Glickfield v. State

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant was convicted of attempted bribery of a football player in a trial before the court without a jury, and sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to serve an indeterminate sentence of 18 months. Error is first alleged in the overruling of his motion to dismiss the indictment. The indictment charged that Glickfield on October 23, 1952, “did unlawfully and corruptly offer to Thomas E. Cosgrove, who was then and there a player on the University of Maryland football team and a participant in an athletic contest between the University of Maryland and Louisiana State University, held on the 25th day of October, 1952, at College Park, Prince George’s County, Maryland, the sum of $1,000 in an attempt to bribe the said Thomas Cosgrove to control the score in the said athletic contest * * The motion to dismiss was on the ground that Section 30, Article ⁴⁰³ 27, of the 1951 Code, upon which the indictment was based, is so vague, indefinite and ambiguous that it cannot meet constitutional requirements.

Section 30, Article 27, of the 1951 Code, as enacted by Chapter 612, Acts of 1939, provides: “Any person or persons who shall bribe or attempt to bribe any persons participating in or connected in any way with any athletic contest held in this State shall be deemed guilty of bribery * * It may be noted that Section 31, Article 27, of the 1951 Code, as enacted by Chapter 67, Acts of 1947, makes it a misdemeanor for any participant in an athletic contest to accept a “bribe to alter the outcome” of said athletic contest. Thus, in the case of the taker, as distinguished from the giver, of a bribe in connection with an athletic contest, the purpose of the inducement is more specifically defined. However, we think the difference in phraseology is immaterial, for the words as to alteration of outcome are implicit in the word “bribe.” A typical definition of the word is that found in the Oxford English Dictionary: “To influence corruptly, by a reward or consideration, the action of (a person); to pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct by a gift.” In the context, we think the bribery of a player refers to a corrupt influence upon his performance with reference to the outcome, in this case, the score. The words of a statute must be accorded the meaning naturally given them in ordinary usage.

Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 370 . It is commonly understood that players are under at least a moral duty to exert their honest efforts for their side. Indeed, it might be said that the sporting concept of fair play is not only commonly understood but is one of the basic tenets of Anglo-American jurisprudence. We need not now consider whether a mere inducement to play harder would amount to a bribe.

Here we have an allegation that money was offered “to control the score.” The testimony was that the specific offer was conditioned upon Cosgrove, in the key position of offensive center, ⁴⁰⁴ playing in such a fashion that the University of Maryland would not win the forthcoming game by more than 201/2 points, this being the spread upon which certain gambling syndicates were operating. The appellant argues that the statute is fatally vague and contradictory because at common law the crime of bribery connoted the corrupt influencing of official action only, and a participant in an athletic contest is in no sense a public official. It is true that the common law offense was so limited. Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed).

Vol. 3, p. 2522 defines the crime of bribery at common law as “corruptly, tendering or receiving a price for official action.” It was limited under the previous statute (Section 29, Article 27, Code of 1951) to specified public officers or public employees in the performance of their official duties. Cf. Cunningham v. State, 190 Md. 578 . But we perceive no reason why the legislature cannot remove the limitation, and in this instance we think it has done so by extending the offense to participants in athletic contests, whose duty to perform with honesty and integrity is analogous to the duty imposed by law upon persons holding public office or performing a public function.

It is of course true that a statute so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the constitutional guarantee of due process. Martin v. State, 203 Md. 66, 77 , 98 A. 2d 8, 13 , and cases cited. But we cannot suppose that a person of ordinary intelligence reading this statute would be in doubt as to the nature of the acts condemned. Nor do we entertain any doubt that the judgment in question will fail to protect the