Graham v. Joyce

²⁹⁹ Bond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The controversy in this case is between opposing views on the location, under the charter of Baltimore City, of the power to determine what the salaries of public school teachers in the city shall be. The Board of School Commissioners claims all such power, subject to limitations on its aggregate salary budget, under the provision in section 99 of the charter that, “The salary of all officers, teachers, secretaries, clerks and employees shall be fixed by said board, not to exceed in the aggregate the amount appropriated by ordinance.” On behalf of the City Comptroller the view urged is, principally, that under section 36, concerning the preparation and adoption of the estimates of city expenditures for any given year, the salary to be paid a teacher in any one position is determined by the itemized estimates and appropriations made by the Board of Estimates and the City Council. According to this latter view, the Board of School Commissioners is limited to the recommendation of salaries, and to the designation of the teachers to occupy one or another of the positions for which the salaries are so fixed by the ultimate appropriations.

The appeal is from the issuing of a writ of mandamus requiring the City Comptroller to pay to the petitioner for the writ, Olay T. Joyce, principal of the Westport Public School, the full monthly instalments of a salary of $2,780 fixed for him by the school board for the year 1926, instead of instalments of $2,480, to which amount the Board of Estimates reduced the allowance in making up the ordinance of estimates for the year. The petition for the writ recites that the school board voted to increase the salary of this principal from $2,480 to $2,780, after the building of a new schooL house, and the consolidation of two formerly separate schools and the housing of both in the’one new building, with a consequent large increase of pupils for the school; that the increased amount was included in the estimate sent by the school board to the Board of Estimates, but that the Board of Estimates substituted the figure $2,480, the sub ³⁰⁰ stituted amount being ultimately included in the ordinance of estimates, and that the City Comptroller then declined to pay the original amount, as increased by the school board. And it is alleged, in addition, that payment of the increase in the amount of this salary would not make the salaries fixed by the school board, in the aggregate, exceed the amount appropriated by the ordinance. There is no dispute on the facts.

The answer of the Comptroller sets out at length the considerations which, as he is advised, are opposed to the contention of the school board, and a demurrer to that answer was sustained. The respondent having declined to answer further, the writ of mandamus was ordered to be issued. The provision in section 99 of the charter, that “the salary of all * * * teachers * * * shall be fixed by said board, not to exceed in the aggregate the amount appropriated by ordinance,” is, in itself, clear and explicit. And in Thomas v. Field, 143 Md. 128 , this court assumed it to be clear that the power to fix teachers’ salaries was so vested in the school board, arguing from that fact that the City Council could not have intended to command the expenditure by the board of an extra fund, appropriated for equalizing salaries.

In the opinion in that case written by Judge Offutt, it was said, page 139, that “in our opinion, it was intended to leave the question, as to whether it should or should not be used, in their discretion. Any other construction would necessarily make the provision conflict with that provision of the charter which authorizes the School Board to fix the salaries of the teachers in the city schools, for, until it is amended, under the charter, that power undoubtedly rests with them, and not with the. Board of Estimates. It is true the' Board of Estimates can and does determine the aggregate amount to be allowed for teachers’ salaries, but that is a very different power from one which would authorize them to say what salary each teacher, or any particular class of teachers should receive, and we know of no' existing provision of law which requires the School Board to expend the entire amount so appropriated to the payment of such salaries, if in their judgment the needs of ³⁰¹ the system do not require it.” Quite apart from the force of that opinion as an authority, we have come to the same conclusion, after a study of the arguments against it in this case.

In the first place, counsel for the appellant urge that an earlier decision, that of Baltimore v. Gorter, 93 Md. 1 , is in conflict with this conclusion. That was a controversy between the Council and the Board of Estimates on the claim of the-Council to a power to change the purpose as specified by the-board of an appropriation of a lump sum of money for “new improvements.” In the estimates for that purpose, the second, of the form of estimates specified in the charter, the board allowed $190,000 for “Purchase of lots, with the approval of' the Mayor, City Comptroller and President of the School Board, erecting buildings, enlargement of existing buildings for school purposes.” And the Council, in the ordinance of estimates, changed the statement of purpose to read, “for new improvement, to be constructed by the Inspector of Buildings for the Board of School Commissioners.” In this dispute the function or powers of the Board of School Commissioners were not involved. And, indeed, the provision concerning the function of that board in the make up of the estimates for neAv improvements differs somewhat from the provisions concerning its function in the make up of the. departmental estimates which cover salaries. For the latter-estimates they are to furnish the items required for their-expenses, including a statement of their salaries, and it is-, in respect to these items that they are given the special power-under section 99; while for the estimates for new improvements they are merely to file their “recommendations” to the-Board of Estimates.

And there was no question in Baltimore v. Gorter of a difference between the recommendations of the-school board and the estimates of the Board of Estimates; there was only a question of the finality of the determination, by the Board of Estimates as to the application of the money,, however that board might have arrived at its figure or at-its decision on the application. It seems to- us, therefore, to be sufficiently clear from these distinguishing facts, with ³⁰² out discussing the expressions of the Court quoted by the appellant on the powers of the Board of Estimates, and on the finality of its application of the money for the new improvements, that the decision cannot be taken to settle the question here, of the finality of the figure of salary of a scchool principal, fixed by the school board for the estimates of the first kind, the departmental estimates of expenses. The scheme and procedure adopted in section 36 of the charter for the making up of the estimates for appropriations, and the ordinance of estimates, to which much of the appellant’s argument refers, has been frilly stated in the earlier cases of Baltimore v. Gorier and Thomas v. Field, supra, but a brief review of it, so far as it concerns boards such as the school board, may be of assistance here. Under the provisions of section 36, the Board of Estimates, made up of the Mayor, the City Solicitor, the Comptroller, the President of the Second Branch of the City Council, and the President of the Board of Public Improvements, are required to prepare three lists of moneys to be appropriated by the City Council for the next ensuing fiscal year.

The first list, known as the “departmental estimates” is one of amounts estimated to be required to pay the expenses of conducting the public business, and includes estimates for salaries. It is to be prepared in such detail as to the aggregate sum, and the items allowed each board, as the Board of Estimates shall deem advisable. And to enable the Board of Estimates to make this list, the head of each department or board of the city government is required to send in a sworn estimate of the amounts needed for the condnct of that department or board; and this department or board estimate is required to “specify in detail, the objects thereof, and the items allowed” for its expenses, and to include a statement of salaries. The second list, is one of “estimates for new improvements”; and to aid in making up this, the head of each department or board is required to file with the Board of Estimates his “recommendations as to the amounts which they may consider will be needed” for the purpose in the- particular depart ³⁰³ ment or board.

A third list contains amounts annually appropriated to institutions. When the three lists have thus been made up, the Board of Estimates causes a draft of an ordinance to be prepared and submitted to the City Council, providing appropriations sufficient to meet the amounts called for by the three lists. The form of ordinance is published, and afterwards considered by the Council, and the Council may reduce any amounts fixed by the Board of Estimates, except any for payment of state taxes and interest and principal of the municipal debt, but cannot increase any of the amounts or insert new items, nor can it by subsequent ordinance enlarge any items or appropriate money for the same purposes. And it is provided that no appropriation “shall be diverted or used under any circumstances for any purpose other than that named in the ordinance,” and that the Comptroller shall not draw any warrant for any items unless he has received the amounts and they are actually to the credit of the department or board.

We do not find in these provisions evidence of an intention that the Board of Estimates or the Council shall exercise their judgment on the amounts of particular salaries in the statement furnished by the school board, and reduce the figures if they disagree. It has not, indeed, been required that the departmental estimates, on which the ordinance of estimates is to be based, shall give the items of these salaries; those estimates need only “be prepared in such detail as to the aggregate sum and the items thereof allowed * * * as the said Board (of Estimates) shall deem advisable.” Certainly no power to regulate or fix particular salaries has been expressly given in section 36. And we see no ground for implying it from anything in the section, especially in the face of the clear provision of section 99 giving that power to the school board. It is argued that the clause that no appropriation provided for in the ordinance of estimates shall be diverted or used for any purpose other than that named in the ordinance, is inconsistent with a power in the school board, after a reduC ³⁰⁴ tion has been made in the ordinance of estimates, to require payment of a salary as originally fixed by it, making up the deficiency, necessarily, out of portions of its aggregate appropriations other than that appropriated in the ordinance to the particular salary.

This argument assumes that the clause ■contemplates itemization of teachers’ salaries in the ordinance to be laid before the Council, and, as has been seen, ¡that is not required. And the argument seems mistaken, too, 'in assuming that the final effect given to the designations of