Garay v. Overholtzer

KARWACKI, Judge. On December 10, 1986, while walking between several parked cars, Reynaldo Augusti Garay, a two and one-half-year-old boy, emerged from between the parked cars and was struck and injured by an automobile driven by Mildred Irene Overholtzer. Nearly five years later, on November 18, 1991, a two-count complaint was filed by Reynaldo and Reynaldo’s ³⁴⁴ parents, Ana G. Garay and Reynaldo A. Garay, against Overholtzer in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. 1 In the first count of the complaint, the minor through his mother as next friend alleged that as a result of Overholtzer’s negligence he sustained “great bodily injury, disability, pain and suffering ... as well as disfigurement which will continue for the rest of his natural life,” for which he sought $1,000,000 in damages. In the second count, the parents alleged that, as a result of Overholtzer’s negligence, their son sustained injuries for which “they have expended great sums of time and money and will continue to expend great sums of time and money for their son’s recovery during his minority,” for which they sought $500,000 in damages.

Overholtzer moved to dismiss the second count of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2). Overholtzer’s motion asserted that under Maryland law the parents of a minor child are responsible for the child’s medical care and that the parents’ claim for medical expenses incurred on behalf of their son accrued on the date of the accident. Overholtzer further contended that, by failing to file a complaint within three years from the date of the accident, the parents’ claim for medical expenses was barred by Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations. 2 At the conclusion of a hearing on September 2, 1992, Judge J. James McKenna granted Overholtzer’s motion to dismiss the second count in the complaint. ³⁴⁵ On the very next day, the minor through his mother as next friend filed an amended complaint, containing a single count.

In this amended complaint, the minor alleged in relevant part: “3. That as a result of the negligence of [Overholtzer], great bodily injury, disability, pain, and suffering, were suffered by the [minor] as well as disfigurement which will continue for the rest of his natural life. “4. By reason of the negligence of [Overholtzer] large sums have been expended for his medical care and great sums will be incurred on his behalf and by him for future medical services during and after his minority.” The amended complaint sought $1,000,000 in damages from Overholtzer. Overholtzer moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Overholtzer asserted that the right to bring a cause of action to recover the sums expended for medical care rests solely with the parents of the minor, that the minor is under no legal obligation to pay for his medical care, that the minor lacks standing to pursue a claim for recovery of sums expended for his medical care, and that, because the parents’ claim for medical expenses is barred by limitations, an attempt by the minor to bring the claim amounts to an invalid assignment of the claim. At the conclusion of a hearing on November 10, 1992, Judge McKenna granted Overholtzer’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The parents of the minor filed appeals from both judgments to the Court of Special Appeals, which consolidated the appeals. Prior to any consideration of the case by the intermediate appellate court, we issued a writ of certiorari to determine heretofore undecided questions relating to the recovery of medical expenses when a minor is negligently injured.

I. Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § 5 — 203(b)(1) of the ³⁴⁶ Family Law Article provides that “[t]he parents of a minor 3 child ... are jointly and severally responsible for the child’s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.... ” For a chronological history of § 5-203(b)(l), see Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 633 , 620 A.2d 1363, 1366 (1993). With regard to this statutory obligation, we have previously stated “[w]hile this statute does not mention ‘medical care’ in specific terms, we have no hesitancy in holding that it is embraced within the scope of the broad language used.” Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 596 , 155 A.2d 684, 688 (1959); see also State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 425 , 348 A.2d 275, 280 (1975); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 397 , 190 A.2d 621, 625 (1963). 4 It is well settled that when a person negligently injures a minor two separate causes of action arise; the minor child has a cause of action for injuries suffered by it, and the parent or parents of the minor child have a cause of action for loss of services and for medical expenses incurred by the parent for the treatment of the minor’s injuries. Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521 , 174 A.2d 339 (1961); see also Meyers v. Meagher, 277 Md. 128 , 352 A.2d 827 (1976); County Comm’rs v. Hamilton, 60 Md. 340 (1883); John H. Derrick, Annotation, Tolling of Statute of Limitations, on Account of Minority of Injured Child, as Applicable to Parent’s or Guardian’s Right of Action Arising Out of Same Injury, 49 A.L.R.4th 216 (1986 & Supp.1992); L.S. Tellier, Annotation, What Items of Damages on Account of Personal Injury to Infant Belong to Him, and What to Parent, 32 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1953, Supp.1989, & Supp. 1993). ³⁴⁷ In Hudson v. Hudson, supra, a mother brought two separate suits against a tortfeasor whose negligence injured her daughter. One suit was brought by the mother as next friend of her daughter for personal injuries to the daughter.

The second suit was filed in her individual capacity for reimbursement of necessary medical expenses incurred by the mother. With regard to the separate causes of action, we stated: “There can be no doubt that the mother was charged with the support, care, nurture and welfare of her infant daughter until the minor’s marriage, the father being deceased. Code (1957), Article 72 A, Section 1. It is almost if not universally recognized that one tortious act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct causes of action; and it is very generally held that where a person negligently injures an infant, under circumstances that create legal liability to the infant, ... ordinarily there arises in the parent or parents of said infant a right of action for loss of services (if such loss can be proven) and for doctors’ bills and medical and hospital expenses necessarily and reasonably incurred by the parent for the treatment of the injuries, in those cases where the parent is primarily responsible therefor; and this cause of action is quite separate and apart from any right of action that the infant may have for his or her injuries.

And the parent who has actually incurred the obligation to pay for such medical services is entitled to recover for them, although the bill for them has not, in fact, been paid.” 226 Md. at 527-28 , 174 A.2d at 342 (footnotes omitted). Rejecting the notion that the parent’s cause of action for medical expenses was part of the minor’s action, we reasoned: “The [tortfeasor] relies heavily upon the case of Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., [ 188 Wis. 376 ] 206 N.W. 198 (Wisc.1925). It is true that the Court in that case (involving negligent injury to a minor by automobile) used some rather broad language and subtle reasoning, and came to the conclusion that the parent’s right of action for loss of services and medical expenses of a minor child was really a part of the child’s cause of action, and was, therefore, ³⁴⁸ derivative in nature and analogous to an assigned contract; “The reasoning in the Callies case (as well as the result) is criticized by Dean Prosser, Prosser, op. cit., p. 702, and other writers upon the subject. 39 Am.Jur., Parent and Child, § 74, says: “Although it has been said that the parent’s cause of action is merely a part of the child’s cause of action, [citing Callies ] * * * it would seem that, properly considered, the two rights of action are entirely separate and distinct. The parent is not, as is sometimes held, [again citing Callies ] a mere assignee of a part of the child’s cause of action.

In other words, when a minor child is injured, two causes of action immediately spring into existence: * * See also 42 A.L.R. 717 , 723, 724. We have little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the prevailing view is the proper one; namely, that where a parent is entitled to recover for medical expenses incurred as a result of negligent injuries to his minor child, the parent’s cause of action is not derivative, in a legal sense, from the infant’s cause of action, but is a separate and distinct ground for recovery vested in the parent.” 226 Md. at 528-30 , 174 A.2d at 343 . That separate causes of action exist in the minor and parent was further evidenced by our holding in Hudson that a procedural bar 5 to the minor’s suit would not preclude the separate parental action, if all the elements of liability to the minor existed. We quoted from the Restatement of Torts, § 703(b) (1938): “One who by reason of his tortious conduct is liable to a minor child for illness or other bodily harm is subject to liability to ³⁴⁹ “(b) the parent who is under a legal duty to furnish medical treatment for any expenses reasonably incurred or likely to be incurred for such treatment during the child’s minority. “Comment: “a.

Child’s contributory fault or consent. The rule stated in this Section is applicable only if the actor is liable to a child for a tort committed against it. All the elements of liability to the child must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the child and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by it. * * *. “b. Separate character of action.

The liability to the parent stated in this Section is distinct from the liability of the actor to the child. Damages recoverable in the one action are not recoverable in the other; a judgment obtained and satisfied in one action will not prevent a recovery in the other; a release by the one will not affect the other’s recovery; a waiver by the child of his own right of action will not affect the parent’s recovery; and an abatement by the death of either the parent or the child will not bar a recovery by the other. Moreover a procedural bar which prevents the child from maintaining an action for the harm which it has sustained will not affect the parent’s action. Thus, neither the expiration of the statute of limitations as to the child’s cause of action, nor the death of the child, will bar an action by the parent. * * *. “e. * * *.

A parent can recover for reasonable medical expenses incurred or likely to be incurred for his child’s treatment, although he is not entitled to the custody and earnings of the child, if by law he is under the duty of supplying the child with such treatment.” 226 Md. at 530-31 , 174 A.2d at 343-44 . A. The appellants mount a three-pronged attack on the circuit court’s dismissal of both the second count of the original ³⁵⁰ complaint and the entire amended complaint. First, the appellants assert that the parents’ claim for medical expenses incurred as a result of the negligent injuries to their minor child is tolled during their child’s minority. Second, the appellants contend that the parents, by bringing a suit as next friends of their injured minor child, in which a claim is included for medical expenses, waive to the minor the right to recover for the medical expenses.

Moreover, the appellants argue that their waiver of the right to recover the medical expenses may occur at any time during the minority of the child, notwithstanding that the statute of limitations has run against the parents’ claim for medical expenses. Finally, assuming that the claim for medical expenses may not be waived in favor of the minor, the appellants posit that the minor has its own independent standing to bring the claim for medical expenses. B. We note that this appeal reaches us following separate dismissals of the second count of the plaintiffs’ original complaint and of the plaintiffs’ entire amended complaint pursuant to Md.Rule 2 — 322(b)(2). In reviewing these judgments, we assume the truth of all relevant and material facts well pleaded and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from those facts.

See Stone v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 330 Md. 329, 333-34 , 624 A.2d 496, 498 (1993) and cases cited therein. As such, the second count of the original complaint embodies a claim by the parents of the injured minor for pre-majority medical expenses, including paid medical expenses, incurred but unpaid medical expenses, and future medical expenses needed by the minor prior to reaching majority. The amended complaint embodies claims by the minor for personal injuries and for medical expenses.

The minor’s claim for medical expenses includes both future medical expenses during and after his minority and medical expenses for which someone has paid or is obligated to pay. ³⁵¹ II. In contending that the parents’ claim for medical expenses should be tolled during their child’s minority, the plaintiffs argue essentially for compulsory joinder of the parents’ claim for medical expenses and the child’s own claim for personal injuries. If the parents’ claim for medical expenses and the child’s own claim for personal injuries are required to be brought in one action, the plaintiffs assert that this action enjoys the benefits of Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), § 5-201 of the Courts Article. Section 5-201 provides in relevant part: “(a) Extension of time. — When a cause of action subject to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title accrues in favor of a minor or mental incompetent, that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed. “(b) Exception. — This section does not apply if the statute of limitations has more than three years to run when the disability is removed.” In arguing for compulsory joinder of the parents’ claim for medical expenses and the child’s own claim for personal injuries, plaintiffs rely upon the joint cause of action we required in Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 247 Md. 95 , 231 A.2d 514 (1967).

In Deems , after years of permitting a husband to recover for loss of consortium due to an injury to his wife as a result of the negligence of a third person but denying a concomitant right to a wife to recover for loss of consortium due to an injury to her husband, we recognized a joint cause of action for injury to the marital relationship. After recognizing the joint action for injury to the marital relationship, evincing a concern against double recovery, and in order to avoid the constitutional issue of whether unequal treatment of men and women denied women equal protection of the laws, we stated: “[W]e hold that, when either husband or wife claims loss of consortium by reason of physical injuries sustained by the other as the result of the alleged negligence of the defendant, that claim can only be asserted in a joint action for ³⁵² injury to the marital relationship. That action is to be tried at the same time as the individual action of the physically injured spouse.” 247 Md. at 115 , 231 A.2d at 525 . The reasons justifying the change in the common law governing spousal claims for loss of consortium are in no way analogous to the issue of whether there should be compulsory joinder of the claims of the parents and child in the instant case, and consequently, Deems is inapposite to the issue of compulsory joinder posed in the instant case.

In addition to Deems , plaintiffs rely on Korth v. American Family Insurance Co., 115 Wis.2d 326 , 340 N.W.2d 494 (Wis. 1983), for support of their contention that the parents’ claim for medical expenses should be joined with the minor’s claim for personal injuries and that both are tolled by § 5-201 of the Courts Article. In Korth , a minor, who had been bitten by a dog, and her parents filed a suit during the child’s minority but after Wisconsin’s general three-year statute of limitations had run. The minor’s claim was for her personal injuries and her parents’ claims were for medical expenses and loss of society and companionship arising from the injury to then-daughter. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that “[although there are strong public policy reasons for applying the three-year statute of limitations to the parents’ claims, there are equally strong public policy reasons for applying the minor’s disability tolling provision.” Korth, 115 Wis.2d at 333-34 , 340 N.W.2d at 497 .

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin went on to hold that since the parents’, claims were filed along with that of the minor child, the parents’ claims were entitled to the benefit of the statute tolling the period for filing the child’s claim. Eight years prior to Korth , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Shockley v. Frier, 66 Wis.2d 394 , 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), presaging the result that was reached in Korth . In Shockley , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin first recognized the parental cause of action for loss of society and companionship of the injured child. The Shockley court required the parental ³⁵³ cause of action for loss of society and companionship to be brought in the same action as that of the child’s claim for the child’s personal injuries. 66 Wis.2d at 404 , 225 N.W.2d at 501 .

In determining that the statute tolling limitations for a minor’s action during the minority of the child also applied to a claim by a parent for medical expenses arising out of the injury to the child, the court in Korth reasoned: “We begin with three undisputed, settled principles. First, two causes of action arise for injury to a child: the child’s for the injury to the child and the parents’ for the invasion of the parents’ interests. Second, parents may maintain an action against a negligent tortfeasor for medical expenses and loss of society and companionship of an injured child. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394 , 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).

Third, the parents’ cause of action for loss of society and companionship must be ‘combined with that of the child for personal injuries.’ Shockley v. Prier, supra, 66 Wis.2d at 404 , 225 N.W.2d 495 . Although Shockley apparently does not require the joinder of the parent’s claim for medical expenses with the child’s claim, as a practical matter the parent’s claim for medical expenses should be joined with the parent’s claim for loss of society and companionship. The Shockley joinder requirement protects the defendants from multiple litigation and inconsistent judgments and it protects the public’s interest in the prompt, complete efficient settlement of controversies in one proceeding.” 115 Wis.2d at 330-31 , 340 N.W.2d at 496 . For reasons we now explain, in this state the parents’ claim for medical expenses is not required to be joined in the same action brought by the injured minor to recover for its own personal injuries.

Consequently, the assertion that the parents’ claim for medical expenses may be tolled during the minority of the child by § 5-201 of the Courts Article is without merit. ³⁵⁴ The joinder of claims by separate parties in a single action is governed by Md.Rules 2-211 6 and 2-212. 7 It is clear that ³⁵⁵ the parents’ claim for medical expenses and the minor’s claim for personal injuries may be brought in the same action under Md. Rule 2-212. Equally clear, however, is that under Md. Rule 2-211 the parents’ claim for medical expenses and the minor’s claim for personal injuries are not required to be joined in a single action. As we have recognized, Rule 2-211 essentially tracks Fed. R.Civ.P. 19. South Down Liquors, Inc. v. Hayes, 323 Md. 4, 10 , 590 A.2d 161, 164 (1991); Mahan v. Mahan, 320 Md. 262, 272 , 577 A.2d 70, 75 (1990).

Therefore, interpretations of that federal rule are persuasive as to the meaning and proper applications of the Maryland rule. New Jersey ex rel. Lennon v. Strozzella, 331 Md. 270, 279 , 627 A.2d 1055, 1059 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726 , 738 n. 8, 625 A.2d 1005 , 1011 n. 8 (1993); Mahan, supra, 320 Md. at 272 , 577 A.2d at 75 . The purpose of the Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 is “to bring before the court all persons whose joinder would be desirable for a just adjudication of the action.” 7 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1604, at 36 (2d ed. 1986).

Professors Wright, Miller and Kane state: “There is no precise formula for determining whether a particular nonparty must be joined under Rule 19(a). The decision has to be made in terms of the general policies of avoiding multiple litigation, providing the parties with complete and effective relief in a single action, and protecting the absent persons from the possible prejudicial effect of deciding the case without them. Account must also be taken of whether other alternatives are available to the litigants. By its very nature, Rule 19(a) calls for determinations that are heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of individual cases, although certain general patterns are apparent in the decisions.” 7 Wright, et al., supra, § 1604, at 40.

With regard to tort actions involving multiple plaintiffs who are severally entitled to relief against a tortfeasor, it has been stated: ³⁵⁶ “When several tort actions instituted by different persons arise out of the same incident, the complaining parties need not be joined in the suits brought by the others. For instance, in an action by a husband for personal injuries, his wife’s joinder may not be essential if her claim for loss of consortium is wholly independent under state law and she is free to assert it in a separate action.” 7 Wright, et al., supra, § 1623, at 349-350. Professor Moore similarly states in this regard: “The possibility of adjudications that are inconsistent merely as a matter of logic does not trigger the application of Rule 19(a)____ Thus when several persons are injured by the same tort and proof of damage is individual, the fact that want of an estoppel may leave a defendant who has defended successfully against one of the injured parties with the risk that he will be liable to another in a subsequent suit does not make it necessary that all the putative plaintiffs be joined in the same suit....” 3A James W. Moore & Jo D. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 19.07-1[2.-2], at 19-123-24 (1993). In line with the commentators, federal decisions generally manifest a pattern of not requiring joinder of parties who possess separate and distinct causes of action arising out of a single tortious incident.

See Lewis v. Holden, 821 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.1987) (Under Mississippi law, parents and minor possess separate causes of action for negligent injury to minor and minor need not be joined in parent’s action by Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a)); Bakia v. County of Los Angeles, 687 F.2d 299 (9th Cir.1982) (It is a misapplication of Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) to add parties who are neither necessary nor indispensable, who are not essential for just adjudication and who have a separate cause of action entirely); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir.1980) (wife, whose cause of action for loss of consortium was separate and distinct from decedent spouse’s claim, not required to be joined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States Disk Ct., 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.1975) (airplane crash victims’ next of ³⁵⁷ kin, who may be potential plaintiffs, are not required to be joined in suit with other crash victims); Sove v. Smith, 311 F.2d 5 (6th Cir.1962) (wife, whose cause of action for loss of consortium was separate and distinct from husband’s own claim, not required to be joined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19); Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.R.D. 427 (C.D.Cal.1983) (minor not required to be joined in parents’ suit seeking recovery for emotional distress as a result of defendant’s negligent medical treatment of minor); Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319 (S.D.Iowa 1965) (wife, whose cause of action for loss of consortium is a separate and distinct from husband’s own claim, not required to be joined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)). But see Aguilar v. County of Los Angeles, 751 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 , 105 S.Ct. 2656 , 86 L.Ed.2d 273 (1985) (where under California state law collateral estoppel may preclude minor from relitigating issue of negligence if his parents were unsuccessful in a federal diversity action, minor required to be joined in his parent’s action for recovery of pre-majority medical expenses); Lopez v. Martin Luther King, Jr. Hosp., 97 F.R.D. 24 (C.D.Cal.1983) (same). State courts addressing this issue likewise have not required joinder of the child’s claim for personal injuries and the parent’s claim for medical expenses. Troutman v. Ollis, 134 Mich.App. 332 , 351 N.W.2d 301 (1984); Independent School List. 1-29 v. Crawford, 688 P.2d 1291 (Okla.1984); Glover v. Narick, 184 W.Va. 381 , 400 S.E.2d 816 (1990).

Indeed, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized in circumstances similar to the case sub judice, requiring joinder of separate causes of action arising out of a single tortious incident would render meaningless the distinction between permissive and compulsory joinder. Field, supra, 626 F.2d at 301 . In Field, supra, the court determined that a wife’s separate and distinct cause of action for loss of consortium was not required to be joined in the same action brought by her deceased husband’s estate and her son against the tortfeasor. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained in relevant part: ³⁵⁸ “The right to separate and individual relief asserted against VWAG by [the wife] in her individual capacity, however, even though it arises out of the same occurrence, exists quite apart from the claims asserted by [her son and her husband’s] estate and, if upheld, would impose upon VWAG an obligation separate and distinct from its obligations to the other parties.

Complete relief under Rule 19(a)(1) ‘refers to relief as between the persons already parties, not as between a party and the absent person whose joinder is sought, and mere theoretical considerations of disposing of the whole controversy should not be employed’ to dismiss an action ‘where it appears unlikely that absent persons could be adversely affected.’ Indeed, to dismiss the action on the ground that [the wife] is indispensable would appear ‘to deny a principal aspect of several liability.’ ” 626 F.2d at 301 (footnotes omitted). Although we have stated that one of the purposes of compulsory joinder is “to prevent ‘multiplicity of litigation by assuring a determination of the entire controversy in a single proceeding,’ ” Mahan v. Mahan, 320 Md. at 272 , 577 A.2d at 75 (quoting Bender v. Secretary, Dep’t of Personnel, 290 Md. 345, 351 , 430 A.2d 66, 69-70 (1981)), we agree with the commentators and other courts that have addressed this issue and hold that under Md. Rule 2-211 the parents’ claim for medical expenses arising because of a tortious injury to their minor child is not required to be joined in a single action with the minor’s claim for personal injuries. In Hudson , we explained that the parents’ cause of action for medical expenses “is not derivative, in a legal sense, from the infant’s cause of action, but is a separate and distinct ground for recovery vested in the parent.” 226 Md. at 530 , 174 A.2d at 343 . The parents in this case were required by § 5-101 of the Courts Article to file an action within three years from the date of the accident to recover for medical expenses.

Having failed to file this action to recover for the medical expenses within the three-year limitations period, the parents are barred from recovering for any medical expenses ³⁵⁹ for which they have paid or for which they will be obligated to pay during their child’s minority. Furthermore, by not requiring the parents’ claim for medical expenses to be joined with the minor’s own claim and allowing both to be tolled by § 5-201 of the Courts Article, we remain loyal to the well established principle “that where the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.” Booth Glass Co., Inc. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 623 , 500 A.2d 641, 645 (1985); see also Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207, 211 , 378 A.2d 1100, 1102 (1977); McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 160 , 40 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1944). Our unwillingness to provide implied or equitable exceptions to a statute of limitations is evidenced by two recent decisions, in which we refused to give an expansive interpretation to § 5-201. In Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285 , 628 A.2d 162 (1993), we rejected the argument that § 5-201 tolled the 180-day claim filing requirement of the Maryland Tort Claims Act 8 during the plaintiffs’ minority.

Similarly, in Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52 , 626 A.2d 353 (1993), we refused to apply § 5-201 to save a wrongful death action 9 brought by a minor. Although these two cases involved interpretations of the Maryland Tort Claims Act and the wrongful death statute, they evidence our unwillingness to recognize implied exceptions or strained interpretations of statutes so as to avoid the bar of limitations. See Walko Corp., 281 Md. at 211 , 378 A.2d at 1102 . Finally, our view that § 5-201 does not apply to the parents’ claim for medical expenses during the minority of the child is in accord with virtually every court that has addressed this issue.

See Doran v. Compton, 645 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (applying Texas law); Perez v. Espinola, 749 ³⁶⁰ F.Supp. 732 (E.D.Va.1990) (applying Virginia law); Davis v. Drackett Prods. Co., 536 F.Supp. 694 (S.D.Ohio 1982) (applying Ohio law); Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 448 F.Supp. 10 (E.D.Mo.1977) (applying Missouri law), aff'd, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir.1978); Myer v. Dyer, 542 A.2d 802 (Del.Super.Ct.1987); Rose v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc., 184 Ga.App. 182 , 361 S.E.2d 1 , cert. denied, 184 Ga.App. 910 (1987); Severe v. Miller, 120 Ill.App.3d 550 , 76 Ill.Dec. 34 , 458 N.E.2d 173 (1983); Walter v. City of Flint, 40 Mich.App. 613 , 199 N.W.2d 264 (1972); Ostrander v. Cone Mills, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 240 (Minn.1989); Macku v. Drackett Prods. Co., 216 Neb. 176 , 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984); D’Andria v. County of Suffolk, 112 A.D.2d 397 , 492 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1985); Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C.App. 566 , 366 S.E.2d 518 (1988); Day v. MacDonald, 67 Ohio App.3d 240 , 586 N.E.2d 1135 (1990); Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613 , 561 A.2d 1261 (1989); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.1983). But see Vedutis v. Tesi, 135 N.J.Super. 337 , 343 A.2d 171 (1975) (N.J.StatAnn. § 2A:14-2.1 provides that parents’ claim for damages as a result of injury to their child enjoys benefit of statute tolling child’s claim where the parents assert their claim in the same action with their child’s claim), aff'd, 142 N.J.Super. 492 , 362 A.2d 51 (1976); Lauver v. Cornelius, 85 A.D.2d 866 , 446 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1981) (limitations on both minor’s action and parents’ action against alleged child molester were tolled during the minor’s infancy); Korth v. American Family Ins.

Co., supra. Parents are charged by § 5-203 of the Family Law Article with the legal obligation to provide necessary medical care to their minor children. Consequently, when their minor child is negligently injured, we have recognized that the right to recover for the attendant medical expenses is “vested in the parent[s].” Hudson, 226 Md. at 530 , 174 A.2d at 343 . By failing to file an action within three years of the accident, the parents’ claim for all medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident prior to emancipation of the minor is barred by limitations.

Accordingly, the circuit court properly dismissed the second count of the original complaint. ³⁶¹ III. In assailing the circuit court’s dismissal of the entire amended complaint, plaintiffs assert that the parents, by bringing an action as next friends of the minor child, waive to the minor the right to recover the medical expenses. Moreover, the plaintiffs assert that this waiver may occur at any time during the minority of the child, notwithstanding that the statute of limitations has run against the parents’ claim for medical expenses. We shall conclude, however, that even if parents could waive to their minor child their right to recover for the medical expenses, the waiver in this case is similarly barred by limitations.

There is authority for the proposition that a parent, by bringing an action as guardian or next friend of an injured minor child in which a claim is made for medical expenses, waives or relinquishes the right of recovery to the child. See Tellier, Annotation, supra, 32 A.L.R.2d 1060 , § 14, at 1083 and cases cited therein. One commentator has explained the waiver of the parents’ claim for medical expenses this way: “The parent may, of course, assign his claim for the medical expenses to the child, or he may waive his right to recover by the child’s emancipation. Perhaps the most