Martin v. Howard County

ELDRIDGE, Judge. Maryland Code (1974, 1996 Repl.Vol.), § 14-120 of the Real Property Article, creates a cause of action to “abate” a nuisance when real property is used in connection with certain ⁴⁷² controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia. The plaintiff in this case filed a complaint under § 14-120, seeking an order requiring a tenant to vacate a federally-subsidized apartment and seeking restitution of the property to the landlord. The question presented is whether, in light of the nature of this proceeding, Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights gives the tenant a right to a jury trial. 1 I. Before turning to the facts of this case, we shall briefly review § 14-120 of the Real Property Article.

Section 14-120 was enacted by Ch. 505 of the Acts of 1991. According to the title of Ch. 505, the enactment was “[f]or the purpose of permitting certain persons to bring an action to abate a nuisance when certain property is being used for certain controlled dangerous substance offenses.” Subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) of § 14-120 together define the meaning of “nuisance” for purposes of the statute as follows: “(3) ‘Controlled dangerous substances’ has the meaning stated in Article 27, § 279(a) and (b) of the Code. “(4) ‘Nuisance’ means a property that is used: (i) By persons who assemble for the specific purpose of illegally administering a controlled dangerous substance; (ii) For the illegal manufacture, or distribution of: 1. A controlled dangerous substance; or 2. Controlled paraphernalia, as defined in Article 27, § 287(d) of the Code; or ⁴⁷³ (iii) For the illegal storage or concealment of a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under all the circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense: 1.

A controlled dangerous substance; or 2. Controlled paraphernalia, as defined in Article 27, § 287(d) of the Code.” With respect to leasehold property, subsection (a)(6)(i) defines a “tenant” as “the lessee or a person occupying property, whether or not a party to a lease.” Section 14-120(b) specifies that the judicial proceedings authorized by the statute are under Code (1974, 1996 Repl. Vol.), § 4-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides for actions within the exclusive original civil jurisdiction of the District Court of Maryland. Thus, an action under § 14-120 must initially be brought in the District Court.

Subsection (b) goes on to specify that the action “may be brought by: (1) The State’s Attorney of the county in which the nuisance is located; (2) The county attorney or solicitor of the county in which the nuisance is located; or (3) A community association within whose boundaries the nuisance is located.” Subsections (e) and (f) delineate the remedies available in an action under § 14-120. Subsection (e), relating to equitable remedies, states as follows: “(e) The court may issue an injunction or order other equitable relief whether or not an adequate remedy exists at law.” Subsection (f) provides for additional remedies as follows: “(f)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in addition to or as a component of any remedy ordered under subsection (e) of this section, the court, after a hearing, may order a tenant with knowledge of the existence of the nuisance to vacate the property within 72 hours. ⁴⁷⁴ (2) The court, after a hearing, may grant a judgment of restitution or the possession of the property to the owner if: (i) The owner and lessee are parties to the action; and (ii) A tenant has failed to obey an order under subsection (e) of this section or paragraph (1) of this subsection. (3) If the court orders restitution of the possession of the property under paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall immediately issue its warrant to the sheriff or constable commanding execution of the warrant within 5 days after issuance of the warrant. (4) The court may order the owner of the property to submit for court approval a plan of correction to ensure, to the extent reasonably possible, that the property will not again be used for a nuisance if: (i) The owner is a party to the action; and (ii) The owner knew of the existence of the nuisance.” The remaining provisions of the statute concern the admissibility of evidence in an action under § 14-120, costs, attorney’s fees, and times for appeal.

II

In 1994 Howard County, pursuant to § 14-120, filed a “Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance and Restitution of Possession of the Premises” in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Howard County. 2 The defendants were Columbia Housing Limited Partnership, Sandra Kay Martin, and Van Albert Carroll. The County alleged that Columbia Housing owned a townhouse at 5519 Cedar Lane, Columbia, Maryland, and that Martin and Carroll were tenants therein. The ' County further alleged that the tenants’ rent was “subsidized ⁴⁷⁵ by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, pursuant to [Chapter] 8 of [Title 42 of] the United States Code.” The complaint went on to assert that Martin and Carroll “have knowingly permitted the leased premises to be used for the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, controlled paraphernalia, or the illegal storage or concealment of a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to indicate ... an intent to distribute or dispense the same.” Howard County’s complaint requested the following specific relief in addition to costs and attorney’s fees: “(a) Order Defendants Sandra K. Martin and Van Albert Carroll to vacate the property within 72 hours after a hearing on this matter; “(b) Grant Defendant Columbia Homes Limited Partnership restitution of possession of the property____” Martin filed a timely request for a jury trial. After some procedural skirmishing in the District Court, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Howard County. 3 The County filed a motion in the circuit court to strike the demand for a jury trial, asserting that the action was equitable in nature and that, therefore, there was no right to a jury trial under Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights.

This motion was initially denied by the circuit court. ⁴⁷⁶ The County also filed a new complaint in the circuit court which was identical to the complaint filed in the District Court except for the title and caption. The title was changed from “Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance and Restitution of Possession of the Premises” to “Complaint For Injunctive Relief.” Nevertheless, the new complaint, like the old one, did not request an injunction against the continuation of the alleged nuisance. The only specific relief requested was an order requiring Martin and Carroll to vacate the premises, an order granting restitution of the property to the landlord, costs and attorney’s fees. 4 The defendant Martin filed an answer to the circuit court complaint, denying the allegations that the defendant Carroll was a tenant or resident of the townhouse,. and denying the allegations concerning nuisance, controlled dangerous substances, and controlled paraphernalia. 5 The case was scheduled for a jury trial to be held on January 9,1995. When the case was called for trial on January 9, 1995, counsel for the defendant landlord stated that the landlord agreed with the County’s position and “consent[ed]” to the relief sought by the County.

The circuit court thereupon directed the clerk to enter a judgment against the landlord; a “judgment against def. Columbia Housing” was entered on the docket, and the landlord was not thereafter treated as a party. 6 Next on January 9, 1995, before jury selection began, and during remarks by the County’s attorney when the attorney ⁴⁷⁷ referred to the caption of the complaint as a “Complaint for Injunctive Relief,” the circuit judge sua sponte raised the issue of the defendant Martin’s entitlement to a jury trial. The County reiterated its argument that the proceeding was equitable in nature and that “one does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial [in an action to enjoin] a nuisance.” While acknowledging that it sought the eviction of the tenants and an order restoring the property to the landlord, the County distinguished Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Comm’n, 306 Md. 515 , 510 A.2d 540 (1986), and similar cases “in the federal system,” on the ground that those cases involved evictions and restitution of premises under leases, whereas the eviction and restitution in the present case were sought by a government entity under a statute. The County also stated that it was not relying on any argument that the amount in controversy, ie. the value of the right to possession, was insufficient to trigger the constitutional right to a jury trial.

Instead, the County made it clear that it was relying on the nature of the proceeding. Martin’s attorney argued that if the county were only seeking an injunction to stop the continuation of the alleged nuisance, pursuant to subsection (e) of § 14-120, Martin “would be happy” to forego a jury trial. Nevertheless, Martin’s attorney went on to point out that, instead of seeking an injunction under subsection (e), the County was seeking to evict Martin and restore the property to the landlord. According to Martin’s attorney, since “we are talking about taking her right to a possessory interest in the property, then she does have her right to a jury trial ..., which has been recognized in the cases Joy v. Daniels, [ 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir.1973) ] as well as Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Commission, [ 306 Md. 515 , 510 A.2d 540 (1986) ].” Answering the circuit court’s comment that § 14-120 was enacted “subsequent to that [Carroll ] case [and] possibly in response to it,” Martin’s attorney specifically invoked the tenant’s constitutional right to a jury trial in actions of this nature.

The circuit court agreed with the County’s argument, struck its earlier order denying the county’s motion to strike the ⁴⁷⁸ request for a jury trial, granted the County’s motion, and remanded the case to the District Court for trial. 7 Martin appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed. Martin v. Howard County, 107 Md.App. 331 , 667 A.2d 992 (1995). In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that actions by landlords to evict tenants and recover possession of property are actions at law to which the right of jury trial attaches. 107 Md.App. at 341 , 667 A.2d at 997 . Nevertheless, the intermediate appellate court held that an action under § 14—120(f)(1) for an order requiring a tenant with knowledge of the nuisance to vacate the premises “is clearly injunctive in nature,” “presumably could be enforced through contempt proceedings,” is “exclusively equitable,” and thus is not the type of action for which there is a right to a jury trial. 107 Md.App. at 342, 344 , 667 A.2d at 998 .

The Court of Special Appeals stated that “[s]uch an order, by itself, does not terminate the tenancy,” that an order to vacate under § 14-120(f)(l) “would not seem to preclude even an ousted tenant from subleasing the property or assigning his lease,” and that, under § 14—120(f)(1), the order could be for “a temporary ouster.” 107 Md.App. at 342-343 , 667 A.2d at 998 . The court also relied on the definition of “tenant” in § 14-120 “to include any person ‘occupying property, whether or not a party to a lease,’ and so may include” persons “who are not tenants in the traditional property law sense.” 107 Md.App. at 342 , 667 A.2d at 998 . The intermediate appellate court stated that an order to vacate the premises under § 14-120(f)(1) “is not significantly different from” a protective order, requiring an abuser to vacate the family home, issued under Maryland’s Domestic Violence Act, Code (1984, 1991 ReplVol., 1997 Supp.), § 4-506 of the Family Law Article. 107 Md.App. at 343 , 667 A.2d at 998 . The Court of Special Appeals did express the view that an order granting restitution of the premises to the landlord ⁴⁷⁹ would terminate the tenancy, and that the restitution proceeding would be legal rather than equitable and thus subject to trial by jury.

The intermediate appellate court concluded, however, that “the request for restitution of possession was not properly before” both courts below. 107 Md.App. at 344 , 667 A.2d at 999 . As the Court of Special Appeals construed § 14-120, the “remedy of restitution” does not “rest[] upon issues of fact in common with” a request for relief under subsection (f)(1), and “it cannot be granted contemporaneously with the [subsection (f)(1) ] relief, as it requires ... (1) a separate hearing, and (2) a finding of noncompliance with an ... order” under subsection (e) or subsection (f)(1). 107 Md.App. at 343-344 , 667 A.2d at 998 . The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that, under its construction of § 14-120, if a tenant complies with an order to vacate under subsection (f)(1), and the premises are left vacant, there is no remedy under the statute for a statutory plaintiff or the landlord to obtain restitution of the premises to the landlord. 107 Md.App. at 344 , 667 A.2d at 999 .

The Court of Special Appeals suggested that, in this situation, the landlord could bring an action under § 8-402 of the Real Property Article to obtain possession. 107 Md.App. at 344 , 667 A.2d at 998 . 8 After the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, Martin filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. Martin v. Howard County, 342 Md. 263 , 674 A.2d 961 (1996). Martin argues that Howard County did not seek injunctive relief in this case but, instead, sought the permanent eviction of a tenant and the restitution of the premises to the landlord. The County, according to Martin, sought “to dispossess Ms. Martin of her leasehold” interest.

(Petitioner’s brief at 8). Martin contends that, in light of the issues and the remedy sought, the action is “within the ambit” of an ejectment action, which is an action at law in which there is a right to a jury trial. (Ibid.) Martin claims that the Court of ⁴⁸⁰ Special Appeals misinterpreted the statute and that, under the intermediate appellate court’s view, she could never get a jury trial to resolve the factual issues “which could lead to her eviction from her subsidized housing.” (Id. at 10). Howard County responds that, “[b]y focusing on the relief requested in the Complaint, the Petitioner has opted to ignore the fact that the traditional form of actions to abate nuisances are equitable in nature to which no right to a jury trial attaches.” (Respondent’s brief at 3-4).

The County concedes that, “if this were an action [by the landlord] to terminate the tenancy for breach of the lease ..., Petitioner would be entitled to a trial by jury.” (Id. at 4). Nevertheless, according to the County, “the action filed in this case is an action to abate a nuisance, which always has been and continues to be an action in equity.” (Ibid.) The County relies upon numerous cases in which governmental entities sought injunctions to require property owners to remove items from the property or to cease engaging in certain activity on the property, and the courts held that the actions were equitable, with no right to a jury trial. The two cases chiefly relied on are Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 672-674 , 8 S.Ct. 273, 303-304 , 31 L.Ed. 205, 214-215 (1887) (action for an injunction to restrain the defendant from manufacturing or selling intoxicating liquors on the property); and Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. 165 , 102 A.2d 830 (1954) (action for an injunction to require a property owner to remove a gasoline pump, erected without a required permit, from the sidewalk). III. “The Maryland Constitution, in Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights, guarantees a right to jury trial in those types of civil cases to which the right historically attached if the [requisite] amount in controversy” is present.

Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Comm’n, supra, 306 Md. at 520 , 510 A.2d at 542 . The Constitution, therefore “guarantees a right to a jury trial in actions at law, where historically there was a right to a jury trial, as opposed to equitable actions where there was no such right.” Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 346 , 335 A.2d 670, 676 , application for stay denied, 421 U.S. 983 , ⁴⁸¹ 95 S.Ct. 1986 , 44 L.Ed.2d 475 (1975). See, e.g., Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 542 , 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987) (“jury trials were historically available in actions at law”); Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 695 , 481 A.2d 186, 188 (1984); Knee v. City Pass. Ry.

Co., 87 Md. 623, 624 , 40 A. 890, 891 (1898). Moreover, when a party presents legal issues and legal claims for relief in an action which also involves equitable issues and claims, the party is ordinarily entitled to a jury trial on the legal issues and legal claims for relief. Edwards v. Gramling Engineering Corp., 322 Md. 535, 542-543 , 588 A.2d 793, 797 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 915 , 112 S.Ct. 317 , 116 L.Ed.2d 259 (1991); Higgins v. Barnes, supra, 310 Md. at 547-552 , 530 A.2d at 731-734 . An action by or on behalf of a landlord to evict a tenant, on the ground that the tenant no longer is entitled to possession, and to restore possession to the landlord, “ ‘is historically an action at law to which the right to a jury trial has always attached in this State.’ ” Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Comm’n, supra, 306 Md. at 521 , 510 A.2d at 543 , quoting Bringe v. Collins, supra, 274 Md. at 346-347 , 335 A.2d at 676 .

It is a form of the traditional legal action of ejectment. 1 John Prentiss Poe, Pleading and Practice in Courts of Common Law, § 272 (Tiffany ed. 1925); 1 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, § 180 (1939). See, e.g., Annapolis Mall v. Yogurt Tree, 299 Md. 244 , 473 A.2d 32 (1984); Parkington Apartments v. Cordish, 296 Md. 143 , 460 A.2d 52 (1983); Purvis v. Forrest Street Apts., 286 Md. 398 , 400—101, 408 A.2d 388, 389 (1979); Streeter v. Middlemas, 240 Md. 169 , 213 A.2d 471 (1965); Frederick Motor Sales v. B. & O.R. Co., 202 Md. 491 , 97 A.2d 326 (1953); Redwood Hotel, Inc. v. Korbien, 195 Md. 402, 411 , 73 A.2d 468 (1950); Schultz v. Kaplan, 189 Md. 402, 408-409 , 56 A.2d 17, 20 (1947); Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403 , 117 A. 882 (1922); Schlerf v. Bond, 139 Md. 10 , 114 A. 739 (1921); Gibbs v. Didier, 125 Md. 486 , 94 A. 100 (1915); Shanfelter v. Horner, 81 Md. 621 , 32 A. 184 (1895). 9 Since ejectment, as well as ⁴⁸³ trespass out of which the action of ejectment grew, are actions at law, the constitutional right to a jury trial attaches. McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 492-493 , 17 A. 387, 387 (1889). With respect to actions involving interests in real property or the right to possession of real property, the well-established differences between actions at law and equitable actions have been set forth in a myriad of this Court’s opinions.

As a general rule, where there are substantial disputes over interests in land or the right to be in possession of a parcel of land, “the proper jurisdiction is at law.” Stinchcomb v. Mortgage Co., 171 Md. 317, 322 , 188 A. 790, 792 (1937). See, e.g., Glorius v. Watkins, 203 Md. 546, 548-552 , 102 A.2d 274, 275-277 (1954); Redwood Hotel v. Korbien, supra, 195 Md. at 411 , 73 A.2d at 471 ; Schultz v. Kaplan, supra, 189 Md. at 408 , 56 A.2d at 20 ; Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 418 , 24 A.2d 795, 799 (1942); Oberheim v. Reeside, 116 Md. 265, 274 , 81 A. 590, 593 (1911); Bernei v. Sappington, 102 Md. 185, 191 , 62 A. 365, 366 (1905); Whalen v. Dalashmutt, 59 Md. 250, 252-254 (1883); Ches, and Ohio Canal Co. v. Young, 3 Md. 480, 489 (1853). An equitable action, by a party not in possession, to decide a disputed title or right to possession, ordinarily will not lie. Livingston v. Hall, 73 Md. 386, 395 , 21 A. 49, 50-51 (1891).

Thus, in Glorius v. Watkins, supra, 203 Md. 546 , 102 A.2d 274 , the plaintiff filed a bill in equity alleging that the defendants were in possession of a piece of real estate belonging to the plaintiff, that the defendants were assignees under a contract to purchase the property from the plaintiff and had defaulted, that a new agreement was then entered whereby the defendants became tenants, that the defendants thereafter refused to pay rent, and that the defendants had recorded the ⁴⁸⁴ original contract to purchase even though they had defaulted under that contract and had entered a new agreement. The plaintiff asserted that the recording constituted a cloud on her title, and she requested the equity court to declare that she had good and merchantable title free of any interest of the defendants. After a trial, the court entered a decree granting the relief prayed for. This Court, however, reversed, stating in an opinion by Chief Judge Sobeloff ( 203 Md. at 549 , 102 A.2d at 276): “The relief sought by the appellee is essentially legal, and clearly available in ejectment.

While title to real estate may sometimes be adjudicated in equity on a bill quia timet, this is not such a case because the complainant alleged she was not in possession---- Equity entertains jurisdiction where, although the complainant fears vexatious litigation due to a cloud on his title, he nevertheless cannot sue in ejectment because he is already in possession. The ground of equity jurisdiction in such a case is that being in possession he is denied a remedy at law. “In the instant case complete relief could be given in the legal forum, and if the appellee should prevail in ejectment this would effectually terminate any cloud on her title which she fears from the recent recording by the appellants of the original agreement between the appellee and Haviland, and of the assignment of that agreement to them. If appellee wished additionally the incidental advantage of a specific declaration, either affirmative or negative in form, as to the status of the recorded documents, that would be available to her under [the Declaratory Judgment Act] in a proceeding for a declaratory judgment at law, but not by resort to equity.” The plaintiff in Glorius , simply by seeking a declaratory decree in equity, did not change the nature of the proceeding. As the Court stated ( 203 Md. at 548 , 102 A.2d at 275), “[i]f the proceeding is of a legal nature, it does not become equitable when cast in the form of a demand for a declaratory decree; just as a remedy purely legal cannot be sought ⁴⁸⁵ in an equity court merely by invoking [the Declaratory Judgment Act].” The Court concluded ( 203 Md. at 552 ,102 A.2d at 277) that the plaintiffs “remedy appropriately is not in equity, but at law, to which side of the court the case may be transferred, ... whereupon suitable application may be made for jury trial.... ” One of the cases chiefly relied upon in Glorius v. Watkins, supra, was Redwood Hotel, Inc. v. Korbien, supra, 195 Md. 402 , 73 A.2d 468 .

The Redwood Hotel case is quite analogous to the case at bar. The plaintiffs in Redwood Hotel, owners in fee simple of the hotel property, brought an action in an equity court against the lessees of the property. As in the instant case, the plaintiffs in Redwood Hotel sought an “injunction” ousting the tenants. They alleged that the tenants had breached covenants in the lease by not keeping the premises in good order and allowing them to deteriorate, that the tenants had failed to pay utility bills, and that the tenants had failed to pay rent.

Following a trial, the chancellor issued an injunction ousting the tenants and restoring possession to the plaintiffs. Upon the tenants’ appeal, this Court reversed and ordered that the action be dismissed, saying ( 195 Md. at 411 , 73 A.2d at 471 ): “The real and vital purpose sought to be accomplished by this bill is the ousting of the tenant by the landlords by means of an injunction, and all other relief prayed is incidental thereto. Considering all of the facts alleged in the bill, we are of opinion