Mayor of Oakland v. Mayor of Mountain Lake Park

RAKER, Judge. The primary question in this case concerns the manner of computation of time required to give notice of the hearing on an annexation resolution. In this case, two municipal corporations seek to annex the same unincorporated area located in Garrett County. The computation of time question on appeal is whether the terminal day, i.e., April 23, 2004, is to be included or excluded in computing the number of days of the statutory requirement of “not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices.” We granted certiorari to answer the following questions: “I. Did the Circuit Court err in applying the common law ‘clear time’ rule in determining that Oakland failed to set the public hearing on the Oakland Annexation Resolution for not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the public notices of the Oakland Annexation Resolution as required by Article 23A § 19(d)?

II

Did Mountain Lake Park act in contravention of Article 23A, § 19 in holding a referendum election on the Mountain Lake Park Annexation Resolution before the end of the 45-day period during which referendum petitions may be sub ³⁰⁵ mitted under Article 23A, § 19(f) in an effort to make the Mountain Lake Park annexation effective prior to the stated effective date of the Mountain Lake Park Annexation Resolution and the Oakland Annexation Resolution?” Oakland v. Mountain Lake Park, 388 Md. 673 , 882 A.2d 286 (2005). We shall answer both questions in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Garrett County. I. On Tuesday, March 16, 2004, The Mayor and Town Council of Oakland, Maryland, introduced an annexation resolution (Oakland resolution), R2004-01, 1 at a regular meeting of the Oakland Town Council, to enlarge its corporate boundaries by annexing property of the Board of Education of Garrett County and the property of Floyd and Eleanor Arnold. Pursuant to Art. 23A § 19(d), public notice of this resolution and the area to be annexed by Oakland was published in The Republican, a newspaper of general circulation in Oakland, on March 18, 2004, March 25, 2004, April 1, 2004, and April 8, 2004.

The Mayor and Town Council of Oakland held a public hearing on the annexation resolution on April 23, 2004. The Oakland resolution was enacted following the public hearing. The Oakland resolution provided that it would become effective on the forty-sixth day following its enactment, which was June 8, 2004. The Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park introduced an annexation resolution (Mountain Lake Park resolution), Resolution No.2004-2, to enlarge the corporate boundaries of Mountain Lake Park by annexing an area known as the “Western Annexation” at a special meeting on Wednesday, March 17, 2004. 2 Included within the boundaries ³⁰⁶ of the Western Annexation was the land sought to be annexed by Oakland, as well as additional land.

Pursuant to Art. 23A § 19(d), public notice of the Mountain Lake Park resolution was published in The Republican, a newspaper of general circulation in Mountain Lake Park and the Western Annexation, on March 18, 2004, March 25, 2004, April 1, 2004, and April 8, 2004. The Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park enacted the Mountain Lake resolution following a public hearing on April 28, 2004. The Mountain Lake resolution stated that it would become effective on the forty-sixth day following its enactment, which was June 13, 2004. Several weeks before the public hearing on the Mountain Lake Park resolution, the Town Clerk of Mountain Lake Park prepared a referendum petition that was circulated to the residents of Parkwood Village East, an apartment complex within the Western Annexation.

A resident advocate of that community, after speaking with the Town Clerk, informed the residents of that apartment complex that it would be of financial benefit to them to be annexed into Mountain Lake Park, and therefore, they should sign the petition for referendum. Deposition testimony revealed that the petition was circulated only to the residents of Parkwood Village East because Mountain Lake Park officials believed that Parkwood residents supported Mountain Lake’s annexation efforts. Following a submission of the requisite number of signatures on a referendum petition, the referendum election was scheduled for May 22, 2004 at Parkwood Village East, and public notice of this election was published in The Republican on April 29, 2004 and May 6, 2004 pursuant to Art. 23A § 19(i). Thirty-one residents of Parkwood Village East 3 voted in the referendum election on May 22, 2004, and a majority of those persons voted in favor of annexation by Mountain Lake Park. ³⁰⁷ Two days before the end of the forty-five day period permitted for the submission of a referendum petition on the Mountain Lake resolution, on June 10, 2004, a resident of the Western Annexation, not residing in Parkwood Village East, submitted another referendum petition on the resolution.

Mountain Lake Park did not accept this second petition. The Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park filed in the Circuit Court for Garrett County a Complaint for Declaratory Relief pursuant to Md.Code (1973, 2002 RepLVol., 2005 Cum.Supp.), § 3-403 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, seeking a declaration that the Oakland resolution, No. R2004-01, was void because the Mayor and Town Council of Oakland did not comply with the notice requirement of Art. 23A § 19(d). The Mayor and Town Council of Oakland filed a Counter-Complaint seeking a judgment declaring the referendum election on the Mountain Lake resolution void and having no impact on the effective date of the Oakland resolution, that the effective day of the Mountain Lake Park resolution could not have been prior to June 12, 2004, which was forty-five days after its enactment, and that the Mountain Lake resolution was ineffective because the Oakland resolution was effective first. 4 The Complaint alleged that the annexation resolution adopted by the Mayor and Town Council of Oakland on April 23, 2004 was not in conformance with Article 23A § 19. The facts were not in dispute.

Oakland held its annexation resolution hearing on April 8, 2004, and adopted the resolution on ³⁰⁸ April 23, 2004. The notice was published four times in The Republican, with the last publication date on April 8, 2004. The pertinent provision of the annexation statute requires that there be fifteen days between the fourth publication of the notices and the public hearing on the annexation resolution. The question before the Circuit Court was whether April 23rd was to be included in determining whether there was not less than fifteen days before the hearing was held.

The Circuit Court held that the town of Oakland had not complied with the requirements of Art. 23A § 19, and that the hearing which was held on April 23, 2004 was less than fifteen days after the publication of the last advertisement. 5 The Court voided Oakland’s annexation on the ground that Oakland failed to comply with the notice requirements of Art. 23A § 19(d), and that Mountain Lake’s annexation of the disputed area was valid. The Court ruled as follows: “When the statute reads ‘not less than 15 days from the date of the last publication,’ it means not less than 15 full days from the last publication. In determining compliance in this situation, the Court counts forward beginning with ³⁰⁹ the day after the last date of publication, and 15 days is not 14 andjé days. As to the consequences of the breach of time, one could speculate, but it simply cannot be measured.

The only recourse is to start over again, if possible. So, the first ruling the Court makes is that the Doctrine of Substantial Compliance does not apply. “Now, Mt. Lake Park’s petition to annex the same, and additional property, was enacted, and on the very next day a petition for referendum was filed. Was this petition to defeat Oakland’s time?

Well, it certainly has that aroma to it. But it was timely filed; it was published conspicuously, and the people were able to vote on it. It was not defeated; it passed. Mr. Tinsley was from the same area and wanted to file his own petition.

The petition from the affected area had already been filed, and to have another petition would simply be confusing to say the least. “The [Board of Garrett County] Commissioners could have filed a petition, and the citizens from Mt. Lake Park could have filed a petition, but they didn’t. The referendum was filed from the affected area. It was voted on and it passed, and the rest is speculation. “So the ruling of this Court is that Oakland did not comply with its time, and that the Mt.

Park Annexation is valid.” Oakland noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. This Court granted Oakland’s petition for writ of certiorari while Oakland’s appeal was pending before the intermediate appellate court. Oakland v. Mountain Lake Park, 388 Md. 673 , 882 A.2d 286 (2005).

II

The question of the sufficiency of the notice turns on the construction of Md.Code (1957, 2005 RepLVol.), Art. 23A § 19(d) and Md.Code (1957, 2005 RepLVol.), Art. 1 § 36. The issue in this case is the proper method of calculating the notice period described in the statute. Art. 23A § 19 sets out the procedure for annexation of land in Maryland. Art. 23A ³¹⁰ § 19(d) provides that after the introduction of an annexation resolution into the legislative body of a municipality, there must be public notice and a public hearing before the annexation resolution may be enacted by the legislative body.

The public hearing shall be set for “not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices.” The pertinent part of Art. 23A § 19(d) reads as follows: “The public notices shall specify a time and place at which a public hearing will be held by the legislative body on the resolution; the hearing shall be set for not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices or, if the total area of the proposed annexation is for 25 acres of land or less, not less than 15 days after the second publication of the notices, and shall be held either within the boundaries of the municipal corporation or within the area to be annexed.” (Emphasis added). In the case before us, the hearing was held either fourteen days after the last publication of the notices, or fifteen days, depending upon whether the hearing could properly be held on the fifteenth day. We must decide the meaning of “not less than 15 days” as used in Art. 23A § 19(d). Petitioner argues that the Circuit Court was wrong in voiding Oakland’s annexation resolution and that the Court computed the days improperly.

Petitioner maintains that the phrase “not less than 15 days” permits the town to hold the hearing on the fifteenth day and that the trial court erred in applying the common-law clear-time rule and holding that fifteen clear days were required. Petitioner asserts that the Circuit Court erroneously applied the clear-time rule to conclude that the public hearing should have been held after April 23,2004. Petitioner’s argument is grounded in Art. 1 § 36, which establishes a uniform method for computing time in Maryland. Art. 1 § 36 provides in pertinent part, as follows: “In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default, after which the designated period of time begins to run is ³¹¹ not to be included.

The last day of the period so computed is to be included.... When the period of time allowed is more than seven days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall be considered as other days.... ” (Emphasis added). Petitioner maintains that by the plain language of the statute, the time computation method in Art. 1 § 36 applies to the notice period set out'in Art. 23A § 19(d). Petitioner’s position is that under Art. 1 § 36, the last day of period is included in the computation of time, and therefore, a hearing held on the fifteenth day would satisfy the statutory requirements of Art. 23A § 19(d).

Had the Circuit Court applied Art. 1 § 36 to the matter sub judice, petitioner continues, it would have concluded that the public hearing on the Oakland resolution was held properly on April 23, 2004, because that was the “15 days after the fourth publication of the notices” required by Art 23A § 19(d). Respondent argues that the general computation of time rule set out in Art. 1 § 36 is inapplicable to the calculation of time under Art. 23A § 19(d) because the latter statute uses the phrase “not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices,” which requires an application of the clear-time rule, an exception to the general rule for the computation of time. Under the common-law clear-time rule, if an action requires the expiration of a certain number of days, then both the first day and the final day are excluded from the time computation. Therefore, Art. 23A § 19(d) did not permit the Mayor and Town Council of Oakland to hold the public hearing on the Oakland resolution on April 23, 2004 because that date was less than fifteen days of clear time after the fourth publication of notices.

We first turn to the question of whether the clear-time rule governs the computation of time under Art. 23A § 19. We conclude that the general method for computing time set out in Art. 1 § 36 applies, because the Legislature did not express an intent to the contrary. ³¹² III. The general rule in Maryland, as in most other states, is that in computing the time for the performance of an act or an event, the designated first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included. See Equitable Life Assurance v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 262 , 508 A.2d 137, 139 (1986); Winter v. O’Neill, 155 Md. 624, 635 , 142 A. 263, 268 (1928).

See generally J.A. Bock, Annotation, Inclusion or Exclusion of First and Last Days in Computing the Time for Performance of an Act or Event Which Must Take Place a Certain Number of Days Before a Known Future Date, 98 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1964). The general rule is applicable unless there is an indication or intention to count only “clear” or “entire” days. See Winter v. O’Neill, 155 Md. at 635 , 142 A. at 268 ; Graham v. Wellington, 121 Md. 656, 660 , 89 A. 232, 233 (1913); Harris v. Latta, 298 N.C. 555 , 259 S.E.2d 239, 240 (1979). In Graham , we noted, in construing the election law requiring that certificates of nomination should be filed not less than twenty-five days before the election, that “[w]hile the general rule, in the computation of time, is to include one day and exclude the other, and not to include or exclude both, there are many decisions which hold that if a statute indicates that there are to be so many clear days, or that requires so many days at least, both are to be excluded.” 121 Md. at 660 , 89 A. at 233 .

The Maryland General Assembly codified the common-law method of time computation, initially enacted in 1941 as Art. 94 § 2, with the express purpose of establishing “a uniform method of computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the rules of any Court, or by order of Court, or by any applicable statute.” 1941 Md. Laws, Chap. 522. (emphasis added). The Act, now codified as Art. 1 § 36, 6 provides as follows: ³¹³ “In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default, after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included unless: (1) It is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day, which is neither a Sunday or a holiday; or, (2) the act to be done is the filing of some paper in court and the office of the clerk of said court on said last day of the period is not open, or is closed for a part of a day, in which event, the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday, Saturday, a legal holiday, or a day on which the said office is not open the entire day during ordinary business hours.

When the period of time allowed is more than seven days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall be considered as other days; but if the period of time allowed is seven days or less, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall not be counted in computing the period of time.” See also Md. Rule 1-203 (governing computation of time). In concluding that the Oakland resolution was invalid because Oakland did not wait fifteen clear days before holding a public hearing after the fourth publication of notices, the Circuit Court did not use the method prescribed by this statute in computing the applicable time. Because Art. 1 § 36 provides a uniform method for computing time prescribed by Maryland law and Art. 23A § 19 does not contain any exceptions to this general rule, the Circuit Court construed these statutes incorrectly. This Court has applied the statutory rule for computing time to the determination of the amount of time required ³¹⁴ under a number of different statutory schemes.

See, e.g., Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 14-15 , 728 A.2d 1280, 1286 (1999) (applying Art. 1 § 36 to conclude that a post-conviction petition was timely filed under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, then Art. 27 § 645A); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 536-37 , 578 A.2d 1177, 1178-79 (1990) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to conclude that a land installment contract was recorded one day late); Equitable Life Assurance v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 265 , 508 A.2d 137, 141 (1986) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to determine that the insured died within the two-year period during which the life insurance policy was subject to contest); Tingling v. Smith, 259 Md. 260, 262-63 , 269 A.2d 612, 613 (1970) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to determine whether a bill of complaint was timely filed in a suit against an executor); State Housing, Inc. v. Baltimore, 215 Md. 294, 298 , 137 A.2d 708, 711 (1958) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to determine date by which an appeal from a decision of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore had to be taken); Fischer v. Fischer, 193 Md. 501, 505-06 , 69 A.2d 51, 52 (1949) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to conclude that an appeal was taken in time); see also Pumphrey v. Stockett, 187 Md. 318, 322-23 , 49 A.2d 804, 806-07 (1946). Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257 , 508 A.2d 137 (1986) is instructive as to the application of the statutory rule for computing time to the matter sub judice. In Jalowsky , we explained that Md.Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 94 § 2, now codified at Art. 1 § 36 with no changes, essentially is a codification of the common-law rule, requiring the “exclusion of the first day and the inclusion of the last [day]” in computing time commencing from a particular day. See id. at 262, 508 A.2d at 139 .

We applied Art. 94 § 2 to determine the final date on which an insurer could contest the validity of an insurance policy under Art. 48A § 390. Md.Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol., 1985 Cum. Supp.), Art. 48A § 390 provides that, in pertinent part, a life insurance policy “shall be incontestable, except for the nonpayment of premiums, after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two (2) years from its ³¹⁵ date of issue.” 7 Writing for this Court, Chief Judge Robert Murphy explained why Art. 94 § 2 and Art. 48A § 390 must be construed together: “It is thus clear that Art. 48A, § 390 contains a two-year limitation for contesting an insurance policy while Art. 94, § 2 addresses the computation of time periods contained in applicable statutes. Both statutes relate, at least in part, to the same subject matter—that of time.

We have long held that ‘in construing legislative enactments, all statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be considered and harmonized as far as possible.’ In addition, there is a ‘policy that statutes are not to be construed to alter the common-law by implication.’ “As previously indicated, Art. 94, § 2 codified the then existing common law rule for computing time. In this regard, the General Assembly ‘is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law.’ Article 94, § 2 preceded Art. 48A, § 390; hence, the General Assembly is presumed to have had full knowledge of its content and underlying policy when it passed Art. 48A, § 390.” Id. at 263, 508 A.2d at 140 (citations omitted). Because the General Assembly did not exempt Art. 48A § 390 from the generally applicable method of computing time set forth in Art. 94 § 2, we construed the two statutes in harmony and provided full effect to each of them. Id. at 265, 508 A.2d at 141 .

In calculating the applicable two-year period under the statute, we excluded the day on which the policy was issued, explaining that “the limitations period commences on the following first full day.” Id; see also Fischer, 193 Md. at 505-06 , 69 A.2d at 52 (concluding that Art. 94 § 2 requires that a ³¹⁶ Maryland rule governing time for when an appeal may be noted “must be construed in light of that statute” because its intent is “to make uniform the method of computation of time”). Respondent argues that the general rule and the method for time computation set forth in Art. 1 § 36 does not apply to Art. 23A § 19 because Art. 23A § 19(d) uses the phrase “not less than 15 days,” thereby triggering the clear-time rule. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. See Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452 , 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005).

In ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, we give effect to the statute as it is written. See Piper Rudnick v. Hartz, 386 Md. 201, 218 , 872 A.2d 58, 68 (2005). If a statute has more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 879 A.2d at 1114 .

If the language of the statute is ambiguous, we resolve the ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, considering the legislative history, ^ise law, and statutory purpose. See Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591 , 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005). We consider both the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute and how that language relates to the overall meaning, setting, and purpose of the act. See Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004).

We avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. See Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462 , 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005). We construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Moore, 388 Md. at 453 , 879 A.2d at 1115 .

In construing statutes, we presume that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes affecting the same subject matter “to blend into a consistent and harmonious body of law.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65 , 862 A.2d 419, 429 (2004). Therefore, we read together statutes on the same subject and harmonize ³¹⁷ them to the extent possible, so as to avoid rendering either statute “or any portion, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory.” Id. at 65-66 , 862 A.2d at 429-30 . In the context of Art. 23A § 19(d), we do not find that the Legislature’s use of the phrase “not less than” was intended to invoke the clear-time rule and to reject the application of the uniform method for time computation as set out in Art. I § 36. Article 1 § 36 was enacted initially in 1941; Art. 23A § 19(d) was enacted in 1955.

As we noted in Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United, States, the Legislature is presumed to have had full knowledge of the content and underlying policy set out in Art. 1 § 36. 306 Md. at 263 , 508 A.2d at 140 . Therefore, more than merely the use of the words “not less than” is required to express a legislative intent to employ a different method of time calculation than “the uniform method of time computation” set out in the statute. See id. at 263, 508 A.2d at 140 . The cases relied upon by respondent, with the exception of Pumphrey v. Stockett, 187 Md. 318 , 49 A.2d 804 (1946), 8 all predate the enactment of Art. 1 § 36 and are no longer persuasive.

See, e.g., Iverson v. Jones, 171 Md. 649 , ³¹⁸ 652-653, 187 A. 863, 865 (1936) (concluding that the phrase “not less than eighteen days before” requires eighteen clear days); Winter v. O’Neill, 155 Md. 624, 635 , 142 A. 263, 268 (1928) (acknowledging that a statute using the phrase “at least” or “not less than” requires clear time); Owens v. Graetzel, 146 Md. 361, 368 , 126 A. 224, 229 (1924) (explaining that the phrase “at least three weeks” means “three clear weeks”); Iverson v. Perlman, 137 Md. 62, 67-68 , 111 A. 220, 222 (1920) (concluding that the phrase “not less than thirty days” means thirty clear days); Graham v. Wellington, 121 Md. 656, 660 , 89 A. 232, 233 (1913) (indicating that the phrase “not less than twenty-five days” requires twenty-five clear days); Walsh v. Boyle, 30 Md. 262, 266-67 (1869) (discussing English cases recognizing the clear-time rule). In 1948, then Attorney General Hall Hammond, later Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in an opinion to the Maryland Secretary of State regarding the final date on which a candidate for public office could withdraw a certificate of candidacy for nomination, explained his view that the general statutory rule for computing time was applicable to statutes where an act is to be done “at least” or “not less than” a given time. See 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 166, 168 (1948).

The statute Attorney General Hammond was asked to construe required that withdrawal certificates be filed at least thirty days before the day of the primary election. General Hammond stated in the opinion letter that the method of computation was that prescribed in Art. 94 § 2, the uniform method for time computation, rather than the clear-time rule. He stated as follows: “It is our opinion that Section 2 of Article 94 of the Code is to govern the computation of time, and that the formula which it prescribes is not to be disregarded or ignored ³¹⁹ because of the phraseology of the statute or rule under consideration. In other words, we believe that the statute is applicable alike in those instances where an act is to be done ‘at least’ or ‘not less than’ a given time, as well as where it is to be done ‘within’ a stated period.” 33 Op.

Att’y Gen. at 168. Courts’ treatment of the effect on the computation of time of the words “at least” or “not less than,” where an act is required to take place at least or not less than a certain number of days before a known future date, has not been consistent. See J.A. Bock, supra, 98 A.L.R.2d at 1337 (noting that a number of cases have held that such expressions have no effect on the general rule, and that other courts have taken the view that the expressions imply a count of clear days). With respect to the use of the phrase “at least” in a contract, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated as follows: “We conclude that use of this phrase does not alter the general rule for the computation of time.

We stress again that the phrase ‘at least’ is not specially defined in the option contract and therefore must be given its ordinary meaning. When this is done, it is clear that the phrase ‘at least’ does not specify which method of computation is to be used; rather, it merely serves to emphasize that a minimum of sixty days’ notice must be given, to be computed in the manner in which time is normally reckoned. “It is important to note that the general rule for computation of time in this jurisdiction comports with the manner in which persons of ordinary understanding would determine the time within which an act is to be done.” Harris v. Latta, 298 N.C. 555 , 259 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1979) (citations omitted); Treadway v. Miller, 354 S.W.2d 500, 501-02 (Ky.1962); Watson v. Koontz, 74 Nev. 254 , 328 P.2d 173, 174 (1958); State v. Lacklen, 129 Mont. 243 , 284 P.2d 998, 1003 (1955). The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that the legislature’s use of the phrase “at least” in a statute expresses “the idea of a minimum and nothing more,” and as such, does not indicate a legislative intent to depart from the general rule for ³²⁰ time computation. Santow v. Ullman, 166 A.2d 135, 139 (Del.1960); see also Maciborski v. Chase Serv.

Corp. of Az., 161 Ariz. 557 , 779 P.2d 1296, 1302 (Ct.App.1989) (concluding that the legislature’s use of the phrase “at least” or “not less than” in a statute does not indicate an intent to depart from the general rule for time computation, and explaining that the use of these phrases in a statute reflects both “the minimum time period [required] and that a longer time would be permissible”). The court found that construing the Legislature’s use of the phrase “at least” or “not less than” to require the application of the clear-time rule is unsound: “The list of exception cases appears impressive. But, as will be seen, there are very weighty objections to the soundness of these decisions. None of them contains any real discussion of the basis of the exception, nor any satisfactory reason why the addition of the phrase ‘at least’ is sufficient to indicate a legislative intent to depart from the general rule.

Why should ‘at least seven days notice’ mean, in common parlance, eight days’ notice? Our exception cases derive from Robinson v. Collins, [ 1 Har. 498 ]. The memorandum of the decision contains only the pronouncement that the service ‘must be exclusive of both the day of the service and the day of the return.’ “No authority is cited, but it is permissible to surmise that it followed the English precedents. * * * “In 1838 the same Court [in The Queen v. The Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & E. 173] had before it the same question, i.e., the construction of the phrase ‘fourteen days at least.’ The point was fully argued. The Court, with marked reluctance, adhered to the rule in Zouch v. Empsey, [4 B. & Aid. 522 (1821) ], though solely on the ground of adherence to precedent.

Three of the four justices expressed their disapproval of the rule.” Id. at 138. Our early cases stating that use of the phrase “at least” warrants application of the clear-time rule have their ³²¹ genesis in the same line of English cases addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Ullman ; those cases do not explain why the use of “at least,” or any other phrase warrants the application of the clear-time rule. See Walsh v. Boyle, 30 Md. 262, 266-67 (1869) (citing The Queen v. The Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & E. 173 (1838), for the proposition that a statute requiring fourteen days at least, means fourteen clear days, without additional discussion). We conclude that the use of the phrase “at least,” “not less than,” or “within,” is, standing alone, insufficient to indicate a legislative intent to deviate from the uniform method for computation of time as set out in Art. 1 § 36.

Accordingly, in the absence of unambiguous legislative intent to apply a computation method different than that set out in Art. 1 § 36, we reject the application of the clear-time rule to the computation of time required under Art. 23A § 19(d). We hold that the Circuit Court erred in applying the clear-time rule to Art. 23A § 19(d). Construing these statutes together and providing each full effect, we exclude April 8, 2004, the day on which the fourth publication of notices by Oakland in The Republican occurred, from the computation of the fifteen-day period required before a public hearing can be held on an annexation resolution. Fifteen days from April 9, 2004, the day after the fourth publication of notices, is April 23, 2004, the day on which Oakland held the hearing.

April 23, 2004 was neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday. Oakland was permitted to hold its public hearing on the annexation resolution on that day.

IV

We turn next to the period of time during which referendum petitions for annexation may be submitted under Art. 23A § 19 and whether Mountain Lake Park acted in contravention of the statute. With respect to annexation of land in Maryland, we have explained that “[t]he extension of the boundaries of a municipality is a political matter to be regulated by the constitution or the legislature of the State” and that “[c]ustomarily, the ³²² power to annex is delegated to the city or town by statute, since those political entities have no inherent powers to add to their size.” Rockville v. Brookeville, 246 Md. 117, 128-29 , 228 A.2d 263, 270 (1967). By enacting Art. 23A § 19, the General Assembly provided municipal corporations 9 with the power to annex land. Id. at 129, 228 A.2d at 270 ; see 1955 Md. Laws, Chapter 423.

Every municipal corporation in Maryland may annex contiguous land not within the boundaries of another municipality upon the initiative of the municipality’s legislative body, or a written petition signed by not less than twenty-five percent of the persons who reside in the area to be annexed and who are registered as voters in county elections in the precinct in which the territory to be annexed is located. See Art. 23A § 19(a)—(c). The resolution required to annex the unincorporated area may be either introduced by the legislative body of the municipality in accordance with the requirements of Art. 23A § 19(b) or be introduced by the legislative body following a petition by residents satisfying the requirements of Art. 23A § 19(c). 10 Once an annexation resolution is introduced pursuant to the requirements of Art. 23A § 19(b) ³²³ or (c), notice must be provided and a public hearing must be held on the annexation resolution, pursuant to the requirements of Art. 23A § 19(d). Following the public hearing, the legislative body of the municipality may enact the annexation resolution, although the resolution “shall not become effective until at least forty-five (45) days following its final enactment.” Art. 23A § 19(e) (emphasis added).

Those individuals residing in the area to be annexed who are registered as voters in county elections in the precinct in which the territory to be annexed is located may petition for referendum of the resolution “[a ]t any time within the 45 day period following the final enactment of the resolution.” Art. 23A § 19(f) (emphasis added). 11 Those resi ³²⁴ dents of the annexing municipality who are qualified voters may petition for referendum on the resolution “[a ]t any time within the forty-five day (45) period following the final enactment of the resolution.” Art. 2BA § 19(g) (emphasis added). 12 Finally, the governing body of the counties or county in which the municipality is located, by at least a two-thirds majority vote, may petition in writing the chief executive of the municipality for a referendum on the resolution “at any time within the 45-day period following the final enactment of the resolution.” Art. 23A § 19(h) (emphasis added). 13 Subsections (f), (g), and (h) each provides that the chief executive officer of the ³²⁵ municipality shall suspend the effectiveness of the annexation, pending the results of the referendum on the annexation resolution. Oakland argues that Mountain Lake Park’s holding of a referendum election on May 22, 2004, less than forty-five days after the residents’ of Parkwood Village East’s submission of a petition for referendum on April 29, 2004, was in contravention of Art. 23A § 19(f). By holding a referendum election and attempting to make its annexation resolution effective prior to the conclusion of the forty-five day period, petitioner argues, Mountain Lake Park ignored the plain language of Art. 23A § 19, thereby disregarding the intent of the General Assembly. Respondent argues that an annexation resolution can become effective prior to the conclusion of the forty-five day period following the final enactment of the resolution when a petition for referendum is presented and a referendum election on that petition occurs.

Because the purpose of the forty-five day period is to provide citizens with sufficient time to circulate and present a referendum petition to the municipality, respondent maintains, waiting for the forty-five day period to elapse once a referendum petition is circulated and presented lacks any purpose. Therefore, respondent concludes, Art. 23A § 19(Z), providing that an annexation resolution will be effective following the fourteen-day period subsequent to a referendum election, is the period of time applicable to this case. 14 ³²⁶ Because a majority of individuals having voted in the referendum election cast votes in favor of annexation, Mountain Lake Park claims that its annexation resolution became effective on June 5, 2004, two weeks after the referendum election was held on May 22, 2004, which is prior to the stated effective date of Oakland’s resolution—June 8, 2004. 15 See Art. 23A § 19(Z) (providing that if the annexation passes referendum, it “shall become effective ... on the fourteenth day following the referendum”). We disagree. Mountain Lake Park’s receipt of one petition for referendum and its holding of a referendum election does not permit it to ignore other provisions of Art. 23A § 19 clearly applicable to the case sub judice.

Cf. Blackwell v. City of Seat Pleasant, 94 Md.App. 393, 406 , 617 A.2d 1110, 1116 (1993) (Cathell, J.) (explaining that a municipality’s non-compliance with the procedures for enacting a charter amendment pursuant to Art. 23A § 13 “divested the electorate of its right to veto by referendum the Council’s attempt to change the basic form of government” of the municipality). The intent of the General Assembly is clear. It provided for the submission of referendum petitions “at any time” within the forty-five days following the enactment of an annexation resolution by the residents of the area to be annexed, the residents of the annexing municipality, and officials of the county governing body in which the municipality is located.

See Art. 23A § 19(f)—(h). The plain language of the referendum provisions of Art. 23A § 19, subsections (f)—(h), makes clear that the General Assembly intended for a referendum election to occur after the forty-five day period following the enactment of the annexation resolution. By operation of Art. 23A § 19(f)—(h), each constituency receives a fixed period of time during which to ³²⁷ consider the proposed annexation, circulate a petition for referendum, and ultimately, present a petition for referendum to the municipality. Moreover, the General Assembly contemplated that