Hamel v. State

SHARER, J. In this appeal we are asked to determine whether the search of a locked glove compartment comes within the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest, as enunciated in New York v. Belton, 1 and applied in subsequent cases. We shall hold that it does. Following a non-jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Jason Keith Hamel, appellant, was convicted of a single count of possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. The primary evidence against appellant—the firearm and a quantity of cocaine—was admitted after denial of his motion to suppress, which was based on the contention that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal search of the locked glove compartment in appellant’s car.

In his timely appeal, appellant raises a single issue for our review, which, as rephrased is: 2 Whether the circuit court erred in ruling that a search of the locked glove compartment did not exceed the permissible search of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. Because we find no legal error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ³ FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On March 11, 2005, appellant was driving a white Chevrolet Camaro on Eastern Boulevard in Baltimore County. Officer Derrick Bowser, on routine patrol, observed the vehicle to be “weaving from one lane to the other lane, and at times traveling in the center of both lanes, across the dotted lines.” Bowser stopped the vehicle for the observed traffic violations and began his investigation and processing of appellant. After failing a field sobriety test, appellant was placed under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol, and related offenses. 3 Police then searched appellant, incident to the arrest, and discovered an empty black nylon handgun holster in his waistband.

Appellant was then handcuffed and placed inside a police vehicle. Three passengers, who remained in appellant’s car, were removed from the vehicle, patted down, and placed on their knees. 4 The interior of the car was also searched. Finding nothing from that search, the police removed appellant’s keys from the vehicle’s ignition and used them to unlock and open the glove compartment. A search of the glove compartment yielded cocaine, 5 $2,100 in U.S. currency, and a Smith & Wesson .357 Magnum handgun. 6 Appellant moved to suppress the items seized from the locked glove compartment, arguing that the warrantless search of the compartment was illegal and beyond the scope of a permissible search incident to his arrest.

The suppression court conducted a hearing on the motion on September 14, ⁴ 2005, and thereafter received memoranda from counsel to address the issue of whether the search of the locked glove compartment exceeded permissible limits. The court heard further argument on November 10, 2005, and in its oral opinion denying appellant’s motion, the court stated, inter alia: This case is presented to me, and it seems at first blush that the search incident to the arrest principal [sic] and exception shouldn’t apply in this case for all the reasons that [counsel] has presented to the court. So I went back and read New York v. Belton, and [counsel’s] analysis is right on the money. Unfortunately, it is the analys[i]s of the [dissent] in that case.

The dissent says on page 466 of the case, in quotes. “In its attempt to formulate a single familiar standard to guide police officers who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interest involved in a specific circumstance they confront, the Court today disregards these principals [sic] and instead adopts a fiction that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of the arrestee who has recently been in the car.” The Court thus holds “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile, and they also may examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.” The dissent goes on to say “in so holding, the Court ignored both precedent and principle, and failed to achieve its objective of providing police officers with a more workable standard for determining a permissible scope of the search incident to the arrest.” That’s exactly what you’re arguing here, Mr. Santini, and unfortunately, it is the dissent in the case in which the majority says that the police officer can search anything within the passenger compartment. So, I am constrained to find that given that Belton is the law of the land, that the ⁵ police officer did not violate Mr. Hamel’s Fourth Amendment rights in going into the locked glove box. My heart is with the dissent in Belton and with the facts in your clients [sic] case there’s obviously no difference being given to the principles that were enunciated in Chimel. As you pointed out, rightfully so, the police officers weren’t in any danger.

They didn’t know of any contraband that could have been destroyed, but the holding in Belton appears to me to be clear that the police do have the right to search any container, and I believe that locked or not is one of the facts that a container is locked doesn’t in any way reduce the authority of the police to make the search. So again, I appreciate all of your efforts on the subject, and I have to say you’re [sic] most persuasive argument was under the Maryland Constitution than the Federal Constitution has or the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment broadly that this Court should not give it such a broad interpretation. On the other hand, I am aware of the cases that say we should judge cases under the Maryland Declaration of Rights [in] pari materia with the Fourth Amendment so I must respectfully deny the motion on that ground as well. Following the denial of the motion to suppress, appellant entered a plea of not guilty on an agreed statement of facts to possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense.

The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, as supplemented, was adopted as the evidence before the trial court. The court found appellant guilty of the single firearm count and imposed a sentence of ten years, with all suspended but the mandatory minimum five years, followed by five years probation. This appeal followed. STANDARD of REVIEW We recently discussed, in Christian v. State 172 Md.App. 212, 216 , 914 A.2d 151 (2007), the appropriate standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress: ⁶ In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the record at the suppression hearing is our exclusive source of facts. “The one invoking Fourth Amendment protection bears the burden of demonstrating his or her legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or items seized.” We extend great deference to the suppression court’s fact-finding, particularly that court’s ability to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh and determine first-level facts.

When conflicting evidence is presented, we accept the facts as found by the suppression court, unless clearly erroneous, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this case, the State. After giving due regard to the suppression court’s findings of fact, we then make our own independent appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case. (Citations omitted). DISCUSSION As we have noted, appellant does not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest; nor does he assert that the police were not entitled to search the passenger compartment of his vehicle incident to his arrest.

Instead, appellant contends that the scope of the search did not extend to the locked glove compartment. Hence, he concludes that the search of the locked glove compartment violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 7 ⁷ We have previously discussed the warrantless search of a locked glove box, albeit in the context of a distinguishable factual scenario and legal theory. In Cross v. State, 165 Md.App. 164 , 884 A.2d 1236 (2005), we addressed whether evidence seized from a locked glove compartment box during a “Terry stop” was admissible. 8 Cross was detained by police in the parking lot of a 7-11 in Bladensburg after a citizen reported to police that he observed Cross display a handgun during a car chase. The witness identified Cross to police in the 7-11 parking.

The police observed and then detained him before he could escape in his vehicle. Cross was handcuffed and frisked, but no weapon was found on his person. Police then searched the interior of his vehicle. One police officer observed that the glove compartment “was partially apart,” which allowed him to pull the compartment “open a little bit,” so he could see a handgun inside.

Id. at 172 , 884 A.2d 1236 . A fellow officer then retrieved Cross’s keys and unlocked the glove compartment, finding a “handgun, together with a bag containing a large quantity of narcotics.” Id. at 177 , 884 A.2d 1236 . Reviewing the facts developed at the suppression hearing, we determined that Cross was “detained but not under arrest prior to the warrantless search.” Id. at 180 , 884 A.2d 1236 . Cross argued that the State had failed to show that probable cause existed for the police to believe, at the time of the search, that the car contained a handgun.

Id. at 178 , 884 A.2d 1236 . Because we determined that Cross was not under arrest during the search of vehicle, but merely detained, we did not reach the issue of probable cause. Instead, we held ⁸ that the search came within the scope of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Id. at 183 , 884 A.2d 1236 .

In Long, the Supreme Court held that when a person was detained by police, it was permissible under the principles articulated in Terry, supra, and its progency, to conduct a protective search of a motor vehicle for weapons. Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1035 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 . Our holding in Cross stems from the distinguishing factual characteristics of a Terry stop and the Long analysis. We find no prior Maryland case, however, dealing with the search of a locked glove compartment incident to arrest, and counsel has not directed us to such authority. 9 Therefore, we conclude that the issue presented in the case sub judice is one of factual first impression, and which calls for the application of a Belton analysis.

There is, however, federal authority on the issue of opening locked containers during vehicle searches incident to arrest. The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches, subject to certain exceptions that have been judicially announced. The “automobile exception,” or “Carroll Doctrine” is one exception to the warrant requirement. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the vehicle without more.” Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996).

See Wilson v. State, 174 Md.App. 434, 440 , 921 A.2d 881 (2007), cert. denied, 400 Md. 649 , 929 A.2d 891 (2007). A search of an arrestee, incident to a lawful arrest, is another of the exceptions to the warrant requirement of the ⁹ Fourth Amendment. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court held: it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by like rule.

Id. at 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 . The Court further held that a search of “any room other than that in which the arrest occurs-or, ... searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself’ would require a search warrant. Id. The Court broadened the scope of searches incident to arrest in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).

In Belton , police searched a vehicle during a routine, lawful traffic stop after spotting marijuana on the floor of the car. Id. at 455-56 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 . The officer seized a jacket from the rear seat of the vehicle, unzipped a pocket and discovered cocaine. The Court held that the evidence was legally seized: [W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.

It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. Such a container may, of course, be opened or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. Thus, while the Court in Chimel held that the police could not search all the drawers in an arrestee’s house simply because the police had arrested him at home, the Court noted that drawers within an arrestee’s ¹⁰ reach could be searched because of the danger their contents might pose to the police. Id. at 460-61, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (citations omitted).

Appellant, seeking sustenance from Belton , argues that “[t]he Court could easily have included within the definition of this scope a locked glove box, but it did not do so.” We note, however,—as did the circuit court below—that Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in a dissent, offers guidance to interpretation of the majority holding: [T]he Court for the first time grants police officers authority to conduct a warrantless “area” search under circumstances where there is no chance that the arrestee “might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Under the approach taken today, the result would presumably be the same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under arrest, and even if his search had extended to locked luggage or other inaccessible containers located in the backseat of the car. Id. at 468 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The dissent supports an interpretation that the Court did not intend to exclude other locked areas, i.e., glove compartments. Appellant concedes that “the numerical weight of decision authority on this issue favors extension of Belton to locked glove boxes.” We agree.

Our Sister States A number of other jurisdictions have also determined that locked glove compartments may be searched incident to a lawful arrest, even after the arrestee has been secured and safely removed from the vehicle. In People v. Dieppa, 357 Ill.App.3d 847, 294 Ill.Dec. 458 , 830 N.E.2d 870, 873 (2005), the defendant, Alfonao Dieppa, was stopped for a legitimate traffic offense. Upon learning of an open warrant, the officer placed Dieppa under arrest and secured him in the squad car. The officer’s search of the car included opening the glove compartment, in which he found a ¹¹ zipped bank bag that, when opened, revealed a handgun.

On appeal by the state from a trial court ruling suppressing the gun, the Illinois Appellate Court relied upon—and built upon—Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 , 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004). Thornton controls this appeal. When [the officer] searched defendant’s car, defendant was a recent occupant, having just parked it. That defendant was outside the car when [the officer] stopped him is legally irrelevant under Thornton, as is the fact that he lacked any realistic access to the passenger compartment when [it was searched].

Because [the officer] could legally search the passenger compartment of the car, he could also legally search the glove compartment. The glove compartment, whether locked or unlocked, was a “container,” as was the bank bag inside it. Dieppa, 830 N.E.2d at 873 . The Court of Appeals of Kansas, on somewhat similar facts, held that exigent