Gonzales v. Boas

ON REMAND EYLER, J. This appeal arises out of a late response by Corinne 1 Gonzales, appellant, to a request for admission of facts filed by Lawrence Boas, M.D., appellee. See Maryland Rule 2-424. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted appellee’s motion to strike appellant’s response as untimely. After holding that appellant was deemed to have admitted the facts contained in the request for admissions, which eliminated any genuine dispute as to material facts, the court entered summary judgment in appellee’s favor.

On appeal, appellant claims that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting appellee’s motion to strike appellant’s response to the request for admissions. Alternatively, appellant claims the court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request to withdraw its admissions. Finally, appellant contends that the circuit court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that appellant’s response to appellee’s request for admissions was untimely. In an opinion filed on December 29, 2004, we held that the circuit court properly found that appellant’s responses were untimely.

We also held that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting appellee’s motion to strike appellant’s responses or in not permitting appellant to withdraw her admissions. After granting a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by order dated April 7, 2005, vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light ³⁵⁰ of Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185 , 867 A.2d 1077 (2005). We have done so and we reaffirm our prior decision. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

Our holding in this case is very fact dependent and is based on the combination of the following: (1) the response to the request for admissions was filed 8 days late, (2) the late filing was as a result of oversight of appellant’s counsel, who prepared the response but inadvertently did not file it, (3) at the time the response was filed, the case had been pending 3 months and was not near trial, (4) there was a substantial dispute as to the subject of the requests in that the requests were directed to the core facts underlying the claim and were denied in the late response, (5) there was no showing of prejudice to appellee in the presentation of his defense, only the time and expense of having to defend the claim, and (6) the sanction imposed by the circuit court for the late filing was, as a practical matter, summary disposition of the claim. Expenses may be sought as a sanction under Rule 2-424(e) or Rule 1-341 if the required showing is made. RELEVANT FACTS On December 16, 2002, appellant filed a complaint in circuit court, alleging three counts of civil battery against appellee. On February 10, 2003, appellee responded by serving on appellant a motion to dismiss, a motion for a more definite statement, and discovery requests, including a first request for admission of facts.

Through an oversight of counsel, 2 appellant failed to respond to the request for admissions within the thirty-day time period designated by Maryland Rule 2-424. 3 ³⁵¹ Shortly after the expiration of the thirty-day time period, appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as appellant failed to timely respond to his request for admissions, all such facts were deemed admitted, and thus, there were no material facts in dispute. Thereafter, appellant served a response to appellee’s request for admissions, eight days late. Appellant also filed a response to appellee’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were material facts in dispute because her response, although late, still constituted a denial of the requests that could only be stricken upon motion by appellee and in the exercise of the court’s discretion. As there had been no motion to strike, appellant asked that her response be considered as a denial, or alternatively, that she be granted permission to withdraw any of the “deemed admissions,” should the court find that her late response resulted in such. 4 In response, appellee filed a motion to strike appellant’s response to his request for admissions as being untimely.

Appellant filed a response to the motion to strike. On May 8, 2003, the circuit court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice, allowing appellant twenty days leave to amend. The court denied appellee’s motion for a more definite statement and his motion for summary judgment, finding them both moot. The court did not rule on appellee’s motion to strike appellant’s response to his request for admissions.

Thereafter, on May 28, 2003, appellant filed an amended complaint. 5 Appellee responded by filing a second motion for ³⁵² summary judgment and a second motion for a more definite statement. In his motion for summary judgment, appellee again asserted that, as a result of appellant’s failure to timely respond to his request for admissions, appellant had admitted the facts contained in the requests; thus, there were no material facts in dispute. On July 14, 2003, the court denied appellee’s motion. Ap-pellee filed a motion for reconsideration.

On September 23, 2003, the court held a hearing, and on October 21, 2003, the court granted appellee’s motion to strike appellant’s response to appellee’s request for admissions and entered summary judgment in appellee’s favor based on matters deemed admitted. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court on November 20, 2003. DISCUSSION Appellee’s Second Motion to Dismiss Appeal Before reaching the issues raised in appellant’s brief, we address preliminarily appellee’s Second Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. Appellee contends that appellant has committed seventeen violations of the Maryland Rules, eight during trial and nine during the appellate phase, which have caused appellee “considerable inconvenience, delay, and expense.” Appellee argues that the alleged procedural violations justify dismissal of this appeal.

We shall exercise our discretion and deny the motion. Substantively, the allegations in the Second Motion to Dismiss Appeal have been previously considered by this Court. 6 In this motion, appellee lists nine violations of the ³⁵³ rules that he alleges have occurred during the pendency of the appeal. The majority of the alleged rules violations are minor, clerical, and organizational errors. 7 Two of the alleged violations involve questions of rule interpretation. 8 Appellant disputes the facts recited by appellee in support of one of the alleged violations. 9 The final violation was a late response to the initial Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by appellee, which was argued in appellee’s Motion to Strike Appellant’s Response, and earlier ruled on by this court. All of the alleged violations were contained in earlier motions filed by appellee.

This Court has carefully considered the arguments of the opposing parties, both when they were initially made, and again in this motion, has exercised its discretion, and denies the motions. This is not to say that we condone deficiencies in procedure. We urge all persons handling appeals to review ³⁵⁴ the Rules regarding the preparation of the record extract and briefs, paying particular attention to Rules 8-411, 8-412, 8-413, 8-414, 8-501, 8-502, 8-503, and 8-504. Parties who fail to adhere to the prescribed procedures risk dismissal pursuant to 8-602, and also impair the effectiveness of their advocacy by demonstrating a disregard for the Rules.

On balance, however, we decline to dismiss this appeal. Request for Admissions and Summary Judgment Appellant contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant appellee’s motion to strike her response to appellee’s request for admissions and to grant summary judgment in appellee’s favor. Alternatively, appellant contends that the court abused its discretion in failing to allow her to withdraw her “deemed admissions.” Finally, appellant argues that the circuit court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that appellant’s response was untimely. We shall briefly address appellant’s final argument first, which we dispose of quickly as having no merit.

We do hold, however, that the court abused its discretion in granting appellee’s motion to strike and/or alternatively, in failing to permit appellant to withdraw the deemed admissions. Timeliness of Appellant’s Response Appellant contends that the lower court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that her response to appellee’s request for admissions was untimely. Rule 2-424(b) provides that a response to a request for admission must be served either within thirty days after service of the request or within fifteen days after the date on which the served party’s initial pleading or motion is required, whichever is later. Appellant argues that the effect of the circuit court’s dismissal of her initial complaint with leave to amend was to render her amended complaint the initial pleading in this case.

Thus, as she had fifteen days from the date her amended complaint was filed to serve her response upon appellee, and as her response was served within that time, the court erred in finding that her response was untimely. ³⁵⁵ This argument is without merit. It is true that the filing of an amended complaint supercedes the initial complaint, rendering the amended complaint the operative complaint. See Pharmaceia Eni Diagnostics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com’n, 85 Md.App. 555, 563 , 584 A.2d 714 (1991)(“once an amended complaint is accepted by the trial court it supersedes the original complaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case”). While the timing of the granting of the motion to dismiss and the filing of the amended complaint are all relevant to our consideration of whether the court abused its discretion, as set forth below, such a filing does not start the running of time anew for purposes of a response to a request for admission.

See id. (explaining that allowing the filing of an amended complaint to resurrect certain rights which were already lost would defeat the purpose of the limitations established in the rules). The circuit court properly found that appellant’s response was eight days late under the deadline established in Md. Rule 2-424(b). Motion to Strike/Permission to Withdraw Waiver Prior to addressing the merits of appellant’s argument that the circuit court abused its discretion, we shall discuss appellee’s contention that appellant committed three specific instances of waiver.

Appellee argues that: (1) by failing to properly object to the request for admissions; (2) by failing to timely respond to the motion to strike; and (3) by failing to file a motion to withdraw, appellant waived her right to challenge the deemed admissions. First, appellee claims that appellant failed to object to appellee’s requests and to state her reasons for such an objection, and thus, even if her response was timely, she has waived her right to complain that the requests were improper in form or substance. This argument fails because appellant has not challenged the form of the requests, but rather has denied the requests. Rule 2-424(b) provides that “[a]s to each matter of which an admission is requested, the response shall ³⁵⁶ specify an objection, or shall admit or deny the matter, or shall set forth in detail the reason why the respondent cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” In appellant’s response, she simply denied all twelve of appellee’s requests.

It was a permissible response for appellant to deny each assertion, assuming good faith, and she was not required to state an objection or provide an explanation. Appellee’s second and third contentions are equally unpersuasive. The circuit court specifically found that appellant’s response to appellee’s motion to strike was not barred as untimely. Moreover, in both her response to appellee’s motion for summary judgment and in her response to appellee’s motion to strike her response to the request for admissions, appellant argued that, if the court deemed that the requested facts were admitted, it should alternatively allow her to withdraw such deemed admissions. 10 Thus, appellant committed no waiver precluding her from now challenging the admission of the requested facts.

The Merits As set forth above, Maryland Rule 2^424(b) provides that a party has thirty days from the date of service to respond to an opposing party’s request for admissions of fact. Failure to do ³⁵⁷ so will result in the requests being “deemed admitted.” Maryland Rule 2-424(c) provides: “The party who has requested the admission may file a motion challenging the timeliness of the response.... If the court determines that the response was served late, it may order the response stricken.” (emphasis added). With regard to withdrawal of deemed admissions, Rule 2-424(d) states: Any matter admitted under this Rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment.

The court may permit withdrawal or amendment if the court finds that it would assist the presentation of the merits of the action and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. (emphasis added). Thus, as established by the permissive language throughout Rule 2-424, the court has a great deal of discretion in deciding how to handle the situation when an untimely or insufficient response to a request for admission is filed. See Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 13-14 , 174 A.2d 768 (1961) (noting that trial judges are primarily vested with the discretion to administer and apply the discovery rules).

Under our standard of review, we shall not disturb such decisions, absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 14 , 174 A.2d 768 . “An abuse of discretion is present where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court. Thus, where a trial court’s ruling is reasonable, even if we believe it might have gone the other way, we will not disturb it on appeal.” Doe v. Maryland, Bd. of Social Workers, 154 Md.App. 520, 528, n. 7 , 840 A.2d 744 (2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the instant case, appellant filed her response to appellee’s request for admissions eight days after the allotted deadline.

The circuit court found that “there is no dispute that [appellant’s] responses were late under Rule 2-424(b) and are thus deemed admitted.” The court went on to note that the ³⁵⁸ circuit court’s prior decision to grant appellee’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend did not excuse appellant’s late response. The court then found that appellee properly filed a motion to strike appellant’s response and that appellant properly filed a response to this motion. The court concluded that appellant’s response was served late and that appellee’s motion to strike should be granted. Having so determined, the court granted summary judgment in appellee’s favor.

It is true that appellant’s response was untimely under Rule 2-424, and thus “deemed admitted.” It is also true that Rule 2-424(c) provides that “[i]f the court determines that the response was served late, it may order the response stricken.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, it is true that facts deemed admitted under Rule 2-424 may properly support the entry of summary judgment. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27 , 321 A.2d 540 (1974).

Nevertheless, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the court exercised its discretion as to whether to permit “withdrawal or amendment” of the deemed admissions pursuant to Rule 2-424(d). For that reason and because, on the specific facts of this case, it would have been an abuse of discretion to fail to grant such relief, we conclude the court erred in failing to allow appellant to withdraw her deemed admissions and, thus, also conclude that the court erred in granting appellee’s summary judgment motion. The court provided no explanation for its decision to strike appellant’s response except that it was untimely. As the text of the Rule makes plain, however, an untimely response does not automatically require that the response be stricken and does not, by itself, prevent a court from allowing withdrawal of any deemed admissions.

As explained in a comment to Federal Rule 36(b), which governs procedure regarding requests for admissions in Federal Court, “the admission that otherwise would result from a failure to make timely answers should be avoided when to do so will aid in the presentation of the merits of the action and will not prejudice the party who made the request.” 8A ³⁵⁹ Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2257, pg. 543 (2d ed.1994). 11 Similarly, Rule 2-424(d) outlines that withdrawal should be permitted where “it would assist the presentation of the merits of the action and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.” Thus, prior to striking appellant’s response and