FURDA v. State

HOLLANDER, J. In this appeal, we must determine whether an involuntary hospital admission under Maryland law, for the purpose of an emergency mental health evaluation, constitutes a “commitment” under federal law, so as to bar the admittee’s right to possess a regulated firearm in Maryland. The issue is rooted in events that began in February 2003, when the Montgomery County Sheriffs Department served a domestic protective order on Mark Furda, appellant, and transported him for an emergency mental evaluation, based on a petition filed by Karen Furda, who was then appellant’s wife. At about the same time, the sheriffs seized numerous weapons from appellant’s home, including regulated firearms. On July 26, 2005, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Furda pleaded guilty, as a subsequent offender, to one count of violating a domestic protective order issued in September 2004.

See §§ 4-506 and 4-509 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code. The court sentenced Furda to a suspended one-year term of incarceration and two years of probation. On September 13, 2006, while on probation in the protective order case, Furda filed a “Motion,” pro se, in that case, seeking the return of his archery equipment and “other related items” that were seized in 2003. The court denied the motion, without prejudice, on November 1, 2006.

On July 30, 2007, a few days after the expiration of his probation, appellant filed another pro se “Motion,” asking for the “release of all [his] property held for safe keeping by the Montgomery County Sheriffs Department.” Then, on October 31, 2007, through counsel, and before the court had ruled on the July ³⁷⁷ 2007 Motion, appellant filed a “Motion To Return Property,” requesting return of the weapons that had been seized in 2003. After a hearing on November 7, 2007, the circuit court denied the Motion in an Order of the same date (docketed November 9, 2007). It concluded, inter alia, that appellant was prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(4), because he had previously been “involuntarily committed to a mental institution.... ” Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed on December 3, 2007, was denied on January 16, 2008. This appeal followed on February 13, 2008. 1 Appellant poses one question: 1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by not granting Mr. Furda’s Motion to Reconsider because Mr. Furda was not barred by Federal, Maryland State, or Montgomery County law from possessing firearms as he had never been “committed” within the definition of Federal law, Maryland State law, or Montgomery County law; and he did not have an adequate opportunity to respond to the State’s allegations concerning whether he has been “committed” when it was raised for the first time just before the November 7, 2007 Motion argument? ³⁷⁸ The State has filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, based on several grounds. For the reasons set forth below, we shall deny the State’s motion, reverse the circuit court, and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Appellant’s former wife, Karen Furda, obtained a temporary protective order against appellant in February 2003. According to an “Incident Report” submitted on February 28, 2003, by a deputy in the Montgomery County Sheriffs Department, 2 Mr. Furda was served with “a temporary Protection Order” on February 27, 2003, at 11:00 p.m.

See Furda v. Furda, Case No. 0601 SP006212003 (District Court for Montgomery County). He was also served with an order for an emergency mental evaluation, based on a petition filed by Ms. Furda. 3 Pursuant to Ms. Furda’s consent, the Sheriffs searched the Furdas’ home and recovered approximately fifteen rifles, one handgun, a large quantity of miscellaneous ammunition, knives, a bow, and arrows. In the early morning of February 28, 2003, Furda arrived at Montgomery General Hospital (the “Hospital”). By the end of that day, he was transferred to Potomac Ridge Behavioral Health (“Potomac Ridge”) for “involuntary admission,” based on a certification by two physicians that “the individual presents a danger to the life or safety of the individual or of others.” Furda was also described as having “a mental disorder and need[ing] treatment.” A hearing to determine whether appellant would be released or detained involuntarily was set for March 4, 2003, at 9:30 a.m.

However, Furda was ³⁷⁹ discharged from Potomac Ridge on March 4, 2003, at 10:56 a.m. 4 According to the record, Ms. Furda obtained a Final Protective Order against Mr. Furda on March 6, 2003. It stated, in part: “While this Protective Order is in effect you may be subject to a federal penalty under the 1994 amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 922 (g)(8), for possessing, transporting, or accepting a firearm.” Ms. Furda obtained another protective order on September 21, 2004. Then, on February 1, 2005, she filed an “Application for Statement of Charges,” claiming that Mr. Furda “violated the protective order repeatedly....” Thereafter, on March 3, 2005, Furda was charged in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in a one-count Information with failing] to comply with [the Protective Order] ... dated September 21, 2004, issued under Section k-506 of the Family Law Article, that ordered the respondent to refrain from contacting and attempting to contact Karen Furda, by contacting her in writing, and is a subsequent offender, in violation of Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article against the peace, government, and dignity of the State. On July 26, 2005, appellant pleaded guilty to “Protective Order — Fail to Comply/Subsequent Offender,” for which he received a suspended one-year term of incarceration and two years of probation.

See State v. Furda, Case No. 101933, Circuit Court for Montgomery County. We shall refer to the domestic violence proceedings collectively as the “Protective Order Case.” On September 13, 2006, while Furda was still on probation in the Protective Order Case, he filed a pro se “Motion,” seeking the return of his archery equipment and “other related items.” According to the docket entries, the court denied the Motion, without prejudice, on November 1, 2006. 5 On July ³⁸⁰ 80, 2007, just after appellant completed his two-year probation in the Protective Order Case, appellant filed another pro se “Motion,” asking for “the release of all of [his] property held for safe keeping by the Montgomery County Sheriffs Department.” The State opposed the Motion. At a hearing on September 10, 2007, the court set October 31, 2007, as the deadline for filing memoranda, and scheduled a hearing for November 7, 2007. 6 On October 31, 2007, through counsel, appellant filed a “Motion To Return Property,” with an accompanying Memorandum of Law. He asserted that “there is nothing in Maryland Law or Federal Law barring [appellant] from possessing firearms.” In its opposition, the State said, in part: 8.

The Defendant is a prohibited person under Federal Law and therefore, cannot possess a Firearm. Title 18 U.S.C. Section 922 (g)(4) prohibits “a person who has either been adjudicated as mental defective or have [sic] been committed to a mental institution.” 18 U.S.C. 922 does not state a set period of time that the person must be committed to such institution. (Emphasis in original). 9. The State has sent subpoenas to Potomac Ridge Behavioral Health Center to bring certified copies of medical records of the Defendant’s involuntary commitment via EPP [ 7 ] on February 28, 2003.

Karen Furda, the Defendant’s wife at the time, would testify that the Defendant was committed to Montgomery General Hospital on the 28th and was transferred later that day to Potomac Ridge where the Defendant remained until he was discharged on March 4, 2003. The court held a hearing on November 7, 2007, at which non-testimonial evidence was presented. Appellant appeared at the hearing. ³⁸¹ Appellant’s counsel explained that appellant was seeking the return of all items seized by the Sheriff in 2003, with the exception of his “Browning 30-caliber,” which the parties acknowledged was illegal for appellant to possess. Appellant’s attorney argued that, given the expiration of both the probation and the protective order, “there’s absolutely nothing in Federal law, State law, or local law that would bar him from owning, possessing firearms.” Based on Mr. Furda’s medical records, admitted without objection as State’s Exhibit 1, the State urged the court to find that appellant was prohibited from possessing weapons under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(4).

Further, the State argued: I don’t believe the Court has jurisdiction at this time. The probation was fully terminated at the end of July, I think it was and I put in here July 26 was the end of his probation. Mr. Furda did not file this until July 30th. Now I know it’s four days, but still, probation the case was done, so I believe that at that point there was no active criminal case and this was filed under the original Criminal Case of 101933 and therefore it was a closed case, the Court does not have jurisdiction.

And I would ask that because of the fact he failed to file this within the appropriate time while there was still an active case, you do not have jurisdiction to make this decision. According to the State, “Mr. Furda was told on multiple occasions by Lieutenant Rhinestat ... from the Sheriffs Department that he had a certain procedure he had to follow to file for return of his guns.” The State insisted that the required procedure “was to file a written application with the Sheriffs Department and then they would have to look to Federal and State law to determine if, in fact, he was allowed to have them back, and if he was, then they would give them back to him.” The following exchange ensued: THE COURT: What is the statutory authority for the procedure that the Sheriffs Office follows that Lieutenant Rhinestat told Mr. Furda, this is what you have to do. Where is that set out statutorily? ³⁸² [THE PROSECUTOR]: I believe it’s their own policy and again, I apologize for Lieutenant Rhinestat could not be here today, and I actually was going to have Lieutenant Bean here as well. It’s my understand [sic] that there is just like Mr. Furda were to go to Gilbert Guns and apply, by Federal law they have to do a background' check, and that’s what the Sheriffs Office would do.

They would be essentially like Gilbert Guns. They would have to do a background check to determine if legally they can turn them over to him, and it would be my position and that was the second prong of the argument, that he would be prohibited from having them period under Federal law due to the fact he was put in— THE COURT: Well I guess what I’m asking is this, there’s no statutory scheme that tells him, first you must go to the Sheriff, then once the Sheriff— [THE PROSECUTOR]: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Refuses to release the gun, then you can request judicial review of that decision either you know, in whatever court location. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Sure. No, I don’t believe in good faith that when he filed it, he wasn’t relying on the original decision that was that you held this open, the issue of the guns, and two, he was told how to do this after his probation ended and he didn’t.

THE COURT: Well they weren’t going to give them to him. So he would have ended up here sooner or later. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Well then maybe we cut to— THE COURT: So we might as well look at the legal issues. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Well that was his— THE COURT: And he was told ... by the State, he filed it prematurely. You have to wait until you’re off probation, then you can come back to court and ask for these, so I think what we have to address is the merits. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Sure. THE COURT: Is he legally prohibited from getting these back and not about, sort of I’d say, the technicalities of is ³⁸³ his probation closed and was he a day late or, because he’s been told that all along. [THE PROSECUTOR]: I understand.

THE COURT: To get them back you’re going to have to file for them because we’re not giving them to you. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And again, Your Honor, I have to throw all my arguments out to you. THE COURT: Sure. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And that’s why, then we look at the State law, is he a prohibitive [sic] person----[T]hen you look at the more serious level which is the Federal level and there it’s very clear, they don’t have a specific time period where the State is very clear on saying that a person must spend at least 30-days in a mental institution. The Federal law doesn’t even refer to that altogether, it just says, a person who’s either been adjudicated as mental defective, or has been committed to a mental institution. (Emphasis added.) Appellant’s counsel insisted that appellant was not “committed” under federal law.

Rather, appellant was merely “evaluated.” 8 The State countered: The fact was, is that he was transferred and was committed to Potomac Ridge and there was a diagnosis, and Ms. Furda ... could testify as to what the diagnosis of schizophrenia was. It is a commitment and the evaluation, as Mr. Booth is referring to, is from the Montgomery General Hospital and that point [sic], he was involuntary committed further for treatment for Potomac Ridge. According to the medical records, admitted in evidence, Furda, then 37 years old, was brought to the Hospital at 2:30 ³⁸⁴ a.m. on February 28, 2003, based on a petition for an emergency evaluation filed by his wife. Appellant’s “Thought Content” at the Hospital was described as “Organized” and his “Mood” was described as “Frustrated.” His “thinking” was described as “clear and logical,” with “no delusions/hallucinations.” Under “Formulation,” the record noted that appellant was “found to be stable,” although his wife reported that Furda was “suicidal and homicidal____” It also stated: “Pt is not willing to consent to voluntary admission for further evaluation and assessment.” Doctor Behl examined Furda and “recommended inpatient treatment with a provisional diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder.” According to a Maryland form entitled “Involuntary Admission To Mental Health Facility Pursuant to [H.G.] 10-631, 10-632,” two physicians certified that appellant’s “involuntary admission” was sought because “the individual presents a danger to the life or safety of the individual or of others.” A section of the Hospital record, entitled “Disposition,” stated: 9 Case transferred to Kevin Simms for completion after Dr. Behl [of the Hospital] has seen the pt.

Addendum: 2/28/02. The patient was also assessed by Dr. Behl who also recommended inpatient treatment with a provisional diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder. She signed one certificate. Four days of inpatient treatment was authorized by Stewart Smith of Magellan----Two [sic] Admit to Patomac [sic] Ridge on Two physicians certificates.

KPS. As discussed, appellant was then transferred to Potomac Ridge. Although a hearing was scheduled to determine whether appellant would be released or detained, the record does not reflect that a hearing ever took place. Appellant was discharged from Potomac Ridge on March 4, 2003, at 10:56 a.m. 10 Joseph Marnell, M.D., of Potomac Ridge, prepared a Discharge Summary that stated, in part: ³⁸⁵ The patient presents as extremely shallow but cooperated.

His speech and thinking were pressured and paranoid. He was preoccupied and obsessed about his wife’s infidelity. Nonetheless, he minimized his substance abuse and aggressive behaviors. He minimized any threats that he might have made to kill himself or his family, indeed, although he talked about holding a gun, he adamantly denied ever having threatened anyone with it.

CONDITION ON DISCHARGE: The patient refused to sign in on a voluntary basis. I was confronted with the dilemma of whether to try to pursue an involuntary commitment against him as the hearing was to occur on the day of discharge. The patient, throughout this hospital stay, was behaviorally appropriate. His mood had stabilized.

His speech and thinking were better organized and were no longer pressured. He no longer demonstrated any paranoid thinking and was ruminating less about his wife’s infidelity. He acknowledged a need for substance abuse rehab and agreed to go to IOP and to take Zyprexa for any residual effects of amphetamine-induced psychosis. I emphasized, however, that the patient presents as very shallow.

His behavior and attitude seems to be geared more for getting out of the hospital than it is for true rehab. The patient and I reviewed how he is absolutely 100% responsible for his actions, including any consequences for behaviors that he does following his discharge. This includes any behavior linked to relapse and to substance abuse. Nonetheless, I have no grounds for detaining the patient at this time.

There is no evidence of psychosis, confusion or withdrawal. He denies being suicidal or homicidal. He is behaviorally appropriate on the unit. His mood has stabilized.

He is responsible for his actions. He knows the aftercare plan. He knows we will be contacting ³⁸⁶ Child Protective Services. The police still have the weapons.

The diagnosis on discharge included “Psychosis, NOS, probably drug-induced. Amphetamine Dependence.” At the motion hearing on November 7, 2007, the court addressed the items that had been seized by the Sheriffs in 2003, as documented in the “Seized Property/Evidence Log.” 11 The parties agreed upon the release of various items that did not constitute prohibited “firearms.” As to the remaining items, the court took the matter under advisement. On November 7, 2007, the court issued an “Order” (docketed November 9, 2007) denying appellant’s motion for the release of his personal property. The court said, in part: The items at issue were seized at the time a Domestic Violence Protective Order was served on [appellant]____ The Protective Order is now expired and probation arising from a related criminal case is now closed.

Upon the evidence presented, the Court finds that Defendant Mark Furda is considered a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. Section 922 (g)(4) as a result of having been involuntarily committed to a mental institution and is thereby prohibited from possessing firearms. On December 3, 2007, appellant filed “Defendant’s Motion For Re-Consideration” [sic], contending that his evaluation at Potomac Ridge did not constitute a commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(4). Furda insisted that “an evaluation is not an adjudication as a mental defective, nor is being temporarily held for purposes of evaluation, the equivalent of having been committed.” Appellant also argued that his “time in the hospital and at Potomac Ridge also does not constitute a commitment under Maryland law.” He noted that the doctor stated: “ T have no grounds for detaining the patient at this ³⁸⁷ time.’ ” Moreover, no hearing was ever held, as required for an involuntary commitment. 12 On January 16, 2008, the court denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration. Appellant filed an appeal in the Protective Order Case on February 13, 2008.

In the meantime, on January 24, 2008, appellant went to Gilbert’s Guns and completed an application to purchase a regulated firearm. In the application, he represented, under oath, that he had never been committed to a mental institution. As a result, he was charged in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County with perjury, in violation of Md.Code (2002, 2007 Supp.), § 9-101(a)(2) of the Criminal Law Article (“C.L.”), and giving false information or making a material misstatement in a firearm application, in violation of Md.Code (2003, 2007 Supp.), § 5-139(a) of the Public Safety Article (“P.S.”). See State v. Furda, Case No. 110008 (the “Perjury Case”).

Following a bench trial in 2008, the circuit court convicted appellant of both charges and sentenced him to ten years’ incarceration, with all but five years suspended. The Perjury Case is the subject of a companion appeal. See Furda v. State, 194 Md.App. 1 , 1 A.3d 528 (2010). On October 29, 2008, the State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the Protective Order Case, claiming that appellant was not entitled to a direct appeal because his appeal arose from a guilty plea.

It said: “As such, the appropriate avenue for review is an application for leave to appeal, which Appellant neglected to pursue.” Appellant responded that “this appeal is a civil appeal....” On November 18, 2008, this Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice. In its brief, the State renewed and expanded its motion to dismiss the appeal. It argued that “the circuit court lacked ³⁸⁸ jurisdiction to decide Mr. Furda’s Motion To Return Property and motion for reconsideration,” because “the criminal case to which Mr. Furda appended his motion terminated before he filed the motion.” In addition, it maintained that appellant should have filed a replevin action in District Court. And, it maintained that appellant was required to seek leave to appeal.

Alternatively, the State urged this Court to dismiss the appeal as moot, claiming appellant’s convictions for perjury and false statement now render him ineligible to possess a firearm, without regard to the commitment issue. The State has also asked us to dismiss on the ground that appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in connection with seeking the return of his weapons. We shall include additional facts in our discussion. DISCUSSION I. As noted, the State has moved to dismiss the appeal on various grounds.

Noting that appellant filed his motion for return of property on July 30, 2007, i.e., after the termination of his probation, the State asserts: “Termination of the period of incarceration, parole, or probation divests the court of jurisdiction.” The State also argues, for the first time on appeal, that appellant’s motion for return of property was essentially an action for replevin, for which only a District Court has jurisdiction under Md.Code (2006 Repl. Vol.), § 4-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”). It quotes State v. Walls, 90 Md.App. 300, 305-06 , 600 A.2d 1165 (1992), for the proposition that “ ‘forfeiture is a civil in rem proceeding against property, unconnected with any criminal proceeding against the owner or holder of the property.’ ” In the State’s view, “because Furda improperly filed his petition for return of property in the criminal action, the circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide it.” In addition, the State argues that, even if the circuit court had jurisdiction, “this appeal is not properly taken” because “[i]n a case involving a guilty plea ... [t]he only avenue of ³⁸⁹ relief is an application for leave to appeal.” It asserts: “Because Furda seeks review of a denial of a motion for reconsideration in his criminal case by direct appeal — without seeking leave — this appeal should be dismissed.” Further, the State alleges that, “[e]ven if there were no jurisdictional or procedural barriers to Furda’s appeal, the appeal should be dismissed as moot,” because appellant’s perjury and false statement convictions “render him ineligible to possess firearms.” Lastly, the State argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over Furda’s motion because Furda was required first to pursue “informal” administrative remedies under Md.Code (2001, 2007 Supp.), § 13-201 through 13-206 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“C.P.”), governing forfeiture in gun cases. In reply, appellant argues: [T]his is a collateral matter stemming from the criminal action.

As a matter of clean hands, the [State’s] position is unacceptable because on several occasions Mr. Furda by himself, as well as through his attorneys, raised the issue of the return of firearms and was told by both the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office, as well as by the Judges of the Montgomery County Circuit Court, that as long as he was on probation he could not have a firearm, and therefore, completion of his probation would be the first opportunity for him to request their return. Furda also argues: “Montgomery County Police retained the firearms through the probation period. Mr. Furda was informed that as soon as probation was over he should file the appropriate Motion (in the Circuit Court criminal case) to recover his property, and Mr. Furda proceeded in this manner as directed.” Noting that the State never initiated forfeiture proceedings as to the weapons, he asserts: “Instituting a forfeiture proceeding is not the job of the property holder; it is the duty of the State if they want to retain the property of one of its citizens.” Furda also rejects the State’s claim that he should have filed a replevin action in the District Court. He asserts: ³⁹⁰ “There is a statutory scheme for the recovery of firearms as contained in the regulated firearms section of the Maryland Code.” 13 In addition, appellant maintains that he “is not appealing his guilty plea pertaining to failure to comply with a Protective Order.” Furda elaborates: [H]e is appealing a collateral matter to the guilty plea — the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his [motion seeking the return of his personal property].

Mr. Furda did not even begin the process of attempting to recover his property until after the successful completion of his two years of probation (as he was directed by the Court); thus his Motion seeking the return of his firearms, and this subsequent appeal are unrelated to the guilty plea itself. Disputing the State’s claim that the matter is moot based on the perjury conviction, appellant responds: Mr. Furda maintains a property interest in this property. There is no doubt, and there is no argument by anyone, that these firearms are the property of Mr. Furda despite the fact that Mr. Furda is not in possession of the items. It is certainly not argued here (and was not argued below) that Mr. Furda possesses them or that the police do not possess them.

Thus, his property interest has not been extinguished, and his attempt to get the property back is not moot. Appellant also challenges the State’s assertion that his perjury and false statement convictions precluded the court from providing him any relief. In his view, the State is “putting the cart before the horse.” At the time of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, Mr. Furda had not been convicted of perjury. This perjury conviction is based ³⁹¹ entirely on the Order of November 9, 2007.

To argue that the perjury conviction renders the first appeal moot, and then to turn around and use that very document to affirm Mr. Furda’s perjury conviction puts him into a legal loop. The draconian result would be that the first appeal ... gets dismissed because he is now a convicted perjurer, and then the Order from the first appeal is used to convict him of perjury, and then this Court affirms that conviction ... based upon the validity of that Order. This presents Mr. Furda with a legal conundrum, and a classic “Catch 22” from which no Appellant could free himself. Citing Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373 , 863 A.2d 952 (2004), in which the Court recognized an owner’s continuing interest in weapons that he could not possess, appellant argues that, as an alternative to obtaining the return of his firearms, “he certainly may have the property signed over to a licensed [gun] dealer ... and at least reap the financial benefits from a sale of his property.” Moreover, appellant argues that, in the event of a remand, “[t]he Circuit Court could review this issue and actually conduct a hearing with live testimony, real exhibits, and make a determination on the merits rather than on the basis of 15 minutes of argument.” Following oral argument on September 1, 2009, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the jurisdiction issue.

In his memorandum, appellant stated that he “was unable to find any statutory or case-law authority that would specifically grant a Trial Judge the direct authority to entertain” a motion for the return of his weapons under the circumstances of this case. But, appellant noted that the court may be able to retain jurisdiction over this matter, “pursuant to a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, Md.Code. Ann. Crim. Pro. § 7-106, and other post conviction relief, as long as collateral consequences remain as a result of the conviction.” In addition, appellant argued: “[T]he Court could also rely upon the general grant of authority as contained in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the ³⁹² McLCode, which asserts that the Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction.” According to appellant, if we find “that none of the above provisions granted the Circuit Court authority; then, without full and proper authority, the Order of November 7, 2007 becomes null and void.” He maintains that such a finding “would in essence, be granting Mr. Furda’s appeal, because a primary contention of his Appeal in Case No. 3053, is that the Denial of the Motion for Return of Property in the Order of November 7, 2007 was not valid under Maryland law.” In its memorandum, the State posited that C.J. § 4-401(2) and § 1-501 collectively “vest[] exclusive jurisdiction of replevin actions in the district court ... [and] divest[ ] the circuit court of jurisdiction to hear” this case.

It argued that “the statutory scheme for forfeiture of handguns,” found in C.P. § 13-201 through 13-206, “specifically provides for informal administrative review of claims for release of handguns, and, if warranted, subsequent judicial review----” The State acknowledged that dicta in Mom v. City of Gaithersburg, 462 F.Supp.2d 675 (D.Md.2006), aff'd in part, 519 F.3d 216 (4th Cir.2008), “supports Furda’s position that he could have moved to retrieve his firearms in the circuit court____” But, according to the State, even if Mora stands for the proposition that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction in certain cases where a person seeks return of property seized by the Government, this case is not one of them, “[b]ecause Furda failed to follow the statutory judicial review requirements and Maryland Rules governing civil actions, and instead improperly filed a motion in a criminal case having nothing to do with the firearms he sought to retrieve .... ” In its view, “the circuit court did not possess jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims.” Moreover, the State asserts that Furda’s motion was arguably a civil action for declaratory judgment for mandamus, for which the circuit court had to establish personal jurisdiction over the “proper defendant, the Montgomery County Sheriff.” It explains: ³⁹³ Here, none of the requirements for instituting a civil action was satisfied. There was no complaint. No summons and complaint were served upon the custodian of the firearms, the Montgomery County Sheriff. Nor was process served upon any County representative....

Thus, there was no jurisdiction over the custodian of the firearms, and the circuit court had no authority to adjudicate Furda’s claim. As we see it, the State’s primary contention — that the court lacked jurisdiction because appellant’s probation had come to an end — is the proverbial “Catch 22.” The State concedes that, “[ajrguably, when Furda went before the court to seek return of his firearms in 2006, when Furda was still on probation, the circuit court did have jurisdiction to hear that motion.” (Emphasis in original). Yet, at that time the State apparently took the position that the motion was premature, because Furda was still on probation. Evidently, it persuaded the court that such a motion had to await the conclusion of probation.

Appellant abided by the State’s position, and promptly filed another motion as soon as his probation ended. Then, the State claimed that the motion was too late, because appellant’s probation had expired. As the court below recognized, appellant was instructed to make his request at the end of his probation; that is what he did. At the very least, it seems disingenuous for the State to now complain about appellant’s compliance with the State’s instructions.

It is also disingenuous for the State to argue that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion for return of property, given that the court’s denial of that motion was central to the State’s subsequent prosecution of Furda in the Perjury Case. If the court lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s motion for the return of his weapons, it would seem that the court also lacked jurisdiction, in the very same case, to find that appellant had previously been committed. Yet, it is that ruling on which the State relies in urging us to uphold the Perjury Case. The State cannot have it both ways. ³⁹⁴ Cf.

Roebuck v. State, 148 Md.App. 563, 593-94 , 813 A.2d 342 (2002) (noting that in separate trials of co-defendants, the State took inconsistent positions with regard to the reliability of a custodial statement, and stating that the trial court should have considered the State’s reliance on the statement in the one case when assessing the State’s objection to that statement in the other case), cert. denied, 374 Md. 84 , 821 A.2d 371 (2003) . In any event, we are unaware of any authority that bars a court from returning property to a probationer after the probationer has complied with his conditions of probation. To be sure, “in the absence of a probation violation, a court does not have jurisdiction to extend the term of probation after the original term of probation has expired.” Carter v. State, 193 Md.App. 193, 214 , 996 A.2d 948 (2010). But, this is not an extension of probation case. 14 We also reject the State’s assertion that Furda filed his motions to obtain his firearms “in a criminal case having nothing to do with the firearms he sought to retrieve.... ” The weapons were seized in connection with the temporary protective order issued in February 2003.

The weapons had not been returned by the time appellant pleaded guilty on July 26, 2005, to a charge of violating another protective order. Moreover, the probation order in that case instructed him to “[g]et permission from the court before owning, possessing, using, or having under your control any dangerous weapon or firearm of any description.” (Emphasis added.) The State never initiated forfeiture proceedings as to the property in issue, and acknowledged below that there was no statutory ³⁹⁵ scheme in place at the time that governed how appellant was to go about seeking return of the weapons. 15 In any event, we conclude that the circuit court had jurisdiction to decide appellant’s Motion To Return Property, and that the motion is not moot. We explain. C.J. § 1-501 provides: § 1-501.

Jurisdiction and powers in general. The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the State. Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county, and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal. ³⁹⁶ By way of analogy, C.P. § l~203(d)(l) expressly provides circuit courts and district courts with jurisdiction to entertain a motion for the return of property “seized under a search warrant.” It states: (d) Return of property rightfully taken and wrongfully withheld. — (1) A circuit court judge or District Court judge shall cause property rightfully taken under a search warrant to be restored to the person from whom it was taken if, at any time, on application to the judge, the judge finds that the property is being wrongfully withheld after there is no further need for retention of the property. In this case, of course, the weapons were not seized pursuant to a search warrant.

But, the fact that a statute authorizes a court’s consideration of a request if property is seized under a warrant does not mean that the lack of a statute precludes the court’s consideration of a request for the return of property seized without a warrant. Cf. State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 233, 248-49 , 844 A.2d 429 (2004) (recognizing defense of battered child syndrome, despite the absence of a statute, by analogy to statutory defense of battered spouse syndrome). Indeed, in Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 462 F.Supp.2d 675, 695-96 (D.Md.2006), aff'd in part, 519 F.3d 216 (4th Cir.2008), the federal district court recognized the appropriateness of extending the court’s jurisdictional reach beyond the literal text of C.P. § l-203(d)(l).

In Mora , the plaintiff, a licensed gun collector, claimed he was subjected to an unlawful search and seizure, and that the many weapons that he lawfully possessed were taken from him without a warrant. 16 Id. at 680-81 . He sued the City of Gaithersburg, members of two police departments and the Sheriffs Department, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging depri ³⁹⁷ vation of property without due process. Id. at 680 . Of import here, the federal trial court said, id. at 695: In this case, the Court has concluded that Defendants have exceeded their authority under state law in detaining Mora’s property.

Even so, it is clear that at all times Mora has had recourse to Maryland’s circuit courts and/or its district courts to secure return of his property.... In rejecting Mora’s claim of a denial of due process, Judge Messitte looked to the logical extension of C.P. § 1 — 203(d)(1), and said, id. at 695-96: It can hardly be the case that an individual whose property was rightfully seized under a warrant and thereafter wrongfully detained would have access to a reasonable post-deprivation remedy for its return, while an individual whose property was seized without a warrant but pursuant to a valid search incident to an arrest or a consent search would have none. More to the point, it would be altogether anomalous that a party whose property was seized without a warrant would only have recourse to a federal civil rights action to vindicate his claim. In the end, warrantless searches validly conducted pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement essentially equate to searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.

Certainly Maryland circuit courts, in the exercise of their general jurisdiction, Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 1-501, or district courts in the exercise of their replevin jurisdiction, id. § 4-401(2), could entertain Mora’s claim and order immediate return of the detained property rightfully taken and wrongfully detained. Ml this is to say that, from the outset, prompt judicial review has been available to Mora, to consider his options, but “[f]or his part ..., [he has] found it unnecessary even to enter upon, let alone travel the entire length of, that road.” Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d [748] at 755 [1990]. Because this avenue has been open (and still remains open), Mora cannot plausibly maintain that he has been denied the procedural process due him under the Constitution, even if Defendants have incorrectly acted beyond their authority. ³⁹⁸ As to that issue, the Fourth Circuit agreed.

It said, 519 F.3d at 230 n. 2 (emphasis added): Besides his tort claims for trespass to chattels and conversion, Mora might invoke Maryland’s statutory right to the return of property “rightfully taken under a search warrant” but “wrongfully withheld after there is no further need for retention of the property.” Md.Code Ann., Criminal Procedure § l-203(d)(l) (LexisNexis 2001). Although this provision technically applies only where property was taken under a warrant, it seems unlikely that a court would refuse to apply it to property rightfully taken and wrongfully withheld under an exception to the warrant requirement. Here, according to the 2003 Incident Report, Ms. Furda consented to a search of the home for weapons. Numerous weapons were discovered in the basement of the house and were “transported to the [Office of the Montgomery County Sheriff] and stored in accordance with office policy.” Quoting from Mora , “warrantless searches validly conducted pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement essentially equate to searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Mora, 462 F.Supp.2d at 695 .

Therefore, we are satisfied that “Maryland circuit courts, in the exercise of their general jurisdiction ... or district courts in the exercise of their replevin jurisdiction ... could entertain” Furda’s claim for the return of the weapons. Id. at 695-96 . 17 For many of the same reasons, we also agree with appellant that he did not need to file an application for leave to ³⁹⁹ appeal under C.J. § 12-302(e) in order to pursue this issue on appeal. C.J. § 12-302(e) “does not permit an appeal from a final judgment entered following a plea of guilty in a circuit court. Review of such a judgment shall be brought by application for leave to appeal.” Appellant’s appeal does not implicate his guilty plea to the charge of violating a Final Protective Order.

Rather, he has appealed the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration as to his request for the return of his weapons, which were held as a consequence of that case. The court denied his motion for the return of property because it found that appellant was a “prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. Section 922 (g)(4) as a result of having been involuntarily committed to a mental institution.... ” Nor are we persuaded that appellant first had to pursue administrative remedies; the record does not reflect that the administrative process cited by the State was triggered. C.P. § 13-203 obligates the seizing authority to notify the owner of his right to apply for a review as to his qualification to possess a handgun. However, the State never introduced evidence that proper notice was furnished to appellant by the seizing authority.

Finally, we agree with appellant that the matter is not moot. Even if Furda’s perjury conviction renders him ineligible to possess his firearms, Serio, supra, 384 Md. 373 , 863 A.2d 952 , suggests that appellant retains a property interest in the firearms. We explain. Serio was convicted of “manslaughter by automobile,” a felony under Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.

Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 388. Id. at 378, 863 A.2d 952 . On the same day that he was sentenced, Baltimore County police obtained a search warrant and seized numerous firearms from Serio’s home, alleging that he was a felon in possession.

Id. at 378-79 , 863 A.2d 952 . Although Serio was not charged as a felon in possession, the County refused to return the firearms to Serio, or to sell them and give him the proceeds. Serio subsequently filed a five-count complaint against the County and one of the police officers who seized his firearms, seeking ⁴⁰⁰ the return of his seized property. Id. at 379 , 863 A.2d 952 .

Later, Stanski was added as a plaintiff, claiming he intended to purchase the seized firearms. Id. at 380 , 863 A.2d 952 . After further amendment of the suit, related federal court proceedings, and other state court proceedings, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the counts in which Serio requested’ the return of his firearms. Id. at 385 , 863 A.2d 952 .

At a show cause hearing held two months later, to consider the return of the firearms, the court ruled that “the seized firearms and related items could not be returned to Serio or given to Stanski [his designee] for disposal because doing so would allow ‘the defendant or claimant to profit by what he cannot possess legally.’ ” Id. The Court of Appeals reversed. Although Serio, as a convicted felon, “is not permitted to possess the firearms,” the Court recognized that “he retains an ownership property interest in them____” Id. at 396 , 863 A.2d 952 . The Court added that Seño was entitled to due process protections under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states that, “no man ought to be ... deprived of his ... property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” Id.

The Court reasoned, id.: “[W]hether Serio’s firearms are viewed as derivative contraband ... or as property that is incapable of possession because of Serio’s status as a convicted felon, Serio is not divested of his ownership interest, and the County cannot just retain the firearms.” Moreover, the Court noted that, “[w]hen property has been physically appropriated by a governmental entity from a property owner, the government must ‘justly’ compensate the property owner.” Id. at 399 , 863 A.2d 952 . In addition, the Court said: “The full monetary equivalent to compensate a person deprived of his property interests by the government is based upon the fair market value of his property ... which in the present case may be realized through a court ordered sale of the firearms ____” Id. See Md. Rule 14-301. ⁴⁰¹ Under Seño, appellant’s motion is not moot; regardless of the perjury conviction, he may have a right to a court-ordered sale of his weapons. Alternatively, even if the case is moot, it is worthy of our consideration because of the public importance of the issue of whether an emergency mental health evaluation constitutes a commitment. “A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the court cannot provide an effective remedy.” Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 , 674 A.2d 951 (1996); see Hill v. Scartascini, 134 Md.App. 1, 4 , 758 A.2d 1087 (2000).

As a general proposition, “appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course.” In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 502 , 564 A.2d 812 (1989). This is because any decision as to such an issue would amount to an academic undertaking; appellate courts “do not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions.... ” Id. See generally Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 200 , 725 A.2d 1027 (1999); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 562 , 510 A.2d 562 (1986); Atty. Gen. v. Anne Arundel Co. Sch.

Bus Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 286 Md. 324, 327 , 407 A.2d 749 (1979); Committee for Responsible Development on 25th Street v. Mayor of Baltimore, 137 Md.App. 60, 69 , 767 A.2d 906 (2001); Wankel v. A & B Contractors, Inc., 127 Md.App. 128, 171-72 , 732 A.2d 333 , cert. denied, 356 Md. 496 , 740 A.2d 614 (1999). The doctrine of mootness is not without exceptions, however. Indeed, “on rare occasions, we reach issues that are otherwise moot.” Beeman v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 105 Md.App. 147, 158 , 658 A.2d 1172 (1995); see J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n., 368 Md. 71, 96-97 , 792 A.2d 288 (2002); In Re Justin D., 357 Md. 431, 444-45 , 745 A.2d 408 (2000); Bond v. Slavin, 157 Md.App. 340, 354 , 851 A.2d 598 (2004). ⁴⁰² In Lloyd, v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43 , 111 A.2d 379 (1954), the Court articulated the standard by which moot cases may be addressed: [O]nly where the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest, will there be justified a departure from the general rule and practice of not deciding academic questions .... [I]f the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not immediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between the government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a question which has become moot, particularly if all of these factors concur with sufficient weight. The case of Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122 , 775 A.2d 1249 (2001), illuminates the “public interest” exception.

That case arose from a domestic violence dispute. The circuit court entered a protective order, which this Court vacated on appeal; we remanded the matter for further consideration of whether the order was appropriate. Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md.App. 317 , 762 A.2d 198 (2000). By the time the case reached the Court of Appeals, it had become moot, because the protective order had expired by its own terms.

Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 125 , 775 A.2d 1249 . Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals recognized that the case concerned a matter of public importance that warranted the Court’s consideration, despite the mootness. Id. In particular, the Court expressed concern that this Court’s decision could “be construed as weakening the State’s effort to respond aggressively to incidents of violence in the home and frustrating the important objectives of the State’s domestic violence law.” Id.

See In Re: Justin D., 357 Md. at 444-45 , 745 A.2d 408 . In our view, the controversy here involves “ ‘unresolved issues in matters of important public concern that, if decided, ⁴⁰³ will establish a rule for future conduct’.... ” Stevenson v. Lanham, 127 Md.App. 597, 612 , 736 A.2d 363 (1999) (citations omitted). Therefore, we decline to dismiss the case, even assuming it is moot.

II

Appellant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration, “because he is not barred from possessing firearms by any local, state or federal law.” 18 Noting that he was merely “the subject of an emergency evaluation petition,” and that “there was no diagnosis that [he] was mentally unbalanced or that a commitment was required,” appellant argues that “being held for purposes of evaluation ... is not the equivalent of having been committed.” According to appellant, there is nothing in the federal statute that “indicates an intent to prohibit the possession of firearms by persons who have been hospitalized for observation and examination, where they were found not to be mentally ill.” He adds: “Observation is not confinement, it is not treatment, and it does not constitute a mental disorder.” Appellant elaborates: Mr. Furda was only held for a total of 85 hours, of which 24 hours were in the emergency room just waiting to be transferred to Potomac Ridge, a psychiatric hospital, for purposes of the emergency evaluation. Mr. Furda did have a hearing scheduled, but rather was released within an hour of that scheduled hearing. There was never an adjudication, never a decision made by a Judge, and no evidence was ⁴⁰⁴ heard. Furthermore, Mr. Furda was not represented by counsel, and he did not have the adversarial proceeding that is clearly contemplated by the Federal statute....

Thus, Mr. Furda was never “committed” and was never adjudicated a mental defective, and his brief evaluation period does not disqualify him from possessing firearms. The State counters that Furda was committed within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(4), which prohibits possession of a firearm by “a person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” It rejects appellant’s contention that the determination of a “commitment” requires an evidentiary hearing at which the individual is represented by counsel. The State points to several federal cases indicating that, “under statutory schemes similar to Maryland’s, an involuntary admission to a mental facility based on doctors’ certifications is a ‘commitment,’ even in the absence of a formal judicial order of commitment following an adversary hearing.” Thus, in the context of federal law, the State argues: “Furda was ‘committed’ at the second stage of Maryland’s involuntary admission process — that is, when he was certified for involuntary admission to Potomac Ridge by two doctors at Montgomery General Hospital.” Ordinarily, we review the denial of a motion for reconsideration based on an “abuse of discretion” standard. Wilson-X v. Dep’t of Human Resources, 403 Md. 667, 674-75 , 944 A.2d 509 , cert. denied, — U.S.