Fitzgerald v. State

MOYLAN, J. In the Circuit Court for Howard County, the appellant, Matthew Thomas Fitzgerald, was found guilty, by Judge Dennis M. Sweeney, sitting without a jury, of the possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of $1,000. All of the prison sentence and all but $250 of the fine were suspended, in favor of two years’ probation. Our concern on this appeal is with the Fourth Amendment correctness of a single pretrial suppression ruling.

At issue is the reasonableness of using a drug-sniffing canine to gather probable cause for a search warrant. The ruling to be reviewed is that of Judge Lenore R. Gelfman, who presided over the pretrial hearing. The raw material for our review will be confined to the testimony and other evidence produced during the two days of that hearing. Two sub-contentions challenge the establishment in the warrant application of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.

They are A. that the warrant application did not establish probable cause for the search; and B. that the omission from the warrant application of information on the dog’s unreliability fatally compromised, under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the integrity of the warrant application. Working backward in the investigative chronology, two other sub-contentions concern 1) first the threshold applicability and 2) then the satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment, if ⁶¹⁵ applicable, with respect to the antecedent dog sniffing, the result of which was included in the warrant application. They are C. that the smelling by a trained dog of odors emanating from a residence, as opposed to lesser protected places, constitutes a search within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment; and D. that, if the dog-sniffing were, indeed, a Fourth Amendment search, then no sufficient justification for it had been shown to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. The remaining sub-contention is a purely contingent one based upon appellate success on one or more of the earlier sub-contentions.

It is E. that, if the result of the dog sniff were excised from the warrant application, the remaining information was not sufficient to establish probable cause. Even this division by the appellant of the contention into five sub-contentions does not end the proliferating process. The case brings before us so many substantive and procedural nuances that it commits us to a virtual review of the Fourth Amendment, as the outline of what is before us reveals: I. The Issuance of the Warrant on March 21 A. Probable Cause for the Warrant 1. A Canine “Alert,” Without More, Establishes Probable Cause 2.

Additional Indications of Probable Criminality 3. The Allocation of the Burden of Proof: The Presumption of a Warrant’s Validity 4. A “Substantial Basis” for Issuing the Warrant 5. In Appraising a Search Warrant, The Bar of Judicial Review Is Lowered ⁶¹⁶ B. Does The Requirement of a “Track Record” of Reliability Pertain to the K-9 Corps? 1.

The Canine Curriculum Vitae and the “Four Corners” Doctrine 2. • The Appellant’s Attempt to Stray Outside the “Four Corners” 3. The Franks Hearing That Never Was 4. A Procedural Masquerade: Franks v. Delaware Disguised as Frye-Reed Interlude: What We Have Held And What We Have Not Held II. The Warrantless Activity of March 19 A. The Appellant’s Challenge to the Antecedent Police Action of March 19 1.

Readjusting the Fourth Amendment Standard of Review a. In a Single Suppression Hearing, A Judge May Play Different Roles b. For Warrantless Searches, a Counter Presumption c. The Sheppard-Leon “Good Faith” Exemption Is Limited to the Execution of a Warrant 2.

The Threshold Requirement of Fourth Amendment Applicability a. The Coverage of the Place Searched b. The Coverage of the Searcher (State Action) c. The Coverage of the Defendant (Standing) d.

The Coverage of the Police Conduct (Was It a Search? Was It a Seizure?) e. The Impact of Katz f. The Standard of Review for Assessing Applicability g.

The Burden of Proof as to Applicability ⁶¹⁷ 3. The Launching Pad From Which the Dog Sniffing Was Conducted: The Non-Coverage of the Place 4. Is a Dog Sniff a “Search,” Generally? 5. Does the Presence of a Home Transform a “Non-Search” Into a “Search”? 6.

The Use of a Dog’s Nose Is Not A New or Startling Investigative Modality B. The Arguable Justification for the Purported “Search” of March 19 Is Moot III. An Appraisal of the Discounted Warrant Application Is Moot The Search of 3131 Normandy Woods Drive On March 21, 2002, a search and seizure warrant for 3131 Normandy Woods Drive, Apartment A, in Ellicott City was issued by District Court Judge JoAnn Ellinghaus-Jones. The affiant on the warrant was Detective Leeza Grim of the Criminal Investigation Bureau, Vice and Narcotics Division, of the Howard County Police Department. The warrant was executed on April 2.

Recovered in the search were substantial amounts of marijuana and other evidence of marijuana use and marijuana distribution. The appellant moved, pretrial, to suppress the evidence. Judge Gelfman denied the motion. Part I The Issuance of the Warrant on March 21 A. Probable Cause for the Warrant Detective Grim was initially put on the trail of the appellant and his live-in girlfriend, Allison Mancini, when she received information from an “anonymous source.” The affidavit in support of the warrant application recited: In February, 2002, DFC.

Grim received information from an anonymous source that a white male and white female lived together in Normandy Woods Apartments and sold marijuana on a regular basis. The marijuana in question ⁶¹⁸ was a high quality grade called “Kind Bud”. The source advised that the names of the individuals were Matt Fitzgerald and Allison Mancini and that they had a white pickup truck. Subsequent investigation by Detective Grim—1) of the automobile registration of a white pick-up truck parked close to 3131 Normandy Woods Drive, 2) of Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. service records for Apartment A at that address, and 3) of the Howard County Police Records Management System—confirmed that the appellant and Mancini lived in Apartment A of 3131 Normandy Woods Drive.

The appellant, moreover, had a juvenile arrest history that included: February 3, 1998-Distribution of Marijuana Near a School July 6,1998-First Degree Burglary August 6,1998-First Degree Burglary August 12,1998-First Degree Burglary On March 20, Detective Grim received an additional report from the anonymous source: On March 20, 2002, your affiant received additional information from the anonymous source that the subjects continue to sell the “Kind Bud” marijuana. To confirm her suspicions, Detective Grim enlisted the aid of Officer Larry Brian of the Howard County Police Department’s canine unit and of the trained and certified canine, Alex. The affidavit recited their investigation. On March 19, 2002, your affiant met with K-9 Officer Brian and requested that he utilize his canine to scan the stairwells and exterior apartment doors at 3131 Normandy Woods Drive.

Pfc. Brian conducted á scan of apartment doors A, B, C & D. His canine alerted to the presence of narcotics only at apartment “A”. Pfc. Brian repeated the process with identical results.

Pfc. Brian’s canine is a ⁶¹⁹ certified drug detecting dog and scans have resulted in numerous arrests. (Emphasis supplied). 1. A Canine “Alert,” Without More, Establishes Probable Cause As we affirm the adequacy of the warrant application, we hold that Alex’s “alert” to Apartment A was ipso facto enough to establish probable cause.

Both the Court of Appeals and this Court have regularly affirmed the dispositive sufficiency of a canine “alert.” In Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 8 , 668 A.2d 22 (1995), Judge Chasanow stated for the Court of Appeals: Nor does Gadson dispute that once Sandy the dog alerted Trooper Prince to the presence of illegal drugs in the vehicle, sufficient probable cause existed to support a warrantless search of the truck. See United States v. Dovali-Avila, 895 F.2d 206, 207 (5th Cir.1990) (a “dog alert” is sufficient to create probable cause to conduct a warrantless vehicle search). (Emphasis supplied). In Gadson v. State, 102 Md.App. 554, 556-57 , 650 A.2d 1354 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 341 Md. 1 , 668 A.2d 22 (1995), this Court characterized the canine “alert” on which the Court of Appeals, as quoted above, placed its imprimatur.

The probable cause to believe that the truck contained contraband narcotics was supplied by “Sandy,” a member of the Maryland State Police K-9 corps, who had been licensed as a certified drug detection dog and who worked regularly with Trooper Prince. As Sandy stood outside the appellant’s truck, with its doors closed, he “alerted” to the presence of narcotics. That the “alert” to the presence of narcotics by a trained and certified drug-sniffing canine is ample to establish probable cause is well established law. Looking forward from the moment when Sandy, by “alerting,” communicated his belief to Trooper Prince that narcotics were in the truck, the Fourth Amendment was not ⁶²⁰ offended by the ensuing warrantless Carroll Doctrine search of the truck for those narcotics.

(Emphasis supplied). In Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 586 , 774 A.2d 420 (2001), Judge Cathell stated authoritatively: The troopers were able to conduct a lawful search of petitioner’s vehicle because after the K-9 scan alerted to the presence of narcotics they had probable cause to do so. We have noted that once a drug dog has alerted a trooper “to the presence of illegal drugs in a vehicle, sufficient, probable cause existís] to support a warrantless search of [a vehicle].” (Emphasis supplied). The same degree of certainty that will support the warrantless Carroll Doctrine search of an automobile will, ipso facto, support the warrantless arrest of a suspect.

In passing, Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. at 587 n. 24, 774 A.2d 420 , alluded to this arrest-search equivalency: Moreover, some jurisdictions have held that once a drug dog has alerted the trooper to the presence of illegal drugs in a vehicle, sufficient probable cause existed to support a warrantless arrest. See United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir.) (“[W]hen the dog ‘alerted,’ there was probable cause to arrest [defendants] ____”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1059 , 115 S.Ct. 669 , 130 L.Ed.2d 602 (1994); United States v. Williams, 726 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir.1984) (“[A] drug sniffing dog’s detection of contraband in luggage ‘itself establishes] probable cause, enough for the arrest, more than enough for the stop.’ ” (alteration in original) quoting United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 , 103 S.Ct. 3543 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1392 (1983)). (Emphasis supplied). The arrest-search equivalency was also noted by State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 147-49 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002). ⁶²¹ This Court reached the same conclusion in Grant v. State, 55 Md.App. 1, 14-15 , 461 A.2d 524 (1983), cert. dismissed, 299 Md. 309 , 473 A.2d 455 (1984).

They carried the seized suitcase into the airport and exposed it, scrupulously unopened, to the trained nose of a cocaine-sniffing police dog. The dog promptly and emphatically “alerted.” Adding this additional probability to the abundant probable cause already possessed, the police applied for and obtained a constitutionally unassailable search and seizure warrant. (Emphasis supplied). In Snow v. State, 84 Md.App. 243, 248 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990), Judge Rosalyn Bell wrote: We agree with the State that, if Paros properly and constitutionally conducted the scan or sniff of the perimeter of the car using his trained dog, the dog’s responses could be held to provide 'probable cause to search the interior of the car.

(Emphasis supplied). See also Timmons v. State, 114 Md.App. 410, 417 , 690 A.2d 530 (1997); Carter v. State, 143 Md.App. 670, 674 , 795 A.2d 790 (2002) (“The dog ‘alert’ supplied the probable cause for a warrantless search of the van.”). In this case, the affidavit attested that “Pfc. Brian’s canine is a certified drug detecting dog and scans have resulted in numerous arrests.” In State v. Funkhouser, 140 Md.App. 696, 711 , 782 A.2d 387 (2001), this Court unequivocally held: In this case there was no disputing the olfactory expertise of the trained and certified cocaine-sniffing canine.

When a qualified dog signals to its handler that narcotics are in a vehicle, moreover, that is ipso facto probable cause to justify a warrantless Carroll Doctrine search of the vehicle. (Emphasis supplied). See also In Re Montrail M., 87 Md.App. 420, 437 , 589 A.2d 1318 (1991) (“the dog’s reaction properly served as probable cause to search the vehicle.”); State v. Wallace, 372 Md. at 145 , 812 A.2d 291 (“Nor is there any argument that ... the canine sniff of the Buick ... ⁶²² provided the police officers with probable cause to search the car.”). The federal case law is in line with Maryland’s position.

See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir.1995) (“The fact that the dog alerted provided probable cause to search.”); United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994) (“[A]n alert by a properly trained and reliable dog establishes probable cause.”); United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir.1993) (“We therefore have held in several cases that a dog alert without more gave probable cause for searches and seizures.”); United States v. Florez, 871 F.Supp. 1411, 1417 (D.N.M.1994) (“The Tenth Circuit has consistently held that a positive dog alert by a trained narcotics dog, standing alone, is generally sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.”); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Williams, 726 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Wood, 915 F.Supp. 1126, 1142 (D.Kan.1996) (“The alert of a trained and certified narcotics detection canine, by itself, provides probable cause to believe the car contains narcotics.”). 2. Additional Indications of Probable Criminality Although it is superfluous in this case, there was significant other evidence to support the issuance of the warrant. The information supplied by the anonymous source, assuming.it to have been reliable, was substantively damning to the appellant’s cause. The source stated that the appellant and his companion “sold marijuana on a regular basis” and that the “nwijuana in question was a high quality grade called Kind Bud.” On the day after the canine sniffing at the apartment, the anonymous source called back and indicated that “the subjects continue to sell Kind Bud marijuana.” The nature of the information received gave rise to an inference that the source could well have been a concerned neighbor.

In Carter v. State, 143 Md.App. 670, 678 , 795 A.2d 790 (2002), we addressed a similar permitted inference. ⁶²³ At about 7:40 p.m. the Howard County Police Department received a telephone call. The caller, to be sure, was anonymous. The circumstances were such, however, as to give rise to a reasonable inference that the caller was a concerned neighbor and, therefore, a “citizen informer” rather than the more suspect confidential informant “from the criminal milieu.” For the distinction, see Dawson v. State, 14 Md.App. 18, 33-34 , 284 A.2d 861 (1971); Hignut v. State, 17 Md.App. 399 , 410 n. 2, 303 A.2d 173 (1973). (Emphasis supplied).

In Carter v. State, we analyzed at length, 143 Md.App. at 678 , 795 A.2d 790 , the distinction between citizen-informers and “stool pigeons” from the criminal milieu. Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, an extensive body of law developed as to how courts should assess information received by the police from informants (including telephone callers). The earlier cases involved instances in which the informant was the classic police “snitch” or “stool pigeon,” someone “from the criminal milieu,” exchanging underworld information for cash payment or for other under-the-table police favors. The assessment of information from such sources was accordingly circumscribed with scepticism.

The suspect’s credibility needed bolstering in order to be given any weight. As the analysis of information from third-party sources evolved, however, it soon came to be recognized that there was also a broad category of third-party sources, such as concerned citizens or fellow law enforcement officers, whose veracity was not inherently suspect and as to whom the skepticism, directed at police stool pigeons ivas not appropriate. (Emphasis supplied). In this case, moreover, there was extensive independent verification of the anonymous source’s report.

Information as to the identities of the male and female occupying Apartment A turned out to be accurate, as did the information as to their ownership of the white pick-up truck. Of more direct perti ⁶²⁴ nence to criminality, the police records check on the appellant fully corroborated the source’s story. The source reported that the appellant was selling marijuana; his juvenile record showed that in 1998 he had been arrested for the distribution of marijuana near a school. The appellant’s juvenile record, we should add, serves a double function in a case such as this.

It is direct evidence bearing on the probable cause itself. Additionally, it serves as independent police verification of the reliability of the information coming from the anonymous source. Also serving that double function was the March 19 canine “alert” to Apartment A. In addition to establishing probable cause for the search in and of itself, it verified in the strongest possible way the accuracy of the source’s report that marijuana was being sold from that address. In her Memorandum Opinion and Order, Judge Gelfman took note of this extensive verification of the source’s reliability- While the source’s reliability in the case sub judice could not be attested to due to the anonymity of the source, the source was able to give detailed information, including Defendants’ names, the type of car they drove and the type of marijuana they sold.

Additionally, Detective Grim corroborated the information with computer searches, personal observations of the name on the mailbox and the location of the truck, and ultimately with the use of a canine sniff. (Emphasis supplied). 3. The Allocation of the Burden of Proof: The Presumption of a Warrant’s Validity At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Judge Gelfman ruled, inter alia, that the warrant application established a “substantial basis” for Judge Ellinghaus-Jones to have issued the warrant. Based on the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden to prove that ⁶²⁵ the magistrate lacked a “substantial basis” for concluding that there was probable cause for issuing a search and seizure warrant.

(Emphasis supplied). In passing, we commend Judge German’s meticulously proper allocation of the burden of proof when a defendant challenges the adequacy of a search warrant. She pointed out not that the State had met its burden, but that the defendant had failed to meet his burden. One of the ways in which the Supreme Court has provided an incentive for police officers to resort to judicially issued search warrants has been to create the presumption in their favor that searches conducted with warrants are, nothing else being shown, valid, whereas the opposite presumption prevails with respect to warrantless searches.

Once it is established, as it was in this case, that the police obtained a search warrant, there is a presumption that the warrant was valid. The burden of proof is allocated to the defendant to rebut that presumption by proving otherwise. Once a warrant is shown to exist, the State wins the nothing-to-nothing tie (or a tie at any other level). The allocation of the burden of proof is the law’s tiebreaker.

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the Supreme Court referred to this presumptive validity: There is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. The Court of Appeals took note of this presumption of regularity in Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 229-30 , 550 A.2d 670 (1988): As the key protection from unreasonable government searches, warrants continue to be favored at law.... [T]he defendant must overcome the presumption of regularity attending a search warrant. See Massachusetts v. Upton ⁶²⁶ (1984). Thus, the overall incentive to obtain a search warrant remains strong.

(Emphasis supplied). This Court, in Herbert v. State, 136 Md.App. 458, 492 , 766 A.2d 190 (2001), discussed in detail the allocation of the burden of proof to a defendant challenging a warrant. Once again, the Supreme Court has provided an incentive for searching with a warrant and a disincentive for searching warrantlessly. What are affected by this incentive/disincentive combination are the burdens of proof at a suppression hearing.

When the State has procured evidence of guilt by the favored and preferred modality of a warranted search, it is rewarded by a presumption of validity in favor of its warrant application. Let the fact be once established or otherwise accepted that the search in issue was pursuant to a judicially issued warrant and the State is then entitled to the presumption. Because it is the State that enjoys the presumption, the burden is allocated to the defendant to rebut it, if he can. (Emphasis supplied).

See also In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md.App. 149, 195-96 , 458 A.2d 820 (1983) (“The burden was not upon the State to prove that there was probable cause; it was upon the petitioners to prove that there was not.”); State v. Riley, 147 Md.App. 113, 117-20 , 807 A.2d 797 (2002). 4. A “Substantial Basis” For Issuing the Warrant Judge Gelfman’s ruling that the warrant had a “substantial basis” for its issuance continued: The evidence presented to the magistrate , must be viewed as building blocks to probable cause. Detective Grim received an anonymous tip. From this tip, the Detective performed computer searches to verify whatever information possible.

Initially, Detective Grim obtained Defendants’ names, but did not match them to the address given by the source. So, she investigated further and found that a white pick-up truck was located in front of the implicated ⁶²⁷ apartment building, and this white pick-up was registered to someone with the same last name as the female identified by the source. Again, the Detective does not merely rely on this information, but rather checks the mailboxes on this apartment building and finds the last name of the male identified by the anonymous source on the mailbox for apartment A. Detective Grim then does a BG & E inquiry, verifying that Defendant Fitzgerald began service at apartment A on 9-7-01. Additionally, Detective Grim obtains a juvenile record for Defendant Fitzgerald to add to the evidence she had compiled to that point.

Finally, rather than relying solely on information received by the anonymous source and her preliminary verification of the facts, Detective Grim obtains a canine scan of the apartments in the target building. After this canine scan results in a positive alert at the door of the apartment being rented by Defendant Fitzgerald, and after receiving another tip from the anonymous source that marijuana continues to be sold out of this residence, Detective Grim completes her application for a search and seizure warrant, providing the magistrate with the above timeline of events, as well as her own credentials. Detective Grim followed procedure correctly by verifying the information received by an anonymous source through computer research, personal observation of the location of the truck and the label on the mailbox, and the use of a canine scan. And, the magistrate appropriately found that the information provided within the four comers of the application and supported by affidavit substantiated probable cause to issue a search and seizure warrant.

(Emphasis supplied). Once again, Judge Gelfman commendably recognized the constraints on her reviewing role. She did not presume to find probable cause. That was not her job.

What she found was that Judge Ellinghaus-Jones had had a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause. That was her job. ⁶²⁸ 5. In Appraising a Search Warrant, The Bar of Judicial Review Is Lowered Even if we were making an independent de novo determination as to the existence of probable cause to support the warrant, our result in this case would be the same. In appraising the adequacy of the warrant application, however, neither a reviewing trial court nor a reviewing appellate court is permitted to make its own independent determination as to probable cause.

The habit of making independent de novo determinations of ultimate constitutional “facts” is recently becoming so ingrained, however, that bench and bar need to be reminded periodically that de novo determination is not the appropriate standard of review for search warrants. This, rather, is one of those situations in which we do not make a de novo determination of probable cause. Judge Thieme discussed the more deferential standard in West v. State, 137 Md.App. 314, 322 , 768 A.2d 150 (2001): Reviewing courts (at the suppression hearing level or at the appellate level) do not undertake de novo review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination but, rather, pay “great deference” to that determination. Id. at 236, 768 A.2d 150 ; Ramia v. State, 57 Md.App. 654, 655 , 471 A.2d 1064 (1984).

Reflecting a preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination has been that, so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. (Emphasis supplied). In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court was emphatic about how a reviewing court should appraise a warrant: “Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s ‘deter ⁶²⁹ mination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’ ” (Emphasis supplied).

In Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the position it had taken in Illinois v. Gates with respect to the proper standard of judicial review: We also emphasized that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant. (Emphasis supplied). The United States Supreme Court in that case reversed the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for having presumed to conduct a de novo probable cause determination. The Supreme Judicial Court also erred in failing to grant any deference to the decision of the Magistrate to issue a warrant.

Instead of merely deciding whether the evidence viewed as a whole provided a “substantial basis” for the Magistrate’s finding of probable cause, the court conducted a de novo probable-cause determination. We rejected just such after-the-fact de novo scrutiny in Gates. 466 U.S. at 732-33 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 (emphasis supplied). This Court placed its own seal of approval on the highly deferential standard of review in Ramia v. State, 57 Md.App. 654, 660 , 471 A.2d 1064 (1984): Illinois v. Gates leaves no room for doubt that reviewing courts, at the appellate level or at the suppression hearing level, have no business second-guessing the probable cause determinations of warrant-issuing magistrates by way of de novo determinations of their own. (Emphasis supplied).

In Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 572 , 479 A.2d 1335 (1984), Chief Judge Robert Murphy stated distinctly for the Court of Appeals: ⁶³⁰ After-the-fact judicial scrutiny of the affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. See also McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467-68 , 701 A.2d 675 (1997); Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 701 , 566 A.2d 488 (1989); State v. Amerman, 84 Md.App. 461, 469 , 581 A.2d 19 (1990) (“[Reviewing courts shall not presume to assess probable cause de novo but shall instead extend ‘great deference’ to the prior determination of the magistrate on that issue.”). Judge Gelfman properly ruled that the application established a “substantiál basis” for Judge Ellinghaus-Jones to have issued the search warrant. She properly did not offer her own opinion on the subject of probable cause.

B. Does The Requirement of a “Track Record” Of Reliability Pertain to the K-9 Corps? The appellant mounts yet a second attack on the issuance of the search warrant. In days of yore, when the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), was the height .of Fourth Amendment fashion, analysis abounded about informants’ “track records” of successes and failures. The appellant’s next contention raises the question of whether that once familiar inquiry has passed forever from our ken or has simply been transferred to the K-9 Corps.

The appellant argues that the “omission from the affidavit of information demonstrating [Alex’s] unreliability renders the search warrant invalid.” He challenges Alex’s competence. We shall look at that challenge in two contexts. We shall first examine it within the traditional context for assessing the adequacy of a warrant (including its application), to wit, within the “four comers” of the warrant and warrant application. We shall secondly examine whether 1) a required showing was made for going outside the “four corners”; and 2) if such a showing was successfully made, what significance that extrinsic evidence may have. ⁶³¹ 1.

The Canine Curriculum Vitae And the “Four Corners” Doctrine The appellant contends that the assertions in the warrant application about Alex’s “alert” to Apartment A are facially insufficient to establish probable cause because, “[w]ithout further information demonstrating the dog’s reliability, the alert does not establish probable cause.” The heart of the appellant’s contention is: Since the affidavit here contains no information concerning Alex’s reliability beyond the mere assertion that he is “a ceHified drug detecting dog,” Alex’s alert to the presence of drugs does not establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant. (Emphasis supplied). In Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585 , 647 A.2d 1243 (1994), as in this case, the appellants were challenging the validity of a search warrant. In that case, as in this, part of the probable cause for the warrant was that a “dog gave a positive alert for drugs.” 101 Md.App. 634 , 647 A.2d 1243 .

The appellants there claimed, as does the appellant here, that the “olfactory reactions made by the dog should not have been considered by the warrant-issuing magistrate in assessing probable cause” because “an adequate predicate of reliability was not established” by the warrant application. 101 Md.App. at 634 , 647 A.2d 1243 . As authority for their argument, the appellants relied on Terrell v. State, 3 Md.App. 340 , 239 A.2d 128 (1968), and Roberts v. State, 298 Md. 261 , 469 A.2d 442 (1983). In rejecting the contention, this Court pointed out the chasm of difference between the admissibility of challenged evidence at a trial and the consideration of such information in an ex parte warrant application. There are a number of challenges that a defendant might properly mount against the admissibility of a piece of evidence or the results of an investigative technique at the trial on the merits that are completely inappropriate by way of challenging their inclusion in an application for a search warrant.

The forums are completely different and the respective rules of admissibility ⁶³² are completely different. In distinguishing Terrell v. State, we pointed out, 101 Md.App. at 634 , 647 A.2d 1243 : Terrell is not remotely apposite. Terrell involved the admissibility of dog-sniffing evidence not in an ex parte warrant application, but at the ultimate trial on the merits.... ... The appellants are uncritically attempting to incorporate the prerequisites for trial admissibility into the far less formal setting of a warrant application.

Actually, they are simply asserting that the Terrell prerequisites must be satisfied, without pointing out the significant difference between the two forums. We hold that the requirements for trial admissibility are not prerequisites to the use of the information in assessing probable cause. (Emphasis supplied). We similarly distinguished Roberts v. State: A very similar situation was dealt with by the Court of Appeals in Roberts v. State.

In that case, a rapist was identified at trial because of the ability of a trained tracking dog, appropriately named “Sniffer,” to follow a trail after having smelled a ski cap worn by the rapist and ultimately to pick out the defendant from what was referred to as a “dog lineup.” The Court of Appeals held the evidence to be admissible, relying in part on testimony detailing the training and the handling of Sniffer. In that case, as in Terrell, the question was the admissibility of the evidence at the ultimate trial on the merits. 101 Md.App. at 634-35 , 647 A.2d 1243 (emphasis supplied). To the extent to which the appellant is now claiming that the warrant application was inadequate on its face because of either 1) an insufficient showing of the dog’s reliability or 2) the failure to include the dog’s “track record” in the application, our holding in Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. at 635 , 647 A.2d 1243 , is dispositive. It does not follow in any way from Terrell or Roberts that there are any such requirements or qualifications that must be satisfied before the results from a canine sniff can ⁶³³ be considered in a warrant application in the assessment of probable cause.

By analogy, a confession must be shown to be voluntary before it may be introduced in court. A warrant application may make reference to a confession without any such qualification. A lineup identification must be shown to be reliable before it can be introduced in court. There is no such threshold requirement for it to be considered in a warrant application.

Prior criminal records that may never be introduced in court are standard fare in a warrant application. The warrant-issuing process is ex parte and is far less formal than a courtroom proceeding. (Emphasis supplied). What did pass muster in Emory v. State was that the “marijuana-sniffing dog ... was certified and was regularly described in the warrant as certified.” Id.

The sufficient characterization in Gadson v. State, 102 Md.App. at 557 , 650 A.2d 1354 , had been to “a trained and certified drug-sniffing canine.” The adequate reference in State v. Funkhouser, 140 Md.App. at 711 , 782 A.2d 387 , was to “the trained and certified cocaine-sniffing canine.” In United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963 (1st Cir.1976), a search warrant was attacked on the ground that the affidavit in support of the warrant simply stated that the dog was “trained” to detect drugs and that such was insufficient to establish its reliability. In rejecting the contention, the First Circuit said: Furthermore, the word “trained,” when considered in the context of the affidavit, has a common and well understood meaning.... Assuming, therefore, that the magistrate was a qualified official possessing ordinary and reasonable intelligence and prudence it does not in our view defy logic to conclude that the magistrate understood that the “trained dog” was endowed, by reason of experience and training, with the ability to sniff out cocaine. 536 F.2d at 966 . A similar attack on the adequacy of a warrant application was made in United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th ⁶³⁴ Cir.1977).

The Tenth Circuit held that it is not necessary to go beyond characterizing the dog as “trained and certified” and that no further underlying facts need to be shown. It held: In this regard the defendant takes particular aim at the statement in the affidavit that Chañe was a “trained, certified marijuana sniffing dog.” Such, according to counsel, is a conclusory statement and does not sufficiently set forth the underlying facts so as to allow the issuing judge to exercise his independent judgment on the matter. We do not agree that Chañe’s educational background and general qualifications had to be described with the degree of specificity argued for by counsel. We agree with the reasoning of Meyer , and the statement in the present affidavit that Chañe was trained and certified as a marijuana-sniffing dog is sufficient. 563 F.2d at 1007 (emphasis supplied).

United States v. Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834 (11th Cir.1982), dealt with a similar attack on the results of a dog sniff offered in a warrant application. It observed: His argument is that a mere statement that the dog had been trained in drug detection was not enough without an accompanying statement that the dog had proved reliable in the past and that an experienced handler was with the dog.... We believe, in any event, that his argument is without merit. The case on which Sentovich relies, United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir.1980), does staté that statements that a dog had had training and had proved reliable in the past were sufficient indicia of the dog’s reliability. 677 F.2d at 838 n. 8 (emphasis supplied).

See also United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.1989); and Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454 , 530 A.2d 74 (1987). In United States v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146 , 151 n. 7 (1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected a ⁶³⁵ defendant’s argument that the affidavit itself must show how reliable a drag-detecting dog has been in the past in order to establish probable cause. See also United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir.1995). In United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (1996), the Sixth Circuit held that a search warrant application need not describe the particulars of a dog’s training and that a reference to the dog as a “drug sniffing or drug detecting dog” is sufficient to support probable cause.

In United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (1980), the Seventh Circuit held that a statement that the dog had graduated from training class and had proven reliable in detecting drugs on prior occasions was sufficient to support probable cause. In United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (1997), the Tenth Circuit articulately stated the general rule: As a general rule, a search warrant based on a narcotics canine alert will be sufficient on its face if the affidavit states that the dog is trained and certified to detect narcotics .... We decline to encumber the affidavit process by requiring affiants to include a, complete history of a drug dog’s reliability beyond the statement that the dog has been trained and certified to detect drugs. (Emphasis supplied).

For the proposition that the failure to have included in the warrant application information bearing on Alex’s “track record” rendered the warrant invalid, the appellant cites the three federal cases of United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392 (6th Cir.1994); and United States v. Wood, 915 F.Supp. 1126 (D.Kan.1996). Significantly, not one of those cases involved a warranted search or the review 'of a warrant application. Each of those cases involved warrantless canine scans of vehicles and they have no bearing, therefore, on the issue before us of whether a warrant application established a “substantial basis” for issuing the warrant. Quite aside from the critical difference in procedural postures, those three federal cases, but for a stray sentence of ⁶³⁶ dicta here or there, do not help the appellant’s cause.

The primary holding of Ludwig was that a dog sniff was not a “search” and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. As to its ability to establish probable cause for a Carroll Doctrine search of an automobile trunk, the Tenth Circuit held the following about a sniff by a dog with respect to which no “track record” whatsoever was established: Ludwig suggests that dog sniffs are not as reliable as "courts often assume, and therefore the dog alert did not give the agents probable cause to open and search Ludwig’s trunk.... We ... conclude that the dog alert did give the ’ agents probable cause to search Ludwig’s trunk. ... Although Ludwig cites several cases of mistaken dog alerts, a dog alert usually is at least as reliable as many other sources of probable cause and is certainly reliable enough to create a “fair probability” that there is contraband.

We therefore have held in several cases that a dog alert without more gave probable cause for searches and seizures. 10 F.3d at 1527 (emphasis supplied). In the Diaz case, the defendant contended that because “the government failed to establish the dog’s training and reliability,” the agents thereby “lacked probable cause to search the car.” 25 F.3d at 393. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument. It, somewhat dubiously, analogized the receipt of evidence at a suppression hearing about a canine “alert” to the receipt of expert opinion evidence at a trial.

The court nonetheless accepted the dog’s expertise. Any challenge to the dog’s competence went only to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. The dog’s reliability was not deemed to be a threshold question. When the evidence presented, whether testimony from the dog’s trainer or. records of the dog’s training, establishes that the dog is generally certified as a drug detection dog, any other evidence, including the testimony of other experts, that may detract from the reliability of the dog’s performance properly goes to the “credibility” of the dog. ...

As ⁶³⁷ with the admissibility of evidence generally the admissibility of evidence regarding a dog’s training and reliability is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion. Id. at 394 (emphasis supplied). In the Wood case, the District Court engaged in an interesting discussion of why a trained canine is “inherently more reliable” than an informant. Competence aside, dogs are inherently less untruthful than people. [T]he instant court sees a positive alert from a law enforcement dog trained and certified to detect narcotics as inherently more reliable than an informant’s tip.

Unlike an informant, the canine is trained and certified to perform what is best described as a physical skill. The personal and financial reasons and interest typically behind an informant’s decision to cooperate can hardly be equated with what drives a canine to perform for its trainer. The reliability of an informant is really a matter of forming an opinion on the informant’s credibility either from past experience or from independent corroboration. With a canine, the reliability should come from the fact that the dog is trained and annually certified to perform a physical skill. 915 F.Supp. at 1136 n. 2 (emphasis supplied).

In all three of these federal cases cited by the appellant, we again point out, the challenge to the dog’s competence was made at a suppression hearing reviewing warrantless vehicular scans, at which evidence was offered and challenged and received. None of those cases involved the ex parte decision to issue a search warrant based on the “four comers” of the warrant application. See United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d at 1376-78 . In this case, the assertion in the warrant application that “Pfc.

Brian’s canine is a certified drug detecting dog and scans have resulted in numerous arrests” was facially valid and supported the finding of probable cause. We fully concur with that part of Judge Gelfman’s Memorandum Opinion and Order in which she ruled: ⁶³⁸ When a canine has been certified in contraband detection, it is not within the magistrate’s responsibility or training to re-analyze the statistical record for each canine whose sniff is presented as support for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant, how the canine signals to its handler or how long is appropriate for a response to be made. As in the Emory and Meyer discussion supra, a magistrate must be able to defer generally to the skill of a trained handler and the certifying agency unless there is a clear example of abuse. (Emphasis supplied). 2.

The Appellant’s Attempt to Stray Outside “The Four Corners” At the outset of the suppression hearing on September 18, 2002, the appellant called, as his witness, Officer Larry Brian, Alex’s handler, and examined at length Alex’s record of past successes and failures. This was a highly unusual procedure that calls for close scrutiny by us as to why a witness was even called and for what purpose. When suppression hearings are conducted to consider the exclusion of such things as allegedly involuntary confessions or allegedly unreliable identification procedures, witnesses may abound. When the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is invoked for allegedly unreasonable warrantless searches or seizures, witnesses are regularly called by both State and defendant.

Even in a warranted search situation, witnesses may be called when the alleged unconstitutionality concerns the manner of the execution of the warrant. When, by stark contrast, the issue being litigated is the initial issuance of a warrant, ordinarily no witnesses are ever called and no extraneous evidence is ever produced. Except in the rare situation, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), in which the defendant has made a threshold showing that a governmental affiant has perjured himself on a material matter, there, will be no witnesses called. At a suppression hearing ⁶³⁹ challenging the issuance of a search warrant, the only evidence that should be considered by the court is that which is confined within the “four comers” of the warrant and its application.

The hearing, to be sure, may involve extensive legal argument, but it should not involve the taking of any evidence other than the submission of the warrant itself, including its application. Maryland’s steadfast adherence to the “four corners” doctrine dates back to Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329, 335 , 62 A.2d 287 (1948). [T]he court’s consideration of the showing of probable cause should be confined solely to the affidavit itself, and the truth of the alleged grounds stated in the affidavit cannot be controverted by receiving the testimony of the accused and other witnesses. (Emphasis supplied). See also Goss v. State, 198 Md. 350, 354 , 84 A.2d 57 (1951); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 139 , 88 A.2d 556 (1952); Harris v. State, 203 Md. 165, 172 , 99 A.2d 725 (1953).

In Tischler v. State, 206 Md. 386, 390-91 , 111 A.2d 655 (1955), Judge Delaplaine wrote for the Court of Appeals: [I]f the affidavit that forms the basis for the issuance of a search warrant is sufficient on its face, any question as to whether the affidavit showed probable cause is confined to the affidavit itself, and on a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground of lack of probable cause, no testimony can be received to contradict the truth of the allegations in the affidavit. [T]he rule is so firmly established in Maryland that it should not be changed by a decision of this Court. We also take occasion to say that this rule has been generally followed in other states. (Emphasis supplied). See also Burrell v. State, 207 Md. 278, 280 , 113 A.2d 884 (1955); Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 499-500 , 224 A.2d 111 (1966). ⁶⁴⁰ This Court has also rigorously adhered to the “four corners” doctrine.

In Herbert v. State, 136 Md.App. 458 , 471-72 n. 1, 766 A.2d 190 (2001), we observed: [T]he prevailing law in Maryland, since 1948, has been that the scrutiny of a warrant application, including supporting affidavits, had to be confined within “the four comers” of the supporting affidavit and that no challenge was permitted to the veracity of a warrant application and its supporting documents. (Emphasis supplied). See also Dawson v. State, 11 Md.App. 694, 714-15 , 276 A.2d 680 (1971); Grimm v. State, 7 Md.App. 491, 493 , 256 A.2d 333 (1969); Grimm v. State, 6 Md.App. 321, 326 , 251 A.2d 230 (1969); Hall v. State, 5 Md.App. 394, 397 , 247 A.2d 548 (1968); Sessoms v. State, 3 Md.App. 293, 296-97 , 239 A.2d 118 (1968); Scarborough v. State, 3 Md.App. 208, 211-12 , 238 A.2d 297 (1968). As we have already analyzed at length, an examination of the “four comers” of the warrant application in this case 1) led Judge Gelfman to rule that there was a “substantial basis” for Judge Ellinghaus-Jones to have issued the search warrant and 2) leads us to hold that Judge Gelfman was not in error in that regard.

What remains for us to decide is whether even to consider the appellant’s statistical argument as to Alex’s “track record” based on the testimony of Officer Brian at the suppression hearing. Although a cursory glance at the appellant’s statistical argument leads us to conclude that, were we to address it, we would probably find it to be without merit, our holding is that the statistical argument and the testimony of Officer Brian were immaterial and had no basis even being received at the suppression hearing. If the field of scrutiny is to be expanded beyond the “four comers” of the warrant and warrant application, it is incumbent on the appellant to establish a sound basis for such a departure from the norm. He has not done so.

If the suppression hearing in fact broadened the inquiry beyond that to which the appellant was entitled, he got more than he ⁶⁴¹ deserved. We, however, see no reason to assess an immaterial argument or an immaterial ruling on a purely gratuitous inquiry. 1 3. The Franks Hearing That Never Was The appellant contends that all references in the warrant application to Alex’s “alert” to Apartment A should have been excised therefrom because of his compelling demonstration (although it did not persuade Judge Gelfman), at a Franks v. Delaware taint hearing, that the affiant on the warrant application had been guilty of such deliberate and misleading material omissions of Alex’s past failures that, had they been known, they would have decisively undermined Alex’s reliability. ⁶⁴² As Alice might have observed in Wonderland, the appellant’s contentions are “getting curioser and curioser.” What Franks v. Delaware taint hearing? The appellant has simply conjured up out of thin air a Franks v. Delaware taint hearing that never was.

A Franks v. Delaware taint hearing was never conducted in this case. A Franks v. Delaware taint hearing was never even requested in this case. Where does one begin to refute, or even to pin down, a fluid and shifting phantasmagoria? The fact that the appellant was permitted to go outside the “four corners” of the warrant application and to question Officer Brian about Alex’s training and track record, for another purpose pursuant to a different request, does not cause a Franks v. Delaware taint hearing suddenly to materialize.

It is not enough to proclaim, “Voila!” The appellant requested and, in a burst of apparently excessive generosity, was granted a hearing, pursuant to the so-called Frye-Reed test of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 , 391 A.2d 364 (1978). It was a hearing at which to challenge the general acceptance in the scientific community of dog sniffing as an investigative modality. Now, in an Orwellian rewriting of the case’s history, the appellant treats that Frye-Reed hearing as if it had been a Franks v. Delaware taint hearing. We will defer for the moment our opinion as to the propriety of a Frye-Reed hearing in the course of a challenge to the issuance of a search warrant, while we try first to exorcize the demon of Franks v. Delaware that the appellant has conjured up.

In 1978, in Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court carved out the only known exception yet extant to confining a challenge to the issuance of a search warrant to the “four comers” of the warrant application. Again and again, it has been stressed that a Franks hearing is a rare and extraordinary exception 1) that must be expressly requested and 2) that will not be indulged unless rigorous threshold requirements have been satisfied. ⁶⁴³ The Supreme Court, 438 U.S. at 155-56 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , established a formal threshold procedure before á defendant will be permitted to stray beyond the “four comers” of a warrant application to examine live witnesses in an effort to establish that a warrant application was tainted by perjury or reckless disregard of the truth. [WJhere the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. (Emphasis supplied).

The Supreme Court expressly set out the daunting threshold that must be crossed before such a taint hearing will be permitted. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross examine. There must be ■ allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons.

Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted today ⁶⁴⁴ is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant. 438 U.S. at 171 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 (emphasis supplied). In McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452 , 471-72 n. 11, 701 A.2d 675 (1997), Judge Raker for the Court of Appeals reconfirmed these preconditions that must be satisfied before a defendant is even entitled to a hearing.

Franks v. Delaware set out a procedure, requiring a detailed proffer from the defense before the defendant is even entitled to a hearing to go behind the four comers of the warrant. Under Franks , when a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant intentionally or recklessly included false statements in the supporting affidavit for a search warrant, and that the affidavit without the false statement is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the defendant is then entitled to a hearing on the matter. The burden is on the defendant to establish knowing or reckless falsity by a preponderance of the evidence before the evidence will be suppressed. Negligence or innocent mistake resulting in false statements in the affidavit is not sufficient to establish the defendant’s burden.

(Emphasis supplied). In Yeagy v. State, 63 Md.App. 1, 8 , 491 A.2d 1199 (1985), Judge Rosalyn Bell first recognized for this Court the threshold requirements that must be satisfied. To challenge an omission under Franks, supra, the accused must make a preliminary showing that it was made intentionally or with reckless disregard for accuracy; a negligent or innocent mistake does not suffice. United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d [318, 329 (5th Cir.1980)]; United States v. House, 604 F.2d [1135, 1139 (8th Cir.1979)].

This must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See also Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585, 631-33 , 647 A.2d 1243 (1994); Wilson v. State, 132 Md.App. 510, 538 , 752 A.2d 1250 (2000) (“A suppression hearing and a Franks hearing are, albeit related, very different animals.”). Wilson v. State, supra, was a case in which the correction of course by the suppression hearing judge came late in the ⁶⁴⁵ game, but it nonetheless came in time. We agreed that a Franks v. Delaware issue had no business being conducted even though witnesses had actually been called and argument had actually been made just as if a proper Franks v. Delaware hearing were being held. “Although the appellant never formally requested a Franks hearing and never made the required threshold showing that might have entitled him to a Franks hearing, he nonetheless received the full procedural benefit of a Franks hearing.” 132 Md.App. at 538 , 752 A.2d 1250 .

The appellant there was not “confined to arguing within the four corners of the application for the ... warrant.” Id. He “had the benefit of cross-examining at length” the detective “who was the affiant on the warrant.” Id. All of this, however, turned out to be gratuitous and was not properly before the court. It did not ripen into an entitlement just because it happened.

As we observed: [Ojnly because of the stubbornly persistent argument of appellant’s counsel, the specter of Franks v. Delaware hovers about this case although it was never formally established that Franks v. Delaware had any business in this case. Id. When it came time for her ultimate ruling, however, the trial judge recognized that Franks v. Delaware, indeed, had no business being in the case and she scrupulously confined her probable cause analysis to the “four corners” of the application. At the end of the somewhat hybrid suppression hearing, Judge Kavanaugh recognized what defense counsel wanted her to do.

In the last analysis, however, she agreed with the State that the decision as to whether the 1991 warrant application spelled out probable cause was one that should be made by looking “at the four comers” of that warrant application. 132 Md.App. at 541 , 752 A.2d 1250 (emphasis supplied). The trial judge, notwithstanding the witnesses and the argument, made no rulings pursuant to Franks v. Delaware. We, in turn, held that none were required: ⁶⁴⁶ Judge Kavanaugh never determined by a bare preponderance of the evidence or by any other standard whether 1) any statement in the warrant application by Detective Pikulski had been made with reckless disregard for its truth or 2) if so, whether that particular statement was indispensable to the establishment of probable cause. It is our conclusion that no such ridings were required.

In any event, Judge Kavanaugh''s final ruling was of the type ordinarily made at a routine suppression hearing and ivas not a Franks ruling. Id. at 541-42 , 752 A.2d 1250 (emphasis supplied). In reaffirming the principle that qualifying for a Franks hearing is “a formal procedure that must be satisfied” and not something that a suppression hearing may simply carelessly or inadvertently lapse or slide into, we stated: Franks v. Delaware established a formal procedure that must be satisfied before a defendant will be permitted to look beyond the four comers of a warrant application and to examine live witnesses in an effort to establish that a. warrant application was tainted by perjury or reckless disregard of the truth. 132 Md.App. at 538 , 752 A.2d 1250 (emphasis supplied). The appellant’s Franks v. Delaware argument in this case is even more bereft than the one we found wanting in Herbert v. State, 136 Md.App. 458, 470-74 , 766 A.2d 190 (2001).

The appellant in that case, like the appellant in this case, was simply stumbling into a Franks v. Delaware argument: What the appellant seems to have been teetering toward, without ever plotting a clear or steady course in that direction, was some sort of a “taint hearing” within the contemplation of Franks v. Delaware. Without any preliminary argument or announcement of purpose, appellant’s counsel proceeded to call five witnesses, including the appellant, to the stand. 136 Md.App. at 471-72 , 766 A.2d 190 (emphasis supplied). We commented, 136 Md.App. at 472 n. 2, 766 A.2d 190 , on the formlessness of the approach. ⁶⁴⁷ What the appellant thought he was doing is by no means clear. One does not just stumble into a Franks hearing casually, let alone inadvertently.

That is why Franks makes repeated references to the fact that “a sensible threshold shoiving is required ” and that the “requirement of a substantial preliminary showing should suffice to prevent the misuse of a veracity hearing.” The appellant here did not even pause a,t the threshold. (Emphasis supplied). We pointed out that although the appellant in fact called witnesses, he had never satisfied the indispensable threshold requirements. Not only did the appellant never mention Franks v. Delaware specifically or a “taint hearing” generally, he never attempted to make the threshold showing, required by Franks , even to be entitled to a hearing that went beyond argument confined to the “four corners” of the warrant. 136 Md.App. at 473 n. 5, 766 A.2d 190 .

The holding of this Court, 136 Md.App. at 473-74 , 766 A.2d 190 , was that, even though witnesses had testified, the merely hypothetical merits of a Franks v. Delaware taint hearing, which the appellant had never expressly requested and to which he had not established his entitlement, were not properly before us and we, therefore, declined to address them. The appellant was apparently attempting to establish through extrinsic evidence, presumably under Franks v. Delaware, that a key allegation in the warrant application was false and that the entire warrant application was thereby tainted. Arguably (although it was never argued), that controverting of the information in the affidavit could have been used in an effort to show not that Officer Satterfield was necessarily lying about having observed the controlled buy generally but at least that his informant was lying about having made the controlled buy from the appellant personally. ⁶⁴⁸ The appellant, however, never made an argument based on Franks v. Delaware. It is, therefore, unnecessary to point out the ways in which the appellant’s possible Franks v. Delaware argument, if indeed that is what he was intending to make, was flawed for that potential argument has now been abandoned.

(Emphasis supplied). When it comes to qualifying for a Franks v. Delaware hearing, the appellant must turn square comers. There was no Franks v. Delaware taint hearing in this case and there should have been none. We will not, therefore, address the appellant’s present contention in terms of Franks v. Delaware. 4.

A Procedural Masquerade: Franks v. Delaware Disguised As Frye-Reed What the appellant did do was to attempt to slip past an unsuspecting doorman a Franks v. Delaware hearing disguised as a Frye-Reed hearing. Even once inside the ballroom, the Frye-Reed masquerade continued, and it is only now on appeal that the disguise is finally discarded. The appellant seeks, in retrospect, to transmogrify a Frye-Reed hearing that was requested into an imagined Franks v. Delaware hearing that was not. The Frye-Reed disguise was initially beguiling, even if not legally sound.

On August 16, 2002, the appellant filed a Motion for a Hearing on the Scientific Reliability of the Canine Sniff. Citing Frye v. United States, supra; Reed v. State, supra; Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480 , 663 A.2d 1289 (1995); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); and Maryland Rule 5-702, the appellant sought a hearing at which he proposed “to introduce evidence to debunk the myth of infallibility of canine sniffs.” The motion cited a number of federal cases broadly calling into general question the investigative technique of canine sniffing. Although the appellant’s presentation at the suppression hearing soon reduced itself not to a broad attack, pursuant to ⁶⁴⁹ the Frye-Reed test, on the general acceptance of the investigative technique by the relevant scientific community but simply to an ad hoe challenge to the training and reliability of Alex specifically, the focus nonetheless remained on the reliability of the result. Even if a Frye-Reed test ruling were before us on its merits, (it is not), the appellant’s case would not lift off the ground.

If we were to assume, arguendo, that the olfactory sensitivity of dogs is a new scientific technique (a dubious proposition), the Frye-Reed test is concerned only with the general scientific acceptance of the technique and not with the ad hoc reliability of a particular dog on a particular occasion. In Reed v. State, 283 Md. at 381 , 391 A.2d 364 , Judge Eldridge made the sweeping nature of the inquiry unmistakably clear. The question of the reliability of a scientific technique or process is unlike the question, for example, of the helpfulness of particular expert testimony to the trier of facts in a specific case. The answer to the question about the reliability of a scientific technique or process does not vary according to the circumstances of each case.

It is therefore inappropriate to view this threshold question of reliability as a matter within each trial judge’s individual discretion. Instead, considerations of uniformity and consistency of decision-making require that a legal standard or test be articulated by which the reliability of a process may be established. (Emphasis supplied). A more fatal blow to the appellant’s cause, were a Frye-Reed issue actually before us, would be that this entire line of inquiry concerns the ultimate admissibility of evidence at a trial.

Frye-Reed law has no remote applicability to what a warrant-issuing magistrate may consider on the purely ex parte decision of whether there is a “substantial basis” to issue a warrant. The very concept of imposing a sophisticated Frye-Reed inquiry onto a magistrate’s ex parte review of a warrant application is ludicrous. As we explained at greater length in Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. at 635 , 647 A.2d 1243 , ⁶⁵⁰ extended and probing inquiries may challenge the admissibility at trial of such evidence as a defendant’s or a codefendant’s allegedly involuntary confession, an allegedly unreliable identification procedure, prior criminal records, or alleged hearsay evidence, but such evidence is, generally speaking standard fare in a warrant application. The warrant-issuing process is ex 'parte and is far less formal than a courtroom proceeding.

Id. In her Memorandum Opinion and Order, Judge Gelfman recognized the inappropriateness of applying the “standard used for scientific evidence” at trial to the very different assessment of “the probable cause necessary for a search and seizure warrant.” Defendants question the scientific reliability of canine sniffs and request that this Court analyze it under the standard used for scientific evidence. As has been discussed, supra, the use of a canine in contraband detection is well established in Maryland. This Court finds no need to investigate the statistical accuracy when it is not being introduced as evidence to prove the truth of the matter at hand.

The canine sniff, in the case sub judice, was not used to justify an arrest, or even a warrantless search. It was an investigative tool used only to obtain the probable cause necessary for a search and seizure warrant. (Emphasis supplied). A suppression hearing challenging the sufficiency of a warrant application is simply not the proper forum for a hearing pursuant to Frye-Reed.

Even if the appellant had been in the right pew, he was procedurally in the wrong church. The short answer to the Frye-Reed issue, however, is that it has not been raised on appeal. In neither the appellant’s brief nor his reply brief is there so much as a citation to Frye or to Reed or to any of the Frye-Reedr-related cases. Conversely, there was no mention at the suppression hearing of Franks v. Delaware.

The appellant’s now feeble response to the foreclosing effect of a Franks v. Delaware ⁶⁵¹ hearing’s having been neither requested nor generated nor granted is to point out that a footnote in the State’s brief mentions that “Fitzgerald got something resembling a Franks hearing—when he was able to examine witnesses at the suppression hearing.” The reply brief also refers to the fact that at the beginning of the suppression hearing the prosecutor advised Judge Gelfman that “counsel and the State did discuss the fact that there was going to be testimony ... going outside the four corners of the warrant.” We observe preliminarily that the State’s apparent acquiescence to “testimony going outside the four corners of the warrant” by no means necessarily refers to testimony in the context of a Franks v. Delaware hearing, that was never requested, versus testimony in the context of a Frye-Reed hearing, that was requested. More to the point, however, it is not in any event within the prei’ogative of the State to grant or to accede to a Franks v. Delaware taint hearing to which the defendant himself has not established his formal entitlement. No Franks v. Delaware issue is before us in this case. Alex’s olfactory reliability was unimpeached, and Judge Gelfman’s ruling on there having been a “substantial basis” for the issuance of the warrant is unimpeached.

Interlude: What We Have Held And What We Have Not Held Notwithstanding our extended discussion, we have not at this point held that the search warrant was necessarily valid. Our limited holding, thus far in the analysis, is that that presumptively valid search warrant issued on March 21 by Judge Ellinghaus-Jones 1) was not facially inadequate and 2) has not been invalidated by any extrinsic factor coming in from outside the “four corners” of the warrant application. The appellant’s third sub-contention (his fourth sub-contention is but a spin-off from the third), by contrast, requires us to turn to the very different question of whether that March 21 warrant may have been tainted by some intrinsic factor ⁶⁵² within the “four corners” of the warrant application. The contrast can be significant, because such an examination may call for the use of a distinctly different set of analytic tools and procedures.

Part II The Warrantless Activity of March 19 A. The Appellant’s Challenge to the Antecedent Police Action of March 19. The appellant claims that the police, without Fourth Amendment justification, conducted a warrantless search of his residence on March 19. He claims that that unconstitutional violation of his Fourth Amendment rights calls for the exclusion of the evidence produced by that search, to wit, that the State may not offer at trial Alex’s indication that the residence contained contraband. Thus far, there is no problem, because the State did not offer such evidence at a trial on the merits.

The appellant’s exclusionary motion, however, is more far reaching. He claims that just as the State may not offer any direct evidence emanating from the unconstitutional search of March 19, neither may it offer derivative evidence proceeding from that same source. He invokes, in effect, the “fruit of the poisoned tree” doctrine of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). He claims that the probable cause that led to the issuance of the March 21 search warrant was the unattenuated “fruit of the poisoned tree” and that the search warrant itself, therefore, was unconstitutionally tainted derivative evidence. 1.

Readjusting the Fourth Amendment Standard of Review As our focus shifts from the issuance of the search warrant on March 21 to the warrantless police conduct of March 19, our framework of potential Fourth Amendment analysis must ⁶⁵³ undergo a radical readjustment. If it should eventuate that, in answer to our threshold question, the Fourth Amendment is in fact applicable to the police actions of March 19, then the standards by which we would assess whether the Fourth Amendment had been satisfied would differ markedly from the standards we earlier invoked to assess the facial sufficiency of the search warrant. a. In a Single Suppression Hearing A Judge May Play Different Roles The shift in focus from the issuance of the warrant on March 21 to the warrantless activity of March 19 was of significance to Judge Gelfman, just as it is to us. In reviewing the warrantless actions of March 19, she was the judge of first impression, called upon to make legal rulings and, when necessary, to make findings of fact.

Upon appellate review, the appellate court, except when called upon to make ultimate de novo determinations, focuses only on the correctness of the suppression hearing judge’s decisional process and does not substitute its judgment for that of the suppression hearing judge on the factual merits. The appellate focus is on the decision of the suppression hearing judge. When, by contrast, the subject before the suppression hearing is the issuance of a warrant, as it partially was in this case, the focus of both the suppression hearing court and the appellate court shifts dramatically. With respect to the warrant that was issued on March 21, Judge Gelfman was not the judge of first impression.

Judge Ellinghaus-Jones was, and Judge Gelfman, like us, sat only in a far more restrained reviewing capacity, subject to the typical appellate disciplines. Whether she herself would have issued the warrant was beside the point, just as whether we would have issued the warrant is beside the point. All that mattered was that Judge Ellinghaus-Jones had had a “substantial basis” to justify her having done so. Upon appellate review of the issuance of a warrant, we do not so much review the decisional process of the ⁶⁵⁴ suppression hearing judge as we sit in the place of the suppression hearing judge.

Our primary focus, as was the focus of Judge Gelfinan, is upon the warrant-issuing magistrate and the “substantial basis” vel non for her decision. In this case, Judge Gelfman not only switched roles at the proper time but played both roles admirably. With respect to the warrantless dog sniffing of March 19, by contrast, Judge Gelfman was the decision maker of first impression. Our focus, accordingly, shifts to the propriety of her decision as to the dog sniffing of March 19. b.

For Warrantless Searches, A Counter Presumption In attacking the facial sufficiency of the March 21 search warrant, the appellant bore the burden of proof. The warrant was presumptively valid and the burden of rebutting that presumptive validity was on him. With respect to the warrantless police activity of March 19, by contrast, the Fourth Amendment presumption is that a warrantless search, if such a search occurred, was unreasonable. The burden, accordingly, would shift to the State to rebut that presumption and to establish that the search was reasonable.

This Court analyzed the shifting of presumptions in Herbert v. State, 136 Md.App. 458, 493-94 , 766 A.2d 190 (2001): Let one critically different fact be established, however, and the burdens shift dramatically.... When the State has procured evidence of guilt via the disfavored or non-preferred modality of a warrantless search, it is the State that suffers the disincentive of a presumption of invalidity. It is the State that then must assume the burden of rebutting that presumption of invalidity and of proving that the warrantless search was somehow justified under one of the