Petitto v. Petitto

HOLLANDER, Judge. This appeal arises from an action to modify child support filed by Wayne Petitto, appellee, against Jane Petitto, appellant. Among other things, we have been asked to consider whether the parties’ marital separation agreement required the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to apply Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines in calculating appellee’s child support obligation. The parties were married and divorced in Massachusetts.

In connection with their divorce, they executed an Agreement of Separation that is central to this case. It includes a provision requiring an annual recalculation of child support for ²⁸⁹ the parties’ only child, Jocelyn, and another clause providing that the Agreement shall be governed by Massachusetts law. After the divorce, appellee relocated to Virginia, while appellant and Jocelyn settled in Maryland. In late 1998, appel-lee filed suit in the circuit court to reduce his weekly child support obligation of $374.45.

Although the parties disagree about whether appellant impeded the progress of that suit, it is undisputed that appellee’s ease was dismissed on November 30, 1999, because the Massachusetts divorce decree was never enrolled in Maryland. Consequently, on February 9, 2000, appellee filed a second complaint to modify child support; it is that complaint that is in contention here. Applying the “ceiling” of the Maryland child support guidelines in this “above guidelines” case, the circuit court reduced appellee’s child support obligation to $221 per week, and made the reduction retroactive to the filing of the first modification petition. As a result, appellee was relieved of arrearages of $9735.70.

Moreover, the court ordered appellant to reimburse appellee for the overpayment in child support. Unhappy with the court’s disposition, Ms. Petitto noted this appeal. She presents several questions for our consideration, which we have rephrased as follows: I. Pursuant to the parties’ separation agreement, did the court err in failing to apply Massachusetts law, rather than Maryland law, in calculating appellee’s child support obligation?

II

Even if the court did not err in applying Maryland law to calculate child support, did the court err or abuse its discretion in modifying and reducing child support?

III

Because appellee’s first petition for child support was filed in late 1998, but was subsequently dismissed in 1999, did the trial court err in modifying child support retroactively to December 1998?

IV

Did the trial court err in finding that appellant is voluntarily impoverished? ²⁹⁰ For the reasons discussed below, we shall vacate the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL SUMMARY The parties were married in Massachusetts in January 1983. Their only child, Jocelyn, was born on February 14, 1984, and thus has become emancipated during the pendency of this litigation. In May 1997, while still residing in Massachusetts, the parties separated.

They obtained a Judgment of Divorce Nisi (the “Judgment”) in Massachusetts on August 11, 1997. Their Agreement of Separation (the “Agreement”) of May 15, 1997, was made a part of the Judgment and “merged” into it. Both parties have since remarried, and appellee has a child with his current wife. Among other things, the Agreement provided for joint legal custody of Jocelyn, with appellant having primary physical custody.

Section 5.2 of the Agreement obligated appellee “to pay child support pursuant to the child support guidelines .... ” That provision, however, does not identify the child support guidelines of a particular state. It reads: 5.2 Child Support. [Appellee] agrees to pay child support pursuant to the child support guidelines commencing on the first Friday after the execution of this Agreement, and every Friday thereafter until such time as the minor child, Joeelyn[,] is emancipated as hereinafter defined. * * * [The parties] agree that on an annual basis, commencing on or about April 15, 1998, they will exchange up-dated financial statements and re-calculate the child support guidelines based upon their current incomes. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, appellee’s weekly child support obligation was set at $374.45. Under § 5.6(a) of ²⁹¹ the Agreement, appellee also agreed to pay Jocelyn’s private school tuition for high school. 1 Section 12.10 of the Agreement is also relevant.

It states: 12.10 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by, interpreted and construed according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts without regard to its conflict of laws provisions. This Agreement has been executed and completed in Massachusetts and is a Massachusetts contract. The master held an evidentiary hearing on August 11, 2000, with respect to appellee’s petition.

As of that time, appellee had not paid any child support since December 1999. Appel-lee argued that Maryland law should govern the court’s disposition, while appellant maintained that, pursuant to the Agreement, Massachusetts law applied. The parties seem to agree that, under the Massachusetts child support guidelines, appellant would receive more money in child support than she would receive pursuant to the Maryland guidelines. The master issued a comprehensive Report and Recommendation of November 27, 2000, in which he reviewed the evidence adduced at the hearing and made several findings of fact that are relevant here.

Ultimately, the master recommended the denial of appellee’s request for modification of child support, as well as the denial of attorneys’ fees to both parties. We turn to consider the evidence and the master’s findings. Both parties are members of the United States Air Force. Appellant, a reservist for over 20 years, was a Major with a gross annual income of $13,255 when the Agreement was executed.

She was subsequently promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, earning $1990 a month on a part-time basis. She also had monthly investment income of about the same amount, ²⁹² based on a return of $23,879 in 1998. She last worked full-time in 1977, when she earned $27,000. Appellee was a Lieutenant Colonel when the Agreement was executed, with monthly earnings of $5917.

In 1998 and 1999, he had an annual income of approximately $72,000 to $74,000. In February 2000, appellee was promoted to the rank of Colonel, and his gross annual income increased to $100,125.96, or $8343.83 per month. Including monthly investment income of $832.17, appellee earned approximately $9176 per month at the time of the hearing. At the time of separation, the parties divided their savings.

Appellant received $200,000, while appellee received $100,000. Appellant also received an additional $250,000 in 1998, when the marital home was sold. In addition, appellee acknowledged that his father “has been gifting” $10,000 per year to him. 2 The master found that appellant, who is quite well educated, is voluntarily impoverished, as she works just six weeks a year. According to appellant’s 1997 tax forms, she earned $26,156.

Based upon appellant’s 1997 earnings, plus interest income, the master attributed earnings to appellant of $4170 per month. Further, the master determined that, from December 14, 1999, when appellee last paid child support, until June 20, 2000, when an Earnings Withholding Order was signed, appel-lee accumulated a child support arrearage of $9,735.70. Ac ²⁹³ cordingly, the master proposed payment by appellee of $75.55 per week towards his arrears. The master was of the view that the Maryland Child Support Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) applied to appellee’s request for modification.

He reasoned: The legal issues in this case are initially controlled by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Fam. Law Article §§ 10-301, et seq. The present order from the Massachusetts court is controlling and must be recognized.

FL § 10-310. However, Massachusetts no longer has Continuing Exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) because all of the individuals have left that state. See FL § 10-308(a)(l). Because Mother and the child now reside in Maryland, and Father has registered the divorce decree, this Court has authority to both enforce and modify that support order.

FL § 10-348. Any modification of the support order is subject to the same requirements, procedures and defenses that apply to the modification of an order originally issued by this Court. FL § 10-350(d). Upon issuing an order modifying the present support order, this state will obtain CEJ.

See FL §§ 10-308, 10-348. However, this State has no authority to modify any provision of the [Massachusetts] order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state. FL § 350(c); Holbrook v. Cummings, 132 Md.App. 60 , 750 A.2d 724 (2000). Nor may this State modify the provisions of the agreement which have been incorporated into the Massachusetts order.

FL § 10-308(f); see also FL § ll-101(c) (court bound by agreement of the parties); and see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (full faith and credit act). With respect to appellee’s request to reduce his child support, the master found a material change in circumstances, stating: “[T]he evidence is uncontradicted that both parents have enjoyed advancements in rank, have remarried, and have changed residences. While there may be no one event that would justify a review, all of these changes combined result in a material change in circumstances.” The master added: “It is unchallenged that Father is now earning more than he was at the time of the divorce.” ²⁹⁴ Based on the Guidelines, the master computed a weekly child support obligation for appellee of $196.00. As the master observed, “[t]hat sum is a significant reduction from the agreed-upon child support of $874.45 per week.” Nevertheless, the master recommended the continuation of appellee’s child support obligation at $374.45 per week, to maintain Jocelyn’s standard of living.

The master added that appellee’s “decision to remarry and have a new child cannot — or at least should not — be the basis for reducing his obligation to Jocelyn.” Both parties filed exceptions to the master’s recommendations, and the circuit court held an exceptions hearing on March 7, 2000. Appellant again argued that Massachusetts law applied in regard to the amount of child support. Moreover, she claimed that the master erred in finding that she was voluntarily impoverished, given that she had worked part-time for 26 years. Further, appellant noted that appellee had failed to present any evidence as to what job she was qualified to hold or what money she could earn.

Asserting that appellant is “bleeding my client dry to completely support the child,” appellee’s counsel urged the court to reduce the child support. He claimed that appellee was paying twice the amount of child support required under the Guidelines. Further, appellee urged the court to make the reduction in child support retroactive to December 1998, when appellee filed his first modification action. Appellee also excepted to the master’s denial of attorney fees.

On March 23, 2001, the court issued its Opinion and Order, in which it expressly adopted the master’s first level factual findings. The court also observed that, “strictly speaking,” the Guidelines do not apply, because the parties have a combined monthly income in excess of $10,000. See Voishan v. Palma, 327 Md. 318 , 609 A.2d 319 (1992). The court overruled appellant’s exception to the master’s finding of voluntary impoverishment.

Noting that appellant only earns $1,990 per month as a reservist, the court said that appellant did not present ²⁹⁵ any reason that she was unable to work more than regular reserve stint for part of each year; asked whether she had looked for other regular civilian work, she stated, without further explanation, “No, I haven’t.” ... This appears to be a sufficient basis for the Master to have found the mother as “voluntarily impoverished” and to impute potential income to her under Family Law Art., sec. 12-204(b). Further, the court upheld the master’s finding that appellant “apparently would be able to earn as much as she did in 1997 ($26,156), if she chose to do so, rather than choos[ing] a lifestyle of ease as she apparently has done.” Including $1990 per month in investment income, the court imputed to appellant a total income of $8429.67 per month. The court also accepted the finding that appellee currently earns $9176 per month, as compared to his earnings of $5917 per month at the time of the divorce.

The court acknowledged that the Agreement provides for the recalculation of child support annually, based on “the child support guidelines” and the current incomes of the parties. The court also recognized that the Agreement provides that it is to be construed in accordance with Massachusetts law. Nevertheless, the court took “judicial notice that Massachusetts law, like Maryland law, provides that the Guidelines do not actually apply when the parties’ combined gross annual income exceeds $100,000. Cf, Massachusetts Ann. Laws, Sch. 208, Sect. 28, et seq.” Regardless of whether Massachusetts or Maryland law applies, the court determined that it had discretion in the award of child support because this is an above guidelines case.

The court was also mindful that the master had recommended that the court “deny the father’s request for modification down to the guideline range, which would reduce the originally agreed support level by nearly 50% from $374.45 to $196 per week.” Significantly, the court said it agreed with the master “that the father has offered no evidence to show how it would be in Jocelyn’s best interest to have the level of support previously agreed and paid for her benefit reduced. ” ²⁹⁶ (Emphasis added). Nevertheless, the court disagreed with the notion that the “agreement was one for a specific amount of support to be paid indefinitely.” It reasoned that the parties’ Agreement provided for support to be recalculated annually, as nearly as possible, consistent with the child support guidelines. Such an agreement by the parents is presumed to be in the best interests of the child absent contrary proof. E.g., Kierein v. Kierein, 115 Md.App. 448, at 458 , 693 A.2d 1157 (1997).

And, no proof was offered in this case to indicate that such an agreed modification of support within the guidelines range (‘floor to ceiling’) would be inadequate to- the child’s actual needs or prior standard of living in light of improved finances of both her parents. Accordingly, the court rejected the master’s recommendation to maintain the status quo. Instead, the court reduced appellee’s weekly support obligation from $375 to $226, a sum equal to the “ceiling” of the Guidelines, in order “to give effect to the [AJgreement.” Moreover, the court made the reduction retroactive to December 1, 1998, when appellee filed his first petition. The effect of that ruling was to eliminate all child support arrearages.

In addition, the court ordered appellant to reimburse appel-lee for the overpayment of support, and to pay $1000 towards appellee’s attorney’s fees. Citing Rand v. Rand, 40 Md.App. 550, 554-555 , 392 A.2d 1149 (1978), the court said that if “ ‘the custodial parent ... has not, in fact, expended the ‘overpayment’ for the support of the child and has it ... available for repayment, it is only fair and just that the paying parent be able to recover it.’ ” The court reasoned: Because of the mother’s extensive assets, the undersigned does find that she has “the equivalent” of support money in her accounts which would enable her to return the overpayment which would not have been made, if the parties had made timely modification of the support obligation, as agreed. We shall include additional facts in our discussion. ²⁹⁷ DISCUSSION I. Appellant contends that, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the parties agreed upon the use of the Massachusetts guidelines for purposes of calculating child support. 3 Therefore, she claims that the court erred in failing to apply Massachusetts law in calculating appellee’s child support obligation. As we observed, the parties seem to agree that, if the court had applied the ceiling of the Massachusetts guidelines, appel-lee’s child support obligation would have been “significantly higher.” Using the “minimum presumptive level under Massachusetts guidelines,” appellant contends that appellee would have had a weekly child support obligation of $329.08, well in excess of the $221 per week ordered by the trial judge.

In addition, appellant challenges the court’s order attributing income to her. Without that income imputed to her, she claims appellee would have owed weekly child support of $447.83 under Massachusetts law. Appellee disagrees with appellant’s position, noting that the Agreement does not expressly provide for the application of the Massachusetts guidelines. Moreover, he asserts that, “on grounds of public policy,” it is unsound “to impose amounts of child support arrived at by legislatures of other [sjtates upon children living in Maryland.” Although appellee recognizes that “Maryland law generally allows parties to agree on the choice of law by which an agreement will be governed,” he asserts: The Massachusetts Legislature set guidelines on the basis of support needed for children living in Massachusetts.

Because Jocelyn no longer resides [in Massachusetts] and her expenses are no longer related to Massachusetts, setting child support based upon her former residence would ²⁹⁸ be contrary to the intent of the agreement to provide support for the child. By not specifying that Massachusetts guidelines should always be used, but rather that child support should be recalculated according to [the] guidelines, it was the intent of the parties that the appropriate guidelines should be used. (Emphasis added). It is undisputed that, under both Maryland and Massachusetts law, this is an “above guidelines” case, meaning that the parties’ combined, gross monthly income exceeds the upper limit to which the child support guidelines of either state apply.

Therefore, the court concluded that it did not have to resolve which state’s guidelines applied, because under the law of either state, it has discretion to make an appropriate award of child support. The court then established appellee’s child support obligation using the “ceiling” or top of the Maryland Guidelines. In our view, the trial court did not err by declining to apply the Massachusetts guidelines in regard to child support. We explain.

Maryland has long recognized that parties to a domestic case may resolve their disputes by way of separation agreements that are enforceable as independent contracts. Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 505 , 784 A.2d 1086 (2001); Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 516 , 644 A.2d 510 (1994); Moore v. Moore, 144 Md.App. 288 , 797 A.2d 839 (2002); Campitelli v. Johnston, 134 Md.App. 689, 696 , 761 A.2d 369 (2000), cert. denied, 363 Md. 206 , 768 A.2d 54 (2001); see Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), §§ 8-101, 8-105 of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”); J. Fader and R. Gilbert, Maryland Family Law § 14-3(b)(3rd ed.2000). As the Court said in Gordon v. Gordon, 342 Md. 294 , 675 A.2d 540 (1996): “The prevailing view is now that ‘separation agreements ... are generally favored by the courts as a peaceful means of terminating marital strife and discord so long as they are not contrary to public policy.’ ” Id. at 300-01 , 675 A.2d 540 (quot ²⁹⁹ ing 5 S. Williston, a Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 11:7, at 396-99 (R. Lord ed., 4th ed.1993)). As a contract between the parties, such an agreement is subject to the general rules of construction applicable to other contracts.

Bruce v. Dyer, 309 Md. 421, 433 , 524 A.2d 777 (1987); Moore, 144 Md.App. at 303 , 797 A.2d 839 ; Rauch v. McCall, 134 Md.App. 624, 637 , 761 A.2d 76 (2000); Fultz v. Shaffer, 111 Md.App. 278, 298 , 681 A.2d 568 (1996). Accordingly, the principles of contract construction are relevant to our analysis of the Agreement, although not necessarily dis-positive of the issue before us.' 4 The construction of a written contract is a question of law, subject to de novo review by an appellate court. Langston, 366 Md. at 505-06 , 784 A.2d 1086 ; JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 625 , 697 A.2d 898 (1997); Nationwide Insurance Companies v. Rhodes, 127 Md.App. 231 , 732 A.2d 388 (1999). As a fundamental principle of contract construction, we seek to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the contracting parties.

Society of Am. Foresters v. Renewable Natural Resources Found., 114 Md.App. 224, 234 , 689 A.2d 662 (1997); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 109 Md.App. 217, 290-91 , 674 A.2d 106 (1996), aff'd, 346 Md. 122 , 695 A.2d 153 (1997).

Moreover, “the primary source for determining the intention of the parties is the language of the contract itself.” Hartford Accident & Indem., 109 Md.App. at 290-91 , 674 A.2d 106 . In this regard, contracts are interpreted “as a whole to determine the parties’ intentions.” Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 508 , 667 A.2d 617 (1995). The terms of a contract are construed consistent with their usual and ordinary meaning, unless it is apparent that the parties ascribed a special or technical meaning to the words.

See Fister v. Allstate Life ³⁰⁰ Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 210 , 783 A.2d 194 (2001); Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 766 , 556 A.2d 1135 (1989). In ascertaining the parties’ intent, Maryland follows the objective law of contract interpretation.

See Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 178 , 776 A.2d 645 (2001); B & P Enterprises v. Overland Equip. Co., 133 Md.App. 583, 604 , 758 A.2d 1026 (2000). Under this doctrine, when a contract is clear and unambiguous, “its construction is for the court to determine.” Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 251 , 768 A.2d 620 (2001) (citation omitted). Moreover, the court is required to “give effect to [the contract’s] plain meaning,” without regard to what the parties to the contract thought it meant or intended it to mean.

Wells, 363 Md. at 251 , 768 A.2d 620 ; see PaineWebber Inc. v. East, 363 Md. 408, 414 , 768 A.2d 1029 (2001); Auction & Estate Representatives, Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 340-41 , 731 A.2d 441 (1999); Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 436 , 727 A.2d 358 (1999). Generally, “it must be presumed that the parties meant what they expressed.” PaineWebber Inc., 363 Md. at 414 , 768 A.2d 1029 ; see Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 533 , 740 A.2d 1004 (1999). “ ‘If only one reasonable meaning can be ascribed to the [contract] when viewed in context, that meaning necessarily reflects the parties’ intent.’ ” Labor Ready, Inc. v. Abis, 137 Md.App. 116, 128 , 767 A.2d 936 (2001) (citation omitted). Thus, “ ‘the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean.’ ” Calomiris, 353 Md. at 436 , 727 A.2d 358 (citation omitted). The “ ‘test of what is meant is ... what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought’ the contract meant.” Society of Am.

Foresters, 114 Md.App. at 234 , 689 A.2d 662 (citation omitted). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a threshold question of law, subject to de novo review by an appellate court. Calomiris, 353 Md. at 434 , 727 A.2d 358 . Contractual language is considered ambiguous when the words are suscep- ³⁰¹ tibie of more than one meaning to a reasonably prudent person.

Ashton, 354 Md. at 340 , 731 A.2d 441 ; Calomiris, 353 Md. at 436 , 727 A.2d 358 ; Davis v. Magee, 140 Md.App. 635, 650 , 782 A.2d 351 (2001). “The determination of whether language is susceptible of more than one meaning includes a consideration of ‘the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution.’ ” Calomiris, 353 Md. at 436 , 727 A.2d 358 (citation omitted). When a contract is ambiguous, “the meaning of the contract is a question to be determined by the trier of fact.” University of Baltimore v. Iz, 123 Md.App. 135, 162 , 716 A.2d 1107 , cert. denied, 351 Md. 663 , 719 A.2d 1262 (1998); see Shapiro v. Massengill, 105 Md.App. 743, 754-55 , 661 A.2d 202 , cert. denied, 341 Md. 28 , 668 A.2d 36 (1995). A contract is not ambiguous, however, merely because the parties do not agree as to its meaning. Fultz, 111 Md.App. at 299 , 681 A.2d 568 .

Ordinarily, “parties to a contract may agree as to the law which will govern their transaction, even as to issues going to the validity of the contract.” General Insurance Company of America v. Interstate Service Company, Inc., 118 Md.App. 126, 137 , 701 A.2d 1213 (1997); see National Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Properties, Inc., 336 Md. 606 , 650 A.2d 246 (1994); Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 43 , 415 A.2d 1096 (1980). But, in General Insurance, we recognized the following limitations on that right, based on the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 187 (Supp.1989): (1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue. (2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either ³⁰² (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. General Insurance, 118 Md.App. at 137 , 701 A.2d 1213 ; see National Glass, 336 Md. at 610-11 , 650 A.2d 246 ; (quoting Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 187(2) (Supp.1989)).

Although § 12.01 of the Agreement provides that it is “governed by, interpreted and construed according to the laws of Massachusetts,” it does not expressly require application of the Massachusetts guidelines. There is no language in the Agreement that requires use of the Massachusetts guidelines for the rest of Jocelyn’s minority, under all conceivable circumstances, including those attendant here, where none of the parties .resides in Massachusetts. Indeed, the specific provision concerning child support says nothing about the guidelines of any particular state. It states only that appellee “agrees to pay child, support pursuant to the child support guidelines.... ” Had the parties meant to require use of the Massachusetts child support guidelines under all circumstances, they could have easily said so.

Moreover, contractual language providing for the interpretation or construction of the Agreement under Massachusetts law is not the same as a provision requiring use of the Massachusetts guidelines under all circumstances. As we see it, even if Massachusetts law applies pursuant to the Agreement, the question is whether Massachusetts law would require use of the Massachusetts guidelines when neither of the parties has any current ties to Massachusetts. Appellant has not provided us with any authority to suggest that a Massachusetts court, applying Massachusetts law, would use Massachusetts guidelines in light of the facts of this case. ³⁰³ In any event, the canons of contract construction do not require us to abandon our common sense or logic in interpreting the Agreement or in ascertaining the parties’ intent. To the extent that the parties contemplated use of the Massachusetts child support guidelines, it undoubtedly was because they lived in Massachusetts when the Agreement was executed.

Putting it another way, the child support provision of the Agreement is not an open ended obligation for appellee to pay child support based on the Massachusetts guidelines if neither of the parties had any ties to Massachusetts. We reject appellant’s position for yet another reason. Regardless of the terms of the Agreement with respect to child support, the Agreement does not take priority over the best interests of the child, the standard that controls decisions affecting children. Voishan, 327 Md. at 326 , 609 A.2d 319 ; see Ley v. Forman, 144 Md.App. 658, 672 , 800 A.2d 1 (2002).

Parents cannot waive or bargain away appropriate child support. Walsh v. Walsh, 333 Md. 492, 504 , 635 A.2d 1340 (1994); see Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 130 , 656 A.2d 773 (1995); Stambaugh v. Child Support Administration, 323 Md. 106, 111 , 591 A.2d 501 (1991). “A parent has both a common law and statutory duty to support his or her minor child.” Drummond v. State, 350 Md. 502, 520 , 714 A.2d 163 (1998); see Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 633 , 620 A.2d 1363 (1993); Sezudlo v. Berry, 129 Md.App. 529, 542 , 743 A.2d 268 (1999). This policy is codified in the child support guidelines. See Md.Code (1999 Repl.Vol.), Title 12 of the Family Law Article; Drummond, 350 Md. at 520-21 , 714 A.2d 163 ; Tannehill v. Tannehill, 88 Md.App. 4, 11 , 591 A.2d 888 (1991).

In effect, strict adherence to appellant’s position could result in the subordination of the child’s best interest in favor of an agreement between the parties. It may not be in a child’s best interest to construe a child support agreement in such a way as to link support to a state to which none of the parties has any present connection. For example, if the child had relocated from a state with a cost of living lower than Mary ³⁰⁴ land’s, and with child support guidelines that provided correspondingly less support, it would nqt necessarily be in the child’s best interest to have a parent’s support obligation limited by an agreement obligating the court to use guidelines based on the cost of living in the other state. Indeed, that position might well conflict with the public policy considerations that culminated in the enactment of the child support guidelines.

See Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 460 , 648 A.2d 1016 (1994); Voishan, 327 Md. at 322 , 609 A.2d 319 ; Jackson v. Proctor, 145 Md.App. 76, 92 , 801 A.2d 1080, 1090 (2002). It happens that, in this case, the use of foreign guidelines might yield more child support. But, we cannot sanction a policy that permits use of foreign guidelines so long as the parent pays more support than might otherwise be required, while