Grayson v. State

ELDRIDGE, Judge. We granted petitions for writs of certiorari in these two cases to decide issues relating to the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.), Art. 27, § 645A. The questions raised in the petitions and briefs include the following: (1) whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Court of Special Appeals in these two cases; (2) whether petitioner Grayson’s petition for post conviction relief should be reviewed under the provisions of the Post Conviction Procedure Act that were in effect before the 1995 amendments, Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 27, § 645A, as interpreted by this Court in Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215 , 522 A.2d 1344 (1987); (3) whether the circuit court reopened a prior post conviction proceeding when reviewing petitioner Jackson’s most recent petition for post conviction relief; and (4) whether the circuit court’s decision regarding Jackson’s petition can be reviewed by the Court of Special Appeals. We shall hold that this Court has jurisdiction, shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals in both cases, shall direct that Grayson’s case be remanded to the circuit court, and shall direct that Jackson’s case be further considered by the Court of Special Appeals.

I. The Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, “[a]s originally enacted in 1958 ... did not place any limit on the number qf post conviction petitions which a petitioner was entitled ¿o file.” Mason v. State, supra, 309 Md. at 217-218 , 522 A.2d at 1345 . Nevertheless, “by Chapter 647 of the Act of 1986, the General Assembly amended § 645A [the Post Conviction Procedure Act] by adding new Subsection (a)(2) which provided that ‘[a] person may not file more than two petitions, arising out of each trial, for relief under this Subtitle.’ Section 2 of Chapter 647 provided ‘That this Act shall take effect July 1, ⁴ 1986.’ ” 309 Md. at 218 , 522 A.2d at 1345 . This Court in Mason held that the 1986 amendments to the Post Conviction Procedure Act, imposing the two petition limit, were not intended to be applied retroactively, and that, regardless of the number of petitions filed by a petitioner prior to the 1986 amendments, all petitioners had the right to file two petitions under the Act after July 1,1986. The General Assembly in 1995 once again addressed the number of petitions under the Post Conviction Procedure Act which could be filed to challenge a particular conviction.

By Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995, which was captioned “Death Penalty Reform” and which primarily amended statutory provisions relating to capital punishment, the General Assembly also amended subsection (a)(2) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act to provide as follows: “(2)(I) A person may file only one petition, arising out of each trial, for relief under this subtitle. “(II) The court may in its discretion reopen a postconviction proceeding that was previously concluded if the court determines that such action is in the interests of justice.” The first of the above-quoted paragraphs was subsequently codified as Art. 27, 645A(a)(2)(i) and the second as Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(iii). Sections 2, 3 and 5 of Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 stated as follows: “SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That, subject to Section 3 below, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all criminal cases, regardless of whether the case arises out of an offense that is committed before or after the effective date of this Act or whether the trial or sentencing of the defendant occurs before or after the effective date of this Act. “SECTION 3. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That the provisions of this Act that amend Article 27, § 645A of the Code do not apply to a case in which a second postconviction petition was filed prior to the effective date of this Act.

In such a case, the court shall process the case in ⁵ due course as required under Article 27, § 645A prior to the effective date of this Act.” “SECTION 5. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall take effect October 1,1995.” The effect of these provisions upon § 645A(a)(2) was that a petitioner, who had previously filed a petition relating to a particular trial, had until September 30, 1995, to file another petition under the statute relating to the same trial. Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 was signed into law by the Governor on April 11,1995. Subsection (a)(2) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act was also amended by Ch. 258 of the Acts of 1995, which was signed into law by the Governor on May 9,1995.

Section 1 of Ch. 258 provided as follows: “SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows: Article 27 - Crimes and Punishments 645A. (a)(2)(I) A person may not file more than 2 petitions, arising out of each trial, for relief under this subtitle. (II) Unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed later than 10 years from the imposition of sentence.” The above-quoted first paragraph of § 645A(a)(2) represented no change in the wording that had been enacted by Ch. 647 of the Acts of 1986.

The second paragraph was entirely new language, and is now codified as Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(ii). Sections 2 and 3 of Ch. 258 of the Acts of 1995 stated as follows: “SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall be construed prospectively to apply only to postconviction proceedings for sentences imposed on or after the effective date of this Act and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on or application to postcon ⁶ viction petitions for sentences imposed before the effective date of this Act. “SECTION 3. AND IT BE FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall take effect October 1,1995.” II.

The underlying facts in the two cases before us are as follows. A. In 1965 James W. Grayson was found guilty by a Baltimore City jury of first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment on January 17, 1966. Grayson, represented by his court-appointed lawyer, took an appeal, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment. Grayson v. State, 1 Md.App. 548 , 232 A.2d 284 (1967).

In 1968, the same attorney filed the first of Grayson’s petitions for post conviction relief, raising the identical issues in the post conviction petition that had been raised on direct appeal.' The court denied relief on the ground that the issues raised in the post conviction petition had been fully and finally litigated on direct appeal. An application for leave to appeal was denied by the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion. Thereafter Grayson filed, pro se, a second petition for post conviction relief, asserting, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. In 1969, the trial court denied relief, and the Court of Special Appeals again denied Grayson’s application for leave to appeal.

Grayson’s third petition for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, also filed pro se, commenced the present litigation. According to the record, the petition was given to the prison officials to mail to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on Thursday, September 28, 1995. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City marked the petition as filed on Monday, October 2, 1995. The circuit court declined to consider the merits of the petition and denied relief, stating that it was precluded from considering Grayson’s petition because “ ‘a person may file only one petition, arising out of each trial, for relief under ⁷ [Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(i) ].’ ” Additionally, the circuit court stated that it was precluded from considering the petition because Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(ii), “states ‘unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed later than 10 years from the imposition of sentence.’ ” The court stated that “Petitioner was sentenced thirty (30) years ago ... [and] this Court finds that ‘extraordinary cause’ is not shown in Petitioner’s allegations.” Grayson applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion, stated: “James Walker Grayson has filed an application for leave to appeal from a denial of post conviction relief. The petition that initiated this case was filed after October 1, 1995, and is the third post conviction petition the applicant has filed seeking review of this case. Because the law, Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(i), allows only one petition to be filed per case, we must dismiss the instant application. “Application For Leave To Appeal Denied. Any costs to be paid by applicant.” Grayson filed in this Court, pro se, a petition for a writ of certiorari, asserting that the circuit court erroneously applied Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 retroactively, that, in any event, his petition should be treated as filed when he delivered it to the state prison officials on September 28,1995, that under the Maryland Rules his petition should be treated as filed before the October 1 statutory deadline, and that the circuit court erred in applying Ch. 258 of the Acts of 1995 retroactively.

We granted the petition, Grayson v. State, 345 Md. 459 , 693 A.2d 356 (1997), and requested the Office of the Public Defender to represent Grayson in this Court. B. On January 30, 1991, Michael James Jackson was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of first degree sex offense, burglary, and assault with intent to rape. Jack ⁸ son was sentenced to life imprisonment plus two fifteen year terms to run consecutive to the life sentence but concurrent to each other. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments, Jackson v. State, 92 Md.App. 304 , 608 A.2d 782 (1992), and this Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Jackson v. State, 328 Md. 238 , 614 A.2d 84 (1992). Jackson filed, pro se, a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act on July 19, 1993. Relief was denied by the circuit court on September 14, 1994. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, granted Jackson’s application for leave to appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

We denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Jackson v. State, 339 Md. 354 , 663 A.2d 72 (1995). On December 5, 1995, upon remand, the circuit court once again denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals denied Jackson’s application for leave to appeal, and we denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Jackson v. State, 342 Md. 473 , 677 A.2d 566 (1996). Jackson initiated the present case on June 20,1996, by filing in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County another petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. Jackson argued, inter alia, that the circuit court should revisit some of the issues raised in his first petition for post conviction relief in light of a then recently filed opinion by this Court, Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38 , 673 A.2d 221 (1996). The circuit court, in a memorandum opinion, considered on their merits Jackson’s various challenges to his 1991 convictions, rejected Jackson’s arguments on their merits, and denied relief.

Jackson filed an application for leave to appeal, and the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, stated: “Michael James Jackson has filed an application for leave to appeal from a denial of post conviction relief. The petition that initiated this case was filed after October 1, 1995, and is the second post conviction petition the applicant has filed seeking review of this case. Because the law, Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(i), allows only one petition to be filed per case, we must dismiss the instant application. ⁹ “Application For Leave To Appeal Denied. Any costs to be paid by applicant.” Jackson filed in this Court, pro se, a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the issues of whether “Art. 27, § 645[A](a)(2), as amended [in] 1995, bar[s] a person sentenced prior to October 1, 1995, from filing a second petition for post conviction relief,” whether, when “a post conviction court accepts a second petition and issues an opinion” on the merits, “ § 645[A](a)(2)(i) bar[s] that person from appellate review,” and whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing Jackson’s application for leave to appeal.

This Court granted Jackson’s certiorari petition, Jackson v. State, 345 Md. 459 , 693 A.2d 356 (1997), and requested that the Office of the Public Defender represent Jackson in this Court. C. With regard to the first issue raised in Grayson’s and Jackson’s certiorari petitions, the Public Defender’s Office, in its briefs on behalf of Grayson and Jackson, appears to concede that the “one petition” limitation under Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995 is viable and applies retroactively to bar the filing, after September 30, 1995, of a new petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act challenging a trial if the petitioner had earlier filed one or more petitions under the Act challenging the same trial. We shall accept, for purposes of these cases, this concession. The Public Defender’s Office nevertheless argues that if Grayson’s petition was untimely, 1 the circuit court should have treated it as a reopening, under Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(iii), of his earlier petitions because “Mr. Grayson never had a meaningful opportunity to challenge the effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel in 1969 when he had his post-conviction ¹⁰ hearing.” (Grayson’s brief at 11).

The Public Defender’s Office points out that the circuit court clearly erred in applying the ten-year limitation in § 645A(a)(2)(ii) retroactively to Grayson. The Office of the Public Defender further argues that, in Jackson’s case, the circuit court in effect treated his petition as a reopening under § 645A(a)(2)(iii), and that the Court of Special Appeals should have exercised its discretion to grant or deny leave to appeal instead of dismissing the application under the “one petition” provision of Ch. 110 of the Acts of 1995. The State, in addition to arguing that the Court of Special Appeals properly dismissed both applications for