Frazier v. Warfield

Bartol, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The question which gave rise to this controversy, involves the construction of the act of 1858, ch. 256, and inasmuch as that question has been fully argued, and the solicitors on both sides have united in expressing the wish, that the judgment of this court should be pronounced thereon, for the purpose of definitively settling other cases, now pending and awaiting the decision of this, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question of jurisdiction. For conceding that the Superior court had jurisdiction over the case, without however so deciding, it is admitted by the appellee, that if the construction of the act, claimed and insisted on by him, be erroneous, he is not entitled to the relief prayed in his bill of complaint, and the injunction granted by the Superior court must be dissolved. It appears from the record, that the complainant, with his partner in trade, on the 1st of July 1858, had contracted with a certain William S. Pawson for the purchase of a lot of wheat, represented by sample.

The wheat was delivered at the warehouse of complainant, and the appellant, Frazier, the Inspector General of grain in and for Baltimore city, w'as notified that the same was ready to be measured and weighed. The appellant proposed to measure said wheat, and to ascertain its weight by weighing one bushel in every sixty, according to the long established usage in Baltimore. The complainant objected to that mode of weighing, and insisted, that the appellant was bound, under the law, to weigh the whole parcel, and upon the refusal of the appellant to adopt that construction of the law, the complainant proceeded to have the same measured and weighed, himáelf, and thereupon, proceedings were instituted against him before a justice of the peace, to recover the penalty under the 15th section of the act. Then, on application of the complainant, the Superior court, sitting in equity, issued an injunction to restrain the ³⁰¹ proceeding before the justice of the peace, and from the order Of said court refusing to dissolve the injunction, this appeal was taken.

It is admitted in the case, “that the practice of weighing wheat in the city of Baltimore, prior to the act of 1858, ch. 256, always has been, to weigh one bushel in sixty, as the index or mode of determining the weight between the buyer and seller; and that in this case the inspector was ready, and offered to weigh the wheat according to said practice, and that the inspector refused to weigh the wheat in any other mode, and has ever since refused -to weigh wheat in any other mode; and that the complainant, in consequence of such refusal, and alleging that the law did require all the wheat to be weighed, proceeded to Weigh the same, by weighing one bushel in every sixty, in order, as he alleged, to ascertain the true quantity of wheat in the lot, which he and his partner had purchased of said Pawson, and which lot, being contracted for at a given price per bushel, and the number of bushels not being known at, the time of the contract, the complainant weighed the wheat in manner aforesaid, and he and his said partner paid and settled for said lot of wheat, as of the quantity ascertained by such weighing of one bushel in every sixty, by the complainant as aforesaid.” Upon this state of facts, the question presented for our decision, is, whether the inspector, by measuring and weighing the wheat in the mode proposed by him, was fulfilling the requirements of the act of 1858? The principles which govern courts of justice in the construction of statutes, are simple and well defined. Among them the cardinal one is, that the intention of the Legislature shall be carried out. That intention is to be collected from the words of the statute, by considering every part of it. 2 Cranch., 386.

It may also be ascertained, by considering “the cause or necessity of making the act, or from foreign circumstances.” 4 G. & J., 152 . Guided by these rules, we have but little difficulty in coming to a conclusion, upon the proper construction of the act of 1858, and ascertaining the true intent of the Legislature in ³⁰² passing it. The object and general purpose of the law was, to provide a competent and suitable officer, to inspect grain sold in the city of Baltimore, and to ascertain, with fairness and accuracy, the true quantity sold by weighing and measuring; to establish a system by which the Legislature supposed the former would more honestly receive, and the merchant more honestly pay, exactly for what is sold and bought. The act proposes to accomplish this result, not by introducing a new mode of weighing and measuring, but (to use the language of the judge of the Superior court) by placing “between the buyer and seller, an