General Motors Corp. v. Seay

GREENE, J. On March 24, 2003, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found in favor of Randall C. Seay in his wrongful termination case against General Motors Corporation (“GM”) and Gerry Grant, a labor relations representative at GM (collectively “GM” unless otherwise indicated). During the trial, GM made a motion for judgment at the close of Seay’s case-in-chief and, ostensibly, again at the close of its own case. GM did not, however, renew the motion following rebuttal testimony offered by Mr. Seay. On April 3, 2003, GM filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), or in the alternative a motion for a new trial.

Seay opposed the motion but did not raise the issue of GM’s failure to renew the motion for judgment following Seay’s rebuttal testimony. The ³⁴⁴ trial court granted the motion for JNOV on May 27, 2003. Seay filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals which held that GM’s right to file a motion for JNOV was relinquished when it failed to renew the motion for judgment following Seay’s rebuttal testimony. By petition for writ of certiorari, GM presents the following questions, which we have reworded, for our review: 1.

Whether the trial court is entitled to consider a motion for JNOV where a defendant made a motion for judgment following both the close of plaintiff’s case and the close of defendant’s case, but did not formally renew the motion following protracted argument on the motion and the trial court’s ruling? 2. Considering that Seay failed to object to the timeliness of GM’s motion for JNOV at trial, should the Court of Special Appeals have ruled that plaintiff’s objection was waived and refused to consider the issue when raised for the first time on appeal? Seay requested, in a conditional cross-petition for writ of certiorari, that if this Court were to grant certiorari to GM, we should, in the interest of judicial economy, address the merits of the trial court’s ruling on GM’s motion for JNOV. We granted both certiorari petitions.

General Motors v. Seay, 383 Md. 211 , 857 A.2d 1129 (2004). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for JNOV. As we have often said, the Maryland Rules are “precise rubrics” which are to be strictly followed. Maryland Rule 2-532(a) provides that “a party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence and only on the grounds advanced in support of the earlier motion.” The language is mandatory and unambiguous.

Therefore, when GM failed to renew the motion for judgment at the close of all of the evidence as the Rule provides, it lost its right to file a motion for JNOV. Because we hold that the motion was procedurally defective we need not address the merits of the trial court’s decision. ³⁴⁵ FACTS Randall C. Seay (“Seay”) was employed for thirteen years with General Motors Corporation at its Broening Highway plant in Baltimore City. On February 14, 2000, he was discharged, allegedly for falsifying a workers’ compensation claim following an injury to his hand that occurred on November 18, 1999. Seay denies that the claim was false and argues that he was terminated solely because he filed a workers’ compensation claim. 1 On November 18, 1999, Seay began his shift at 4:30 in the afternoon.

According to Seay, he left the GM plant at 9:30 p.m. for his “lunch” break. He testified that he drove to Poncabird Pub (“Pub”) and purchased a sandwich. 2 Seay saw Barry Blevins, another GM employee, at the Pub. They spoke briefly and then followed each other back to the plant. Seay “punched back in” at 9:43 and, at approximately 10:10 p.m., resumed work.

At approximately 11:40 p.m., Seay claims to have injured his hand on the edge of a piece of equipment while performing his job duties in the body shop. At first he tried to stop the bleeding by sucking on his hand and then by rinsing it in the bathroom. His immediate supervisor sent him to the on-site medical department after Seay asked for a band-aid. The nurse in the medical department sent him to Concentra Medical Center lor stitches.

Subsequently, Seay’s hand became infected from human saliva and required surgery. Seay testified that he was hospitalized for four days as a result of the injury. On or about November 27, 1999, after being released from the hospital, Seay filed a workers’ compensation claim. He returned to work and was assigned to perform light duties for a period of three months until a ³⁴⁶ doctor released him to return to his regular duties.

Shortly thereafter, on February 14, 2000, Seay was discharged. General Motors disputes Seay’s version of events. GM claims that Seay left the GM plant during his lunch break, drove to “Jimmy’s (Famous Seafood) Restaurant,” and was involved in an altercation with another GM employee, Anthony Tucker. GM’s version is based on an investigation by Grant, that included interviewing five GM employees and a physician. 3 At trial, GM presented testimony of Tucker and Joseph Wooten.

Tucker testified that he was involved in an altercation with Seay and that Seay punched him in the mouth. Wooten testified that he witnessed the altercation and, for the most part, confirmed Tucker’s account of the events. 4 They both testified that Seay was not bleeding following the altercation. GM argues that Seay injured his hand during the scuffle, not at work. GM further argues that since the injury did not occur at work, Seay filed a false workers’ compensation claim.

On March 3, 2000, prior to Seay filing a civil complaint, the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”) awarded Seay workers’ compensation benefits. The Commission found that Seay, “sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on November 18, 1999; and f[ou]nd that the disability of the claimant [wa]s the result of the aforesaid accidental injury; and that as a result thereof the claimant was temporarily totally disabled.” He was awarded ³⁴⁷ $602.00 a week from November 24, 1999, through December 28,1999. General Motors sought judicial review of the Commission’s ruling in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. On January 19, 2001, a jury in Baltimore County answered “No” to the question, “Did the claimant sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on or about November 18, 1999?”.

Based on the jury’s finding, the court reversed the Commission’s award and disallowed Seay’s workers’ compensation claim. On February 9, 2001, Seay appealed the decision to the Court of Special Appeals. General Motors filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted on September 11, 2001, when Seay failed to respond in a timely manner. 5 Subsequently, on March 14, 2001, Seay filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against GM and Grant, as well as GM employees, Jerome Jones, 6 Anthony Tucker, and Joseph Wooten. GM removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland on the grounds that Seay’s claims were preempted under the Labor Management Relations Act. 7 Seay subsequently dropped the claims in his complaint that were based on the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), and on October 24, 2001, the case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 8 ³⁴⁸ On February 22, 2002, Seay filed his third amended complaint alleging wrongful termination, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 9 At the end of Seay’s case-in-chief, both parties made a motion for judgment.

The court reserved its ruling on the motion until the next day following the close of GM’s case-in-chief. The court then ruled on the motion made at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The court stated “[a]s to defendant’s motion for judgment at the close of the plaintiffs case, I have up to this point, heard motion and argument and I have granted the motion for judgment [on the wrongful termination count] in favor of defendant’s Tucker and Wooton, and as of this moment denied it as to defendants General Motors, Grant, and Jones.” The court also granted the motion for judgment for all defendants as to the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress counts. Following the court’s ruling on the motions at the close of the plaintiffs case, General Motors presented argument regarding the proper parties in the wrongful termination action and whether Seay met his burden of demonstrating that he was fired “solely” for filing a workers’ compensation claim.

GM stated: I’m sorry for being redundant from yesterday but since this is also up for a new motion for judgment at the close of all of the evidence 10 we would state that there has been evidence clearly from the plaintiff that there were other ³⁴⁹ reasons involved here. It was unequivocal that there were other reasons involved here. Following argument by Seay, the court held: Okay. Again, at least taking these separately, at the junction at the close of the plaintiffs case facts and inferences in a light most favorable I’ll deny the motion still as to General Motors, Mr. Grant and Mr. Jones and then even at the close of all of the evidence I think there — I’m persuaded that there is sufficient to allow the jury to sort out whether solely because he filed a workers’ compensation claim or because he filed a false claim, and that’s something — that’s why we have juries to sort out.

Over GM’s objection, Seay’s counsel then presented rebuttal testimony. The testimony was offered to rebut Jones’s testimony that Seay had approached him at Bally’s Gym on a number of occasions and made remarks about the ongoing dispute. Jones testified that on one occasion Seay approached him and stated, “I’m going to get you in court.” On another occasion, following the trial in Baltimore County, Seay approached him and allegedly said: He said; that’s okay. I’m going to sue you guys.

I don’t even want my job back because I’m going to take General Motors for millions of dollars, and once again I said; just leave me alone. I don’t want to talk about it. It’s in the courts. Just leave me alone.

He said; you’re not at General Motors now. You don’t have any authority here. I said; just leave me alone I have nothing to say to you. In rebuttal, Seay denied saying he was going to “get him or anything like that.” He testified that: Well like I said earlier I just said; why are you doing this to a brother you know like that?

Then he said; you’re not my brother. Then he was like we’re going to go to a court of law in Baltimore County this time and we’re going to reverse this decision that you’ve got in your favor. General Motors neglected to renew the motion for judgment following this testimony. ³⁵⁰ On March 24, 2003, a jury found that Seay was wrongfully .terminated by GM and Grant. The jury awarded Seay a judgment in the amount of $300,000 against GM and $200,000 against Grant.

The jury found in favor of Jones. A mistrial was declared on the issue of punitive damages when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision. On April 3, 2003, GM filed a motion for JNOV, or in the alternative a motion for a new trial. Seay’s counsel filed a motion in opposition to GM’s motion for JNOV challenging the merits of the motion but not on the basis that it was procedurally defective.

On May 27, 2003, the trial court granted the motion for JNOV in favor of GM, Jones, and Grant and set aside the jury’s verdict. On June 25, 2003, Seay filed a notice of appeal. Notwithstanding Seay’s failure to preserve the issue, the Court of Special Appeals reviewed the trial court’s ruling on the motion for JNOV and reversed that ruling. On May 21, 2004, in an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that, although the testimonial evidence by Jones was immaterial and extraneous, [w]hen [GM] failed to renew their motion for judgment at the conclusion of appellant’s rebuttal testimony, which concluded all of the evidence in the case, their right to file a motion for JNOV thereafter was effectively relinquished.

Seay v. General Motors, Corp., No. 982, slip op. at 7-8 (September Term, 2003). DISCUSSION I. GM concedes that under the Maryland Rules the motion for JNOV was procedurally defective when it failed to renew it at the close of all of the evidence. It maintains, however, that this oversight was trivial because the evidence presented was extraneous and had no substantive effect on the trial court’s ruling. General Motors contends that the motion for JNOV was procedurally proper under the federal rules and that we should review and reinterpret Maryland’s mandatory ³⁵¹ JNOV rule to follow the more permissive view recognized by the majority of federal circuits that have addressed the issue.

Seay contends that the intermediate appellate court ruled correctly when it reversed the trial court’s grant of GM’s motion for JNOV. According to Seay, when GM failed to renew its motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence, as mandated by Md. Rule 2-532(a), GM waived its right to place a motion for JNOV before the trial court and the trial court improperly ruled on it. Maryland Rule 2-519, which governs motions for judgment, provides in pertinent part: (a) Generally. A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues in any action at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party, and in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence.

(d) Reservation of decision in jury cases. In a jury trial, if a motion for judgment is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may submit the case to the jury and reserve its decision on the motion until after the verdict or discharge of the jury. Md. Rule 2-519. Our rule governing a motion for JNOV is Md. Rule 2-532(a).

It states in relevant part: (a) When permitted. In a jury trial, a party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence and only on the grounds advanced in support of the earlier motion. Md. Rule 2-532(a) (emphasis added). In Maryland, a motion for judgment, made at the close of an opponent’s case and thereafter denied, is withdrawn when the party making the motion offers evidence in its own case-in-chief.

But, after offering evidence, the motion may be re-offered or renewed. Smith v. Carr, 189 Md. 338 , 56 A.2d 151 (1947). In addition, if the court denies the motion for judgment, the moving party may make a motion for JNOV following an adverse jury verdict. See Md. Rules 2-519 and ³⁵² 2-532(a).

A motion for judgment must be made at the close of all the evidence before a motion for JNOV can be properly-made and ruled on by the court. Md. Rule 2-532(a). See P. Niemeyer & L. Richards, Maryland Rules Commentary, 430-31 (2003) (Noting that in Maryland, “[t]he safe practice is to renew the motion routinely at the conclusion of all the evidence. The renewal of a motion for judgment also preserves the opportunity to move for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 2-532(a) in the event that the verdict goes against the moving party.”).

When we interpret the Maryland Rules of Procedure, we apply the same rules of construction that we use to interpret statutes. Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 78 , 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (2001) (citations omitted). We endeavor to “ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.” O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 113 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004); Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 260 , 647 A.2d 1204, 1206 (1994). The “goal of our examination is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 605 , 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004).

Accordingly, we must ascertain the intent of this Court from the language of both Rule 2-519 and 2-532, requiring that all the evidence be completed before a party may move for judgment or JNOV in a jury trial. Maryland Rule 2-532 was adopted in 1984. It is a compilation of Rule 563 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The first Maryland rule discussing motions for JNOV was Trial Rule 8.

Later, the Rules Committee drafted several new trial rules, including the motion for JNOV, to reduce costs to litigants and promote time efficiency by reducing both retrials and duplicate trials due to errors. See 1947 Cumulative Supplement to the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland, Explanatory Notes at 2073. The Rules Committee noted that trial errors could not be completely eliminated; however, “it is possible to provide various means for minimizing the likeli ³⁵³ hood of such errors, or for correcting them.... A number of devices for these purposes have been developed ... including] ... judgment notwithstanding the verdict.... ” Id.

The specific reason the Committee drafted Rule 8 was: At present when a party moves at the close of the evidence for a directed verdict, the Court faces a dilemma if the question is doubtful. If the verdict is directed and the ruling reversed on appeal, a new trial is required; while if the lower court refuses the motion, but concludes after the verdict that the motion should have been granted, it can only grant a new trial, although the Court of Appeals could now enter the proper judgment. To correct this, many states have authorized the lower court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Under this practice, after the verdict or disagreement of the jury, the party who moved for the directed verdict may renew his motion within a specified time, and the court, if convinced that judgment should have been directed, may enter judgment accordingly despite the verdict or disagreement of the jury.

The opposing party may, of course, appeal from this ruling and the upper court, if it reverses on this ground, may reinstate the verdict. 1947 Explanatory Notes, Trial Rule 8 at 2085-86. The 1941 version of Trial Rule 8 did not include the mandatory language of today’s Rule 2-532(a). Compare, 1943 Supplement to the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland, Trial Rule 8 at 1219-20, “(a) Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made by a party at the close of all the evidence is denied ...” with Rule 2-532(a), “In a jury trial, a party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence.... ” The 1941 version of Trial Rule 4, lor Directed Verdicts, however, did include the mandatory language of Rule 2-532(a). It stated in relevant part: A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted without having re ³⁵⁴ served the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made, but in so doing he withdraws the motion.

Trial Rule 4,1943 Supplement at 1219-20. From the inception of Trial Rule 8 and Trial Rule 4 we have applied a strict compliance prerequisite to the motion for JNOV. The strict compliance language can be traced back sixty years: Trial Rule 8 ... introduces in this State a new practice with respect to judgments n.o.v.....But for the rule to be applicable the case must be one in which the party may be entitled to a directed verdict and the party must move for such a verdict at the close of all the evidence. Hajewski v. County Com’rs of Baltimore County, 184 Md. 161, 165 , 40 A.2d 316, 318 (1944) (emphasis added).

In a case factually similar to the case at bar, Baltimore Harbor Charters, Ltd. v. Ayd, 134 Md.App. 188 , 759 A.2d 1091 (2000), affirmed in part on other grounds, vacated in part, and remanded, 365 Md. 366 , 780 A.2d 303 (2001), the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not err when it denied a motion for JNOV that was not preceded by a motion for judgment at the close of all of the evidence by the party seeking the JNOV. Baltimore Harbor Charters, Ltd., 134 Md.App. at 198 , 759 A.2d at 1096 . In that case Baltimore Harbor Charter, Ltd., (BHC), the defendant, conceded on appeal that it failed to renew its motion at the close of all the evidence but contended that its motion at the end of Ayd’s case-in-chief was sufficient to preserve its right to make a motion for JNOV. 11 The intermediate appellate court conclud ³⁵⁵ ed that the trial judge did not err in denying BHC’s motion for JNOV “because BHC failed to follow the dictates of Rule 2-532(a) that a motion for judgment must be made at the close of all the evidence in order to preserve the right to move for a JNOV.” Id. The issue of the JNOV motion was not raised in the petition for writ of certiorari in that case.

We note, however, that the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion regarding the motion is consistent with our holding here today. Historically, our motion for JNOV was never meant to be simply a guide to follow but rather to set forth a precise and unambiguous requirement for the trial court. 12 We abide by the plain language of Md. Rule l-201(a), which, in part, states that, “[tjhese rules shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. When a rule, by the word ³⁵⁶ ‘shall’ or otherwise, mandates or prohibits conduct, the consequences of noncompliance are those prescribed by these rules or by statute.” As we have said time and time again, the Maryland rules are “precise rubrics,” which are to be strictly followed. Robinson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346 , 278 A.2d 71, 73 (1971) (quoting Brown v. Fraley, 222 Md. 480, 483 , 161 A.2d 128, 130 (1960)); Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 557 , 446 A.2d 844, 848 (1982) (stating that, “[tjhis Court has firmly adhered to the principle that the rules of procedure are precise rubrics to be strictly followed, and we shall continue to do so”); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 463 , 408 A.2d 1302, 1311 (1979); Isen v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 259 Md. 564, 570 , 270 A.2d 476, 479 (1970); see also Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 623 , 751 A.2d 473, 479 (2000) (stating that, “our adherence to the more general principle that the rules of practice and procedure adopted by this Court are to be strictly followed ... ”).

Maryland case law is well settled on this issue. The federal circuits, however, are split regarding whether a motion or renewal of a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence is a mere technicality or a prerequisite to a post-trial motion for judgment. In interpreting the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) and (b), 13 some federal courts have ³⁵⁷ abided by the view that “[i]t is well settled that a court can only consider a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if the moving party has previously made a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.” 14 Portage II v. Bryant Petroleum Corp., 899 F.2d 1514, 1522 (6th Cir.1990). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, Advisory Committee Notes (“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict will not lie unless it was preceded by a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence.”).

Those circuits requiring strict compliance hold that a motion at the close of plaintiffs case is never sufficient to support a Rule 50(b) motion. See Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., Ltd., 100 F.3d 1353, 1364 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that “[t]his [cjourt gives effect to the plain language of Rule 50(b) by requiring that a motion for judgment as a matter of law be made at the close of all the evidence in order to be preserved for post-trial consideration”); 15 Hudson v. NeXus Worldwide Holdings, Ltd., 191 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.2000) (holding that defendant’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at close of all the evidence precluded him from obtaining judgment as a matter of law following an adverse jury verdict, even if the plaintiff was not prejudiced); Redd v. City of Phenix City, Alabama, 934 F.2d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir.1991) (stating that in applying Rule 50 the court is, “presented with ³⁵⁸ a particularly clear and mechanical rule of law; the City did not comply and the district judge may not waive his magic wand dismissing a procedural requirement as a technicality”). The requirement that a party must renew the motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence serves two fundamental purposes. First, renewal of the motion “enables the trial court to examine the sufficiency of all the evidence before submitting the question to the jury.” Petit v. City of Chicago, 239 F.Supp.2d 761 (N.D.Ill.2002).

And second, it “alerts the opposing party to any defect in its case, thereby affording it an opportunity to cure any such defect.” Id. In Szmaj v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir.2002), the court pointed out that, if a motion for judgment