Goetz v. Smith

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These two cases, Nos. 46 and 47, October Term 1948, argued together in this Court, involve the attempted enforcement of a restrictive covenant against the sale, lease, transfer or permitted occupation of the respective properties mentioned to or by “any negro, Chinaman, Japanese, or person of negro, Chinese or Japanese descent”. The properties are parts of a tract called Beach-wood Forest, platted and subdivided in 1922 by R. L. Jones, the owner at that time, and are located on the Magothy River in Anne Arundel County. Jones started to convey lots in this subdivision, the deeds containing restrictive covenant above set out, with the additional statement that such covenant should be inserted in all deeds for any land described in the plat.

One of the first deeds, however, was to Edward D. Booz of 64.8 acres, which comprised the northern two-thirds of the entire tract. This deed describes the property by metes and bounds, but refers to the plat, and contains 93 out of the 160 lots in the subdivision. There is no restrictive cov ⁷⁰⁹ enarit in this deed. All of the other deeds made by Jones of lots in the subdivision, except that of one lot to G. Murray Seal, contain the restriction, and Seal subsequently conveyed this lot, with others acquired by him, by a deed containing the restriction.

Jones conveyed his remaining lots on April 16, 1925 to a certain Requard, subject to the restriction and two of the plaintiff-appellees in No. 47, the Amers, purchased their lots from Requard, the restrictive covenant appearing in their deed. The other plaintiff-appellees in No. 47, the Phillips, acquired their lots, with the restriction through mesne conveyances from Requard. The Saunders and the Smiths, defendant-appellants in No. 47 are negroes and purchased their lots in 1946. The deed to the Smiths of one of their four lots omits the restriction, but the deed to the other three contains it.

The Saunders deed is without the restriction. All of the lots with which No. 47 is concerned are in the tract which remained after the 64.8 acres were sold to Booz, and none of them comes out of that acreage. In No. 46, the plaintiff-appellants own lots, subject to the restrictive covenant inserted in their deeds, which also are part of the tract reserved by Jones, but the Smiths, defendant-appellees in this case, purchased the 64.8 acres intact from the Trustees under the will of Edward Booz in August, 1943 and have since expended about $70,000 upon it, and use it as a picnic ground and park for negroes. These are the same Smiths who are defendant-appellants in No. 47 with respect to other lots.

The case in No. 46 has to do only with their 64.8 acres, and their deed to this property does not contain the restrictive covenant. The plaintiffs in No. 46 were unsuccessful in their effort to enforce the restrictive covenant against the Smiths’ 64.8 acre tract, the chancellor holding that the restriction did not apply to this tract. The plaintiffs in No. 47 succeeded in getting a decree restraining the defendants from using and occupying their lots which came out of the tract reserved by Jones from the sale to Booz, ⁷¹⁰ the chancellor holding that the restriction applied;to these lots. The losers below, in each case, appealed.

It was contended below by the appellant-defendants in No.- 47 that the enforcement of the restriction constituted-a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Chancellor found that the decisions-of the Supreme Court and of this Court were to the contrary, citing Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 , 46 S. Ct. 521 , 70 L. Ed. 969 ; Meade v. Dennistone,