Friedman v. Hannan

ADKINS, Judge. In this case we interpret Section 4-105(4) of Md.Code (1974, 2001 ReplVol.) Estates & Trusts Article (“ET”), which directs that , provisions in a will “relating to the spouse” be revoked upon divorce from that person. We hold that the automatic revocation provision of ET Section 4-105(4) is not limited to bequests to a former spouse, and may include bequests to a former spouse’s family members. A court should utilize the terms of the will and circumstances surrounding its execution to determine whether a bequest “relat[es] to the spouse” within the meaning of Section 4-105(4), On appeal de novo from the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore City, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was called upon to construe the will of James Patrick Hannan (“Decedent”).

The Decedent was married at the time he executed the will, but was divorced before his death. There is no dispute that after the divorce, all testamentary bequests made to Decedent’s former spouse were revoked by operation of ET Section 4-105(4). The question at issue involves the status of Decedent’s bequests to “those surv[iv]ing immediate family members of my Wife[.]” The former spouse’s immediate family members, (Lydia Friedman, Patricia Tolley, Barbara Graves, Genia Covert, Kelley Gallagher and Kimberly Shiké [collectively, “Friedman”]) appealed from the trial court’s decision that the marital dissolution revoked their legacies. The Court of Specials (“CSA”) affirmed, and we, in turn, affirm the intermediate appellate court.

FACTS & LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The facts in this case are simple and uncontested. On June 5, 1981, James Hannan married Anna Zelinski. 1 No children ³³³ were born to them during the marriage. At some point, the two separated, and later divorced on February 6, 2001. As part of the separation, both parties entered into a property settlement agreement.

Zelinski testified that Decedent met all of his obligations under that agreement. 2 Decedent subsequently died on September 10, 2006. He had never remarried. This action involves a will that Decedent executed during his marriage to Zelinski (“the Will”), 3 the relevant provisions of which state: ITEM TWO: I appoint as Executor of this, my Last Will and Testament, provided she shall survive me, my Wife, ANNA MARIE COVERT HANNAN. In the event my Wife preceedes [sic] me in death, I appoint my Brother, KEVIN HANNAN as Executor of this Will.

ITEM THREE: I give and bequeath to my Wife, ANNA MARIE COVERT HANNAN, provided she survives me, all of my possessions.... ITEM FOUR: Should my Wife, ANNA MARIE COVERT HANNAN, and myself die together by accident or otherwise, the estate is to be handled by LYDIA ELIZABETH COVERT FRIEDMAN and KEVIN HANNAN. All real and personal property, except jewelry belonging to my Wife and myself, be liquidated and proceeds there of [sic] be divided equally between my surviving immediate family members and those surving [sic] immediate family members of my Wife: JEROME B. HANNAN, KEVIN HANNAN, MICHAEL HANNAN, KATHLEEN HANNAN and DANIEL HANNAN, LYDIA ELIZABETH COVERT FRIEDMAN, PATRICIA JO COVERT TOLLEY, BARBARA ³³⁴ JANE COVERT, GENIA LOUISE COVERT, and KELLEY ANN FRIEDMAN (said KELLEY is to share her part with her sister KIMBERLY BETH FRIEDMAN). ITEM FIVE: Jewelry belonging to myself shall be given to my Wife if she survives me.

If she has preceeded [sic] me in death, it shall go to my brother DANIEL HANNAN, to do with as he wishes. Jewelry belonging to my Wife, is addressed in her own Will. Both parties assume that the Decedent drafted the Will himself, without the aid of legal counsel, although no evidence was presented to confirm that conclusion. Decedent’s brother, Jerome B. Hannan (“Hannan”) filed the Will with the Register of Wills, and he was appointed personal representative of the estate. 4 On May 16, 2007, the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore City concluded that “[t]he remaining clause [in Item Four] pertaining to distribution provides that certain family members, including [Friedman], are entitled to distribution only if the Decedent died in a common disaster with his wife[.]” Accordingly, the Orphans’ Court ordered that the Will not be admitted to probate, effectively leaving Decedent intestate.

Both parties appealed to the Circuit Court, seeking an interpretation of Item Four as a residuary clause and a determination as to whether Zelinski’s named family members would inherit under that clause. At trial, Zelinski testified that her named family members were her sisters and two of her nieces. She admitted that Decedent did not know her named family members prior to their marriage, and that those family members did not live with them during the marriage. Decedent’s divorce attorney, Susan Huesman-Mitchell, testified that Decedent was a merchant marine, an avocation that required him to live away from his wife on a boat for several weeks at a time. ³³⁵ The Circuit Court agreed with the parties’ interpretation of Item Four as a residuary clause, and therefore found that Decedent died testate.

The court then considered the Will as a whole and determined that its provisions relating to the immediate family of Decedent’s wife could not be fulfilled because of the divorce. The court issued a written order, ordering that “only the immediate family members of the deceased ... receive the proceeds from the estate[,]” and that Friedman “be excluded from receiving any proceeds of the estate.” The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion, and Friedman filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court. We granted certiorari to consider the following three questions: 1. Did the trial court err in deciding that the bequests to Friedman were conditioned on Decedent being married to Zelinski at the time of Decedent’s death? 2.

Did the trial court err in deciding that the bequests to Friedman were class gifts and not individual gifts even though the beneficiaries were individually named in the will? 3. Did the trial court err in deciding that ET Section 4-105(4) acts to revoke a person’s testamentary gifts to his former spouse’s specifically identified family members when his will was executed during his marriage and unchanged after his divorce? We hold there was no error, and affirm the Circuit Court. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(c), where, as here, an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. “It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous[.]” Md. Rule 8-131(c). “The appellate court must consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party[.]” Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 392 , 347 A.2d 834, 835 (1975). “If there is any competent evidence to support the factual find ³³⁶ ings below, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202 , 857 A.2d 1109, 1123 (2004) (citation omitted).

The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are not entitled to the deference of the clearly erroneous standard. See Clancy v. King, 405 Md. 541, 554 , 954 A.2d 1092, 1099 (2008). DISCUSSION Neither party argues that the Will is invalid or should not be admitted to probate. Moreover, the parties agree that Item Four of the Will functions both as a simultaneous death clause and a residuary clause in the event that Decedent’s wife predeceased him.

The dispute is whether the bequest to Friedman in Item Four of the Will survived the divorce of Decedent and ZelinsM. Friedman contends that in Item Four Decedent crafted individual bequests with the intent that those gifts survive any divorce between Decedent and ZelinsM. Hannan responds that the bequest to Friedman was contingent upon Decedent being married to ZelinsM at the time of his death. Hannan views the bequest as one intended to be a gift to a class, which fails because of the divorce.

They also differ on the meaning of ET Section 4-105, with Friedman arguing for a narrow interpretation, and Hannan urging the opposite. The starting point of our analysis will be ET Section 4-105, which sets forth the methods or circumstances under which a will may be revoked. Subsection (4) thereof includes divorce as a cause of dissolution to this extent: Divorce or annulment.—By an absolute divorce of a testator and his spouse or the annulment of the marriage, either of which occurs subsequent to the execution of the testator’s will; and all provisions in the will relating to the spouse, and only those provisions, shall be revoked unless otherwise provided in the will or decree. ³³⁷ (Emphasis added). 5 Both parties agree that the statute applies, and that the case turns on the meaning of “relating to the spouse[.]” Although neither party contends that this provision is ambiguous, they divide on its meaning. Hannan argues that the phrase “provisions in the will relating to the spouse” mandates revocation when, in the mind of the testator, the connection between the legatees and the ex-spouse is “substantial and logical” and that there is “no other basis for a connection^]” Friedman, on the other hand, advances a narrow interpretation, which would apply only to bequests to or for the direct benefit of the spouse.

Maryland has consistently recognized these guiding principles of statutory interpretation: In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional, or part of the Rules. We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions, and our analysis ends. If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, or when the language is not clear when it is part of a larger statutory scheme, it is ambiguous, and we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute. ³³⁸ People’s Ins.

Counsel Div. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 351-52 , 969 A.2d 971, 979-80 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Following these principles, we start by considering the plain meaning of “relate,” which is “[t]o stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with; with ‘to.’ ” Black’s Law Dictionary 1288 (6th ed. 1990); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383 , 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037 , 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (using the Black’s Law definition of “relate” to interpret the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 which preempted States from enforcing any law “relating to rates, routes, or services” of any air carrier). Thus, the ordinary meaning of “relate” is the existence of a connection between two subjects, not that the two subjects need be the same.

See State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 81-82 , 702 A.2d 723, 729 (1997) (stating that in order to qualify under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the “declarant’s statement must have some connection with the startling event in order to relate to the startling event ....”) (emphasis added); Trimble v. BNSF Ry. Co., 636 F.Supp.2d 916, 922 (D.Neb.2009) (stating that the definition of “relating to” was not so narrow as to require that two subjects be identical); Contractors Ass’n v. West Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Div. of Pub.

Safety, et. al., 189 W.Va. 685 , 434 S.E.2d 357, 369 (1993) (services provided by Department of Public Safety for road patrol, traffic control, etc. were “relating to” the duties of the Division of Motor Vehicles because “the activities of one [agency] ha[d] a bearing on the activities of the other.”). Courts have generally treated this language as broadly inclusive. See Se. Ala.

Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 572 F.3d 912, 917 (D.C.Cir.2009) (holding that “fringe benefits—which are part of the compensation an employee receives for his or her services—fit comfortably within the broad meaning of the term ‘wage-related.’ ”). Like the courts in the cases cited above, we read “relating to” as a broad term, and hold that the trier of fact, when applying the statutory language of section 4-105(4) to ³³⁹ decide whether a particular bequest is one “relating to the spouse,” is not limited to bequests to or for the benefit of the spouse. In other words, the trier of fact may determine that bequests to other persons nonetheless “relate to” the spouse.

We draw this conclusion because the term “relating to” means that “there is a connection between two subjects, not that the subjects have to be the same.” Trimble, 636 F.Supp.2d at 922 . Fundamental principles of statutory construction require that we must take care to “ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase” is rendered surplusage by our interpretation. People’s Ins. Counsel Div., 408 Md. at 351-52 , 969 A.2d 971 .

If the General Assembly had intended Section 4-105(4) to apply more narrowly, it had no reason to use the term “relating to.” It could have simply said that upon divorce, “all provisions in the will for the former spouse are revoked.” Its choice not to do this, but instead to use the broader “relating to” language, must be respected and enforced by this Court. We are not persuaded by Friedman’s argument that “[t]he deliberate inclusion of ‘and only those provisions’ is clear evidence that the legislature intended to limit the scope of [ET Section 4-105(4)] to revoke only those provisions relating to the former spouse.” This language simply clarifies that the balance of the will remains intact. It adds nothing that would further define or limit the meaning of the phrase “relating to the spouse.” With such a broadly worded statute, the task of determining, on a case by case basis, whether a particular bequest in a will was “related to” the decedent’s former spouse, falls to the courts. This decision is made largely by the trial court because it involves a fact-based inquiry, i.e., determination of the decedent’s intent.

When construing a will, the “paramount concern of the court is to ascertain and effectuate the testator’s expressed intent.” Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 649 , 919 A.2d 641, 645 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Generally, that intent is “gathered from the four corners of the will, with the words of the will given their ‘plain ³⁴⁰ meaning and import.’ ” Id. Where, as here, “a will is drawn by a layman, the language used may be given the meaning it would commonly have to a person in his situation!)]” Shriner’s Hosps. v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 270 Md. 564, 570 , 312 A.2d 546, 550 (1973) (citations omitted). Ordinarily, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove the testator’s intent unless there is a latent ambiguity.

See Monmonier v. Monmonier, 258 Md. 387, 390 , 266 A.2d 17, 19 (1970). Yet, when ascertaining that intent, the court may consider “the situation of the testator and his relations with the parties to whom he has devised or bequeathed his property!)]” Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 180 Md. 336, 339 , 24 A.2d 299, 300 (1942). In that regard, the will must be “read in the light of the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of its execution.” Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 48 , 75 A.2d 126, 128 (1950). As the trial court in this case pronounced, “the duty to ascertain and effectuate a testator’s intention is virtually ironclad.” Adhering to that rule, the Circuit Court determined that Decedent intended to create two classes of legatees: (1) Decedent’s surviving immediate family members, and (2) those surviving immediate family members of his wife.

It concluded that because the bequest to his spouse’s relatives was conditioned on him being married at his death, the bequest to the second class failed. Our task is to decide whether the Circuit Court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, or it made an error of law. The Circuit Court’s decision and Friedman’s criticism of it can best be understood if we set forth the key portions in the language of the Court: Looking at the will itself, taking the decedent’s wife out of the will, it is clear that the testator intended to create two classes of persons to share equally in the proceeds of the estate. The first class of individuals was the decedent’s immediate family members, comprising of five persons.

The second class, or group, consisted of six persons, namely his ³⁴¹ wife’s immediate family members. Persons 5 and 6; namely Kelly Ann Friedman, as well as Kelly Beth Friedman, Kelly was to share her part of the proceeds with her sister, Kimberly Beth Friedman. The division here, looking at the four corners of this will, indicates an intent to create the two classes of persons as opposed to individual bequests. At the time of his death, the decedent was unmarried.

He did not have a wife. Since he did not have a wife, there were no immediate family members of a wife at the time of his death. Absent any evidence to the contrary, this was a condition that the decedent—that decedent did not contemplate at the time that he signed the will. The condition, namely passing of proceeds to his wife and/or her immediate family members, cannot be fulfilled.

I find that the case of Herman v. Ortego, 39 California App. 4th, 1529 to be particularly instructive in this case. In that case, which is extremely similar to the case at hand, the court indicated the decisive inquiry is whether or not the testator in making the