Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Administration

CATHELL, J. This appeal stems from the denial by respondent Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) of the April 8, 2003, application made by petitioner, Norris Emmett Gwin, for a Maryland driver’s license. As of the date petitioner made his application, his driver’s license had been revoked both in Illinois and in Florida and the MVA denied his application on the basis of Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 16-103.1(1) of the Transportation Article, which prohibits the MVA from issuing a license “[d]uring any period for which the individual’s license to drive is revoked ... in this or any other state.” Petitioner sought review in the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) of the MVA’s failure to process his license application and in a hearing on January 15, 2004, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), petitioner was granted his requested relief and the MVA was ordered to process petitioner’s application for a driver’s license. On February 10, 2004, the MVA filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Following argument, the trial court issued a written opinion on August 5, 2004, reversing the decision of the ALJ.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court which we granted on November 29, 2004. Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 383 Md. 569 , 861 A.2d 60 (2004). Petitioner presents the following question for our review, to which we have added a second question to reflect the more narrow issue as presented to the trial court: 1. “[Does] the Driver License Compacts Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 16-703 of the Transportation Article] allow[ ] a Maryland resident with a permanent revocation of his Florida driver’s license to apply for a Maryland driver’s license after serving one year of the revocation?” ⁴⁴⁵ 2. Does McLCode (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 16-103.1(1) of the Transportation Article, conflict with the Driver License Compact, found at Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.

Vol.), § 16-703 of the Transportation Article? [Alterations added.] As we have reframed the focus of this case, we hold that there is no conflict between Md.Code (1977, 2002 RepLVol.), § 16-103.1(1) of the Transportation Article, which permits the MVA to deny a driver’s license to an individual whose driver’s license has been revoked in Maryland or any other state, and the Driver License Compact, found at Md.Code (1977, 2002 RepLVol.), § 16-703 of the Transportation Article. The clear legislative intent of these two statutes indicates that Maryland law recognizes extraterritorial license revocations and the MVA is not permitted to issue a license to an individual whose license has been permanently revoked in another jurisdiction, even after a period of one year of the revocation. I. Facts Petitioner, currently a Maryland resident, completed an Application for a Maryland Non-Commercial Driver’s License on April 8, 2003, in pursuit of a Maryland driver’s license. In response to question number four on the application, which states, “Is your driver’s license or privilege to drive suspended, revoked, refused or cancelled in this or any other state, Washington D.C., or Canada?” petitioner indicated in the affirmative.

A bolded statement printed on the application immediately adjacent to the question four response area reads, “If yes, you are not eligible for a Maryland driver’s license.” This statement appears in response to Md.Code (1977, 2002 RepLVol.), § 16-103.1(1) of the Transportation Article, which states: “§ 16-103.1. [Persons not to be licensed] — Disqualifications. The Administration may not issue a driver’s license to an individual: ⁴⁴⁶ (1) During any period for which the individual’s license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or canceled in this or any other state, unless the individual is eligible for a restricted license under § 16-113(e) of this subtitle....” [Alteration added.] Petitioner’s rather dismal driving record indicates that he has four convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“DUI”) for which he received a license revocation in Illinois and a permanent license revocation in Florida. 1 It is ⁴⁴⁷ unclear precisely how long petitioner has resided in Maryland, but it appears to be at least since April 2000 given that petitioner’s MVA record indicates that on April 6, 2000, he secured a Maryland State Identification card, 2 which is valid for five years. The MVA declined to consider petitioner’s application for a driver’s license, noting on petitioner’s application that he would “need clearance letters from the [Florida] and [Illinois] DMV[s]” (alterations added). In a letter from petitioner’s counsel, dated April 9, 2003, one day after petitioner’s license application was denied by the MVA pursuant to § 16-103.1, petitioner requested a hearing in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A hearing was scheduled for May 27, 2003, at which petitioner failed to appear, and, upon petitioner’s request, a later hearing was scheduled for January 15, 2004. At the January 2004 hearing, petitioner appeared with his attorney before Mary Shock, Administrative Law Judge; no representatives from the MVA appeared, and the MVA proceeded on the documents it had submitted. Petitioner argued that the Interstate Driver’s License Compact (“Compact”), into which Maryland had entered in 1987, 3 see 1987 Md. Laws, Chap. 320, codified at Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 16-703 of the Transportation Article, supercedes Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 16-103.1 of the Transportation Article and, effectively, compels the MVA to conduct an investigation of petitioner’s fitness to drive a motor vehicle, and upon a satisfactory assessment, to issue petitioner a Maryland driv ⁴⁴⁸ er’s license after he has served one year of the permanent revocation of his Florida license. Following the conclusion of petitioner’s testimony and counsel’s argument, the ALJ found that: “[Petitioner has] been revoked in Illinois since 1982 and in Florida since 1984.

And the Florida revocation is a lifetime revocation, so you are unable to have that cleared in order to apply for a license or to overcome the disqualification section of 16-103.1. But I have considered the Article [V] of the [C]ompact entered into with other jurisdictions. Article [V], Section 2, states if such revocation is not terminated, except after the applicant has held a license, but the same has been revoked by reason in whole or in part of a violation and if such revocation is not terminated except after an expiration of one year from the date the licensee was revoked, such person may make an application for a new license if permitted by law. And the licensing authority has the authority to refuse but an investigation must be performed.

Even the disqualification section of 16-103.1 does not — although in the end it conflicts it does not prevent the application and the investigation[.][S]o I will order that the MVA process the licensee’s application for a driver’s license because it’s been more than a year since the revocation.” [Alterations added.] On February 11, 2004, the MVA sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of the ALJ’s determination. The trial court examined the issue in terms of whether § 16-103.1 conflicts with § 16-703, and if there is a conflict, which statute prevails. In a decision dated August 5, 2004, the trial court reversed the ALJ and determined that the statutes did not conflict, and instead were intended to act in concert. The trial court reasoned that the language of § 16-103.1 evinces the General Assembly’s intent to provide “recognition of extraterritorial revocations beyond that which the Compact recognizes” and § 16-103.1 “provides the MVA with a mechanism to recognize revocations of non-Compact ■ states and deny issuance of a license on that basis.” ⁴⁴⁹ II.

Standard of Review Our review of this case is enabled by Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article, which provides in relevant part as follows: “(h) Decision. — In a proceeding under this section, the court may: (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.” In undertaking judicial review, “the [cjircuit [cjourt is limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings of fact and whether the agency’s conclusions of law were correct.” Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 490-91 , 796 A.2d 75, 81 (2002) (alterations added); United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). “[W]e reevaluate the decision of the agency under the same statutory standards as would the circuit court, and we do not employ those standards to reevaluate the decision of the circuit or intermediate appellate court.” Charles County Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 294 , 855 A.2d 313, 318 (2004). See Spencer v. Maryland State Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 523-24 , 846 A.2d 341, 346 (2004); Division of Labor v. Triangle General Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 416 , 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001); Dep’t of Health v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123 , 771 ⁴⁵⁰ A.2d 1051, 1060 (2001) (noting that it is the final decision at the administrative level, not the decision of the previously reviewing court, which is the focus of each level of judicial review). Our review is narrowly focused and we do not substitute our “judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken.” Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm’n. of Md., 221 Md. 221, 230 , 156 A.2d 657, 662 (1959) (footnote omitted), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 419 , 80 S.Ct. 1257 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1515 (1960); Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 513 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1124 (1978); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 576-77 , 650 A.2d at 230 .

As we explained many years ago in Bernstein : “Generally, when the entire record shows that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence taken before the agency and such de novo evidence, if any, as may be taken by the court, and such findings and conclusions are not against the weight of such evidence, it is the function of the court to affirm the order of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings if that be necessary. On the other hand, if the court should find that the substantial rights of a petitioner for review have been prejudiced, by one or more of the causes specified in § [10-222 of the State Government Article], because of an administrative finding, inference, conclusion or decision, then it is the function of the court to reverse or modify the order.” 221 Md. at 230 , 156 A.2d at 662 (alteration added).

III

Discussion Turning to the case before this Court, petitioner contends that the Driver License Compact, Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 16-703 of the Transportation Article, trumps the allegedly conflicting Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 16-103.1 of the Transportation Article. Specifically, in support of his position that “application for a new license, after the ⁴⁵¹ expiration of one year from the date a license was revoked by another state, may be made if permitted by law,” petitioner points to Article V of the Compact, with particular focus on Article V(2), which governs Applications for New Licenses: “Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if: (1) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been suspended by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such suspension period has not terminated.

(2) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of 1 year from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.” [Emphasis added.] The MVA responds that petitioner is incorrect in his assertion that § 16-703 Article V(2) “absolutely requires a party state to find individuals still revoked in other states eligible for licensure after one year.” The MVA continues that petitioner’s “assumption ignores savings language in the same Compact provision, providing that the minimum one-year eligibility must yield to a party state’s other law prohibiting eligibility and licensure in those circumstances.” That is, the MVA urges that the inclusion of the phrase “if permitted by law” found in Article V(2) functions as a savings clause, “recognizing that member states, such as Maryland, may have stricter licensure prohibitions that affect the out-of-state revoked driver’s eligibility.” This savings clause, according to the MVA, modifies solely “the exception permitting the applicant to apply for (and obtain) a license while still revoked in another ⁴⁵² state ...” and serves to harmonize the provisions of the Compact with Maryland’s other motor vehicle laws, including § 16-103.1. 4 A. License Application Processing and Denial Petitioner draws a distinction between application for a new license and issuance of a new license and narrowly focuses his appeal on the issue of whether “[petitioner is eligible to apply for a Maryland driver’s license and have an investigation conducted by the MVA” to determine petitioner’s fitness as a safe driver (emphasis added). It is the distinction between application and licensure on which petitioner bases his contention that the MVA may issue a license after the expiration of one year from the date a license was revoked by another state. Petitioner goes on to note that the ALJ simply ordered that the MVA process petitioner’s application for a license, and consideration of petitioner’s eligibility to be issued a license is “not yet ripe for appeal: 1) because the investigation has not been conducted to determine whether it would be safe under Maryland law to issue him a license; and 2) the ALJ did not order the MVA to issue [petitioner] a license” (alteration added).

Petitioner is essentially arguing that he should be considered for licensure and that, upon investigation, is confident that he ultimately will be issued a license in Maryland. In a letter to the OAH dated April 9, 2003, one day after petitioner’s license application was denied by MVA pursuant to § 16-103.1, petitioner’s counsel indicated his belief that he would prevail under the scrutiny of an investigation into his fitness: “Mr. Gwin is confident he will pass such an investigation and is willing to comply with any and all conditions that may be deemed necessary to protect the public safety. Although ⁴⁵³ he does have a serious alcohol problem, he has been abstinent since January 20, 2000. At that time he went into detox at Sinai Hospital in Baltimore for 8 or 4 days.

From there he went to Reality House in Laurel for 45 days. From there he moved to a Transitional Rehabilitative Residence (TRR) for 14 months. Since leaving the TRR he has been attending 2 to 3 AA meetings per week and has stayed alcohol free.” The MVA disputes that this issue is not yet ripe, and classifies that which petitioner deems a failure to process the license application, as an actual denial of petitioner’s license application. According to the MVA, its denial of the license application relegates petitioner’s demand for an investigation irrelevant.

The MVA notes that petitioner “challenged the authority of the MVA to deny his application under [§ 16-103.1], thereby initiating the contested case presently before this Court” (alteration added). The occurrence which we have been asked to review has already taken place and “[t]his Court has defined a justiciable controversy as one wherein ‘there are interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded.’ ” Boyds Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery County Council, 309 Md. 683, 690 , 526 A.2d 598, 601 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Patuxent Oil Co. v. County Comm’rs of Anne Arundel County, 212 Md. 543, 548 , 129 A.2d 847, 849 (1957) (quoting 1 W.H. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments §§ 17 (2d ed.1951))). Moreover, we are confronted with the issue of a possible conflict between statutes applicable to petitioner and applied by respondent, and their dispute as to the proper application of the statutes is a recognition of the existence of a contested case and, indeed, places the issues squarely before us. Thus, our review is appropriate because “there is either an actual existing controversy, or antagonistic claims which indicate inevitable litigation, or when a party asserts a legal status or right and there is a denial by an adversary party, and the court is satisfied that such a decree ⁴⁵⁴ will serve to terminate the controversy.” Eberts v. Congress’l Country Club, 197 Md. 461, 465 , 79 A.2d 518, 519 (1951).

B. License Disqualifications The statutory provision containing the disqualification from licensure of a person whose driving privileges are revoked elsewhere emerged in 1970 as part of the Legislature’s comprehensive repeal and reenactment of Maryland’s Motor Vehicles Laws. See 1970 Md. Laws, Chap. 534. This disqualification, as found in the former Md.Code (1970), Art. 66/6 § 6-103(2), stated, in pertinent part: “§ 6-103. What persons shall not be licensed.

The department shall not issue any license under this subtitle: 2. To any person whose license has been suspended, refused, or cancelled, during the suspension, refusal, or cancellation, or to any person whose license has been revoked.” Later, in 1977, the Legislature repealed Article 66)6 and reenacted it as Titles 11 through 27 of the Transportation Article. See 1977 Md. Laws, Chap. 14. The license disqualification provisions were left largely intact and were supplemented also to bar licensure to anyone whose license had been revoked.

The relevant portion of the statute appeared as follows: “§ 16-103.1. Persons not to be licensed — Disqualifications. The Administration may not issue a driver’s license to an individual: (1) During any period for which his license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or canceled.... ” Owing to ambiguity in the manner in which the word “license” is defined in the Transportation Article, 5 the Legislature in ⁴⁵⁵ 1993 Md. Laws, Chap. 209, clarified and augmented § 16-103.1(1) to articulate the intent that the disqualification apply both to Maryland and to out-of-state licensees whose license had been revoked, suspended, refused or canceled, and to provide an exception allowing restricted licensure under certain circumstances. The Floor Report and Bill Analysis accompanying 1993 Md. Laws, Chap. 209, indicated that the definition of “license” as the privilege to drive in Maryland obscured whether the provisions of § 16.103.1 applied to a person whose license had been revoked, suspended, refused or canceled in another jurisdiction.

The bill was intended to codify the MVA’s de facto policy of not issuing a license to any such disqualified individuals, to provide the MVA with clear authority to refuse to license such persons, and to eliminate any confusion in the law. This revision reads: “§ 16-103.1. [Persons not to be licensed] — Disqualifications. The Administration may not issue a driver’s license to an individual: (1) During any period for which the individual’s license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or canceled in this or any other state, unless the individual is eligible for a restricted license under § 16-113(e)[ 6 ] of this subtitle....” [Alteration added.] [Emphasis added.] [Footnote added.] ⁴⁵⁶ C. The Driver License Compact In recognition of the interaction of motor vehicle laws among states and the possibility for conflicting outcomes, the Maryland Legislature passed 1987 Md. Laws, Chap. 320 to become a part of the Driver License Compact. Chapter 320’s introductory statement reveals the underlying legislative intent for entering the Driver License Compact and reads, in relevant part, as follows: “FOR the purpose of providing for the State of Maryland to enter into a certain driver license compact with other jurisdictions in the United States; providing for the reporting and effect of certain convictions; prohibiting the Administration from assessing points against an individual under certain circumstances; requiring the Administration to assess points against an individual under certain eircum ⁴⁵⁷ stances; prohibiting issuance of a driver’s license under certain circumstances; providing for the applicability of certain other laws.... ” The legislative intent is further highlighted by the statement of changes brought about by the bill as indicated in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee’s Bill Analysis: “By this bill, the State of Maryland adopts the Driver License Compact.

The Compact is a comprehensive interstate agreement designed to promote compliance with motor vehicle laws in the party states and to make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility more just and equitable. The Compact provides, among other things, lor comity among the party states in issuing licenses and for cooperation in reporting convictions of motor vehicle offenses.” D. Petitioner’s License Revocations Petitioner urges that the intent of the Compact, i.e., “to give the MVA clear authority to refuse to issue a driver’s license to a person whose driver’s license has been suspended, revoked, refused or canceled in another jurisdiction,” can be honored by the MVA’s giving effect to an out-of-state revocation for one year before a licensee can apply for a Maryland license. 7 In addition, petitioner contends that although his fourth DUI prompted permanent revocation of his driver’s license in Florida, according to the language of the Compact Art. IV, 8 his ⁴⁵⁸ DUI offenses, in respect to his application for licensure in Maryland, must be treated as if they occurred in Maryland. 9 He explains: “[I]t is clear that the State of Maryland did not intend for out of state revocations to be mandatory in this State, for periods of time longer than would have been imposed had the crime occurred in Maryland. Such an argument is contrary to Maryland policy and the intent of the legislature .... The MVA has failed to show that the legislative intent was to give greater weight to the laws of foreign