Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks

GREENE, J. Linda Hanks filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, seeking benefits for an occupational disease sustained on March 1, 1990. The Commission determined on April 22, 1991, that Ms. Hanks should be compensated. Thereafter, Ms. Hanks filed several issues, requesting additional relief from the Commission. Gleneagles, Inc., the employer, contested Ms. Hanks’s entitlement to additional benefits.

In April 2000, Ms. Hanks impleaded the Subsequent Injury Fund. In May, 2003, the Commission held a hearing and issued an Award of Compensation, finding, among other things, that Ms. Hanks had sustained a permanent partial disability, of which 50% was attributable to the occupational disease of March 1, 1990. The Commission also found that Ms. Hanks’s claim was not barred by limitations. The Commission ordered Glen-eagles to pay Ms. Hanks $282.00 per week, beginning April 28, 1992, and continuing for 333 weeks.

The Commission also ordered the Fund to pay Ms. Hanks $144.00 per week, beginning at the end of Gleneagles’ payments and continuing for 240 weeks. The award accounted from 1992, resulting in an obligation of $93,906 for Gleneagles and $34,560 for the Fund. ⁴⁹⁵ Gleneagles 1 filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Harford County. Gleneagles also filed a Request for Immediate Temporary Restraining Order and Request for Stay and/or Preliminary Injunction. On May 22, 2003, a judge of the Circuit Court held a hearing in chambers on those requests.

The court granted injunctive relief to Gleneagles on May 27, 2003, issuing a temporary restraining order and stating that the Commission’s order of May 9, 2003, “is stayed by this order and the employer and insurer are required to make no monetary payments to the claimant pursuant to that order.” The court held another hearing on July 28, 2003, to address Ms. Hanks’s request to review the Temporary Restraining Order. The court issued an Order and Memorandum Opinion on September 19, 2003, striking the prior order and stating that the court had no authority to grant a stay of an Award of Compensation issued by the Commission. Gleneagles appealed. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court.

Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 156 Md.App. 543 , 847 A.2d 520 (2004). 2 Gleneagles petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted. Gleneagles v. Hanks, 382 Md. 687 , 856 A.2d 723 (2004). The issue before the Court is whether the circuit court has the authority to grant injunctive relief in a workers’ compensation case pending an appeal of an award of monetary benefits from the Workers’ Compensation Commission. We affirm the intermediate appellate court and hold that the court does not have the authority to issue a stay or an injunction pending the appeal of an award of monetary benefits from the ⁴⁹⁶ Workers’ Compensation Commission.

We shall adopt the Factual and Procedural History section of the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion, located at 156 Md.App. at 547-50 , 847 A.2d 520 , in order to avoid repeating the detailed facts, none of which are disputed by the parties. STANDARD OF REVIEW Md. Rule 8-131 requires the appellate court to review actions tried without a jury on the law and the evidence. There is no factual dispute in the case at bar. The question in this case is a legal one.

While we have previously stated that trial courts have broad authority to issue injunctive relief Roper v. Camuso, 376 Md. 240, 260 , 829 A.2d 589, 601 (2003), this case is ultimately a question of statutory interpretation; and, therefore, we review the Circuit Court’s interpretation of the statute de novo. See Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 , 861 A.2d 78, 80 (noting that because “... provisions of the Maryland Code, and the Maryland Rules are appropriately classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters.”). DISCUSSION ■ We begin by noting that the Workers’ Compensation Act “ ‘should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant.’ ” Harris v. Board of Education of Howard County, 375 Md. 21, 57 , 825 A.2d 365, 387 (2003) (quoting Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97 , 656 A.2d 757, 761-62 (1995)).

Section 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article states, in pertinent part, that “[a]n appeal is not a stay of: (1) an order of the Commission requiring payment of compensation!;.]” Md.Code (1991,1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article. In addition, Md. Rule 7-205 states: The filing of a petition does not stay the order or action of the administrative agency. Upon motion and after hearing, ⁴⁹⁷ the court may grant a stay, unless prohibited by law, upon the conditions as to bond or otherwise that the court considers proper. The “cross references” note after the Rule only cites § 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article.

We think that notation is significant. The language of § 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article and the case law interpreting the “no-stay” provision informs us that in the case of a Workers’ Compensation Commission award, the court may not grant a stay, under Md. Rule 7-205, because to do so is “prohibited by law.” Gleneagles argues that despite the prohibition of a stay found in § 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article, the Circuit Court nonetheless had the power to grant some kind of injunctive relief to Gleneagles, pending the appeal of the award to Ms. Hanks. In support of its argument, Gleneagles posits the general equitable power of the courts 3 and relies on Md. Rules 15-501, et seq. Md. Rule 15-501 provides, in pertinent part: ⁴⁹⁸ (a) Injunction. “Injunction” means an order mandating or prohibiting a specified act.

(b) Preliminary injunction. “Preliminary injunction” means an injunction granted after opportunity for a full adversary hearing on the propriety of its issuance but before a final determination of the merits of the action. (c) Temporary restraining order. “Temporary restraining order” means an injunction granted without opportunity for a full adversary hearing on the propriety of its issuance. Gleneagles asserts that to obtain a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, one must overcome particular obstacles 4 that are not required when obtaining a stay and, therefore, § 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article does ⁴⁹⁹ not prohibit the grant of injunctive relief under Md. Rules 15-501, et seq. of the Maryland Rules. 5 We disagree. While there are differences in the rules regarding obtaining a stay of an administrative decision and an injunction generally, the result in this case is the same.

Whether it is called an injunction, a temporary restraining order, or a stay, Hanks was deprived of her workers’ compensation award pending appeal. That is the very result the Legislature intended to avoid by enacting the “no-stay” provision. The general equitable powers of the courts cannot be relied upon in a case in which jurisdiction has been limited by law, as accomplished by § 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article. As stated in § 1-501 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, ⁵⁰⁰ [t]he circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the State.

Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county, and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal: Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 1-501 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). In Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482 , 144 A. 696 (1929) we discussed the “no stay” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act and whether that provision violated the right to jury trial because insurer/employers could be forced to pay awards before their appeals had been tried and determined. We determined that the “no stay” provision did not violate the right to jury trial.

In addition, we stated: The right of the Legislature to provide that an appeal from a decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission shall not be a stay could not be denied, consistently with the principle upon which the general validity of the act has been adjudicated. Its design was to insure speedy, as well as certain, relief in proper cases within the scope of its application. That humanitarian policy would be seriously hampered if the weekly payments of compensation awarded by the commission could be suspended because of an appeal. In providing that an appeal should not be a stay the statute was simply adopting a necessary expedient to accomplish one of the important purposes for which it was enacted.

Id. at 489 , 144 A. 696 (emphasis added). Suspending payments of a compensation award by means of an injunction is just as detrimental to the claimant as suspending payment by means of a stay. We do not agree with Gleneagles that the different procedures for obtaining an injunction makes the grant of one any more palatable as far as the Workers’ Compensation Act is concerned. ⁵⁰¹ Gleneagles argues that to deny them injunctive relief in this case is particularly harsh because of the large lump-sum payments ordered and because the law does not permit them to “recover back” any payments made even if they are ultimately successful on appeal. In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance v. Treadwell, 263 Md. 430 , 283 A.2d 601 (1971), the insurer paid Treadwell the awarded compensation and then prevailed on appeal.

Treadwell, 263 Md. at 430-31 , 283 A.2d at 602 . The insurer sought to recover the amount paid. Id. We noted that the statute did not contain explicit language forbidding or authorizing recovery of an award paid and later reversed on appeal.

Treadwell, 263 Md. at 431 , 283 A.2d at 602 . The insurer argued that the Legislature must have intended the recovery of such payments or it would not have given the employer the right to appeal. Id. The insurer also argued that to decide otherwise would result in the unjust enrichment of the claimant.

Id. In Treadwell , we relied on Article 101, § 56(a), (the predecessor to § 9-741 of the Labor and Employment Article) 6 to hold that an overpayment does not permit a recovery. Treadwell, 263 Md. at 431-32 , 283 A.2d at 602 . We discussed Branch and the humanitarian policy of providing speedy relief in proper cases.

Treadwell, 263 Md. at 432 , 283 A.2d at 602 . We also quoted, with approval, the Kansas Supreme Court’s ⁵⁰² statement that “[t]he workmen’s compensation act establishes a procedure of its own covering every phase of the right to compensation and of the procedure for obtaining and enforcing it, which procedure is complete and exclusive in itself.” Treadwell, 263 Md. at 436 , 283 A.2d at 604 quoting Tompkins v. George Rinner Construction Co., 196 Kan. 244 , 409 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1966) (holding that no recovery back was permitted, even though the workers’ compensation award was reversed on appeal). 7 We explained the decision to prohibit recovery after a successful appeal by stating: As we see it, when the Legislature enacted the “no stay” provision in § 56(a) it must have foreseen the possibility, and as well the probability that payments would be made to claimants whose awards subsequently would be vacated on appeal. That it made no provision for the restitution of those payments suggests to us that restitution was considered and rejected, and that, in lieu thereof, the disposition of appeals was expedited by giving them precedence over all cases except criminal cases. Surely this can hardly be said to serve any purpose other than the mitigation of the employer’s obligation to pay as ordered until the appeal has been decided....

It is of interest also to note that Mr. Pressman states categorically that the employer cannot recover any overpayments made to the claimant in the event of a reversal of the decision of the Commission. M. Pressman, Workmen’s Compensation in Maryland § 4-15 (1970). Treadwell, 263 Md. at 437-38 , 283 A.2d at 605 . In conclusion, we noted that the “no stay” language of the statute reflected “a legislative intent to preclude ‘recovery back’ upon any theory, except fraud perhaps.

If we are mistaken in this regard the General Assembly will know how to enlighten us.” Treadwell, 263 Md. at 439 , 283 A.2d at 606 . ⁵⁰³ While we appreciate the difficult position in which Gleneagles finds itself as a result of the large lump-sum award, we are not permitted to change the law for them. In Petillo v. Stein, 184 Md. 644 , 42 A.2d 675 (1945), we discussed a case in which a claimant had received a lump-sum payment of a Commission award from which the employer and insurer appealed. Petillo, 184 Md. at 646-47 , 42 A.2d at 676 . We discussed Branch and noted that that case involved “only the stay of weekly payments.” Petillo, 184 Md. at 649 , 42 A.2d at 677 .

Nonetheless, we also stated that, [fjailure to get a stay of converted lump-sum payments, especially if they consume the whole of the award, may raise other questions under some conditions. We are concerned here, however, only with statutory provisions. No question arises of judicial relief where substantial fundamental rights are violated by arbitrary or unreasonable administrative action without adequate statutory remedy.... The Legislature did not qualify its requirement that an appeal shall not be a stay, and we cannot attach any conditions to it.

We must hold, following our previous decisions, that it applies to all appeals including those from converted or commuted awards. Petillo, 184 Md. at 649 , 42 A.2d at 677 (internal citations omitted). The size of the award against Gleneagles is no reason to abandon our previous jurisprudence regarding the legislative mandate that an appeal is not a stay of a Commission award. 8 As we stated in Petillo , while lump sum awards are the “exception rather than the rule,” they are permitted. Petillo, 184 Md. at 652-53 , 42 A.2d at 679 . ⁵⁰⁴ The Legislature wisely left the determination of when they should be made, and to what extent, in the discretion of the administrative body charged with special knowledge of the subject.

This authority given to the Commission is safeguarded by ample opportunity for review by the courts. In cases where an appeal by the employer and the insurer is pending, the Commission should be careful to see that no damage is done to their fundamental rights by granting a request for a lump-sum conversion. On the other hand, there may be cases in which converted awards are very necessary for the proper care of injured workmen and their dependents. We cannot assume, in the case before us, that the Commission did not properly consider all the circumstances before it acted.

Petillo, 184 Md. at 653 , 42 A.2d at 679 . Similarly, we cannot assume that the Commission failed to properly consider all the circumstances before it acted in this case. 9 We have previously discussed seeming inequities in the Workers’ Compensation Act and concluded that the Legislature must be the body to remedy any unfairness, should they consider it necessary. As stated in Paul v. Glidden, 184 Md. 114 , 39 A.2d 544 (1944), ⁵⁰⁵ [t]he Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed to promote the general welfare of the State and to prevent the State and its taxpayers from having to care for injured workmen and their dependents, when under the law as it previously existed, such workmen could not recover damages for their injuries. There were, in its first enactment, certain inequalities which have, from time to time, been corrected by amendment.

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