Greene v. State

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Clayton Maurice Greene, the appellant, was convicted by the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Judge Albert L. Sklar presiding without a jury of storehouse breaking and stealing merchandise of the value of $5. or more, the crime occurring on December 11,1968. Greene alleges that since, at the time of the crime, he was age 16, his date of birth being September 11, 1952, exclusive jurisdiction to try him was vested in the Juvenile Court under Md. Code, Art. 26, §§ 51-101 inclusive, in the absence of waiver, Art. 26, § 70-16. He contends that the exception contained in Art. 26, § 70-1 (c) [Declaring that a child under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Act is a person who has not reached his 18th birthday, except in Baltimore City, where, until July 1, 1971, such child is defined as a person who has not reached his 16th birthday] is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Art. 23 of the Declaration of Rights of Maryland.

We considered this identical question in Graves v. State, an unreported opinion, No. 201, Initial Term, 1967, filed ¹⁰⁸ July 21, 1967, where, as in the instant case, no evidence was produced to show an insufficient legislative basis for the classification. Graves held that in the absence of such evidence under Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556 , 214 A. 2d 775 and Kirkwood v. Provident Sav. Bank of Baltimore, 205 Md. 48 , 106 A. 2d 103 , the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment would prevail. We also relied on the long history in the State of Maryland of the enactment of local laws affecting only some counties and of the exemption of some counties from the operation of general laws, citing Stevens v. State, 89 Md. 669 , 43 A. 929 , State v. Shapiro, 131 Md. 168 , 101 A. 703 , Salsburg v. State, 201 Md. 212 , 94 A. 2d 280 and particularly Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 , 74 S. Ct. 280 , 98 L. Ed. 281 sustaining a local law of Anne Arundel County permitting illegally procured evidence in certain trials although inadmissible elsewhere in the State.

Although Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 subsequently held all such evidence inadmissible, we considered the Salsburg case as precedent for the validity of territorial classifications. We also relied upon McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 81 S. Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 relating to different county laws as to Sunday sales of merchandise. Of course, we were aware the Maryland courts had declared unconstitutional some acts of the legislature where there was no rational basis for territorial distinctions. Maryland Coal & Realty Co., et al. v. Bureau of Mines, et al., 193 Md. 627 , 69 A. 2d 471 ; Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251 , 183 A. 534 .

In Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (affirmed without discussion of the major question by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 15,033, decided January 18, 1971) the United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the evidence produced therein sufficient to overcome the general presumption of the validity of a legislative act and held Md. Code, Art. 26, § 70-1 (c) unconstitutional. The District Court relied on a report of the Legislative Council Special Committee on Juvenile Courts, January 1966, generally known as the ¹⁰⁹ Rasin Committee Report recommending a uniform age of 17 throughout the State. The Report recited that if formerly there was a disparity between children in Baltimore City and children in the counties, there was little to show such differences today. The Report continued: “If differentiation of individuals is necessary, as it surely is, it should be made on the basis of facts about the individual, and not on the basis of an assumption about a huge and diverse group such as the youthful population of a city.

Whatever differentiation is needed may be made by a court, either by the device of a waiver to the adult criminal court, or by the nature of the disposition following and adjudication of delinquency. The patent unfairness and unjustified inequality which results from the present disparity undermines a basic value of our legal system. . . Other evidence in the case was summarized by the trial judge as follows: 316 F. Supp. at 27-28 . “The testimony in this case fully supports the conclusion that there is no psychological or physical basis for distinguishing between sixteen and seventeen year olds residing in Baltimore City and in the Counties. Such is the testimony of Robert C. Hilson, Director of the State Department of Juvenile Services, after working with city and county children for a number of years; of Dr. John Hamilton, a licensed medical doctor, practicing psychiatrist, and Director of Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital, who also testified that City children on the whole were less mature than County children, and required more intensive services and attention; James V. Bennett, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons for twenty-seven years, and formerly in charge of the National Training School for Boys in ¹¹⁰ Washington, D. C.; and Judge Joseph Howard, a member of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, and a former probation officer and social caseworker.” The District Court found no evidence had been produced to show that the difference in classification served any legitimate state objective.

The Judge pointed to the consequences following a criminal conviction as an adult such as loss of right to vote and incarceration with adults, as opposed to the consequences of a finding of delinquency under the Juvenile Act, including additional psychological and psychiatric services and the confinement with other children. The Judge also found discrimination in the effect on juveniles whose conduct, although not criminal, evidenced the need for help and attention. Lastly, the Judge pointed out that the legislature of Maryland had applied the Juvenile Act to children between 16 and 18 in Baltimore City by Laws of Maryland, 1966, Ch. 127, to