Greenwade v. Greenwade

Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the commission of lunacy, in the year 1852, the appellant, Charity Greenwade, was adjudged to be a person of unsound mind, and incapable of having charge of her person and property. In her application tp have the commission superseded, it is alleged she has recovered from the infirmity, and ought now to be restored to .her rights. Before the inquisition found, she was presumed to be sane; but when shown to be otherwise under the commission, it was necessary to furnish proof of her recovery. ³¹⁵ The main purpose of the original commission, was to ascertain whether such a measure was necessary for the benefit of the appellant, with reference to her mental condition and the protection of her property.

Alexander’s Ch. Prac., 234. If she has recovered her reason, there is no further occasion for the protection of the Court, and she is entitled to be restored to her rights. The authority of the Court ceases upon her restoration to sanity.

Under the 79th sec. of Art. 16 of the Code, power is given to the Court to superintend and direct the affairs of persons non compos mentis, both as to the care of their persons and. management of their estates, and to make such orders and decrees in regard thereto, as may seem proper. The Act of 1785, ch. 72, sec. 6, thus codified, described the party to be affected thereby as lunatics or idiots. The terms non compos mentis used by the Code, embraces not only lunatics and idiots, but all persons of unsound mind. The Code after prescribing the standard of incapacity, does not, nor does the Common law furnish any unerring-rule, by which to determine that the party is a fit subject for the commission of lunacy.

They have certainly not prescribed any degree of intellect, as essential to protect a party from the custody of a Court of Chancery. If a person at Coihmon law, or by the provisions of the Code, is compos mentis, his right to dispose of his property at his own pleasure, cannot be questioned. Whether he makes a wise, or improvident use of it, is immaterial. His own determination and will stand as sufficient reasons for his conduct.

It will be readily perceived if the standard, the unsoundness of mind prescribed by the law, was not the criterion, it would be a difficult if not an impossible task, to establish a better one, looking to a higher requisite, or the possession ³¹⁶ of a certain defined degree of intelligence. There would be insuperable difficulty, in graduating the capacity of parties under any other rule: The foundation of the jurisdiction of the Courts, is made to depend upon the fact of the party, being non compos mentis. Without such fact, however the party may be of weak or feeble mind, the Courts will not undertake to exercise their authority, and dispose of the person and estate. The appellant ought not to be treated judicially, as