Jackson v. State

EYLER, Judge. Appellant, Valentino Maurice Jackson, was charged with child sexual abuse and related offenses. On appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to enforce an agreement with the State and to dismiss the charges against him. Before doing so, we must consider whether the issue is properly appealable at this time.

For reasons discussed below, we hold that the issue is appeal-able, and we affirm the trial court’s ruling. Facts On March 14, 1997, appellant appeared before the Honorable Lenore R. Gelfman in the Circuit Court for Howard County to argue certain defense motions. As of that time, the trial was scheduled for March 24, and the Hicks 1 deadline was April 28th. One of the matters argued at the March 14 hearing was appellant’s request to review the victim’s Department of Social Services records.

Counsel for the parties agreed that Judge Gelfman should review the records in camera before making the determination. Judge Gelfman then stated: I’m just wondering the best way, the most efficient way, the quickest way to review the information and get you the ¹¹⁸ Court’s decision and still give you time to review any evidence if in fact the Court orders that it be disclosed. The prosecutor subsequently informed Judge Gelfman that there would be a request for a new trial date, and after discussion, counsel agreed on May 5 as the new trial date. With respect to Hicks, the following colloquy occurred: [PROSECUTOR]: We do have a Hicks problem at the end of April, I believe, so we need to get it in some time in April.

I’m not suggesting a trial date. I’m just saying that that — I would mention that to the Court. * * * * [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think with regard to the Hicks problem I — you know, consistently in my practice have taken the position that that oughten to drive anything. I mean, in other words, we’ll waive whatever we have to waive to avoid a Hicks problem. This case is not going to go away because it doesn’t get to trial.

I mean, so I think what we ought to be talking about is what’s a time frame in which to get done the things that need to get done to get this ease prepared for trial, and then if it happens to be after the date that — that Hicks ran, we’ll waive, do whatever waiver we have to do with regard to that. THE COURT: Okay. I don’t know if therefore you are saying that Defendant waives Hicks if and when it becomes an issue. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I will waive Hicks if it'becomes an issue. THE CLERK: April 28th is the Hicks date.

THE COURT: Okay, that was the next question. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is there — what’s the — I have to be out of the country on assignment the week before, not on vacation. The — with regard to something else I’m doing. What’s the — the—is there a week after that? What’s the Monday— THE CLERK: (Indiscernible).

THE COURT: What is the trial date presently? ¹¹⁹ [PROSECUTOR]: 24th of March. (Asides.) [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, I don’t have any problem right now during that week. THE COURT: Which week? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May 5th. [PROSECUTOR]: Now, that is after Hicks. THE COURT: That’s after Hicks. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I know that is after Hicks. [PROSECUTOR]: May 5th is the week I’m in court, so that is convenient. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. [PROSECUTOR]: I’m only saying that.

I mean, we can— [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand. I understand. I don’t have any problem. Appellant was then advised of his right to be tried within 180 days of an appearance.

As a result of the colloquy which followed, Judge Gelfman found that appellant waived that right. The relevant portion of the transcript is as follows: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Mr. Jackson, do you understand — I’ve just explained to you that the State has an obligation to bring you to trial within a hundred and eighty days of your — of the — in this case of the entry of our appearance in October which would run at the end of April. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: They must by law do that. Do you understand that if we set the trial date on May the 5th, which we are agreeing to at this point, do you understand that would be beyond that date? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And that in order for the Court to set it on that date you must understand that you are waiving your right to a speedy trial as that is determined— as that is set forth in Maryland law. You are waiving your right to be tried within one hundred and eighty days of our ¹²⁰ appearance which would be before the end of April.

Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And understanding then do you knowingly waive your right to be tried within a hundred and eighty days and accept the court’s trial date of May 5th, 1997? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. THE COURT: Sir, you’re not under the influence today of any alcohol, drugs or medication prescribed or otherwise?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am. THE COURT: Are you being treated for any psychiatric illness at this time or taking any medication? THE DEFENDANT: No. Well, I’m seeing a psychiatrist, you know. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He’s been getting drug counseling, but that’s not for any mental impairment. THE COURT: Do you — do you find that that interferes with your ability to understand what is being said to you? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, ma’am.

THE COURT: Do you understand everything that [defense counsel] has said to you and you agree to have this case tried on May 5 which is later than the date that ordinarily would have been set in this case? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Now, I’m just being — okay. Let me make a finding.

Defendant waives Hicks. New trial date May 5, 1997. Let me inform Counsel that on May 5 Judge Leasure is the principle [sic] criminal judge, and Judge Sweeney is the backup criminal judge. So it more likely than not will be one of those particular judges.

On April 14,1997, the State filed a motion to reschedule the trial from May 5 to a date prior to the Hicks deadline. On April 25th, Judge Gelfman held a hearing on that motion. At the hearing, Judge Gelfman was advised of the existence of an agreement that had been reached on March 14 between ¹²¹ counsel for the parties but had not been disclosed at that time. Counsel revealed that, on October 23, 1996, the victim’s mother had given a bed sheet to the police with an explanation that it had been on the bed when and where the victim had been molested.

The bed sheet contained a stain that the State wanted to have subjected to DNA testing. At the April 25 hearing, the prosecutor explained: Your Honor, when the State filed the Motion after receiving the information back on the sheet, having there been an agreement on the 14th of March, when we were last before the Court. At that time, as the Court recalls, there were various Motions filed by the Defense and there were various materials that the Court was going to review in camera to determine what could be released and what couldn’t be released. And on the 14th of March, which was ten days before the then scheduled trial date, the State at that time did in the middle of the Motions agree with the Defense that the trial date of the 24th would be continued, and that if the information came back on the — on the white fitted bed sheet which excluded the Defendant, the State would dismiss the case.

When that information came back to the State the D.N.A. came back on two different items. One was dated the 13th of March and one was dated the 17th of March. The State was away — this Prosecutor was away the week of the 17th as was told to the Court and to the Defense on the 14th. We did not get the information from the Maryland State Police — the State’s Attorney’s Office did not get the information from the Maryland State Police until either the 24th or 26th of March, which was the following week after I returned from the State’s Attorney’s business out-of-state.

And the results came back that the particular white fitted bed sheet had excluded Mr. Jackson caused some concern with the State. I discussed the matter at length with the State’s Attorney — with the Deputy State’s Attorney, with the Detective, and then I had to meet with the victim’s mother. ¹²² When I met with the victim’s mother on the 8th of April and I advised the Defendant I was — Defense attorney I was going to meet with the victim’s mother, it was determined for the first time, the State’s Attorney’s Office got additional information, that this white fitted bed sheet which had been alluded to in police reports much earlier as being identified by the victim as her bed sheet and as being the bed sheet that was on her bed when various crimes against her had been committed by the Defendant, it had come to the State’s attention — State’s Attorney’s Office attention on April 8th that this sheet had been used somewhere else. It had been used on the sofa. The sofa had been used by victim’s mother and someone who she had been seeing at the time.

As a result of that additional information the State’s Attorney’s Office advised the Defendant through his Counsel, we were not going to honor the agreement of the 14th and that we were going to proceed forward with the case. Defense counsel responded: The only thing that in — you’re correct that the agreement itself was never put on the record. Reference was made to the agreement with regard to the continuance. * ❖ * * On the 14th, ten days before trial, we sat in that room and we reviewed every element of where this case sat, including the importance of the D.N.A. on this white fitted bed sheet which according to their evidence was — the victim was going to testify was on her bed when in fact these — some or all of these acts occurred, the ones that occurred on her bed. We discussed openly the fact that if that white fit — the D.N.A. came back on that white fitted bed sheet with our client’s semen stains on it, that by the time this case got to trial that white fitted bed sheet was going to be like a second skin on that little child.

We also discussed that if the white — if the D.N.A. came back contrary to our client, excluded our client, all of a ¹²³ sudden everybody was going to distance themselves from the white fitted bed sheet. This was the nature of the kinds of discussions that we had. [The prosecutor] then asked us, [other defense counsel] and I, after discussing every element of this case, the weaknesses in the case, the strengths of the case, the problems with both sides and where we stood as we were about to come into court, whether we would consider a continuance in this case because there were, as a result of our discussion, some outstanding matters, not the least of which was the D.N.A. And in fact, we had even alluded to the fact that if the D.N.A. came back in the week prior to trial that we would do everything we could to exclude the results of that D.N.A. because this D.N.A., the material from which the D.N.A. was to be taken, has been available since October the 24th, as has virtually every question dealing with this white fitted bed sheet, been available to the State since October 24th. We have sought in every way we could to get them to do their work. In fact, this case was continued back in January, among other things, precisely so the D.N.A. could in fact — so the D.N.A. results would be available.

We discussed all this. [The prosecutor] said, would you consider a continuance? I said, give me a minute to talk with [other defense counsel]. The two of us talked and we came back to [the prosecutor], and we sat back there in that room. We will not agree to a continuance except under one circumstance and one circumstance alone.

The circumstances is (sic) that if the D.N.A. on the white fitted bed sheet comes back and excludes our client you will dismiss this case. Otherwise, we will not agree to a continuance. THE COURT: But suppose they have other evidence. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That could — that—they could — they had other evidence. We all knew what the other evidence was at the time.

There are fundamental weaknesses in this case and [the prosecutor] was aware of them and we had just discussed ¹²⁴ them. If the D.N.A. came back our client’s way, it weakened an already weak case from our p[er]spective, and apparently from [the prosecutor’s] p[er]spective on March the 14th. He made an agreement. He stood up to us and said at that time — let me just finish the recitation because it is important what happened.

At that time, on March the 14th, he stood up and he said to us, let me think about it, as we left the room back there. Everything had been discussed. That was the agreement. We did not ask for a continuance in this case.

We came into court fully prepared to go to trial. We asked the Court to make the rulings that the Court — we’ve been asking the Court to make. The Court then, on the Court’s own Motion said, well, what are we going to do about the trial date in this case? Perfectly legitimate, raising an issue, since we seemed to be — we had some things that had to be resolved, or arguably had to be resolved before trial.

What are we going to do about the trial date? I was standing right here. I said — I asked the Court for leave to speak with [the prosecutor]. I walked across the courtroom and I said to him, do we have an agreement?

At which time, he said — thought for a moment and he said, yes. And I said to him over there as I was — right over there said — and the agreement is, without any question if the — if we will do whatever we need to get the continuance, to get you the continuance that you want, we will do that, we’ll waive Hicks, we’ll do whatever we have to do, if you will agree that if the semen comes back on the white fitted bed sheet and excludes our Defendant, and only the white fitted bed sheet, excludes our Defendant, you will — the case will go away, is the words I used at that moment. But after our meeting there’s absolutely no question about what that meant. It meant that the case would be dismissed, and [the prosecutor] knew that.

He acknowledged that. I walked back here. I asked leave of the Court one more time to explain exactly what was going on to my client because we recognized there was a Hicks problem. There ¹²⁵ was then a voir dire.

We agreed to a continuance of this case. We agreed to a continuance of the case beyond Hicks. Judge Gelfman, after listening to argument of counsel and after listening to the tape of the March 14th hearing, found as follows: [F]irst of all, I don’t know why the State filed the request to reset the trial date. I didn’t see a Hicks problem in the first place.

And I guess the State was just trying to be extra cautious, but there’s no Hicks problem. The critical event is not when the trial date is, the critical event is when the postponement occurred. The postponement had to occur for several reasons, not the least was the D.S.S. records. Why did the D.S.S. records have to be reviewed?

Because there’s a statute that precludes the Department of Social Services from releasing sensitive and confidential information. It is a criminal statute. Therefore, D.S.S. intervened to ask the Court to either file a Protective Order or to review the information in camera and make its ruling accordingly. Why did D.S.S. intervene?

D.S.S. intervened because the Defense subpoened Susan Glorioso and the other D.S.S. officials. She’s not going to — Ms. Glorioso who I believe is a licensed social worker for the — or investigator for D.S.S. cannot under penalty of criminal sanction divulge any of the information absent Court Order. It was occasioned by the Defense’s request. There is no Hicks problem.

Defendant did in fact waive Hicks but it wouldn’t have been a problem anyway in my opinion because there was sufficient good cause to have the trial date on May 5. Now, whether or not there was an agreement between Defense and State, I don’t know. There’s going to have to be a full, perhaps, evidentiary hearing on that issue. But the fact of the matter was, I think it’s kind of [naive], frankly for Counsel to think that if the State comes back -with one piece of information that says it exculpates your client that they’re not going to go forward.

They could have said that on the record, Your Honor, we’re waiting for ¹²⁶ some D.N.A. information. If in fact it comes back negative on Mr. Jackson, we don’t have a case. They could have said that. They didn’t.

They apparently have other information. And I will tell you from the benefit of having reviewed the D.S.S. records both the Defense has valid information to present, and I must tell you, the State has very valid information to present. For all these reasons, the Motion to reset the trial date is denied. Motion to dismiss the case is denied.

Trial goes forward on May 5. Based on the above, Judge Gelfman refused to reschedule the trial date. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and to enforce the alleged agreement. That motion was heard by the Honorable Dennis M. Sweenet on May 5, 1997, and testimony was taken.

The victim’s mother testified that the sheet in question had been used occasionally on the sofa on which she slept and that she had had sex with partners other than appellant. Counsel for both parties testified with respect to the terms of the alleged agreement between them. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Sweeney denied appellant’s motion to dismiss on Hicks grounds, based on its finding that Judge Gelfman had ruled on April 25 that appellant had waived Hicks on March 14, and alternatively, independently found that appellant had waived Hicks on March 14. Judge Sweeney expressly did not decide whether Judge Gelfman had made a good cause finding to justify postponement of a trial date beyond the Hicks deadline.

With respect to appellant’s motion to enforce the agreement and to dismiss the indictment, Judge Sweeney found that the State had agreed that, if the DNA results were negative, the charges against the appellant would be dismissed. He further found that consideration for that agreement existed, in that appellant agreed not to oppose a postponement of the then existing trial date. In sum, Judge Sweeney found the existence of an agreement and that it had been breached by the State. He went on, however, to find that appellant had suffered no prejudice from the delay, concluded that dismissal ¹²⁷ of the charges was not justified, and denied appellant’s motion to dismiss.

Later that day, the Acting Administrative Judge granted a postponement of trial pending appeal so that appellant could file this immediate appeal. Discussion A. Appealability The State moved to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that the appeal is interlocutory and not allowed by law. It argues that there is no final judgment in a criminal case until a verdict has been rendered and sentence has been imposed. See Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423 , 432 n. 4, 701 A.2d 419 (1997); Telak v. State, 315 Md. 568, 575 , 556 A.2d 225 (1989).

Appellant responds that the denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss is appealable under the collateral order doctrine. We agree. An otherwise interlocutory order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine if it (1) conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, (2) re-solvéis] an important issue, (3)[is] completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4)[is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Courtney v. Harford County, 98 Md.App. 649 , 635 A.2d 8 (1994).

The State concedes that the order meets the first two prongs of this test. Accordingly, we need discuss only prongs three and four. Clearly, the merits of appellant’s motion to dismiss is completely separate from the merits of the criminal proceeding against him. The enforceability of the agreement between appellant and the State has no bearing upon appellant’s guilt or innocence on the criminal charges.

See Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213 , 406 A.2d 1922 (1979)(holding that merits of enforceability of settlement agreement are completely separate from merits of underlying tort claim); Courtney, 98 Md.App. at 657-58 , 635 A.2d 8 (holding that enforceability of ¹²⁸ agreement between defendant and State was completely separate from merits of criminal proceedings against defendant). A closer question is whether the agreement would be effectively unreviewable following the entry of a final judgment. For reasons similar to those set forth in Courtney , we hold that it would be. Courtney involved the enforcement of a plea agreement.

The defendant in that case had been charged with a variety of drug related offenses, including being a drug kingpin (Md. Code, art. 27, § 286(g)). The defendant agreed to provide the State with testimony implicating others in drug charges in exchange for a promise by the State not to charge the defendant’s wife with crimes, acceptance by the State of a guilty plea on possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, dismissal by the State of the other charges, and recommendation by the State of a suspended sentence of five years. The State breached the agreement, the defendant sought injunctive relief, and the trial court declared the agreement to be null and void. Thereafter, the defendant filed an immediate appeal.

In considering whether the order met the fourth criterion of the collateral order doctrine, we noted that, in one sense, the agreement would be reviewable on appeal of any convictions because, in the event that we found the State was bound by the agreement, we would be obliged to reverse any convictions other than the one bargained for in the plea agreement. Id. at 658, 635 A.2d 8 . We further stated, however, that such a reading of the fourth criterion was too narrow. We used a quotation from Clark to explain: “[A] final judgment on the merits of the underlying tort claim would render the ruling on the settlement agreement effectively unreviewable.

One of the principal considerations in entering a pre-trial settlement agreement is the avoidance of the expense and inconvenience of a trial. If the defendants must proceed to a trial on the merits, this contractual benefit will be irretrievably lost. Regardless of the outcome of the trial or the outcome of an appeal after ¹²⁹ trial, the defendants will have been forced to go to trial and thus will have been deprived of a right under the contract if the contract should have been enforced.” Id. (quoting Clark, 286 Md. at 213 , 406 A.2d 922 ).

Relying upon this reasoning, we held that delaying consideration of the agreement until after any convictions would deprive the defendant of the benefit of his bargain. Indeed, we noted, the consequences for the Courtneys, and criminal defendants generally, were much more onerous than those faced by a recalcitrant civil litigant. Id. at 658-59, 635 A.2d 8 . The State attempts to distinguish Courtney on the basis that the agreement at issue in this case “did not implicate a plea to some lesser offense, and was not taken primarily in an effort to avoid the expense and inconvenience of a trial.” First, we note that the holding in Courtney did not turn on the fact that the bargain included a guilty plea.

Accordingly, lack of a guilty plea in the instant case does not distinguish this case from Courtney . Further, contrary to the State’s assertion, the record reveals that dismissal of the charges and avoidance of trial is precisely what appellant was seeking when he entered into the bargain with the State. If we refused to consider the appeal at this time, appellant would be