Piselli v. 75th Street Medical

¹⁹³ ELDRIDGE, Judge. This case comes to us by a Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-601 through 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and Maryland Rule 8-305. The question of Maryland law set forth in the Certification Order is as follows: “[W]hether, when a claim is brought by parents on behalf of a child who was injured before reaching age eleven, the three-year statute of limitations of section 5-109(a)(2) [of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article] begins to accrue upon the discovery of the injury by the child or upon discovery of the injury by the parents.” 1 ¹⁹⁴ The Certification Order acknowledged “that the Court of Appeals of Maryland may reformulate this question.” See also § 12-604 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, providing that “[t]he Court of Appeals of this State may reformulate a question of law certified to it.” The Certification Order also indicated that the term “discovered” in § 5-109(a)(2) referred to Maryland’s traditional “discovery rule,” under which, in the language of the United States Court of Appeals, “a statute of limitations begins to accrue when a person acquires knowledge sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make an inquiry that, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have disclosed the existence of the allegedly negligent act and harm.” See Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 358 Md. 435, 441-447 , 749 A.2d 796, 799-802 (2000), cited by the federal court in its Certification Order. We shall reformulate the certified question and shall hold that, in light of Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, in an action under § 5-109(a) by or on behalf of a claimant who was a minor at the time the injury occurred, the time limitations prescribed in § 5-109(a) shall commence running when the claimant reaches the age of 18 years.

I. On August 2,1993, Christopher Piselli, who was at that time 10 years and 11 months old, was on vacation in Ocean City, Maryland, with his family. That morning, Christopher and his father went fishing at a pier in Ocean City for approximately three hours. When they left the pier and were walking back toward their car, Christopher’s father noticed that his son was limping and that, as his son was walking, he was throwing out his left leg in an unusual circular, outward motion. Christopher also complained of a great deal of pain in his left hip ¹⁹⁵ area.

Christopher’s father then took Christopher to the 75th Street Medical Center, located in Ocean City, for a medical examination. At the 7oth Street Medical Center, Dr. Lynn Yarborough examined Christopher, and she ordered a series of hip X-rays to be taken by the X-ray technician at the Medical Center. Based upon her examination of Christopher and the X-rays, Dr. Yarborough informed Christopher’s father that Christopher had most likely suffered a pulled hamstring muscle. She prescribed a muscle relaxant and ibuprofen for Christopher, and she instructed Christopher’s father to use a warm compress on Christopher’s leg.

Dr. Yarborough also directed that Christopher should return to the Medical Center in two to four days if his condition did not improve. Three days later, on August 5th, Christopher further injured his left leg while standing in shallow water at the edge of the ocean, when a wave broke near him and caused him to fall over. Christopher was transported by ambulance from the beach to a nearby hospital, and he was ultimately taken to Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. Christopher had suffered a slipped capital epiphysis at the top of his left leg, a condition in which the capital epiphysis of the femur moves out of place.

At Johns Hopkins, the fracture was placed in traction and then pinned. A medical expert further explained at the trial of this case that a slipped capital epiphysis is a “slippage through the growth plate of the ball of the hip joint,” the growth plate being made of “cartilage and relatively soft.” During August and September 1993, Christopher was required at all times to use crutches, and he needed to restrict his mobility so as to facilitate the healing process in his leg. By the beginning of October, Christopher was able to use the crutches on a more intermittent basis. Subsequently, in the fall of 1993, Christopher’s hip developed a condition referred to as avascular necrosis, a complication of the injury which he had suffered.

Avascular necrosis is the “pathologic death of one or more cells, or a portion of tissue or organ, resulting from irreversible damage ... due to ¹⁹⁶ deficient blood supply.” See Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1185 (27th ed.2000). In Christopher’s case, the upper portion of his left femur ceased growing as a result of avascular necrosis. This condition began to create a significant gap between the length of his right leg and the length of his left leg. At the recommendation of Christopher’s doctors, a procedure was performed to kill the growth plate in Christopher’s right leg in order to help alleviate the growth disparity between the two legs.

Following this surgery, Christopher’s left hip remained malformed because of necrosis and arthritis in the joint. Christopher’s mobility and his ability to participate in a range of activities were limited. Christopher’s physicians informed his parents that his disability would last throughout his lifetime and that Christopher would need a series of operations. In 1998, the Pisellis filed a medical malpractice claim in the Health Claims Arbitration Office of Maryland, pursuant to § 3-2A-02 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Thereafter, the parties elected to waive arbitration, and the Pisellis filed this medical malpractice action. The facts concerning the judicial proceedings are recited in the United States Court of Appeals’ Certification Order as follows (footnotes omitted): “On July 24, 1998, Donato and Marie Piselli filed this medical malpractice action, individually and as Christopher’s ‘next friends,’ against Dr. Yarborough and the Medical Center. The action was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and was referred to Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm for all proceedings, including a jury trial. “Prior to trial, Dr. Yarborough and the Medical Center moved for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. The district court found that there was a genuine factual dispute as to when Christopher’s injury was or should have been discovered, and the court therefore denied the motion for summary judgment and put these questions to the jury. ¹⁹⁷ “The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Yarborough and against the Medical Center, finding that the Medical Center had deviated from the accepted standard of care in its treatment of Christopher and that this deviation was the proximate cause of Christopher’s injury on August 5, 1993.

The jury awarded damages of $410,000 to Christopher and $28,000 to Donato and Marie Piselli. By answer to the special interrogatories, the jury also found that Donato and Marie Piselli discovered Christopher’s injury in November 1993 and that Christopher did not discover his injury until 1999, after this action was filed. “Following the jury’s verdict, the district court ruled as a matter of law that this action is time-barred, holding that the statute of limitations in Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-109 began to accrue in November 1993, when Christopher’s parents had knowledge of his injury. Therefore, the court entered judgment in favor of Dr. Yarborough and the Medical Center. * * * “It is undisputed that Christopher was not yet eleven years old at the time the injury was committed in August 1993.

It is also undisputed that this action, commenced in July 1998, was filed within ‘[f|ive years of the time the injury was committed,’ § 5-109(a)(l). The relevant question, therefore, is whether this action is time-barred as not filed within j'tjhree years of the date the injury was discovered’ as required by section 5-109(a)(2), the answer to which, in this case, depends upon whether the referenced ‘discovery’ is that of the parents or that of the child. “No Maryland case addresses the question of whether, when a claim is brought by parents on behalf of a child who was injured before reaching age eleven, the three-year statute of limitations of section 5-109(a)(2) begins to accrue upon discovery of the injury by the child or upon discovery of the injury by the parents. The answer to this question is dispositive here because the action was filed within three years of the date the injury was discovered by Christopher, ¹⁹⁸ but more than three years after discovery of the injury by Christopher’s parents.” The plaintiffs have been designated as the appellants in this Court, and the. defendants have been designated as the appel-lees.

II

Expressly invoking this Court’s statutory authority to reformulate the certified question, the parties’ arguments before us range beyond the certified question to a considerable degree. The plaintiffs’ initial argument is “that Maryland law should be interpreted to always provide a minor five years to bring a Medical Malpractice claim, and ... that a rational reading of the law reveals that this is what the Maryland Legislature truly intended when it enacted § 5-109.... ” (Appellants’ brief at 7). Second, largely accepting the legal issue as framed by the certified question, the plaintiffs alternatively contend that, under § 5-109, the parents’ knowledge is not imputed to the minor child, and that the three-year period in § 5-109(a)(2) does not run from the parents’ discovery of the child’s injury. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the United States District Court’s interpretation of § 5-109 makes the statute unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 and under Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 3 ¹⁹⁹ The defendants initially disagree with the portion of the Certification Order which indicates that § 5 — 109(a)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article reflects the traditional Maryland “discovery rule,” as discussed in Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., supra, 358 Md. at 441-447 , 749 A.2d at 799-802 .

The defendants argue that “the Fourth Circuit’s formulation of the Certified Question[, which] assumes that § 5-109(a) ... incorporates the traditional common law ‘discovery rule’ articulated in various Maryland cases,” is erroneous and that discovery for purposes of § 5-109(a) “occurred on August 5th, at the beach, and must be deemed, as a matter of law, to have been discovered by parents and child at virtually the same moment.” (Appellees’ brief at 9-10). The defendants also argue that the jury’s determination of discovery by Christopher was erroneous, and that “the orthopedic injuries attributed to the negligence of the Defendants were open and obvious to everyone, including Christopher, as of the time Christopher was taken for treatment to” the hospital on August 5, 1993. (Id. at 12). Next, the defendants argue that, even if § 5-109(a)(2) refers to the traditional Maryland discovery rule, it is the discovery by the parents and not the child which triggers the running of limitations.

Finally, the defendants argue that § 5-109, as construed by the United States District Court, violates neither the Maryland Constitution nor the United States Constitution because the statute has “a rational basis” and is “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” (Id. at 27). The defendants do not specifically address the plaintiffs’ argument based on Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and at oral argument ²⁰⁰ before us, the defendants’ counsel stated that he “has no response” to the Court’s questions concerning the validity under Article 19 of § 5-109 as applied to a minor’s claim.

III

Some of the parties’ arguments exceed the scope of our authority under the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, and some others can be disposed of briefly. A. The plaintiffs’ contentions that the United States District Court’s interpretation of § 5-109 renders that statute unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, do not present issues cognizable under the Certification statute. We have consistently held that “the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act ... does not authorize this Court to decide questions of federal constitutional law in a certified question case.” Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561 , 578-579 n. 15, 702 A.2d 230 , 239 n. 15 (1997). See Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp.

Center, 300 Md. 520, 536-537 , 479 A.2d 921, 929 (1984); Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Purifoy, 280 Md. 46, 54 , 371 A.2d 650, 655 (1977); Guy v. Director, 279 Md. 69, 73 , 367 A.2d 946, 949 (1977). The above-cited holdings involved the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act prior to its revision by Ch. 344 of the Acts 1996, and were based upon the language in former § 12-601 authorizing this Court to answer “a question of law of this State.” Although this reference to “a question of law of this State” was deleted in the 1996 revision of the statute, we adhere to our cases holding that federal law issues are not encompassed by the Certification Act. ²⁰¹ Section 12-603 of the revised Certification Act, enacted by Ch. 344 of the Acts of 1996, now provides: “ § 12-603. Power to answer. “The Court of Appeals of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States or by an appellate court of another state or of a tribe, if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.” The reference to there being no appellate decision or enactments of this State indicates that our authority under § 12-603 is limited to questions of non-federal Maryland law. Such interpretation is also indicated by the use of the word controlling.

This Court’s decisions on questions of federal law are obviously not “controlling” with regard to federal courts or courts of other states. The only court having the authority to issue decisions on federal law which are “controlling” upon the courts throughout the country is the Supreme Court of the United States. Moreover, the report of the House Judiciary Committee on House Bill 1450, which became Ch. 344 of the Acts of 1996, contained in the file of the Department of Legislative Reference, indicates that, except for certain changes expressly enumerated by the Committee, the new version of the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act was intended to be substantively the same as the former version. None of the changes enumerated by the Committee suggested that we could answer a federal law issue in a certified question case. 4 In addition, the Prefatory Note and Comments by the ²⁰² National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, on the revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (1995), refers only to state law or tribal law and, as an option, to Canadian or Mexican law.

Finally, the purpose of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Acts is to obtain authoritative decisions concerning the law of a particular state or tribe, in order to assist federal courts, Native American tribal courts, and state appellate courts in other states in their decision-making processes. The purpose is not to have a court in one jurisdiction advise a court in another jurisdiction on a federal law issue, when both courts have equal authority and equal obligations to interpret and apply federal law. Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment issues raised by the plaintiffs are not cognizable under the Certification Act. . B. Similarly, the defendants’ argument that Christopher “discovered” his injury in 1993, rather than 1999 as found by the jury and set forth in the Certification Order, is beyond the scope of the Certification statute.

While this issue is no longer material in light of our holding under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, we do point out that, under the Certification statute, the answering court is bound by the facts as agreed by the parties or stated in the Certification Order. Section 12-606 of the statute provides as follows: “12-606. Contents of certification order. “(a) In general. — A certification order shall contain: (1) The question of law to be answered; (2) The facts relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose; (3) A statement acknowledging that the Court of Appeals of this State, acting as the receiving court, may reformulate the question; and ²⁰³ (4) The names and addresses of counsel of record and parties appearing without counsel. (b) Where parties unable to agree upon statement of facts. — If the parties cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the certifying court shall determine the relevant facts and state them as a part of its certification order.” See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 228 , 630 A.2d 1145, 1146 (1993) (“Under the Act, this Court considers ‘only questions of state law, not questions of fact,’ ” quoting Mercantile Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Purifoy, supra, 280 Md. at 54 , 371 A.2d at 655 ); Food Fair Stores v. Joy, 283 Md. 205 , 219 n. 7, 389 A.2d 874 , 882 n. 7 (1978) (“[W]e do not evaluate or weigh the evidence, but instead accept the statement of facts submitted by the certifying court”).

C. Apart from the plaintiffs’ argument based on Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the parties’ remaining arguments do not require extensive discussion. We find nothing in the statutory language or the legislative history of § 5-109 to support the defendants’ contention that the language of § 5-109(a)(2), providing three years from discovery for bringing an action, does not reflect the traditional Maryland “discovery rule.” Instead, we fully agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the unambiguous language of § 5-109(a)(2) does embody the traditional Maryland “discovery rule” as set forth in our cases. See, e.g., Bragunier v. Catholic University, 368 Md. 608, 627-632 , 796 A.2d 744, 755-758 (2002); Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., supra, 358 Md. at 441-447 , 749 A.2d at 799-802 ; Jones v. Hyatt, 356 Md. 639, 648-651 , 741 A.2d 1099, 1103-1105 (1999); Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 690-691 , 679 A.2d 1087, 1090 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 , 117 S.Ct. 770 , 136 L.Ed.2d 716 (1997); Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634-638 , 431 A.2d 677, 679-681 (1981). Our holding, based on Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights, that the time periods in § 5-109(a) do not begin ²⁰⁴ running against a child’s claim until the child reaches the age of 18, removes any need to resolve the parties’ statutory interpretation arguments.

Similarly, we need not reach the plaintiffs’ argument that § 5-109, as construed by the .federal District Court, violates Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Pittman v. American Metal, 336 Md. 517, 533 , 649 A.2d 356, 364 (1994) (In a certified question case, when “the answer to one question has made the answer to another question no longer determinative, this Court has declined to reach the unnecessary question”); United States v. Searle, 322 Md. 1, 6 , 584 A.2d 1263, 1265 (1991); Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 245 , 508 A.2d 130, 131 (1986).

IV

A. As recently discussed in Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 616 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1068 (2002), “Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ... guarantees a ‘remedy by the course of the Law of the land, ... according to the Law of the land,’ for ‘every [person], for any injury done to him [or her] in his [or her] person or property.’ ” Article 19 was part of the original Maryland Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776, although it was then designated as Article 17 of the Declaration of Rights. Except for one word, the wording today is identical to the 1776 wording. 5 All of the original state constitutions adopted at the time of the Revolutionary War, except Virginia’s and North Carolina’s, contained provisions like Article 19. While the United States Constitution contains no comparable provision, today the constitutions of 39 states have clauses similar to Article 19. These provisions, often referred to as “Remedy Clauses” or “Open Courts Clauses”- or “Access to Courts Clauses,” are based on Chapter ²⁰⁵ 40 of the Magna Carta or, more particularly, Lord Coke’s interpretation of Chapter 40. 6 For a review of the history, purpose, interpretation, and application of such clauses, see, e.g., Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83 , 23 P.3d 333 (2001); Comment, The Kansas Remedy by Due Course of Law Provision: Defining a Right to a Remedy, 47 Kan.

L.Rev. 655 (1999); Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L.Rev. 1279 (1995); Schuman, The Right To A Remedy, 65 Temp. L.Rev. 1197 (1992); Schuman, Oregon’s Remedy Guarantee, 65 Or. L.Rev. 35 (1986); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering The States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt.

L.Rev. 379, 385 (1980); Perry and Cooper, Sources of Our Liberties 341-351 (rev. ed. 1990); Stringham, Magna Carta Fountainhead of Freedom 54-57 (1966); Thorne, Dunham, Kurland, and Jennings, The Great Charter 52-61 (1965); Thompson, Magna Carta 97-99, 364-365 (1948). See also Everstine, The General Assembly of Maryland 1631-1776 at 566 (1980). An examination of our opinions concerning Article 19 discloses that the constitutional provision generally protects two interrelated rights: (1) a right to a remedy for an injury to one’s person or property; (2) a right of access to the courts. Furthermore, as we stated in Doe v. Doe, 358 Md. 113, 127-128 , 747 A.2d 617, 624 (2000), “Article 19 insures that rights belonging to Marylanders are ‘not illegally or arbitrarily denied by the government,’ ” quoting State v. Board of Education, 346 Md. 633, 647 , 697 A.2d 1334, 1341 (1997).

Some specific applications of this constitutional protection are as follows. We have held that “[fit is a ‘basic tenet, expressed in Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, that a plaintiff injured by unconstitutional state action should have a remedy to redress the wrong.’ ” Dua v. Comcast Cable, supra, 370 Md. at 644 , 805 A.2d at 1061 , quoting Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 105 , 660 A.2d 447 , 464-465 ²⁰⁶ (1995). See, e.g., Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 444 , 788 A.2d 636, 644 (2002); Doe v. Doe, supra, 358 Md. at 128, 747 A.2d at 624 ; Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 680-681 , 541 A.2d 1303, 1312 (1988); Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 653-654 , 73 A. 261, 263 (1909). Where a person clearly has a right to money or property under a statute or common law principle, and no statute specifically provides for a remedy, Article 19 guarantees a common law remedy to enforce the right.

Robinson v. Bunch, supra, 367 Md. at 444 , 788 A.2d at 644 . The principle that one has a Maryland constitutional right to judicial review of adjudicatory administrative decisions is based, in part, upon Article 19. State v. Board of Education, supra, 346 Md. at 647 , 697 A.2d at 1341 . See Board of License Comm. v. Corridor, 361 Md. 403, 415 , 761 A.2d 916, 922 (2000).

Article 19 ordinarily precludes retrospective legislation abrogating accrued causes of action. Dua v. Comcast Cable, supra, 370 Md. at 645 , 805 A.2d at 1085 . Apart from these types of specific holdings with respect to Article 19, the constitutional provision generally prohibits unreasonable restrictions upon traditional remedies or access to the courts but allows the Legislature, pursuant to its authority to change the common law or statutory provisions, 7 to enact reasonable restrictions upon traditional remedies or access to the courts. Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 297 , 628 A.2d 162, 168 (1993) (“Article 19 does guarantee access to the courts ... [but] a ‘statutory restriction upon access to the courts violates Article 19 only if the restriction is unreasonable,’ ” quoting Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 365 , 601 A.2d 102, 113 (1992)).

Several restrictions upon traditional remedies or access to the courts have been upheld under Article 19 as reasonable. For example, we have held that Article 19 does not require the recognition of a new tort cause of action which has never previously been recognized in Maryland, Doe v. Doe, supra, 358 Md. at 128, 747 A.2d at 625 . This Court has ²⁰⁷ indicated that the Legislature may reasonably limit the amount of damages recoverable in tort cases for non-economic damages without violating Article 19, Murphy v. Edmonds, supra, 325 Md. at 366 , 601 A.2d at 114 . The Court has also held that “the Legislature may ordinarily substitute a statutory remedy, including a statutory administrative and judicial review remedy, for a common law remedy without violating Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights,” Robinson v. Bunch, supra, 367 Md. at 446-447 , 788 A.2d at 645 .

Article 19 does not prohibit the Legislature from requiring an arbitration proceeding prior to the filing in court of a medical malpractice suit, Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 298-299 , 385 A.2d 57, 71 , appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 , 99 S.Ct. 60 , 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978). In addition, the application of several traditional immunities from suit has been upheld in the face of Article 19 challenges. See Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 484 , 697 A.2d 468, 478 (1997) (parent-child immunity); Johnson v. Maryland State Police, supra, 331 Md. at 297 , 628 A.2d at 168 (State sovereign immunity); Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 278 F.Supp. 138, 141 (D.Md.), affirmed, 398 F.2d 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 , 89 S.Ct. 453 , 21 L.Ed.2d 443 (1968) (charitable immunity). On the other hand, we have held that Article 19 precludes the Legislature from immunizing from suit both the government and the government official involved, at least when the cause of action is based upon a violation of state constitutional rights.

Ashton v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. at 105-106 , 660 A.2d at 464 — 465; Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680-681 , 541 A.2d at 1312 ; Weyler v. Gibson, supra, 110 Md. at 653-654 , 73 A. at 263 . See also DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 50-53 , 729 A.2d 354, 371-373 (1999); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 370-375 , 597 A.2d 432, 445-447 (1991). Finally, we have held that the five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions set forth in § 5-109(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and the 10 and 20-year statutes of repose for actions based on defective conditions in real property set forth in § 5-108 of that Article, are ²⁰⁸ not unreasonable restrictions upon remedies and access to the courts, and thus do not violate Article 19, under circumstances where the injured claimants were adults. Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 703-705 , 501 A.2d 27, 34-35 (1985); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 359-360 , 499 A.2d 178, 188-189 (1985) 8 The dispositive issue in the present case is whether the time limitations prescribed by § 5-109, as applied to an injured minor’s claim, are unreasonable restrictions upon a traditional remedy and the minor’s access to the courts and, therefore, are in violation of Article 19.

B. It is a long established principle of Maryland law that a tortious injury to a minor child gives rise to distinct causes of action, one by the minor child, which is brought on the child’s behalf by a parent, guardian, or next friend, and another by the parents or guardians. Judge Karwacki for the Court in Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 346 , 631 A.2d 429, 432 (1993), set forth the principle and some of the earlier authorities as follows: “It is well settled that when a person negligently injures a minor two separate causes of action arise; the minor child has a cause of action for injuries suffered by it, and the parent or parents of the minor child have a cause of action for loss of services and for medical expenses incurred by the parent for the treatment of the minor’s injuries. Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521 , 174 A.2d 339 (1961); see also Meyers v. Meagher, 277 Md. 128 , 352 A.2d 827 (1976); County Comm’rs v. Hamilton, 60 Md. 340 (1883); John H. Derrick, ²⁰⁹ Annotation, Tolling of Statute of Limitations, on Account of Minority of Injured Child, as Applicable to Parent’s or Guardian’s Right of Action Arising Out of Same Injury,