Ford v. Baltimore City Sheriff's Office

GREENE, Judge. On March 3, 1999, appellant, Earnest Ford, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming the ¹¹⁴ Baltimore City Sheriffs Office and Baltimore City Deputy Sheriffs Arthur Phillips, Mary Krall, and Arthur Seabrook as defendants in a suit alleging counts of assault, battery, negligence, negligent trespass, intentional trespass, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and supervision, and violations of the Maryland State Declaration of Rights. Thereafter, appellant amended his complaint to remove the Baltimore City Sheriffs Office as a defendant. Appellant instead added the State of Maryland as a defendant in the amended complaint.

On November 30, 2001, at the conclusion of a hearing, the court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by appellees. Appellant subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate, or in the Alternative, for Reconsideration and a Request for Hearing. The court denied that motion on January 8, 2002. Appellant noted an appeal from the court’s January 8, 2002, decision to present the following questions for review 1 : I. Did the court err in ruling that Deputy Phillips did not act with malicious intent?

II

Did the court err in concluding that the State was not negligent?

III

Did the court err in concluding that appellees did not violate appellant’s State constitutional rights? Regarding appellant’s first question presented, we hold that the facts viewed in a light most favorable to appellant do not support a finding of malice or negligence. We conclude, however, that the court erred in dismissing the State constitutional claims against the State. FACTS In 1995, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Queen, who was charged with non-support.

The warrant identification letter noted that Queen was an African-American male, 5'9" tall, and weighed ¹¹⁵ approximately 155 lbs. The warrant notification letter was dated July 28, 1995, and indicated that the warrant was “due” on October 28, 1995. Queen was sentenced to eighteen months in the Anne Arundel County Detention Center on January 22, 1998. The warrant was consequently dismissed on the day of Queen’s sentencing.

On March 10, 1998, not realizing the arrest warrant had been dismissed, Baltimore City Deputy Sheriffs Phillips, Krall, and Seabrook attempted to execute the warrant at 2705 Norland Road, Baltimore, Maryland, where Ford allegedly had resided since 1993. The sheriffs were dressed in plain clothes with their badges around their necks. Following procedure, Deputies Phillips and Krall approached the front door while Deputy Seabrook guarded the back door to ensure that the suspect did not escape. Upon knocking on the front door, the deputies were greeted by appellant, an African-American male, standing 5'9", but weighing approximately 210 lbs.

Appellant was a Maryland State Trooper, although this fact was unknown to appellees. The parties dispute whether Deputy Phillips identified himself or stated the purpose of the visit. 2 Deputy Phillips asked permission to enter the residence to speak with appellant. Appellant stated that the deputies could not come in and attempted to close the front door. Deputy Phillips stuck his foot in the door to keep it from closing and he and Deputy Krall forced their way into appellant’s home.

Upon entering the residence, Deputy Phillips advised appellant that he had a warrant permitting him to enter appellant’s home. 3 Appellant, faced with the forcible entry, moved toward his telephone to attempt to call for assistance. Appellant contends that Deputy Phillips, seeing the furtive movement, jumped on his back and pinned him on the couch. Although ¹¹⁶ these facts are in dispute, it is clear that appellant, at some point, was able to call 911 for assistance and informed the operator that unknown individuals were in his house. Appellant was also able to make a second call to his Maryland State Police barracks.

It is undisputed that appellant refused to inform the deputies of his identity. At this time, Deputy Seabrook entered the home to assist the other deputies and search for other people. Deputy Seabrook, while searching the residence, noticed a photograph of appellant wearing a State Trooper uniform. Deputy Sea-brook informed the other deputies of his discovery.

Thereafter, Deputy Phillips asked appellant if he was a Maryland State Trooper, but appellant would not reveal his identity. 4 Shortly thereafter, Baltimore City police officers arrived in response to appellant’s 911 call. Deputy Phillips explained to the responding officers that he possessed an arrest warrant for an individual living at the address and that the deputies were attempting to determine if appellant was the subject of the warrant. Officer Derek Phyall, one of the Baltimore City officers, recognized appellant and indicated that appellant was a Maryland State Trooper. A debate arose between Deputy Phillips and Officer Phyall when the officer refused to reveal appellant’s identity and defended appellant’s right to refuse to answer the deputies’ questions.

Appellant eventually went upstairs and retrieved his driver’s license. The license revealed that appellant was not the subject of the arrest warrant. Consequently, Deputy Phillips recorded the information, apologized to appellant, and left the residence. Appellant further contends that Deputy Phillips used obscenities and abusive language during the entire incident.

He further alleges that' he sustained injuries to his back when Deputy Phillips jumped on him to subdue him. ¹¹⁷ On March 8, 1999, appellant filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging assault, battery, negligence, negligent trespass, intentional trespass, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and supervision, and violations of the Maryland State Declaration of Rights. The complaint named the three Baltimore City deputy sheriffs and the Baltimore City Sheriffs Department as defendants. On March 31, 1999, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, appellant filed an amended complaint in which he eliminated the Baltimore City Sheriffs Department as a defendant and instead included the State of Maryland.

Defendants filed another Motion to Dismiss that was subsequently denied on May 4, 1999. Consequently, appellant filed a second amended complaint against the State of Maryland and the Baltimore City deputy sheriffs as defendants. Specifically the second amended complaint alleged assault, battery, negligence, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the State of Maryland, Deputies Phillips, Krall and Seabrook. The second amended complaint also included counts of negligent trespass, intentional trespass, violations of the State Declaration of Rights against all four defendants, and counts of negligent training and supervision against the State of Maryland.

On or about April 7, 2000, at the conclusion of discovery, appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the second amended complaint in its entirety. On May 2, 2000, the court granted appellees’ motion. On May 19, 2000, appellant filed a Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. On this same date, appellant also filed a motion to vacate or, alternatively, for reconsideration of the court’s grant of appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

The court, on June 14, 2000, denied both appellant’s motion to extend time and motion to vacate or reconsider the grant of appellees’ motion for summary judgment. On July 18, 2000, appellant noted an appeal to this Court, challenging the grant of appellees’ summary judgment motion and the denial of appellant’s subsequent motions. In an ¹¹⁸ unreported opinion, filed on March 27, 2001, we reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings so that the circuit court could consider appellant’s opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held on November 30, 2001.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court again granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of all defendants. On December 10, 2001, appellant once again filed a Motion to Vacate or, In the Alternative, for Reconsideration and Request for Hearing. That motion was denied on January 8, 2002. Appellant thereafter noted this appeal.

DISCUSSION Standard of Review Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides, in relevant part: The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the facts, including all inferences, in the light most favorable to the opposing party. See Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676 , 766 A.2d 617 (2001); Williams v. Mayor & Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 114 , 753 A.2d 41 (2000). The trial court on summary judgment must not try the case or decide factual disputes, but decide the case when no dispute of material facts exists.

See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst. Inc., 366 Md. 29, 73 , 782 A.2d 807 (2001); Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 205-06 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247 , 434 A.2d 564 (1981). The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court was legally correct. Pence v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 363 Md. 267, 279 , 768 A.2d 639 (2001); Hartford Ins.

Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 144 , 642 A.2d 219 (1994); Sapo ¹¹⁹ nari v. CSX Transp., Inc., 126 Md.App. 25, 37 , 727 A.2d 396 (1999). I. Malice Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment because the facts viewed in the light most favorable to appellant give rise to a genuine dispute regarding malice. We do not agree. We begin by generally examining the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA).

We note that generally under common law, the State enjoys sovereign immunity and is thus protected from suit for both ordinary torts and State constitutional torts. Baltimore Police Department v. Cherkes, 140 Md.App. 282, 306 , 780 A.2d 410 (2001) (citing Condon v. State of Md. University of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 492 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993)). The State, however, has partially waived this immunity by statute. The MTCA provides in pertinent part: (1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State, to the extent provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(2) The liability of the State and its units may not exceed $200,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence. Md.Code (1975, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 12-104(a) of the State Gov’t Article. The MTCA further provides: State personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Md.Code (1975, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 12-105 of the State Gov’t Article.

Section 5-522 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states in pertinent part: ¹²⁰ (a) Tort liability—Exclusions from waiver under § 12-104 of the State Government Article.—Immunity of the State is not waived under § 12-104 of the State Government Article for: $ H* (4) Any tortious act or omission of State personnel that: (1) Is not within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel; or (ii) Is made with malice or gross negligence; :!: =P * (b) Same—State personnel.—State personnel, as defined in § 12-101 of the State Government Article, are immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or its units have waived immunity under Title 12, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article, even if the damages exceed the limits of that waiver. Md.Code (1975, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 5-522 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). The preceding clearly establishes that a party can bring a viable tort action against the State when the tort was committed by a State employee acting within the scope of his or her employment and without malice or gross negligence. Thus, the State has accepted vicarious liability arising from the tortious conduct of State personnel.

See State v. Card, 104 Md.App. 439, 447 , 656 A.2d 400 (1995). The MTCA also clearly provides that a State employee acting within his or her scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence is immune from suit. If, however, the State employee has acted with malice or gross negligence, or the State employee has acted outside the scope of his or her employment, the State is immune from suit and the injured party may only bring a viable tort claim against the State ¹²¹ employee. Md.Code (1975, 2002 Repl.VoL), § 5-522 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

In the case at bar, we must determine whether the facts viewed in the light most favorable to appellant and all reasonable inferences arising from those facts, could support a finding that the deputies acted maliciously or in a grossly negligent manner. Such a finding of malice or gross negligence is necessary to establish a viable claim against the deputies as State employees. Notably, appellant’s second amended complaint does not contain any counts alleging that appellees acted in a grossly negligent manner or outside the scope of employment. It is clear in the instant case that in order to determine whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the counts pertaining to the deputies, we must determine whether the amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish malice.

Such a determination is a question of law. Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 164 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999). We pause to note that it is clear that Baltimore City deputy sheriffs are State personnel. Md.Code (1984, 2002 Repl.Vol.) § 12-101(a)(6) of the State Government Article.

We have recently addressed this issue in Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md.App. 268 , 762 A.2d 172 (2000). The dispute in Thacker arose when an apartment complex manager telephoned for police assistance in removing an irate tenant from the management office. Id. at 278 , 762 A.2d 172 . Three officers responded to the call.

Id. at 295 , 762 A.2d 172 . Thacker, the apartment manager, stated that one of the officers attempted to argue on behalf of the tenant and further stated that the officer made a statement intimating that the argument was a result of racism. Id. According to Thacker, the officer, while leaving with the tenant, chastised Thacker stating that he was a bad manager.

Id. Thacker alleged that he opened the office door and stated “ ‘If I’m a bad manager, then you’re a bad police officer.’ ” Id. at 295-96 , 762 A.2d 172 . Thacker alleged that the police officer threatened to arrest him if he said anything else. Thacker, 135 Md.App. at 296 , 762 ¹²² A.2d 172.

According to Thacker, he stated “if I’ve done something to be arrested for, then arrest me.” Id. The officer responded by arresting Thacker for disorderly conduct. Id. Thacker further testified that he had previously been pressured by the police to hire off-duty officers as extra protection for the development.

Id. Thacker stated that he felt this was a form of extortion. Id. The arresting officer testified in his own defense.

The officer noted that he had past experience with Thacker and believed he was unfair to his tenants. Id. at 297, 762 A.2d 172 . The officer gave a divergent account of the events surrounding the arrest. Thacker, 135 Md.App. at 297 , 762 A.2d 172 .

The trial court disposed of Thacker’s claim on a motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the arresting officers were protected by qualified immunity and that Thacker failed to allege sufficient facts to establish malice. We reversed that decision. In doing so, we noted that questions of malice require a determination of motive and intent and frequently should not be disposed of by summary judgment because they generally present a question for the fact-finder.

Id. at 300-01 , 762 A.2d 172 . Thacker alleged that the arresting officer had made a veiled comment regarding racism, evidence had been presented regarding a possible financial animus, and we noted that the arresting officer had previously formulated some animosity towards Thacker. We held that a rational jury could infer that the arrest was motivated by malice and, consequently, the court erred by disposing of the case through summary judgment. The Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation in Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000).

Okwa involved an arrest for disorderly conduct which occurred in an airport. Okwa arrived at the Baltimore-Washington Airport with a paid ticket for a flight to Nigeria. Id. at 170 , 757 A.2d 118 . Upon attempting “check-in” at the airline’s counter, he was informed by an airline employee that the ticket was not valid. ¹²³ Id. at 170 , 757 A.2d 118 .

A dispute arose between the airline employee and Okwa which alerted two MTA police officers. Id. at 170 , 757 A.2d 118 . Upon reaching the airline counter, the officers were informed by the airline employee that Okwa was “causing trouble.” Okwa, 360 Md. at 171 , 757 A.2d 118 . The parties submitted conflicting stories surrounding the subsequent arrest of Okwa.

Id. Okwa stated, however, in an affidavit that the officers demanded he leave the airport terminal. Id. at 172 , 757 A.2d 118 . Okwa stated that he tried to explain the situation, but the officers handcuffed him and began escorting him away from the ticket counter at which time the officers were joined by another officer with a search dog.

Id. Okwa averred that upon exiting the terminal, the officers forced him to the ground, struck him in the head, and twisted his thumbs. Id. Okwa stated that he never resisted the officers, nor did he provoke the attack, but concluded that the officers’ actions were the result of racial prejudice.

Id. at 173 , 757 A.2d 118 . Okwa was charged with disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assault. Okwa, 360 Md. at 173 , 757 A.2d 118 . He was found not guilty of all charges when the district court decided the State failed to meet its burden.

Id. The court specifically determined that the witnesses for the State presented contradictory testimony. Id. Okwa subsequently filed a complaint alleging, in part, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the officers, the MTA, and the State.

Id. at 174 , 757 A.2d 118 . Defendants filed summary judgment motions which were ultimately granted by the circuit court. Id. at 176 , 757 A.2d 118 . Okwa appealed and the Court of Appeals subsequently granted certiorari.

In reversing the decision of the circuit court, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties presented conflicting stories. Id. at 181 , 757 A.2d 118 . The court noted, however, that a fact finder could believe Okwa’s account of the events and could thereby infer that the officers “were motivated by an improper ¹²⁴ motive or that they had an affirmative intent to bring harm to Mr. Okwa.” Okwa, 360 Md. at 182 , 757 A.2d 118 . Indeed, several other Maryland cases have presented scenarios in which questions of malice, disposed of in summary judgment or by a motion to dismiss, were remanded so that they could be decided by a fact finder.

See, e.g., Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 261-62 , 587 A.2d 467 (1991) (holding that a motion to dismiss in favor of a police officer was not appropriate because plaintiffs’ allegations that the officer, unprovoked and without cause, had thrown rocks at their car and assaulted and battered them could support a finding of malice); Nelson v. Kenny, 121 Md.App. 482 , 710 A.2d 345 (1998) (stating that a question of the officer’s malice was properly held for the jury where an officer arrested a teacher upon the insistence of a student’s mother who expressed racial bias towards the teacher and the officer escorted the teacher from the school and handcuffed the teacher in front of a group of peers); Town of Port Deposit v. Petetit, 113 Md.App. 401 , 688 A.2d 54 , cert. denied sub nom. Maranto v. Petetit, 346 Md. 27 , 694 A.2d 950 (1997) (affirming the denial of a motion for summary judgment because an off-duty officer’s actions in firing shots at appellee’s truck, and aiming his gun at appellee while detaining him could give rise to an inference of malice despite the fact that the officer had witnessed appellee’s vehicle strike a pedestrian as it was fleeing a group of men throwing rocks); but see Chinwuba v. Larsen, 142 Md.App. 327 , 790 A.2d 83 , cert. granted on other grounds, 369 Md. 179 , 798 A.2d 551 (2002) (holding dismissal was appropriate despite appellant’s allegation that the Commissioner of the Maryland Insurance Administration’s public statement disclosing an investigation of appellant was malicious because the allegation was not supported “by any specific factual detail”); Williams v. Prince George’s County, 112 Md.App. 526 , 685 A.2d 884 (1996) (concluding that a jury could not reasonably infer malice where officers, acting upon the erroneous information that a vehicle was stolen, detained and handcuffed appellant, trained their guns on appellant, but did not “rough [him] up” and apologized for the misunderstanding). ¹²⁵ Despite these rulings, it is clear that allegations of malice should not be submitted to a jury merely because questions of intent are inherently intertwined within the counts. We stated in Thacker: [Pjlaintiffs may not rely upon the mere existence of such an intent, motive, or state of mind issue to defeat summary judgment. Because a defendant’s subjective intent is an element of the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiff must point to specific evidence that raises an inference that the defendant’s actions were improperly motivated in order to defeat the motion.

That evidence must be sufficient to support a reasonable inference of ill will or improper motive. Thacker, 135 Md.App. at 301 , 762 A.2d 172 . In the instant case, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to appellant do not give rise to a reasonable inference of malice. The deputies sought to execute an arrest warrant that identified appellant’s residence as the subject address.

Appellant does not allege that the expired warrant was merely a means to harass him or even that the deputies knew the warrant had expired. Consequently, we cannot infer that the deputies initiated the investigation out of malice. We must, therefore, examine the later conduct of the deputies. Upon appellant’s answering the door, the deputies asked if they could enter appellant’s home.

Appellant denied the request and began to close the door. At this time, the deputies allegedly pushed their way into appellant’s home without identifying themselves or stating they possessed a warrant. Absent some other allegation indicating a racial, personal, or other animus for doing so, the evidence is insufficient to conclude that a law enforcement officer with an arrest warrant is acting maliciously when forcibly entering a residence listed on the arrest warrant. Whether the entry was proper or not, malice cannot reasonably be inferred.

Similarly, the evidence is not sufficient to conclude that the deputy acted with malice in allegedly jumping on appellant’s back to prevent him from making a phone call. ¹²⁶ Alternatively, appellant contends that malice may be inferred because the deputies cursed and used profane language directed toward him. Here, appellant generally matched the description of the subject of the arrest warrant with the exception that he was over fifty pounds heavier. The deputies requested that appellant identify himself. When appellant refused, the officers continued to detain appellant and used unpleasant language as a means of obtaining the information sought.

A jury could not reasonably infer that the continued detention of appellant was provoked by malice merely because the deputies used profanities and appellant weighed significantly more than the subject of the arrest warrant. Although the alleged use of harsh language by the deputies might reasonably be construed as evidence of anger, such language does not reasonably suggest the type of targeted retaliatory animus that is necessary to establish malice. Moreover, although the fifty pound difference in the weight description of Queen in the warrant application, and the actual weight of the man who opened the door some two and a half years later, might reasonably be viewed as evidence that the officers acted carelessly after seeing Ford, we cannot say that this reasonably suggests malice on their part. Indeed, the deputies would not be properly executing their duties if they were to release appellant from detention prior to ascertaining if appellant was the subject of the arrest warrant.

II

Negligence Appellant next contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to appellant did not give rise to claims of negligence, negligent trespass, and negligent training and supervision against the State. We do not agree. As noted above, the MTCA provides in pertinent part: (a) In general.— (1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, ¹²⁷ in a court of the State, to the extent provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection. (2) The liability of the State and its units may not exceed $200,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence.

(b) Exclusions and limitations.—Immunity is not waived under this section as described under §§ 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. As noted above, section 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that the State and State agencies will be vicariously liable for torts committed by State employees so long as those torts were committed in the scope of the employees’ duty and the torts were not malicious or grossly negligent in nature. Section 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article further provides that State personnel have qualified immunity from mere negligence suits. Indeed, it is clear that allegations of mere negligence are not sufficient to overcome the qualified immunity of State personnel.

See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 579 (4th Cir.2001) (holding that allegations of negligence are insufficient to “overcome Maryland’s state employee immunity”); Cf. Wells v. State, 100 Md.App. 693, 705 , 642 A.2d 879 (1994) (holding that allegations of “individual negligence” do not indicate “wanton, willful, or reckless disregard for human life or the rights of others”). Consequently, we shall