Green v. Sollenberger

MURPHY, Chief Judge. The principal issue before us in this case is whether Maryland’s adoption law allows a natural parent to adopt her own legitimate children. If such an adoption, although not authorized by law, was nevertheless the subject of a final decree, we must also decide whether its legitimacy can properly be challenged in light of Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.) § 5-325 of the Family Law Article, which provides that “[a] court may not receive a petition to invalidate a final decree of adoption because of a procedural or jurisdictional defect unless the petition is filed within 1 year after the entry of the final decree of adoption.” 1 I. The concept of adoption did not exist at common law; hence, it is purely a creation of statute. Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 691 , 655 A.2d 901 (1995).

The Maryland General Assembly has. enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme governing adoption; it is codified as Code, §§ 5-301 through 5-330 of the Family Law Article. Id. See also Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 110 , 591 A.2d 501 (1991); In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 58 , 591 A.2d 468 (1991); Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 171-72 , 577 A.2d 14 (1990). In this regard, we have said that “ ‘the measure of the chancellor’s authority [in an adoption proceeding] is the [adoption] statute.’ ” In re Adoption No. 9979, supra, 323 Md. at 58, 591 A.2d 468 (quoting Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 81 , 195 A. 306 (1937)).

See also Board of Education v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 286 , 635 A.2d 373 (1994) (“In Maryland, the general rule is that there can be no adoption except under and in accordance with a statute.”); Dawson v. Evers ¹²¹ berg, 257 Md. 308, 312 , 262 A.2d 729 (1970). The following provisions of the current adoption statute are implicated in the instant case. First, the policies and procedures underlying the adoption statute are deemed to be socially necessary and desirable. § 5-303(a). See also Beckman, supra, 337 Md. at 691 , 655 A.2d 901 .

One of the stated objectives of the statute is to protect children from “(i) unnecessary separation from their natural parents; and (ii) adoption by individuals who are unfit for the responsibility.” § 5-303(b)(1). Another fundamental purpose of the adoption law is to foster the creation of familial affiliations where they did not formerly exist. According to §§ 5-307(a) and 5-309(a) respectively, “[a]ny individual, whether a minor or an adult, may be adopted” by “[a]ny adult.” The legal effect of the entry of an adoption decree is that “(1) the individual adopted: (i) is the child of the petitioner for all intents and purposes; and (ii) is entitled to all the rights and privileges of and is subject to all the obligations of a child born to the petitioner in wedlock; (2) each living natural parent of the individual adopted is: (i) relieved of all parental duties and obligations to the individual adopted; and (ii) divested of all parental rights as to the individual adopted; and (3) all rights of inheritance between the individual adopted and the natural relatives shall be governed by the Estates and Trusts Article.” § 5-308(b). According to this provision, an adoption decree endows the adopted child with the status of a natural child of the adoptive parents and bestows upon the adoptive parents all the rights and obligations of a natural parent.

Beckman, supra, 337 Md. at 698 , 655 A.2d 901 . ¹²² The primary consideration in adoption proceedings is the best interest of the child. As we have so frequently held: “[T]he controlling factor, or guiding principle, in both custody and adoption cases is not the natural parents’ interest in raising the child, but rather what best serves the interest of the child; the paramount consideration is what will best promote the child’s welfare, a consideration that is of ‘transcendent importance.’ ” Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 469-70 , 648 A.2d 1016 (1994). See also In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113-14 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994); In re Adoption No. A91-71A 334 Md. 538, 561 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994).

II

Petitioner Dorothy Mae Green (Green) and David Brian Lenick (Lenick) were married on April 21, 1979. They had three children: Thomas Weston, born on September 29, 1979, and Sarah Leeann and Andrew Ryan (twins), born on August 29, 1980. The couple separated in March of 1980. They were subsequently divorced on June 6, 1983.

The court awarded Green custody of the three children, which she has retained continuously since then except for about a year between 1987-1988 when the children resided with Lenick. The court further ordered Lenick to pay child support in the amount of $50.00 per week. Throughout the years following the couple’s separation and divorce, Lenick was consistently behind in his child support payments, accruing substantial arrearages over time. Since 1990, Green has received Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from Maryland to help her support her children.

See Code (1957, 1991 Repl.Vol.) Art. 88A, § 44A. To receive public assistance, Green was required to assign her right to obtain child support payments from Lenick to the State. Over the years, Maryland’s Child Support Enforcement Administration (CSEA) attempted to compel Lenick, currently a Pennsylvania resident, to satisfy his child support obligation with little success. The State lodged wage attach ¹²³ ments with Lenick’s employers, which were enforced by the Pennsylvania courts pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) codified as Code, §§ 10-301 through 10-340 of the Family Law Article.

In May of 1991, Green filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Carroll County to adopt her three legitimate children. Lenick consented to the adoption as did the three children. On September 3, 1991, the court entered a final adoption decree naming Green as the children’s sole parent and changing the children’s surname from Lenick to Green. 2 Even after entry of the final decree of adoption, Lenick continued paying child support to the State and the State continued sending AFDC payments to Green. About a year later, however, Lenick filed a petition in a Pennsylvania court, seeking to be relieved of his obligation to pay child support due to the fact that his children had been adopted by their mother.

On November 25, 1992, the Pennsylvania court suspended Lenick’s child support obligation. At Maryland’s request, the Pennsylvania court stayed the suspension on February 3, 1993, pending a Maryland court’s determination as to whether the adoption decree was valid. In March, 1993, Respondent Meg Sollenberger, the Executive Director of CSEA (the State), filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in the Circuit Court for Carroll County, seeking to have the adoption of the children vacated on the ground that its entry was contrary to both the law and public policy of Maryland. The parties filed motions for summary judgment; they agreed that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact in the case and that summary judgment was appropriate under the circumstances to decide the question of whether, as a matter of law, a natural parent may adopt her legitimate children in order to terminate her former spouse’s parental rights.

See Maryland Rule 2-501. The ¹²⁴ court (Beck, J.) granted the State’s motion and vacated the adoption, declaring it void ab initio. In so concluding, the court stated that “the complaint for adoption failed to allege that substantial social benefits would accrue to the children if the petitioner were to proceed with an adoption and that those social benefits would not accrue by proceeding under rules for a lesser judicial remedy.” On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the judgment was affirmed. Green v. Sollenberger, 100 Md.App. 686 , 642 A.2d 324 (1994).

The intermediate appellate court held that “despite the broad, unqualified language of Maryland’s adoption statute, it was not the intention of the Legislature that any individual may be adopted by any adult, totally without qualification or restriction concerning blood relationships,” and it determined that Maryland’s adoption statute does not authorize a natural parent to adopt her own legitimate children for the purpose of terminating the relationship between the children and their other natural parent. Id. at 691 , 642 A.2d 324 (emphasis in original). It further held that the adoption decree, being void ab initio, could be collaterally attacked and invalidated at any time. Id. at 691-92 , 642 A.2d 324 .

We granted certiorari to consider the important issues raised in this case.

III

Green argues that a natural parent should be permitted to adopt her own legitimate children, maintaining that such an action would not be violative of Maryland law or public policy. She claims that Maryland’s adoption statute places very few qualifications on who may adopt whom. She points to the words of §§ 5-307(a) and 5-309(a) that “[a]ny individual, whether a minor or an adult, may be adopted” by “[a]ny adult.” She contends that Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1 , 497 A.2d 142 (1985), is dispositive authority for her position. In that case, we held that a natural father may adopt his biological children, born out of wedlock, in order to legitimate them. ¹²⁵ Green argues that the fact that the children in Bridges were illegitimate, and hers are not, is not sufficient to distinguish the two cases.

She submits that in Bridges we made a comprehensive review of the law of other jurisdictions as to who may be adopted by whom and we determined that “[i]n view of the broad, unqualified wording of Maryland’s adoption statute ... we are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption in all circumstances by a natural parent of a child born out of wedlock.” Id. at 12 , 497 A.2d 142 . Green contends that the circuit court erroneously interpreted this holding when it stated that “[i]t is clear ... that the [Bridges ] court ruled that the legislature intended to prohibit natural parents from adopting natural children in most circumstances.” Green also posits that because we held in Edelmann, supra, that the only two means for terminating a person’s parental rights are through either a guardianship or an adoption proceeding, and since guardianship is clearly inapplicable in this situation, adoption was the only viable alternative for her to pursue under the circumstances. 3 Green maintains that it is the State’s position that the adoption in this case is invalid because there was no one there to take Lenick’s place after his parental rights were terminated. This argument is without merit, Green says, because it would mean that a single person could never adopt. In this regard, she directs attention to § 5 — 309(b), which expressly states: “A court may not deny a petition for adoption solely because the petitioner is single or ¹²⁶ does not have a spouse.” See also Ex parte Libertini 244 Md. 542 , 224 A.2d 443 (1966).

Green further asserts that this adoption is in her children’s best interest. She claims that it does not involve an “unnecessary separation” of her children from their father, against which the adoption law protects, without fulfilling any of its other objectives. Green contends that the separation is necessary, and thus proper, because it was agreed to by her, Lenick, the children, and the circuit court in 1991. She further argues that the adoption fulfills at least one of the statute’s objectives in that it protects her, the “adoptive” parent, from a future disturbance of her relationship with the “adopted” children by Lenick, their natural father.

See § 5-303(b)(3)(h). She suggests that the adoption also protects her children from having to support their father in the future if he ever becomes destitute. See In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 2152A 2153A, 2154A In the Circuit Court for Allegany County, 100 Md.App. 262, 281 , 641 A.2d 889 (1994) (holding that “[ujnder Maryland law, an adult child who