Geddings v. Filbert

MURPHY, Chief Judge. On October 25, 2000, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Bobby Geddings, appellant, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, asserting that he was unlawfully confined in the Maryland Correctional Institution at Jessup (MCIJ). 1 Appellant’s petition included the following assertions: 2. The basis of Petitioner’s confinement by the Warden under supervision of the Department of Safety and Correctional Services of the State of Maryland (“DOC”) is identified as Commitment Number, 227-214 dated October 22, 1992 pursuant to a sentence imposed by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on October 6, 1992 in which Petitioner received a twenty (20) year sentence with commencement date March 25,1992. 3. The twenty (20) year sentence imposed on Petitioner was concurrent to a prior ten (10) year sentence of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for which Petitioner was incarcerated under commitment number 159-918. ⁹⁷ 5.

Petitioner has calculated the Credits arising out of the sentences comprising his term of confinement as defined above and asserts that the Credits applied to the sentence(s) he is now serving entitle him to an immediate release. 6. The term of confinement as provided above arises out of the following: Case Number 120 075 10/5/71-10/5/86 Fifteen year sentence 180 Months Case Number 158 918 2/21/84-2/21/94 Ten year sentence, consecutive to No. 120 075; 120 Months Case Number 227 217 3/25/92-3/25/2012 Twenty year sentence concurrent with No. 158 918 240 Months Total 540 Months 9. Application of the diminution credits to the term of confinement of Petitioner would entitle Petitioner to a release date of November 19,1999. William O. Filbert, appellee, MCIJ’s Warden, filed a Response that, in pertinent part, stated: 4.

Geddings is attempting to advance an argument that the sentences comprising his current 20-year term of confinement should be aggregated with earlier sentences for which he was earlier committed to the custody of the custody of the Commissioner and Division of Correction, sentences imposed as long ago as 1971, to create a “term of confinement” spanning 42 years, with a maximum expiration date of 3-25-12 (the same maximum expiration date as his 20-year term of confinement). Geddings seeks this result because if he can effectively aggregate all of the sentences from his extensive criminal career into a single 42-year term of confinement, he can aggregate all of the diminution of confinement credits earned and accrued over the span of this 42 years and apply them against the maximum expiration ⁹⁸ date of 3/25/12 to achieve an earlier mandatory supervision release date. 5. Geddings could achieve the result he seeks—the aggregation of all of his criminal sentences into a 42-year “term of confinement,” if all of his “commitments” to the custody of the Commissioner and Division of Correction during that period of time were to overlap. They do not. 6.

At the time that Geddings received the sentences that comprise his current term of confinement, he was on parole from a prior term of confinement. The new convictions and sentences comprising his current term of confinement, and the underlying criminal conduct, could have formed the basis for a revocation of his parole. If his parole had been revoked, he would have been returned to custody to serve the remainder of the term of confinement from which he had been paroled, together with his new tex-m of confinement. Since these terms of confinement would have overlapped, they would have merged into a single, larger term of confinement, and Geddings would have benefited from all of the diminution of confinement credits he had earned during his earlier term of confinement.

Thus, a revocation of his parole would have conferred a perverse benefit on Geddings by allowing for an earlier release on mandatory supervision. But the Maryland Parole Commission did not revoke his parole. 7. Geddings filed a mandamus petition to try to force the Parole Commission to revoke his parole. This action culminated in an unreported decision of the Court of Special Appeals in March, 1999, annexed hereto as Exhibit “C,” recognizing that Geddings wanted to do and why Geddings wanted to do it, but also recognizing the “plenary discretion” of the Parole Commission in matters of parole and revocation, and affirming the authority of the Parole Commission not to revoke Geddings parole.

Geddings v. Maryland Parole Commission, No. 1149 (September Term, 1998). The Court also ⁹⁹ recognized the effect of his decision: “[A]t the present time, [Geddings] does not have any right, constitutional or otherwise, to have diminution credits applied to the sentence he is now serving. He would only have such rights if the [Parole] Commission had decided to revoke his parole.” Geddings has conveniently omitted any mention in the present habeas corpus action of this dispositive Court of Special Appeals decision. The Circuit Court’s Ruling In a November 15, 2000 Memorandum Opinion and Order, The Honorable Clayton Greene, Jr. denied appellant’s petition, explaining: Petitioner incorrectly argues that his three sentences equal one term of confinement.

Petitioner’s first two sentences, the fifteen-year and the ten-year, do overlap for the purposes of a single term of confinement. See Md.Code Ann. CS § 3-701. The twenty-year sentence imposed on October 6, 1992, however, is in itself a single term of confinement as “not all sentences that overlap or run consecutively must aggregate for all purposes to a single term of confinement.” Maryland House of Correction v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 267 , 703 A.2d 167 (1997). For the purposes of good conduct credits, sentences imposed after October 1, 1992 should be considered a separate term of confinement.

See id. at 268 , 703 A.2d 167 . Petitioner’s twenty-year sentence, therefore, did not overlap with either of the first two sentences, and for the purpose of good conduct credits is a separate term of confinement. Accordingly, Petitioner should only receive diminution credits for the twenty-year sentence. The issue raised by Petitioner in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is similar to the one previously argued and litigated in his Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

In the mandamus petition, Petitioner asked that the court order the Parole Commission to conduct another revocation hearing. Essentially, Petitioner sought to force the Commission to revoke his parole in order to receive additional diminution credits. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported ¹⁰⁰ decision, held that the Commissioner had the discretion not to revoke the Petitioner’s parole. See also Md.Code Ann., CS § 7-401.

In addition, the Court of Special Appeals held that because the Commission properly exercised its discretion not to hold a second revocation hearing, Petitioner had no right to another hearing. The Court ultimately held that because the Commission did not revoke his parole, Petitioner has no right to additional diminution credits for his current sentence. The Court further held that Petitioner would only have such a right if the Commission had decided to revoke his parole. In addition to the above discussion, the Court of Special Appeals has addressed the issue now brought before this Court in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

As such, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. On November 22, 2000, appellant filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment, which was denied by Judge Greene on December 19, 2000. This appeal followed, in which appellant presents two questions for our review: I. Does a term of confinement for the purpose of calculation of diminution credits pursuant to Art. 27, § 700, of the Code of Maryland include time served while on parole?

II

Does serving a sentence on parole constitute a break or termination of sentences which are otherwise combined under that statute awarding credits? For the reasons that follow, we shall answer “no” to each question and therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court. I. Appellant argues that his current mandatory release date is incorrect because he has not received all of the diminution credits to which he is entitled. According to appellant’s calculation, as of October 30, 2000, he was entitled to a total of 4573 diminution credits, including time served at Patuxent, ¹⁰¹ which would result in a mandatory release date of October 12, 1999. 2 ¹⁰³ Appellee argues that as of April 12, 2000, appellant’s mandatory release date was October 6, 2006, which reflected the 1,997 diminution credits to which he was entitled. 3 Judge Greene agreed with appellee.

So do we. Appellant is seeking to combine diminution credits applicable only to his most recent sentence with credits applicable to a prior sentence that does not overlap. 4 Appellant argues that ¹⁰⁴ violation of parole is not relevant to the calculation of appellant’s diminution credits under former Article 27 § 700. Appellant’s argument relies on Department of Public Safety, Correctional Servs. v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438 , 718 A.2d 1150 (1998). We are persuaded, however, that the Henderson decision does not control appellant’s case..

In Henderson, the Maryland Parole Commission revoked the inmate’s parole. Appellant’s parole has not been revoked. Neither Md.Code Ann., Art. 27 § 700(which was in effect on October 6, 1992) nor Md. Corr. Serv.Code Ann. § 3-701 (which is in effect today) requires the aggregation of all of appellant’s sentences, because all sentences that overlap or run consecutively do not need to aggregate “for all purposes to a single term of confinement.” Henderson, 351 Md. at 452 , 718 A.2d at 1157 .

As this Court stated in appellant’s mandamus action, his earlier term of confinement could be aggregated with his present term of confinement only if the Maryland Parole Commission, in the exercise of its discretion, revoked appellant’s parole from the earlier term of confinement (emphasis supplied). We agree with Judge Greene that, since the Maryland Parole Commission has not revoked appellant’s parole, appellant is not entitled to the diminution of confinement credits applicable to his earlier term of confinement. Only sentences being served by an inmate in “confinement” are aggregated into a “term of confinement” as that term was defined in 1992 and as that term is defined today. 5 ¹⁰⁵ Any sentence being served on parole or mandatory supervision, for example, is not aggregated into a term of confinement because it is not being served in “confinement.” In the case sub judice, when appellant was sent to the DOC in 1992, and began serving a twenty-year term of confinement, he was on parole for theft. The sentence for theft was not aggregated into the twenty-year term of confinement, even though