Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.

DAVIS, J. Appellant, Alicia Gomez, appeals from the ruling of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Rubin, J.), dismissing her claims against appellee, Jackson Hewitt, Inc. (Jackson Hewitt). On February 4, 2009, appellant filed a Complaint against appellee alleging violations of the Credit Services Businesses Act (CSBA), Md.Code (2005 Rep. Vol., 2007 Supp.), Commercial Law, C.L. § 14-1901 et seq. and the Consumer Protection Act, C.L. § 13-301 et seq. Appellee moved to dismiss appellant’s claims, which the circuit court granted. 1 Appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court and presents one question for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant’s claims on the grounds that the CSBA does not apply to appellee?

For the reasons that follow, we answer appellant’s question in the negative. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ⁹¹ PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant’s Complaint alleged that, on February 6, 2007, appellee prepared her 2006 Federal Income Tax Return. At that time, appellee assisted appellant in acquiring a Refund Anticipation Loan (RAL) from a lender, Santa Barbara Bank & Trust (SBBT) in anticipation of her income tax refund. Appellant asserted that she “indirectly paid” appellee for arranging the RAL “in that the credit that [appellee] obtained for her included in its principal amount the cost of obtaining this extension of credit.” She further alleged that appellee included in “its principal amount fees charged by [appellee] for the preparation and filing of her federal income tax return.” Appellant elected to use part of her RAL to pay appellee’s tax preparation fee of $284.

Appellant alleged that appellee failed to obtain the required license from the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of the Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation (the Commissioner) pursuant to C.L. § 14-902, failed to obtain a surety bond pursuant to Section 14-1908 and failed to provide her with numerous “documents and disclosures” required by Sections 14-1904, 14-1905 and 14-1906. Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that its actions in providing appellant with the RAL did not fall within the purview of the CSBA because she failed to establish that she was a “consumer” within the meaning of the CSBA and that she did not pay anything of value to appellee in exchange for receiving credit services. On June 18, 2009, the circuit court held a hearing on appellee’s motion to dismiss. On June 23, 2009, the circuit court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing appellant’s claims.

Based upon appellant’s Complaint, the circuit court determined: [Appellant’s] RAL application says that she expected a federal tax refund of $2,323, that she has requested a RAL from SBBT, and that the estimated amount of her loan disbursement is $1,950.97, net of loan and fees and the $284 tax preparation fee owed to [appellee]. The loan agreement ⁹² [appellant] entered into with SBBT is clear that it is for a loan in anticipation of her federal tax refund. In addition to [appellee’s] tax preparation fee of $284, [appellant] agreed to pay SBBT a handling fee of $29.95 and prepaid finance charges of $58.08. The circuit court initially examined appellant’s claim under the CSBA and found that the definition of a “credit service business” in § 14-1901(e) and “consumer” in § 14-1901(c) were ambiguous; thus, it looked to the legislative history of the CSBA, which was enacted on May 14, 1987 as 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 469.

The trial court examined the Fiscal and Policy Note, along with numerous documents in the bill file, and concluded that the General Assembly sought to regulate credit repair agencies by enacting the CSBA. Thus, the circuit court ruled: It is manifest that the reason why the General Assembly passed the CSBA was to protect unsuspecting Marylanders from credit repair agencies who offered to ‘fix’ their credit rating, or to obtain loans for the credit impaired customer, in exchange for a fee. The CSBA simply was neither intended nor designed to cover firms engaged in the business of selling goods or services to their customers, when such goods or services are not aimed at improving one’s credit rating. Nor was it intended to cover the extension of credit by a third-party, not privy to the primary transaction, which is ancillary to the customer’s purchase of the goods or services provided by the merchant. [Appellant] is [sic] this case neither had a contract with [appellee] in return for credit services nor a contract for the extension of credit.

The documents appended to her complaint make it clear that her contract in this regard was with SBBT and that the fee she paid for the extension of credit was paid by her to SBBT. The only fee [appellant] was obligated to pay to [appellee] was the $284.00 she agreed to pay for the preparation of her income tax returns. ⁹³ Count I will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Additionally, because relief under count II is dependent upon a cognizable claim under Count I, it will be dismissed as well. Thereafter, appellant noted an appeal to this Court.

Additional facts shall be supplied infra as warranted. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court of Appeals recently reiterated the standard of review of a grant of a motion to dismiss a plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim in RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643 , 994 A.2d 430 (2010). Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Lloyd v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 121-22 , 916 A.2d 257, 264-65 (2007); Sprenger v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 400 Md. 1, 21 , 926 A.2d 238, 249-50 (2007); Pendleton v. Slate, 398 Md. 447, 458-60 , 921 A.2d 196, 203-04 (2007); Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 475 , 860 A.2d 871, 878-79 (2004); Fioretti v. Maryland Stale Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 351 Md. 66, 71-72 , 716 A.2d 258, 261 (1998).

Id. In addition, we review the circuit court’s interpretation of the CSBA de novo. Herlson v. RTS Residential Block 5, LLC, 191 Md.App. 719, 730, 993 A.2d 699 (2010) (“we review the Circuit Court’s interpretation of the statute de novo.”) (quoting Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 385 Md. 492, 496 , 869 A.2d 852 (2005)). Thus, we are tasked with determining whether the circuit court erroneously interpreted the CSBA to pre ⁹⁴ elude appellant’s claims against appellee, based upon the facts as pleaded by appellant in her Complaint, as a matter of law.

LEGAL ANALYSIS Appellant contends that the CSBA applies to “loan arrangers” such as appellee, based upon a reading of the plain language of the statute. Specifically, appellant posits that appellee falls within the plain language of the statutory definition of a “credit services business” and she falls within the definition of a “consumer” under C.L. § 14-1901. Alternatively, she argues that, if there is any ambiguity that requires an examination of the legislative history, the legislative history reveals that the General Assembly intended to target businesses like appellee. Appellee counters that the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and Jackson Hewitt falls outside its purview.

In addition, appellee claims that the legislative history confirms that the General Assembly did not intend for the statute to apply to Jackson Hewitt. Finally, appellee points out that, in May 2010, the General Assembly enacted a statute that specifically targets tax preparation businesses engaged in facilitating RALs, which undermines appellant’s interpretation of the CSBA. For the reasons that follow, we agree with appellee. The plain meaning of the language supports appellee’s position and we think the legislative history undergirding the enactment of CSBA and subsequent amendments indicates that the General Assembly did not contemplate the statute’s application to businesses such as Jackson Hewitt.

The enactment of 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 730 further supports our interpretation of the CSBA. We explain. The Plain Language of the CSBA Initially, appellant contends that the language of the CSBA plainly applies to “loan arrangers” such as appellee. The CSBA seeks to regulate “credit services businesses” by imposing licensing requirements, implementing disclosure require ⁹⁵ ments, providing for an administrative review process for complaints and providing monetary and criminal penalties for violations.

Section 14-1901 provides, in pertinent part: (c) Consumer. — “Consumer” means any individual who is solicited to purchase or who purchases for personal, family, or household purposes the services of a credit services business. (e) Credit services business.'— (1) “Credit services business” means any person who, with respect to the extension of credit by others, sells, provides, or performs, or represents that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform, any of the following services in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration: (i) Improving a consumer’s credit record, history, or rating or establishing a new credit file or record; (ii) Obtaining an extension of credit for a consumer; or (iii) Providing advice or assistance to a consumer with regard to either subparagraph (i) or (ii) of this paragraph. (2) “Credit services business” includes a person who sells or attempts to sell written materials containing information that the person represents will enable a consumer to establish a new credit file or record. (3) “Credit services business” does not include: (i) Any person authorized to make loans or extensions of credit under the laws of this State or the United States who is actively engaged in the business of making loans or other extensions of credit to residents of this State; (ii) Any bank, trust company, savings bank, or savings and loan association whose deposits or accounts are eligible for insurance by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any credit union organized and chartered under the laws of this State or the United States; ⁹⁶ (ni) Any nonprofit organization exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ( 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3)); (iv) Any person licensed as a real estate broker by this State where the person is acting within the course and scope of that license; (v) Any person licensed as a mortgage lender by this State; (vi) An individual admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland when the individual renders services within the course and scope of practice by the individual as a lawyer and does not engage in the credit services business on a regular and continuing basis; (vii) Any broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission where the broker-dealer is acting within the course and scope of that regulation; (viii) Any consumer reporting agency as defined in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 168—1681t) or in § 14-1201(e) of this title; or (ix) An individual licensed by the Maryland Board of Public Accountancy when the individual renders services within the course and scope of practice by the individual as a certified public accountant and does not engage in the credit services business on a regular and continuing basis.

(Emphasis added). Appellant argues that the statute defines a “credit services business” as any business that, in exchange for a fee on behalf of others, promises to (1) improve a “consumer’s credit record, history, or rating or establishing a new credit file or record,” obtain “an extension of credit for a consumer” or (3) provide “advice or assistance to a consumer” regarding improving credit or obtaining an extension of credit. Because the provision is written in the disjunctive, according to appellant, it is therefore plain that appellee, who obtains extensions of credit on behalf of its customers through RALs, falls within the purview of the CSBA and no further construction of the ⁹⁷ statute is necessary. In addition, appellant points out that C.L. § 14-1901(e)(3) provides a list of exemptions from the category of “credit services business” and appellee, as a tax preparer who also facilitates RALs, does not fall within any of the enumerated exemptions.

Thus, according to appellant, the trial court erred. With regard to the issue generated in the trial court as to whether appellant is a “consumer” under the plain language of the statute, appellant maintains that the statute in no way suggests that a “consumer” is a person who pays the credit services business directly. C.L. § 14-1901(c) provides that a consumer is “any individual who is solicited to purchase or who purchases for personal, family, or household purposes the services of a credit services business.” According to appellant, to imply that the statute requires her to pay appellee directly would impermissibly add terms to the statute and narrow its applicability. In addition, appellant points to another provision of the statute, § 14-1906(a), which sets forth requirements for the contract between the credit services business and the consumers.

Section 14-1906 provides: (a) Requirements. — Every contract between a consumer and a credit services business for the purchase of the services of the credit services business shall be in writing, dated, signed by the consumer, and shall include: (1) A conspicuous statement in size equal to at least 10-point bold type, in immediate proximity to the space reserved for the signature of the consumer as follows: “You, the buyer, may cancel this contract at any time prior to midnight of the third business day after the date of the transaction. See the attached notice of cancellation form for an explanation of this right.”; (2) The terms and conditions of payment, including the total of all payments to be made by the consumer, whether to the credit services business or to some other person; (Emphasis added). Appellant contends that this language is an indication that the General Assembly expressly contemplated that a consum ⁹⁸ er falling within the ambit of the statute would make payments to third parties. Appellant adds that, if the General Assembly had intended to limit the class of consumers to which the statute applied to those who paid the credit services business directly, it would have included language to that effect.

In support of this contention, appellant directs our attention to a similar Ohio statute, which was construed in Snook v. Ford Motor Co., 142 Ohio App.3d 212, 755 N.E.2d 380, 383 (2001), wherein the Ohio Credit Services Organization Act formerly explicitly required payment to flow directly from the consumer to the credit services organization. A credit services organization was originally defined in the Ohio statute as “any person that charges or receives, directly from the buyer, money or other valuable consideration easily convertible into money, and that sells, provides, or performs, or represents that the person can or will sell, provide, or perform, any of the following services.” Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4712.01 (C)(1)). In 1999, the Ohio legislature amended the statute and Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4712.01(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2010) now provides: “ ‘Credit services organization’ means any person that, in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration readily convertible into money for the following services, sells, provides, or performs, or represents that the person can or will sell, provide, or perform, one or more of the following services----” Appellant argues that if the General Assembly intended to impose such a specific requirement, it would have included language similar to the language originally included in the Ohio statute.

Similarly, appellant directs our attention to the Federal Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA). 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A) defines a “credit repair organization” as any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of— ⁹⁹ (i) improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or (ii) providing advice or assistance to any consumer with regard to any activity or service described in clause (i). Appellant points out that the CROA “contains the exact same ‘in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration’ ” language that the CSBA contains and cites several unreported trial court rulings interpreting the CROA and holding that a consumer need not pay the credit repair organization directly in order to fall within the CROA. 2 The Commissioner of Financial Regulation (the Commissioner) and The Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Maryland have together filed a Brief of Amici Curiae and add to appellant’s plain language argument that there is no language in the statute that suggests that the CSBA is targeted at regulating the activities of “traditional credit repair services.” Instead, amici argue that C.L. § 14-1901(e) applies to credit services businesses who either obtain an extension of credit for a consumer or who provide assistance in obtaining an extension of credit. Section 14-1901 (f) defines an extension of credit as “the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment, offered or granted primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Amici contend that, “when a consumer obtains an RAL, it is an extension of credit within the meaning of the statute because the consumer incurs a debt for which payment is deferred and the debt is ‘primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.’ ” Appellee counters that a reading of the plain language of the CSBA supports its contention that the CSBA does not apply in this case. Appellee argues that appellant did not purchase any services from Jackson Hewitt with respect to ¹⁰⁰ the RAL and that it was undisputed that she did not make any payments to appellee, precluding a finding that she is a “consumer” within the meaning of the CSBA.

Appellee explains that the only services that appellant purchased from Jackson Hewitt were tax preparation services, “the charge for which was not dependent upon her application for a RAL.” Appellee contends that appellant’s interpretation of the CSBA attempts to insert language not present in the statute to re-define a “consumer” as a person who purchases the services of a credit services business “or who applies for a loan from a lender who, in turn, purchases the services of a third party.” Appellee posits that, reading the CSBA as a whole, it is plain that the General Assembly did not contemplate its application to businesses such as Jackson Hewitt, facilitating RALs. Appellee points out that C.L. § 14-1902(1) contemplates payment for credit services to come directly from the consumer. Section 14-1902(1) provides: A credit services business, its employees, and independent contractors who sell or attempt to sell the services of a credit services business shall not: (1) Receive any money or other valuable consideration from the consumer, unless the credit services business has secured from the Commissioner a license under Title 11, Subtitle 3 of the Financial Institutions Article; (Emphasis added). Appellee, like appellant, also directs us to C.L. § 14-1906(a)(2), which outlines contract requirements between the credit services business and the consumer and provides: “The terms and conditions of payment, including the total of all payments to be made by the consumer, whether to the credit services business or to some other person.” (Emphasis added).

Appellee contends that SBBT “purchased” its RAL services, not appellant. With regard to the definition of “credit services business,” appellee posits that appellant’s argument also requires “re ¹⁰¹ writing” the statute to define a credit services business as follows: any person who, with respect to the extension of credit by others, sells, provides, or performs, or represents that such person can or will sell, provide or perform, any of the following services in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration regardless of the source.... But, appellee argues, the words “in return” are present in the statute because the General Assembly contemplated the giving by one party of something of value in exchange for another thing of value from the other party and we cannot read the statute so as to render those words meaningless. Further, appellee contends, the words “regardless of the source” do not appear in the definition of a credit services business, suggesting that the General Assembly contemplated the source of payment to be the consumer.

Finally, appellee directs our attention to two unreported state trial court orders from trial courts in Missouri and Ohio in which the trial courts ruled that similar statutes in those states did not apply to appellee. These rulings, along with the ruling of the trial court in the case sub judice, appellee maintains, are consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Midstate Siding and Window Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 204 Ill.2d 314 , 273 Ill.Dec. 816 , 789 N.E.2d 1248 (2003). In Midstate, the Court was tasked with determining whether Midstate, a home improvement company, was a “credit services organization” under the Illinois Credit Services Act. Midstate contracted with the Rogers to install windows and siding on the Rogers’ home.

Id., 273 Ill.Dec. 816 , 789 N.E.2d at 1250-51 . The Rogers, however, could not afford the full price of the windows and siding; thus, Midstate offered to assist the Rogers in obtaining financing. Id. The Rogers filled out a credit application that Midstate forwarded to a lending institution, which in turn, agreed to provide a home equity loan to the Rogers.

Id. Midstate argued that the assistance with financing was a “gratuitous service.” Id., 273 Ill.Dec. ¹⁰² 816, 789 N.E.2d at 1251 . The Illinois Credit Organizations Act provided, in pertinent part: “(a) ‘Buyer’ means an individual who is solicited to purchase or who purchases the services of a credit services organization. (d) ‘Credit Services Organization’ means a person who, with respect to the extension of credit by others and in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, provides, or represents that the person can or will provide, any of the following services: (i) improving a buyer’s credit record, history, or rating[;] (ii) obtaining an extension of credit for a buyer; or (iii) providing advice or assistance to a buyer with regard to either subsection (i) or (ii).” Id., 273 Ill.Dec. 816 , 789 N.E.2d at 1253 (quoting 815 Ill.

Comp. Stat. Ann. 605/3(a), (d) (West 1996)). The Court held that the Act did not apply to Midstate: Looking to the definition of a “[b]uyer” and the definition of a “[c]redit [sjervices [organization,” it is clear that the Credit Services Act regulates transactions involving the payment of money or other valuable consideration in return for the services of the credit services organization. In turn, the services of the credit services organization are “improving a buyer’s credit record, history, or rating”; “obtaining an extension of credit for a buyer”; or “providing advice or assistance to a buyer” with regard to “improving a buyer’s credit record, history, or rating” or with regard to “obtaining an extension of credit” for the buyer. 815 ILCS 605/3 (West 1996).

Thus, the Credit Services Act requires payment for credit services, not simply payment for other goods or services. Id. The Court further concluded that “the contract at issue does not provide for payment of money ... in return for credit services provided by Midstate. Instead the agreed consider ¹⁰³ ation is for payment of windows and siding....” Id., 273 Ill.Dec. 816 , 789 N.E.2d at 1254 .

Finally, appellee asserts that, in considering the statute and all its provisions as a whole, it is “eminently clear” that the General Assembly intended that it apply to “traditional credit repair organizations” and not those who prepare tax returns and facilitate RALs. Appellee insists that the “duties” outlined in the statute “make no sense” when applied to businesses such as itself. Specifically, appellee points to § 14-1902(6) which provides that credit services businesses may not “Lc]harge or receive any money or other valuable consideration prior to full and complete performance of the services that the credit services business has agreed to perform for or on behalf of the consumer.” Appellee points out that the documents attached to appellant’s complaint make clear that appellee did not charge or collect funds from appellant, who purchased an RAL from SBBT. By contrast, appellee argues, this provision is “entirely logical” when applied to a credit repair organization that promises to perform services to improve a credit rating or assist with obtaining credit that a consumer might not otherwise be able to do.

Similarly, appellee argues that C.L. § 14-1902(2), which provides that a credit services business may not “[r]eceive any money or other valuable consideration solely for referral of the consumer to a retail seller or to any other credit grantor who will or may extend credit to the consumer, if the credit extended to the consumer is substantially the same terms as those available to the general public,” logically applies to prevent a credit repair agency from taking money “from an unwitting customer” simply for referring that consumer to a creditor whom the consumer could have contacted on his or her own. Likewise, appellee points out that the provisions in C.L. § 14-1902(3) are inapplicable to RAL transactions. Section 14-1902(3) provides that a credit services business shall not [m]ake, or assist or advise any consumer to make, any statement or other representation that is false or mislead ¹⁰⁴ ing, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known to be false or misleading, to a consumer reporting agency, government agency, or person to whom the consumer applies or intends to apply for an extension of credit, regarding a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or true identity. Appellee explains that it made no statements regarding “a buyer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity or true identity” in arranging the RAL.

On the other hand, appellee points out, the provision would certainly apply in the context of a credit repair agency’s promise or solicitation regarding the improvement of a buyer’s credit rating. Next, appellee points to the disclosure requirements contained in C.L. § 14-1905, which are as follows: (a) In general. — The information statement required under § 14-1904 of this subtitle shall include: (1) An accurate statement of the consumer’s right to review any file on the consumer maintained by any consumer reporting agency, and the right of the consumer to receive a copy of a consumer report containing all information in that file as provided under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681g) and under § 14-1206 of this title; (2) A statement that a copy of the consumer report containing all information in the consumer’s file will be furnished free of charge by the consumer reporting agency if requested by the consumer within 30 days of receiving a notice of a denial of credit as provided under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681j) and under § 14-1209 of this title; (3) A statement that a nominal charge not to exceed $5 may be imposed on the consumer by the consumer reporting agency for a copy of the consumer report containing all the information in the consumer’s file, if the consumer has not been denied credit within 30 days from receipt of the consumer’s request; ¹⁰⁵ (4) A complete and accurate statement of the consumer’s right to dispute the completeness or accuracy of any item on the consumer contained in any file that is maintained by any consumer reporting agency, as provided under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681i) and under § 14-1208 of this title; (5) A complete and detailed description of the services to be performed by the credit services business for or on behalf of the consumer, and the total amount the consumer will have to pay for the services; and (6) A statement that accurately reported information may not be permanently removed from the file of a consumer reporting agency. (b) Additional requirements of licenses. — A credit services business required to obtain a license pursuant to § 14-1902 of this subtitle shall include in the information statement required under § 14-1904 of this subtitle: (1) A statement of the consumer’s right to file a complaint pursuant to § 14-1911 of this subtitle; (2) The address of the Commissioner where such complaints should be filed; and (3) A statement that a bond exists and the consumer’s right to proceed against the bond under the circumstances and in the manner set forth in § 14-1910 of this subtitle. Appellee contends that the foregoing disclosures apply in the context of a transaction through which a consumer is attempting to “shore up” his or her credit score and speak to what credit reporting agencies can or cannot do, but none of the disclosures are applicable to RAL transactions.

According to appellee, “providing such information would likely confuse an RAL applicant or, worse yet, cause that applicant to believe that [appellee] thinks their credit needs improvement.” Appellee also maintains that neither C.L. 14-1906(a)(3) nor 14-1906(b) has any application to an RAL. Section 14-1906(a)(3) pertains to the required disclosures that must be present in the consumer contract and provides that the following must appear therein: ¹⁰⁶ A complete and detailed description of the services to be performed and the results to be achieved by the credit services business for or on behalf of the consumer, including all guarantees and all promises of full or partial refunds and a list of the adverse information appearing on the consumer’s credit report that the credit services business expects to have modified and the estimated date by which each modification will occur. Appellee asserts that “this provision has no meaning with regard to Jackson Hewitt” because it has “no control over any financial institution’s decision regarding refunding payments made from a consumer to the institution.” Moreover, appellee avers, Jackson Hewitt does not provide the “types of credit services contemplated by the provision.” Similarly, appellee alleges that the “notice of cancellation” provision of C.L. § 14—1906(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that the contract must advise the consumer that he or she “may cancel this contract, without any penalty or obligation, at any time prior to midnight of the third business day after the date the contract is signed.... ” Appellee states that an RAL is usually paid within forty-eight hours of the application; thus, a “three-day right of cancellation is nonsensical in the context of the purchase of a RAL.... ” Appellee postulates that, if we were to accept appellant’s interpretation of the CSBA, “it would result in liability for numerous retailers operating in Maryland that facilitate credit applications on behalf of financial institutions because retailers often offer assistance to customers with applications for credit offered by third-party banks in exchange for compensation from banks.” This, appellee contends, was clearly not the General Assembly’s intent to reach so many businesses whose primary function is to sell a good or service. Appellant’s rejoinder is that, simply because some portions of the statute may be inapplicable to appellee, does not render the entire statute inapplicable.

In addition, she adds, Mid-state, supra, is distinct from the case sub judice because Midstate, unlike appellee, gratuitously arranged for financing ¹⁰⁷ for its customers, unlike appellee who, appellant baldly asserts, relies upon RALs as “the most profitable aspect of its business.” We have been unable to locate any case construing the Maryland CSBA. The parties, however, have cited the decision of the Fourth Circuit in H & R Block Eastern Enters. v. Raskin, 591 F.3d 718 (4th Cir.2010) for various propositions. 3 Lest there be any doubt, we make clear that the Fourth Circuit did not make any determinations on the merits of the question of whether H & R Block, nor any party in appellee’s business, could be considered a “credit services business” under the CSBA. The Fourth Circuit vacated the ruling of the District Court, which granted partial summary judgment on the grounds that portions of the CSBA were preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA). The Court explained that the trial court erred in assuming, arguendo, that the CSBA applied to H & R Block because, “[t]o conclude that the NBA preempts certain of the CSBA’s provisions, as applied to Block, without first assessing whether the CSBA actually applies to Block, amounts to ‘seeking out conflicts ... where none clearly exists.’ ” Id. at 723 (quoting College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 598 (4th Cir.2005)).

The Court expressed no opinion whatsoever on the merits of whether H & R Block, who engaged in similar transactions with RALs, was a “credit services business.” Finally, immediately preceding oral argument in the case sub judice, appellant submitted to this Court the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 W.Va. 142 , 706 S.E.2d 63 (2010). The certified questions presented to the West Virginia appellate court were: ¹⁰⁸ Does a tax preparer who receives compensation either directly from the borrower or in the form of payments from the lending bank, for helping a borrower obtain a refund anticipation loan meet the statutory definition of a credit services organization under [the credit services statute]? Do the borrowers in a refund anticipation loan transaction meet the definition of a buyer [consumer] under [the credit services statute]? Id. at 68.

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Harper , concluded [w]hen we read the plain and unambiguous terms of § 46A-6C-2(a), we find that the first