Glorius v. Watkins

Sobeloff, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case had its origin in a bill in equity by the appellee reciting that the appellants were in possession of a piece of real estate belonging to her; that the appellants were the assignees from one Haviland of a written contract to purchase the property by monthly installments; that the appellants had defaulted and a new agreement was made surrendering the old contract and appellants then became tenants instead of ⁵⁴⁸ purchasers; that the appellants had refused to pay rent; and that, nevertheless, after a lapse of thirteen years the appellants recorded the original contract under which they are claiming as purchasers. The appellee alleged that the recording of this instrument constituted a cloud on her title, and prayed the equity court to take jurisdiction and declare that she had a good and merchantable title free of any interest of the appellants. The appellants demurred to the bill of complaint on the ground that it did not state a case entitling the complainant to any relief in equity.

They also answered setting up their claims under the old agreement as anticipated in the bill of complaint. After taking testimony the court granted the relief prayed by the appellee, and this appeal followed. The history of the Maryland legislation providing for the declaratory remedy, by decree or judgment, has been so fully, frequently and recently expounded that the subject need not be reviewed at length here. It is true, as the appellee contends, that since the enactment of Chapter 724 of the Acts of 1945, amending Section 6 of Article 31A, Code 1939, the existence of an adequate remedy at law or in equity does not preclude the availability of a declaratory judgment or decree in an appropriate case.

Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Service Co., 192 Md. 333, 338 , 64 A. 2d 151, 153 ; and cases therein cited. This, however, does not mean the obliteration of the traditional distinction between law and equity. If the proceeding is of a legal nature, it does not become equitable when cast in the form of a demand for a declaratory decree; just as a remedy purely legal cannot be sought in an equity court merely by invoking Article 31A. Judge Henderson’s sententious expression in Bachman v. Lembach, 192 Md. 35, 43 , 63 A. 2d 641, 644 , is apposite here.

He said, “We find nothing in the statute that would enlarge the equitable jurisdiction upon a mere prayer for declaratory relief, although such relief is available either at law or in equity, in an appropriate case.” See also, Schultz v. ⁵⁴⁹ Kaplan, 189 Md. 402 , 56 A. 2d 17 . The issue is not the existence of another remedy, for this is immaterial under Article 31A, Section 6, 1951 Code; the question is whether equity is a proper forum in which to seek the desired declaration. The relief sought by the appellee is essentially legal, and clearly available in ejectment. While title to real estate may sometimes be adjudicated in equity on a bill quia timet, this is not such a case because the complainant alleged she was not in possession.

Kelly v. Nice, 141 Md. 472 , 119 A. 333 ; Schultz v. Kaplan, supra; Redwood, Hotel v. Korbien, 195 Md. 402 , 73 A. 2d 468 . The case of Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412 , 24 A. 2d 795 , relied on by appellee, does not support her contention. It is distinguishable, for there irreparable injury from interference with a right of way, without opportunity for timely redress at law, was claimed. Here title to a piece of land is the only matter in issue, and no special circumstances for equitable consideration appear.

Where the object of a proceeding is to obtain possession, the remedy is ejectment. Equity entertains jurisdiction where, although the complainant fears vexatious litigation due to a cloud on his title, he nevertheless cannot sue in ejectment because he is already in possession. The ground of equity jurisdiction in such a case is that being in possession he is denied a remedy at law. In the instant case complete relief could be given in the legal forum, and if the appellee should prevail in ejectment this would effectually terminate any cloud on her title which she fears from the recent recording by the appellants of the original agreement between the appellee and Haviland, and of the assignment of that agreement to them.

If appellee wished additionally the incidental advantage of a specific declaration, either affirmative or negative in form, as to the status of the recorded documents, that would be available to her under Article 31A, Section 6, 1951 Code in a proceeding for a declaratory judgment at law, but not by resort to equity. ⁵⁵⁰