Franklin v. State

THIEME, Judge. At issue in this appeal is the interface of Prince George’s County’s Differentiated Case Management Plan with Md.Ann. Code art. 27, § 591 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) and Maryland Rule 4-271. 1 Appellant Harold Melvin Franklin appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County denying his Motion to Dismiss all charges. Franklin’s motion maintained that the State failed to comply with Maryland statutes that require a defendant to be tried within 180 days of arraignment or appearance of defense counsel. We shall reverse the circuit court’s denial of Franklin’s motion, and remand the case with instructions that it be dismissed.

Reduced to their bare essentials, the facts are as follows. Appellee, the State of Maryland, charged Franklin with Murder and Use of a Handgun in the Commission of a Felony or Crime of Violence. On 5 October 1995, an Assistant State Public Defender entered his appearance on Franklin’s behalf. The Prince George’s County Circuit Court assignment office scheduled the trial date for 15 April 1996, pursuant to a Differentiated Case Management Plan 2 (DCMP) implemented by the administrative judge for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, which includes Prince George’s County.

On the date of trial, Franklin moved to dismiss all charges. He argued that the State failed to comply with § 591 and Rule ⁵³³ 4-271 that establish a defendant’s right to be tried within 180 days of arraignment or appearance of counsel. At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the administrator of the Prince George’s County Circuit Court assignment office, testified how her office established Franklin’s trial date. Because Franklin’s case was a Track 5 case, 3 she attempted to set his trial date 160 days after the appearance of counsel.

Next, she selected a trial judge to preside over Franklin’s case. Finally, she scheduled the case for the first period of time that the judge she selected was available for three consecutive days. The initial trial date was more than 180 days after Franklin’s counsel entered his appearance. Immediately prior to trial, the judge denied Franklin’s Motion to Dismiss.

A jury found Franklin guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter and Use of a Handgun in Commission of a Felony or Crime of Violence. The court sentenced Franklin to 10 years incarceration for manslaughter and 5 years for use of a handgun, with the sentences to be served consecutively. It is undisputed that neither the court nor the State’s Attorney’s Office sought to set a trial date within 180 days of defense counsel’s entry of appearance. Franklin presents a single question for our review: Did the trial court err in allowing the State to try Franklin without requesting or receiving a “good cause” continuance ⁵³⁴ after expiration of the 180-day deadline prescribed in Art. 27, § 591 and Md.Rule 4-271?

We shall answer “yes” to that question. Background Maryland statutes and cases impose a 180-day deadline by which the State must bring a criminal defendant to trial. Article 27, § 591 states, in pertinent part: (a) The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court: (1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: (1) The appearance of counsel; or (ii) The first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules; and (2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those events. (b) On motion of a party or on the court’s initiative and for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date.

Maryland Rule 4-271(a) contains substantially the same language. The plain language of the statute and the rule mandate that a trial date shall not be set later than 180 days after the earlier of the entry of defense counsel’s appearance or the first appearance of the defendant in circuit court. See Art. 27, § 591; Md.Rule 4-271; State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979). This rule is mandatory.

See State v. Parker, 338 Md. 203, 207-08 , 657 A.2d 1158 (1995); State v. Cook, 322 Md. 93, 96-97 , 585 A.2d 833 (1991); Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 107 , 442 A.2d 550 (1982); Hicks, 285 Md. at 318 , 403 A.2d 356 . “In addition to imposing an 180-day deadline, both the statute and the rule require that the moving party show good cause before a trial may be postponed beyond the prescribed time limit and that only the administrative judge or his designee may grant a postponement.” State v. Robertson, 72 Md.App. 342, 346 , 529 A.2d 847 (1987). A “postponement” ⁵³⁵ requires the satisfaction of three conditions: (1) a party or the court must request the postponement; (2) good cause must be shown by the moving party; and (3) the county administrative judge, or a judge designated by him, must approve of the extension of the trial date. Id. at 347 , 529 A.2d 847 . The State must strictly adhere to the requirement that postponement be approved by the administrative judge or his designee.

Id. Against this tedious background of well-developed law, we now focus on Franklin’s issue. 4 Discussion On appeal, Franklin contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Dismiss. He argues that the State and the Prince George’s County State’s Attorney’s Office have the duty to bring a case to trial; their failure to do so within 180 days of arraignment, according to Franklin, necessitates dismissal of all charges. The State argues that the trial court correctly denied Franklin’s Motion to Dismiss.

In advancing its argument, the State calls our attention to Md.Rule 1211, which provides, in pertinent part: b. Case Management Plan; Information Report. (1) The County Administrative Judge shall develop and, upon approval by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, implement and monitor a case management plan for the prompt and efficient scheduling and disposition of actions in the circuit court. The plan shall include a system of differentiated case management in which actions are classified according to complexity and priority and are assigned to a scheduling category based on that classification.

Prince George’s County’s DCMP was implemented and is monitored by the county administrative judge. Under this plan, the trial dates of “Track 5” cases (like Franklin’s case) were scheduled by the assignment office. The State reasons ⁵³⁶ that the administrative judge “implicitly” made a good cause finding when the administrative vehicle he created, implemented, and oversaw resulted in the assignment office scheduling the initial trial date more than 180 days after defense counsel’s entry of appearance. We find the State’s argument to be without merit.

We believe allowing an assignment office initially to schedule a serious and complex criminal case beyond the 180-day deadline because of an individual judge’s heavy docket, without the defendant’s consent, tramples on the 180-day rule created by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the mandatory nature of the 180-day rule. See Parker, 338 Md. at 207-08 , 657 A.2d 1158 ; Cook, 322 Md. at 96-97 , 585 A.2d 833 ; Goins, 293 Md. at 107 , 442 A.2d 550 ; Hicks, 285 Md. at 318 , 403 A.2d 356 . “The policy of the rule, of course, demands that both the court and prosecution take appropriate steps to assure that there is no inordinate delay.” Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md. 473, 483 , 551 A.2d 460 (1989) (citing Robertson, 72 Md.App. at 350 , 529 A.2d 847 ). Any delay exceeding the permissible period of orderly trial preparation must not only be explained by the State, it must be justified.

Id. In the instant case, the State cannot meet its burden because the case was initially set beyond 180 days. Moreover, to hold as the State requests would allow every county to avoid application of the 180-day rule in Track 5 cases (where it is arguably most important) by delegating the authority to “implicitly” make good cause findings to the assignment office and permitting the assignment office to set trial dates beyond the clear mandates of Art. 27 § 591 and Rule 4-271(a). We will not render a decision that will nullify Art. 27, § 591 and Rule 4-271 (a) by making them secondary to administrative efficiency or convenience.

We find the instant case to be legally akin to and controlled by Capers v. State, 317 Md. 513 , 565 A.2d 331 (1989). In Capers , the assignment officer, rather than the county administrative judge or that judge’s designee, granted a postponement that carried the case beyond the 180-day period. The ⁵³⁷ Court of Appeals held that the postponement was a violation that mandated dismissal of the charges because Art. 27, § 591 and Rule 4-271 did not contemplate or permit the exercise of postponement by anyone other than one with the authority of an administrative judge. Id. at 520-21, 565 A.2d 331 .

With Capers in mind, we look to Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1 , 472 A.2d 436 (1984). In Calhoun , the defendant and a co-defendant were indicted for murder, armed robbery, and various other offenses. The trial court granted the State’s motion for a severance, and both cases were scheduled 5 days prior to the expiration of the 180-day deadline. 5 The State chose to proceed with the trial of the co-defendant on an unrelated matter, but never expressly petitioned the administrative judge for a postponement of Calhoun’s trial. The trial court rejected defense counsel’s motion that the charges against Calhoun be dismissed for noncompliance with § 591 and Rule 746. 6 He was tried and convicted.

Id. at 2-5, 472 A.2d 436 . On appeal, Calhoun argued that the trial court violated § 591 and Rule 746 because the administrative judge did not postpone or approve the postponement of the trial date prior to the expiration of the 180-day period. The State argued that even if §