Greco v. State

RAKER, Judge. Maryland Rule 4-345 governs the power of Maryland trial courts to revise a sentence in a criminal case. Subsection (b) of the Rule allows a criminal defendant to seek a modification of sentence, but requires such a motion to be filed within 90 days of the imposition of that sentence. That subsection of the rule provides: (b) Modification or Reduction—Time For.—The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed.

Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (d) of this Rule. The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding. In this case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted a motion to modify the sentence of Appellant Vincent T. Greco, Jr. Within 90 days of that decision, but years after the imposition of the sentence which had been modified, Greco filed a second motion to modify the reimposed sentence. The circuit court refused to hear this second motion on the merits because it concluded that the motion was untimely.

We ⁴²⁶ disagree, and therefore shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. I. On April 6, 1982, a Baltimore County jury found Vincent Greco guilty of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and first degree rape in the strangulation death of 78 year-old Leta J. Larsen. The trial judge sentenced Greco to life imprisonment on the rape charge, to a consecutive life term for the premeditated murder, and to a concurrent life term for the felony murder conviction. The Court of Specials Appeals, in. an unreported opinion, affirmed the convictions.

Reasoning, however, that it would have been “manifestly impossible to kill the same person twice,” the intermediate appellate court concluded that the premeditated and felony murder convictions merged for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to impose the correct sentences. On January 30, 1984, the circuit court sentenced Greco to consecutive life terms for the first degree murder and rape of Larsen. On February 3, 1984, Greco filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence.

The trial court held that motion sub curia, and did not rule on the request for modification until July 16, 1992. At that time, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County modified the sentence imposed in 1984, and ordered Greco’s term of imprisonment for the first degree rape to run concurrently with his term of incarceration for the premeditated killing of Larsen. On August 17, 1992, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(b), Greco filed another Motion for Reduction of Sentence. Prior to hearing the subsequent motion for modification on the merits, the circuit court ruled that the court was divested of jurisdiction to hear the request for modification because that motion was not filed within 90 days of the imposition of sentence on January 30, 1984.

Greco filed a timely notice of appeal, and we granted certiorari on our motion before review by the Court of Special Appeals. ⁴²⁷ II. Before this Court, Greco acknowledges that under Maryland Rule 4-345(b), a trial court loses the power to modify a legal sentence if more than 90 days have passed since the imposition of that sentence, and no motion to modify or reduce that sentence has been filed within that period. Nonetheless, Greco argues, his second Motion for Reduction of Sentence was timely filed because, for purposes of that motion to modify, the applicable sentence was the one imposed on July 16, 1992, and not the earlier sentence of January 30,1984. In other words, the modification of the sentence by the trial court on July 16,1992, was effectively the “imposition” of a sentence in the context of Rule 4-345(b).

Greco argues that Maryland case law, common sense, and a comparison of Rule 4-345(b) to its civil counterpart support such an interpretation. By contrast, the State contends that a fair reading of the unambiguous language of Rule 4—345(b) leads to the conclusion that a sentence can only be “imposed” once. Moreover, even if the language of the rule is ambiguous, the State asserts that the purpose and history of the rule support the proposition that the time for filing a motion for the reduction of a sentence runs from the initial imposition of that sentence, and not from a subsequent modification. In support of this argument, the States relies heavily upon the reported decisions of federal courts interpreting former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).

Finally, the State claims that a primary purpose of the 90-day limitation imposed by Rule 4-345(b) is to protect trial courts from multiple requests for sentence reduction, and that affirming the decision by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County will further such a purpose.

III

At common law, Maryland trial courts possessed the inherent authority to modify their judgments in both criminal and civil cases. Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 170 , 642 A.2d 232, 236 (1994). This authority to modify a judgment existed only ⁴²⁸ during the term of court at which the judgment was entered. State v. Butler, 72 Md. 98, 100-01 , 18 A. 1105, 1106 (1890) (quoting Seth v. Chamberlaine, 41 Md. 186, 194 (1874)).

This common law principle was abrogated by a rule of procedure, more uniform in application, which empowered a trial court to modify a sentence within 90 days of either the imposition of that sentence, or the receipt of a mandate issued by the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals. Edwardsen v. State, 220 Md. 82, 88 , 151 A.2d 132, 135 (1959). As amended, the successor to that original rule is current Maryland Rule 4-345(b). In Cardinell v. State, 335 Md. 381, 384-86 , 644 A.2d 11, 12-13 (1994), this Court concluded that a motion to modify a sentence, filed more than 90 days after a previous motion to modify had been denied, was untimely under the rule.

The case at bar squarely presents the question of whether such a motion was timely if filed more than 90 days after the original imposition of sentence, but within 90 days of the granting of a motion to modify the original sentence. In turn, proper resolution of this question focuses on the accurate definition of the word “imposition” as used in Rule 4-345(b). To interpret rules of procedure, we use the same principles and canons of construction as are used to interpret statutes. State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 24 , 637 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1994).

When construing a rule, the Court first looks to the text of the rule, giving those words their ordinary and natural meaning. Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 667 , 684 A.2d 445, 447 (1996). When the words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily our inquiry ends. In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994).

When, however, the language of the rule is ambiguous, we look elsewhere to discern the legislative intent. 1 It then becomes necessary to survey the surrounding circumstances in which the rule was drafted to accurately discern the intent of the Court of Appeals in ⁴²⁹ promulgating that rule. New Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274 , 627 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1993); Kaczorowski v. City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-16 , 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). Strictly as applied to the issue presented by this case, Maryland Rule 4-345(b) is ambiguous; in the context of Rule 4-345(b), the word “imposition” is reasonably capable of more than one meaning. The State urges that the “imposition” of a sentence refers only to the initial pronouncement of that sentence.

Conversely, Greco argues, it would also be reasonable to interpret the subsequent modification of a sentence, which imposes a different punishment on the criminal defendant, as an “imposition” of sentence. Because the language of the rule is unclear, we must look toward other sources to glean the intent of the rule. In re Victor B., 336 Md. at 94 , 646 A.2d at 1016 ; see Long, 343 Md. at 668 , 684 A.2d at 448 (“We look to the rule’s history to aid us in discerning the reasonable intendment of the language used in the light of the purpose to be effectuated.”). Yet the goal remains to give the rule its most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used.

IV

Prior Maryland case law strongly suggests that the modification of a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(b) is an imposition of sentence for the purposes of that rule. In the past decade, we have decided two cases which prove instructive here. In McDonald v. State, 314 Md. 271 , 550 A.2d 696 (1988), the defendant was placed on probation by the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County. Subsequently, on a de novo appeal, the circuit court found that McDonald had violated the terms of her probation, revoked her probation, and executed the sentence originally imposed by the District Court.

Id. at 284 , 550 A.2d at 702 . Following the imposition of that sentence, McDonald sought a modification of the sentence pursuant to Rule 4-345(b). Id. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County believed it did not have the ⁴³⁰ authority to revise the original sentence, and therefore denied the motion for modification.

Id. at 273 , 550 A.2d at 697 . This Court reversed, concluding instead that the revocation of a criminal defendant’s probation returned McDonald to her original sentencing status, and “ ‘any sentence [then] imposed must have the effect of an original sentence.’ ” Id. at 284 , 550 A.2d at 702 (quoting Coley v. State, 74 Md.App. 151, 156 , 536 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1988)). Although McDonald dealt with the reimposition of an original sentence, rather than the reimposition of a different sentence, the rationale is pertinent to this case: Whether the hearing judge reimposes the original sentence or imposes a new sentence, the effect under Rule 4-345(b) remains the same; the 90-day period runs from the time any sentence is imposed or reimposed upon revocation of probation, and the court retains the authority to modify that sentence as the rule provides. Id. at 285 , 550 A.2d at 702 .

A case decided two years after McDonald also clarifies the issue to be resolved in the present case. In Collins v. State, 321 Md. 103, 105 , 581 A.2d 426, 427 (1990), appeal after remand, 326 Md. 423 , 605 A.2d 130 (1992), the Circuit Court for Howard County revoked the defendant’s probation on March 1, 1988, and “reimposed [a] previously suspended 10-year sentence.” Id. at 110, 581 A.2d at 429 . Collins subsequently sought a review of the 10-year sentence by a three-judge panel pursuant to the Review of Criminal Sentences Act, Article 27, § 645JA of the Maryland Code (1957, 1987 RepLVol.). 2 Id. at 105, 581 A.2d at 427 . At that time, Maryland Rule 4-344 required that any application for review of sentence under § 645JA must “be filed in the sentencing court within 30 days after the imposition of sentence.” 3 Even ⁴³¹ though Collins had filed his request within 30 days of the March 1, 1988 proceeding, the circuit administrative judge denied his motion on the ground that it was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of February 17, 1987, the date of the original sentence.

Id. at 105-06, 581 A.2d at 427 . On appeal, we reversed. As in this case, we noted that the threshold issue was “whether the phrase ‘imposition of sentence,’ includes imposition of both the original sentence and reimposition of a previously suspended sentence.” Id. at 107 , 581 A.2d at 428 . Examining the text and history of Article 27, § 645JA, we rejected the premise that the reimposition of a previously suspended sentence was not an “imposition of sentence” under Rule 4-344.

Id. at 108-10, 581 A.2d at 428-29 . Rather, we concluded this prior history and the language of the statute “convince[s] us that the legislature intended to allow sentence review either following the imposition of the original sentence or following the reimposition of a previously suspended sentence.” Id. at 109 , 581 A.2d at 429 . Significantly, the Court also observed “that our interpretation of ‘imposition of sentence’ as applied in this Rule harmonizes with our interpretation of that phrase as used in Rule 4-345....” Id. Taken together, McDonald and Collins stand for the proposition that the reimposition of a sentence after the revocation of probation is an “imposition of sentence” for purposes of the review of that sentence under Title 4 of the Maryland Rules.

This case presents the question of whether that proposition governs the reimposition of a sentence subsequent to the ⁴³² reduction of an original sentence. We conclude that it does. 4 Both McDonald and Collins quoted with approval Coley v. State, 74 Md.App. 151 , 536 A.2d 1166 (1988). Writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Coley , Judge Karwacki (now a member of this Court) recognized that “[bjecause Rule 4-345(b) applies to any sentence, it must apply to a sentence which is imposed following a revocation of probation.” Coley, 74 Md.App. at 156 , 536 A.2d at 1169 (emphasis added). In interpreting Rule 4-345(b), no sound basis exists to distinguish between the reimposition of a sentence subsequent to the revocation of probation, and the reimposition of a sentence subsequent to the granting of a motion to modify the original ⁴³³ sentence.

Moreover, such an inconsistent interpretation would not be in accord with our previously discussed objective of achieving uniformity in the interpretation of the Maryland Rules. See Md. Rule l-201(a) (“These rules shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure.... ”). Consonant with Rule 4-345(b), a criminal defendant may file a request for modification or reduction of sentence within 90 days of the imposition of that sentence. If the sentencing court grants a motion for modification and reduces the sentence, this subsequent sentence then becomes the effective sentence.

See Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 435 , 109 A.2d 96, 100-01 (1954) (concluding that a motion to modify must be timely in order to “strike out” the original sentence); Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 581 , 92 A.2d 575, 576 (1952) (“On motion of appellant, this sentence was stricken out, and he was resentenced....”); Czaplinski v. Warden, 196 Md. 654, 655-56 , 75 A.2d 766, 766-67 (1950) (noting that the original sentence “was reconsidered and stricken out ... and the applicant was re-sentenced”); Collins v. State, 69 Md.App. 173, 193 , 516 A.2d 1015, 1025 (1986) (“The effect of the modified or clarified sentence was to strike out the [initial] sentence and any infirmity attaching to it.”), cert. denied,