Giles & Ransome, Inc. v. First National Realty Corp.

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County sustaining without leave to amend a demurrer to a petition for the foreclosure of a mechanics’ lien. Giles and Ransome, Inc., the lessor of earth-moving equipment to the grading subcontractor, is the appellant. And the First National Realty Corporation, the owner of a department store building in Greenbelt, and others, are the appellees. ²⁰⁵ The owner, having agreed to erect and lease the building to S. Klein Department Store, entered into a contract with a general contractor, the Regional Construction Company, Inc., for the construction of the project.

The general contractor, in turn, subcontracted with the Hurd Corporation, to grade the building lot to street level. And the subcontractor arranged with the lessor to supply the necessary equipment on a rental basis. The equipment was sent when needed, was kept in running order and was removed when the grading was completed, but the equipment was operated by mechanics of the subcontractor. Only a part of the rental and service charges were paid by the subcontractor and a lien for the balance of $48,423.87 was filed against the owner and others.

The questions presented on appeal are essentially (i) whether the leasing of earth-moving equipment to a grading subcontractor constituted either “work done for or about” the premises or a debt “contracted for work done for or about” the erection of a building within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law, for which the lessor would be entitled to a lien, and (ii) whether a lessor of equipment to a contractor or subcontractor is within the class of persons entitled to a lien. Code (1964 Repl. Yol. 5), Art. 63, § 1, provides in pertinent part that “every building erected * * * shall be subject to a lien for the payment of all debts contracted for work done for or about the [premises], and for materials furnished for or about the same.” Although it is settled that the statute is to be construed in the most liberal and comprehensive manner in favor of mechanics and materialmen, the party seeking a lien must nevertheless come within the plain meaning and obvious purpose of the statute. And where a person is not within the statutory provisions, the scope of the law may not be extended by the courts.

Freeform Pools v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, 228 Md. 297, 179 A. 2d 683 (1962); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lacios, 121 Md. 686 , 89Atl. 323 (1913). It appears that whether or not the lessor of equipment to a contractor or a subcontractor is entitled to a lien for the rental of first impression in this State. We have decided somewhat of and service charges on the equipment supplied is a question ²⁰⁶ related questions in several cases, but none of them are directly in point on the question here presented. In the main, the lessor relies on Gill v. Mullan, 140 Md. 1 , 116 Atl. 563 (1922) and House v. Fissell, 188 Md. 160 , 51 A. 2d 669 (1947), to support its entitlement to the lien.

It is true that in these cases, the Court, after ruling that such items as the depreciation on construction machinery and the cost of fuel and oil used in the operation thereof did not constitute materials within the meaning of the statute, nevertheless held in Gill that there was nothing to preclude the claim of a lien for “work done” and held in House that such items could be brought within the statute as “debts contracted for work done for or about the building,” but in Gill the lienor was a subcontractor and in House he was the general contractor, and neither case involved the rental of equipment for the particular job. The owner, on the other hand, relies on Basshor v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 65 Md. 99 , 3 Atl. 285 (1886), and State use Gwynns Falls Quarry Co. v. National Surety Co., 148 Md. 221 , 128 Atl. 916 (1925), but there is nothing in either of these cases which compels a holding in the instant case that the lessor is not entitled to a lien for the rental of its earth-moving equipment. In Basshor , where the contractor for building a railroad bridge had bought stone-crushing machinery to be used in the manufacture of artificial stone for the masonry work, it was held that the seller of the machinery was not entitled to a lien