither the term “involves” nor the phrase “involves sexual molestation or exploitation” in CR § 3-602(a)(4)(i) is defined in the statute. Therefore, we must use tools of statutory construction to discern the meaning of the word “involves” in the context of the statute. Our goal in statutory construction is to determine legislative intent.

See Walker, 432 Md. at 615 , 69 A.3d at 1083 . We begin with the plain meaning of the statutory language in question. See B.A., 449 Md. at 134 , 141 A.3d at 215 . This is because we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.

When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 481 , 157 A.3d 272, 280 (2017) (quoting Wagner v. State, 445 Md. 404, 418 , 128 A.3d 1, 9 (2015)). “[W]here a term is not defined by statute, we may refer to the dictionary and give the words their ordinary meaning.” State v. Wilson, 471 Md. 136, 160 , 240 A.3d 1140, 1154 (2020) (cleaned up). See also Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327, 366 , 220 A.3d 272 , 294 (2019) (“To ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of [a] term[], we look to dictionary definitions as a starting point, as it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and popular meaning.” (Cleaned up)).

Merriam-Webster - 21 - defines the word “involve,” among other things, to mean “to relate closely[.]” Involve, Merriam-Webster (2023), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/involve [https:// perma.cc/R5AC-L4DF]. Similarly, Macmillan Dictionary defines “involve,” among other things, to mean “to include or affect someone or something in an important way[.]” Involve, Macmillan Dictionary (2023), https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/ dictionary/american/involve [https://perma.cc/7LJ9-ER4U]. Collins English Dictionary states that one definition of the term “involve” is “to relate to or affect[.]” Involve, Collins English Dictionary (2023), https://www. collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/involve [https://perma.cc/7AA7-88S7]. And, Merriam-Webster defines the word “involved” as meaning “being affected or implicated” or “having a part in something[.]” Involved, Merriam-Webster (2022), https://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/involved [https://perma.cc/3T4N-D2HU].

A synthesis of the dictionary definitions of the words “involve” and “involved” demonstrates that the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “involves” includes to relate to, to affect, or to be a part of something. In accord with the dictionary definitions of the words “involves,” we have addressed the meaning of the word “involves” as used in the child sexual abuse statute in case law. In Degren, 352 Md. at 419 , 722 A.2d at 896 , we considered the definition of the word “involves” in a predecessor to CR § 3-602(a)(4)(i) and explained that it “connotes a broad sense of inclusion, such as an act relating to sexual molestation or exploitation.” (Citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 617 (10th ed.) (defining “involve” as “to engage as a participant” or “to have an effect on” and “involved” as “being affected or - 22 - implicated”)) (emphasis in original). We determined that the use of the word “involves” “appears to expand the scope of the word ‘act’ from just the deed of molestation or exploitation into something done by the accused that relates to the molestation or exploitation.” Id. at 419, 722 A.2d at 896 .

We have also explained that the use of the word “involves” in the Family Law statute “allows the statute to reach more broadly than if it simply referred to sexual exploitation.” B.A., 449 Md. at 140 , 141 A.3d at 219 .8 Further, we have stated that because “[o]ne meaning of ‘involves’ is ‘includes,’ . . . any conduct that partly is not sexual exploitation and partly is sexual exploitation nonetheless involves sexual exploitation.” B.A., 449 Md. at 140 , 141 A.3d at 219 (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/involve [https://perma.cc/UED5-VFFH]) (emphasis in original). We do not see any ambiguity in the use of the phrase “involves sexual . . . exploitation” in CR § 3-602(a)(4)(i). The common meaning of the word “involves,” as expressed in the dictionary and in our opinions, is clear and we give effect to it. After consideration of the ordinary meaning of the word “involves” and our case law, we conclude that the phrase “an act that involves. . . sexual exploitation of a minor,” as it is used in CR § 3-602(a)(4)(i), means an act that is related to, affects, or is a part of the sexual exploitation of a minor.

This is so because, under the plain meaning of the word “involves,” an act that involves sexual exploitation of a minor would relate to, affect, or 8 Because the Family Law Article provision at issue in B.A. and the Criminal Law Article statute at issue in this case originated in the same statute and have largely paralleled each other over the years, as discussed below, we generally interpret the language consistently in both contexts. See B.A., 449 Md. at 127 , 141 A.3d at 211 . - 23 - have a part in the sexual exploitation of the minor. Indeed, we have held that sexual exploitation “can be part of a continuing course of conduct” and result from the effect of the perpetrator’s actions as a whole, not parsed individually. Walker, 432 Md. at 624 , 69 A.3d at 1088 .

Based on the ordinary meaning of the language in the statute, it follows that the phrase “an act that involves sexual . . . exploitation” in CR § 3-602(a)(4)(i) encompasses conduct by an individual, with supervisory responsibility for a minor, that relates to, affects, or is a part of ongoing sexual exploitation of the minor outside of the supervisory setting. Under the plain language of CR § 3-602(a)(4)(i), an expression of anger over a minor’s attraction to another person, made in class by a substitute teacher who is sexually exploiting a minor student outside of school, can involve sexual exploitation of the student.9 That said, although there is no ambiguity as to the plain meaning of the phrase “an act that involves sexual . . . exploitation[,]” in this instance, we think it is important to point out that the legislative history of the statute confirms our interpretation of its plain language. In 1963, the General Assembly first enacted the civil and criminal prohibitions of child abuse in one statute, codified in former Article 27 of the Maryland Code. See State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 423 , 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975) (citing 1963 Md. Laws 1536 (Vol. 9 Because we see no ambiguity in the plain language of the statute, we decline Krikstan’s invitation to apply the rule of lenity.

See Walker, 432 Md. at 627 n.26, 69 A.3d at 1090 n.26. The rule of lenity is “a tool of last resort, to be rarely deployed and applied only when all other tools of statutory construction fail to resolve an ambiguity.” Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 681 , 109 A.3d 1147, 1151 (2015) (citation omitted). It “is not a means for determining—or defeating—legislative intent[.]” Id. at 681 , 109 A.3d at 1151 . - 24 - II, Ch. 743, H.B. 922), then codified at Md. Code (1957), Art. 27, § 11A); B.A., 449 Md. at 127 n.2, 141 A.3d at 211 n.2. This represented a public policy decision to improve protections for abused children that were inadequate at common law, which excluded parents and custodians from criminal liability for what was then considered reasonable corporal punishment of children.

See Krikstan, 2022 WL 1284081 , at ⁸-9 (Kehoe, J., concurring). This change “established enhanced penalties for those who had a duty to care for and protect children[,]” but did not remove the sanctions for “assaults and batteries on children by individuals who were neither parents nor custodians[.]” Id. at ⁹ (Kehoe, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In 1970, these provisions were recodified as Art. 27, § 35A. See B.A., 449 Md. at 127 n.2, 141 A.3d at 211 n.2 (citing 1970 Md. Laws 1114 (Ch. 500, H.B. 1044)).10 In 1973, the General Assembly added a definition of “abuse” to the statute, see B.A., 449 Md. at 127 n.2, 141 A.3d at 211 n.2 (citing 1973 (Reg.

Sess.) Md. Laws 1708-09 (Ch. 835, H.B. 1056)), which encompassed any “‘physical injury or injuries sustained by a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of malicious act or acts[,]’” Walker, 432 Md. at 616 n.21, 69 A.3d at 1084 n.21 (quoting 1973 (Reg. Sess.) Md. Laws 1709). The General Assembly described the statute’s purpose as “‘the protection of children who have been the subject of abuse.’” Id. at 616 n.21, 69 A.3d at 1084 n.21 (quoting 1973 (Reg. Sess.) Md. Laws 1708); see also 1974 Md. Laws 1888 (Ch. 554, H.B. 1413).

The following year, the General Assembly added a definition of “sexual abuse” 10 In 1994, the General Assembly recodified Art. 27, § 35A as Art. 27, § 35C. See 1994 Md. Laws 3145 (Vol. V, Ch. 712, S.B. 322). - 25 - similar to the current statute, for the first time including the phrase “any act or acts involving sexual molestation or exploitation” in the statute. 1974 Md. Laws 1889 (capitalization omitted); see Walker, 432 Md. at 616-17 , 69 A.3d at 1084 . In 1984, the General Assembly created the Family Law Article, moving the civil child abuse provisions, including the pertinent definitions, to the new Article.

See B.A., 449 Md. at 127 n.2, 141 A.3d at 211 n.2 (citing 1984 Md. Laws 1847 , 2016-29 (Pt. 3, Ch. 296, H.B. 1)). The same definitions were retained in the criminal provisions in Article 27 and, in 2002, recodified as part of the new Criminal Law Article. See id. at 127 n.2, 141 A.3d at 211 n.2 (citing 2002 Md. Laws 284 (Vol. I, Ch. 26, H.B. 11)).

During the recodification, the General Assembly reworded the definition slightly and created a dedicated section for sexual abuse of a child, separate from other forms of child abuse. See Walker, 432 Md. at 617 & n.22, 69 A.3d at 1084 & n.22. The General Assembly’s consistent focus on the protection of child abuse victims has led us to continually construe the statutes expansively because the General Assembly, over five decades of legislative history, “has not narrowed this language . . . despite having models from numerous other states to draw upon should it have wished to do so.” Walker, 432 Md. at 622 , 69 A.3d at 1087 . Indeed, the General Assembly has consistently broadened the scope of the statutory language: from parents and custodians alone to others with responsibility for the supervision of minors, from a narrow definition of physical abuse alone to a broader definition of abuse including sexual abuse, see Pope, 284 Md. at 317 - 21, 396 A.2d at 1060-62 , and from covering only those children under 14 years old to encompassing all minors (i.e., everyone under 18 years of age), see Walker, 432 Md. at - 26 - 616 & n.20, 69 A.3d at 1084 & n.20. “The General Assembly’s concern for the welfare of children, and the myriad ways in which abusers can sexually exploit minors, militates against unduly narrowing the scope of a statute that is reasonably worded so as to reach a wide swath of behaviors[.]” Id. at 623 , 69 A.3d at 1087-88 .

This legislative history confirms our conclusion regarding the plain meaning of the word “involves” in CR § 3- 602(a)(4)(i) and that, in this case, the evidence was sufficient to support Krikstan’s conviction of child sexual abuse. Relevant Case Law Our case law concerning the definition of the word “involves” in the child abuse statute and the broad construction of statutes involving child sexual abuse, in general, guides our holding in this case. In Degren, 352 Md. at 404 , 722 A.2d at 888 , we affirmed a child sexual abuse conviction because the defendant was “a person with responsibility for a minor child who fail[ed] to prevent that child from being raped while the child [was] in her presence[.]” The defendant and her husband took care of the minor for a few weeks in the summer under an arrangement with the victim’s mother. See id. at 405 , 722 A.2d at 889 . “There was evidence, if believed by the trier of fact, as apparently it was, that on two occasions . . . petitioner not only knew her husband was engaged in sexual intercourse with [the minor], but sat on the same bed and watched” and that the defendant “was aware of and witnessed [another man] and [the minor] engaged in sexual intercourse in the [] home” on another date.

Id. at 425 , 722 A.2d at 899 . We held that the defendant’s “failure or omission to act in allowing [the minor] to be raped, molested, and exploited, constituted sexual abuse pursuant to” the child abuse - 27 - statute. Id. at 428 , 722 A.2d at 900 . The defendant contended that she should not be criminally liable for the sexual abuse of the minor “because her omission or failure to prevent another person’s act of sexual molestation or exploitation [was] not punishable under the language of the statute” and argued “that the plain meaning of the word ‘act’ as used in [the statute] denotes a deed or something affirmative as opposed to an omission.” Id. at 409 , 722 A.2d at 891 .

As a result, we assessed whether an act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation includes a failure to prevent the molestation or exploitation of a minor. See id. at 409, 417 , 722 A.2d at 891, 895 . In determining the meaning of the word “act” in the statute, and whether it includes an omission or failure to act, we found significant that “the word ‘act’ in the definition of sexual abuse is modified by the phrase ‘that involves sexual molestation or exploitation.’” Id. at 419 , 722 A.2d at 896 (cleaned up). Observing that “the word ‘involves’ connotes a broad sense of inclusion, such as an act relating to sexual molestation or exploitation” we concluded that this language “appears to expand the scope of the word ‘act’ from just the deed of molestation or exploitation into something done by the accused that relates to the molestation or exploitation.” Id. at 419 , 722 A.2d at 896 (citation omitted).

From our perspective, the word “act” in the definition of sexual abuse was “capable of more than one interpretation,” so we turned to legislative history. Id. at 419 , 722 A.2d at 896 . Specifically, we examined amendments to the child abuse statute and noted that, in 1974, the General Assembly “declared in its definition of abuse that sexual abuse constituted abuse, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.” Id. at 421 , 722 A.2d at 897 (cleaned up). We explained that this amendment was significant: - 28 - By clarifying that sexual abuse need not necessarily lead to physical injuries in order to be prosecuted, the legislature recognized the extensive emotional, psychological, or physical damage that sexual abuse can cause a child.

Given this clear indication of the Legislature’s awareness of the pervasive harm caused by sexual abuse, we find it difficult to believe that our law-making body, by this statute, would simultaneously punish an individual who watches and fails to intervene during the physical abuse of a child in her care but not punish that person when the child is raped or sexually molested under the same circumstances. Id. at 421 , 722 A.2d at 897 . We thus rejected the defendant’s contention and held, after consideration of the purpose of the child abuse statute, the amendments in which the General Assembly “generally expanded the scope of liability and actions constituting child abuse,” our case law, and “the modern trend in broadly recognizing and punishing all forms of child abuse,” that the definition of sexual abuse in the statute “contemplates not just an affirmative act in directly molesting or exploiting a child, but one’s omission or failure to act or prevent molestation or exploitation when it is reasonably possible to act and when a duty to do so, such as in this case, exists.” Id. at 424-25 , 722 A.2d at 899 . We concluded that use of the word “involves,” modifying the word “act” in the statutory definition, implied that the General Assembly “intended to punish not only the deed of molestation or exploitation, but actions that relate to molestation or exploitation.” Id. at 425 , 722 A.2d at 899 .

We determined that “the acts of watching [another man] and her husband engage in sexual intercourse with [the minor], even if one believe[d the defendant] herself did not engage in sexual contact with the child, [we]re acts involving the molestation or exploitation of [the minor].” Id. at 426 , 722 A.2d at 899 . In Walker, 432 Md. at 592 -93 & n.3, 69 A.3d at 1069 -70 & n.3, we upheld convictions for sexual abuse and attempted sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602 of a - 29 - 38-year-old teacher’s aide who, while working at an elementary school, “gave to an eight- year-old female student a series of notes in which he repeatedly professed his love for her, shared fantasies of kissing and holding her, and expressed jealousy about her having a boyfriend.” The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the convictions, conceding that he had temporary care or custody of the minor and that his behavior was “highly inappropriate,” but arguing that his actions did not constitute sexual exploitation. Id. at 613-15, 69 A.2d at 1082-83. To determine the meaning of exploitation in the statute, we reviewed its plain language, case law from this Court and the Appellate Court of Maryland, the legislative history of the statute, and the language of similar statutes from other jurisdictions.

See id. at 616-23, 69 A.3d at 1083-88 . Because the term “exploitation” is not defined in CR § 3-602, we applied the rules of statutory interpretation, and discerned “several things” from the plain language of the statute itself: First, the use of the phrase “an act,” instead of an enumerated list of abusive conduct, signals the General Assembly’s intent that the child abuse statute be read to include a wide range of behavior. Second, we have observed that the word “involves” implies “a broad sense of inclusion, such as an act relating to sexual molestation or exploitation.” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 419 , 722 A.2d 887 (1999). Finally, the conjunction “or” between sexual molestation and exploitation indicates that only one of the actions, but not necessarily both, is required to support a conviction for child sexual abuse.

Although the word “sexual” is not placed in front of exploitation, and could be viewed as not modifying the term, the title of the statute itself, “sexual abuse of a minor,” makes clear that the exploitation must be also of a sexual nature. Id. at 615-16, 69 A.3d at 1083-84 . We next examined the legislative history of the child abuse statute, concluding that - 30 - we had not found any legislative history explaining “what the General Assembly intended the word ‘exploitation’ to mean within the child abuse statute.” Id. at 617 , 69 A.3d at 1084 . We then turned to case law and noted that we had previously observed “that sexual abuse is not limited to the specified acts” listed in CR § 3-602(a)(4)(ii), and that, rather, by stating that “sexual abuse ‘includes’ these activities, [] we have concluded that th[e] list is meant to be merely illustrative and does not preclude other actions from constituting sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. at 617, 69 A.3d at 1084 (citations omitted).

Moreover, we stated that “actions constituting child sexual abuse do not have to be otherwise criminal in nature.” Id. at 618 , 69 A.3d at 1085 . And, “child sexual abuse does not have to be limited to a single instance but can be composed of an ongoing series of events.” Id. at 619 , 69 A.3d at 1085 . Thus, we “observed that the gravamen of the offense of child abuse is not the sexual act itself but rather the abuse of the child. That abuse can as easily arise from several qualifying acts as from one.” Id. at 619 , 69 A.3d at 1085 (cleaned up).

We concluded that “[o]ur case law also makes clear that it is not required that a defendant touch the victim to be guilty of child sexual abuse.” Id. at 619 , 69 A.3d at 1085 . The defendant contended “that a conviction for child sexual abuse requires ‘sexual, physical touching,’ not necessarily at the defendant’s hands, or, at a minimum, the use of words that are overtly and inherently sexual[,]” and relied on the definition of sexual exploitation used in other state statutes and by the federal government. Id. at 621 , 69 A.3d at 1086-87 . After reviewing other states’ statutes, we concluded that those statutes tended “to be more exact than Maryland’s statute in defining what constitutes sexual exploitation[,]” but did not settle the question of whether the defendant’s conduct - 31 - constituted sexual exploitation of a minor under Maryland law.

Id. at 621-22 , 69 A.3d at 1087 . “Maryland’s law is broader and its language more general than that” of the statutes cited by the defendant. Id. at 622 , 69 A.3d at 1087 . From our review of Maryland case law, we reached several conclusions regarding CR § 3-602: Child sexual abuse can be committed as part of a single act or a series of actions and it is not necessary that the defendant physically touch the child in order to commit the crime. The context in which the abuse occurs matters and failing to act to prevent abuse can be criminal.

Finally, exploitation requires that the defendant “took advantage of or unjustly or improperly used the child for his or her own benefit.” Id. at 622, 69 A.3d at 1087 (quoting Degren, 352 Md. at 426 , 722 A.2d at 900 ) (emphasis in original). We observed that “[CR] § 3-602 is broad” and that this Court and the Appellate Court of Maryland have “continually construed [CR] § 3-602 in an expansive manner.” Id. at 623, 69 A.3d at 1087 . We determined that CR § 3-602 is not limited to child pornography and prostitution, but rather encompasses “any act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation of a minor, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.” Id. at 622-23, 69 A.3d at 1087 . We concluded that this broad language reflected the “General Assembly’s concern for the welfare of children, and the myriad ways in which abusers can sexually exploit minors,” which “militates against unduly narrowing the scope of a statute that is reasonably worded so as to reach a wide swath of behaviors, including those where a minor is sexually exploited but not physically harmed.” Id. at 622-23 , 69 A.3d at 1087 - 88.

In Walker, the defendant, among other things, “characterized his behavior as - 32 - inappropriate, perhaps ‘creepy,’ but not criminal[,]” and argued that our “interpretation is too broad and would encompass activities that are merely romantic or intimate.” Id. at 623 , 69 A.3d at 1088 . We determined that “ample evidence” supported the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s behavior constituted sexual exploitation. Id. at 623 , 69 A.3d at 1088 . We explained that the context—a 38-year-old man writing to an 8-year-old girl—informed the interpretation of the letters.

See id. at 623 , 69 A.3d at 1088 . We agreed with the State that statements in the letters described activities “that have strong undertones of a physical, sexual relationship” and concluded that the trial court “correctly noted that, taken as a whole, the letters contained passionate comments that almost border[ed] on obsession and feature[d] expressions of jealousy.” Id. at 624 , 69 A.3d at 1088 (cleaned up). We explained that, because “[c]hild sexual abuse can be part of a continuing course of conduct and need not hinge on a single action[,]” “[n]either a trial judge or jury, as the fact-finder, nor an appellate court on review of the facts found, needs to parse every statement individually and characterize it as being sexually exploitative or not.” Id. at 624 , 69 A.3d at 1088 . Rather, we concluded that “[t]he effect of the letters as a whole . . . constitute[d] sexual exploitation and, therefore, the crime of child sexual abuse[.]” Id. at 624 , 69 A.3d at 1088 .

We concluded that, “[t]aken together, the content of the[] notes qualifie[d] as being sexually exploitative.” Id. at 625 , 69 A.3d at 1089 . We stated that it was “difficult to read his words and not conclude they [we]re expressing a passionate form of love that [went] far beyond mere friendship.” Id. at 625 , 69 A.3d at 1089 . However, “[w]e decline[d] to - 33 - adopt a definition of exploitation that would require the defendant to personally receive sexual gratification or pleasure out of the conduct.” Id. at 625 , 69 A.3d at 1089 . We determined that the “great pleasure” the defendant described from exchanging notes with the minor “that carried a sexual undertone” led “us to conclude that he ‘received a benefit’ from his actions and therefore exploited her.” Id. at 625 , 69 A.3d at 1089 .

We held that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of child sexual abuse and attempted child sexual abuse. See id. at 625 , 69 A.3d at 1089 . In Anderson, 372 Md. at 287-88 , 812 A.2d at 1018 , another case in which we interpreted the child abuse statute, we were confronted with the question of whether a teacher “was a person with responsibility for supervision of a child” under the child sexual abuse statute, where the “sexual encounter between petitioner and the victim occurred on the last day of the school year, when petitioner gave the victim a ride home from school.” After the end of the school day, the minor stayed to help another teacher, accepted a ride home from the defendant, and agreed to stop at his house for a game of pool, where the sexual abuse occurred. See id. at 289 , 812 A.2d at 1019 .

The defendant was convicted of child sexual abuse despite contending that he lacked responsibility for supervision of the minor at the time of the abuse. See id. at 290 , 812 A.2d at 1019 . In concluding the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, we were unpersuaded by the argument “that the mutual, implied consent which existed as a result of his position as a teacher ended when he and the victim left the school[.]” Id. at 291, 294 , 812 A.2d at 1020, 1022 . We agreed with the conclusion of the Appellate Court of Maryland that there was no temporal break in the teacher-student relationship, because the - 34 - series of events began at school, where the teacher had responsibility for the supervision of students generally, and the student’s mother had “entrusted her not to a particular teacher for a particular activity, but to the school as a whole for the entirety of the school day.” Id. at 294-95 , 812 A.2d at 1022 .

We held that the basis for the defendant’s supervision was “the school related activity immediately connected to the abuse, in this case the transportation of the student home from school[.]” Id. at 296 , 812 A.2d at 1023 . Wicomico Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. B.A.11 The Case and Our Holding In B.A., 449 Md. at 124-25 , 141 A.3d at 210 , we assessed a determination by an administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) that the respondent, B.A., had not engaged in child sexual abuse under Md. Code Ann., Fam.

Law (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol., 2010 Supp.) (“FL (2010)”) § 5-701, et seq. We concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that B.A., a martial arts instructor, did not engage in sexual abuse under the applicable Family Law statute. See id. at 124-25, 141 A.3d at 212 .

Although B.A. was not a criminal case, the definition of “sexual abuse” in FL (2010) § 5-701 was almost identical to that in CR § 3-602. See id. at 125-27, 141 A.3d at 210-11 . That is, FL (2010) 11 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the title of the Judges serving on this Court to that of Justices. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.

And, on the same day, this Court amended Maryland Rule 1-202, effective immediately, to state that the title of “Judge” includes a Justice of the Supreme Court of Maryland and the title of “Senior Justice” means a Senior Judge who has been designated to sit on the Court in a case or other judicial matter pending before the Court. For purposes of this opinion, we will use the then-existing title of “Judge” when referring to opinions authored or joined by members of the Court before December 14, 2022. - 35 - § 5-701(x)(1) defined sexual abuse as “any act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation of a child by a parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a child[.]” Id. at 125, 141 A.3d at 210 (footnote omitted). As in this case, in B.A., the relevant facts were uncontested: B.A. had known the minor’s family since before her birth, had taught her martial arts at a young age, and became her martial arts instructor again when she was 15. See id. at 128 , 141 A.3d at 212 .

The minor described her relationship with B.A. during class as follows: he was “‘really friendly[,]’” he had spoken with her about her “‘personal life’” and “‘how she was doing[,]’” and he had developed the nickname “‘Sunlight’” for her. Id. at 128 , 141 A.3d at 212 (brackets omitted). After four or five months of instruction, B.A.’s communications with the victim, by text, phone call, and email, became undisputedly sexual in nature. See id. at 128-29 , 141 A.3d at 212 .

However, all of the communications occurred outside of class—in class, B.A. “did not touch or speak to [the victim] in a sexual manner.” Id. at 130 , 141 A.3d at 213 . Despite the lack of dispute that B.A.’s actions outside of class were sexually exploitative, the ALJ ordered the Department to issue a finding ruling out sexual abuse because B.A. “did not have care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of [the minor] at the time of the sexually exploitative conduct” as required by the statute. Id. at 131 , 141 A.3d at 214 . In B.A., id. at 133 , 141 A.3d at 215 , we stated that there “appear[ed] to be no question that [B.A.] engaged in sexually exploitative conduct with a child[,]” that B.A. had “committed at least one act enumerated in the definition of ‘sexual abuse,’ namely - 36 - encouraging a child to engage in obscene or pornographic photography or poses[,]” and that “[o]ther out-of-class communications between [B.A. and the minor] could also be characterized as sexually exploitative.” (Citations omitted).

As a result, in B.A., id. at 133 , 141 A.3d at 215 , we narrowed our inquiry to whether B.A. “was a parent, household or family member, or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of the child.” (Cleaned up). Examining the normal, plain meaning of the statutory language, we explained that by using the present tense verb “has,” the statute indicated “that the act must take place while the person has temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision.” Id. at 134 , 141 A.3d at 215 (emphasis in original). We stated that “temporary care or custody” is “equivalent to ‘in loco parentis,’ a relatively restrictive classification that arises only when one is willing to assume all the obligations and to receive all the benefits associated with one standing as a natural parent to a child.” Id. at 134 , 141 A.3d at 216 (cleaned up). By contrast, “responsibility for . . . supervision” is broader and “denotes accountability” and “emphasizes broad authority to