Harford Cnty. v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc.

Panel: Berger, Nazarian, Wells, JJ. Berger, J. ^{128 760} The origin of this dispute dates back to 1990, when Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. ("MRA" or "Maryland Reclamation"), appellee, purchased sixty-two acres of land for the purpose of constructing and operating a rubble landfill. 1 After MRA acquired the land, Harford County (the "County"), appellant, modified its zoning laws to disallow landowners -- MRA included -- from operating rubble landfills. For nearly three decades, MRA has fought the County's regulatory efforts in various administrative and judicial forums. The dispute now reaches the Maryland appellate courts for the fifth time. 2 ¹²⁹ In this appeal, the County appeals from a verdict rendered by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County, in which MRA prevailed on its inverse condemnation claim and was awarded $45,420,076, representing just compensation in the amount of $30,845,553 plus $14,574,523 in interest.

For the reasons explained herein, we reverse the judgment entered below, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. After the County enacted zoning regulations that prohibited MRA from operating a rubble landfill, MRA sought several variances. If approved, the variances would have permitted MRA to proceed with its project. The Harford County Hearing Examiner denied MRA's requests, and in 2007, the Harford County Board of Appeals (the "Board of Appeals" or the "Board") affirmed the Hearing Examiner's decision by a unanimous vote.

In MRA IV , 414 Md. 1 , 994 A.2d 842 (2010), the most recent case between the parties, the Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the County was not estopped from amending its zoning laws, and that the County did not err in denying MRA's requests for variances. On February 19, 2013, following MRA IV , MRA filed suit in the Circuit Court for Harford County, alleging that the County's actions constituted a regulatory taking in violation of the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 3 Thereafter, the County filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that MRA's inverse condemnation claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The County averred that MRA's claim accrued in June 2007, when the Board of Appeals voted 7-0 to deny MRA's requests for variances. The circuit court disagreed.

In a memorandum opinion, Judge William O. Carr denied the County's motions, ¹³⁰ ruling that MRA's claim was timely because the claim accrued in ⁷⁶¹ 2010, when the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in MRA IV . The case was then tried before a jury in April 2018. The jury ultimately found in favor of MRA on its takings claim and awarded damages in the amount of $45,420,076. This timely appeal followed. 4 On appeal, the County poses six questions, which we set forth verbatim . 1.

Should MRA's takings claim be dismissed based on MRA's failure to raise this constitutional issue in any administrative proceeding? 2. Is MRA's takings claim barred by the statute of limitations when it was filed more than three years after the final administrative agency decision denying MRA's variance requests? 3. Is MRA's takings claim barred by the final judgment in MRA IV under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel? 4. Did the Board's denial of MRA's variance requests to construct and operate a landfill constitute an unconstitutional taking when MRA has no vested property right or interest with respect to such a use? 5.

Did the Board's denial of variances to prevent public harm constitute a taking for which compensation is due? 6. Should the jury's award of more than $45 million in damages be reversed when MRA failed to present any evidence of the Property's fair market value? ¹³¹ In its cross-appeal, MRA presents an additional question, which we set forth verbatim . Did the Circuit Court err when it granted summary judgment on MRA's per se takings claim under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 U.S. 1003 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 , 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) ? We hold -- as a matter of law -- that MRA's inverse condemnation claim accrued in 2007, when the Board of Appeals denied MRA's requests for variances.

As a result, MRA's claim is time-barred. We, therefore, reverse the judgment entered by the circuit court and remand the case for the entry of judgment in favor of the County. BACKGROUND This dispute concerns a sixty-two-acre plot of land in Harford County, Maryland. We draw from the Court of Appeals' comprehensive opinions in MRA II , supra , 342 Md. 476 , 677 A.2d 567 (1996), and MRA IV , supra , 414 Md. 1 , 994 A.2d 842 (2010), to summarize the history of the various administrative proceedings and earlier appeals.

In August 1989, the plaintiff-appellant, Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc., contracted to purchase property located adjacent to Gravel Hill Road in Harford County, Maryland. Maryland Reclamation intended to construct and operate a rubble landfill on this property; thus, it began the process of obtaining a rubble landfill permit from the Maryland Department of the Environment pursuant to Maryland Code (1982, 1996 Repl. Vol), §§ 9-204 through 9-210, §§ 9-501 through 9-521 of the Environment Article, and COMAR 26.03 through 26.04. ⁷⁶² Maryland Reclamation first requested that Harford County include the Gravel Hill Road property in Harford County's Solid Waste Management Plan as a rubble landfill. Thereafter, Harford County amended its Solid Waste Management Plan to include Maryland Reclamation's Gravel Hill Road site as a rubble landfill.

The property's inclusion in the Harford County Solid Waste Management Plan, ¹³² however, was made subject to twenty-seven conditions, including a minimum landscape buffer of 200 feet. On November 16, 1989, Harford County advised the Maryland Department of the Environment that Maryland Reclamation's Gravel Hill Road property had been included in the County's Solid Waste Management Plan as a rubble landfill site. Maryland Reclamation next sought approval at the state government level from the Department of the Environment. On November 20, 1989, Maryland Reclamation received Phase I permit approval from the Department of the Environment.

Maryland Reclamation then filed with the Department the necessary reports and studies for Phase II and Phase III approvals. [M]aryland Reclamation had entered into a contract to purchase the property located adjacent to Gravel Hill Road in August 1989, before its inclusion in Harford County's Solid Waste Management Plan. Allegedly relying on the property's inclusion in Harford County's Solid Waste Management Plan and on the Department of the Environment's Phase I approval, Maryland Reclamation consummated the purchase of the Gravel Hill Road property on February 9, 1990, for $732,500. The settlement occurred on the last possible day under the terms of the contract of sale. Four days after the settlement date, newly appointed Harford County Council President Jeffrey D. Wilson and Council Member Joanne Parrott introduced in the County Council Resolution 4-90, which provided for the removal of Maryland Reclamation's property from the County's Solid Waste Management Plan. [Footnote omitted.] In the litigation that ensued over this resolution, the Court of Special Appeals held that Resolution 4-90 was invalid because it was preempted by the State's authority over solid waste management plans and the issuance of rubble landfill permits. [ MRA I ], 90 Md. App. 120 , 600 A.2d 864 , cert. dismissed sub nom .

County Council v. Md. Reclamation , 328 Md. 229 , 614 A.2d 78 (1992). [Footnote omitted.] While the litigation over Resolution 4-90 was pending, Bill 91-10 was introduced in the Harford County Council, on ¹³³ February 12, 1991, as an emergency bill. Bill 91-10 proposed to amend the requirements for a rubble landfill by increasing the minimum acreage requirements, buffer requirements, and height requirements. The bill, inter alia, would establish a minimum rubble fill size of 100 acres and a buffer zone of 1000 feet. After public hearings, the County Council passed the bill on March 19, 1991, and the County Executive signed the bill into law on March 27, 1991. [Footnote omitted.] On April 2, 1991, Bill 91-16 was introduced in the Harford County Council.

This bill would authorize the County Council to remove a specific site from the County's Solid Waste Management Plan if the site does not comply with certain zoning ordinances, if a permit has not been issued by the State Department of the Environment within eighteen months of the site being placed in the County's Solid Waste Management Plan, or if the owner of the site has not placed the site in operation within the ⁷⁶³ same eighteen month period. Bill 91-16 was passed by the County Council, signed into law by the County Executive on June 10, 1991, and is codified as § 109-8.4 of the Harford County Code. [Footnote omitted.] The President of the Harford County Council, on April 25, 1991, sent a letter to the State Department of the Environment, enclosing a copy of enacted Bill 91-10, and advising the Department that the provisions of the bill could call into question the status of sites which were in the process of obtaining rubble landfill permits. On May 2, 1991, the Department of the Environment advised the County Council that if a permit were to be issued to Maryland Reclamation, such issuance would not authorize Maryland Reclamation to violate any local zoning or land-use requirements. Also on May 2, 1991, the County's Director of Planning sent a letter to Maryland Reclamation informing it of Bill 91-10, indicating that Maryland Reclamation's property would apparently fail to meet the requirements of Bill 91-10, stating that Maryland Reclamation should submit documentation showing that the Gravel Hill Road site could meet the ¹³⁴ requirements of the zoning ordinances, and stating that, if the site could not meet such requirements, Maryland Reclamation would need a variance to operate a rubble landfill on the property.

Maryland Reclamation did not submit any documents pursuant to the May 2, 1991, letter and did not file an application for a variance. [Footnote omitted.] Maryland Reclamation did file on May 21, 1991, an "appeal" to the Harford County Board of Appeals from the "administrative decision pursuant to Section 267-7 E in a letter dated 5/2/91," requesting that the Board "review and reverse the decision of the Zoning Administrator interpreting that the standards of Council Bill 91-10 apply to the Applicant." The "application" to the Board of Appeals asserted that Bill 91-10 was inapplicable to the property and that, if it was applicable, it was invalid. [Footnote omitted.] On May 14, 1991, Resolution 15-91 was introduced in the Harford County Council. This resolution purported to interpret Harford County law and determine that the Gravel Hill Road site was not in compliance with county law; the resolution went on to remove the site from the County's Solid Waste Management Plan. The County Council passed Resolution 15-91 on June 11, 1991. The resolution was apparently not submitted to the County Executive for his approval.

Maryland Reclamation on June 20, 1991, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County, seeking a Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief against Harford County and the Harford "County Council." Maryland Reclamation requested, inter alia, the following: (1) a declaration that Bills 91-10 and 91-16, as well as Resolution 15-91, are "null and void as to the Gravel Hill Site;" (2) an injunction preventing the County from enforcing Bills 91-10 and 91-16 and Resolution 15-91 against Maryland Reclamation; and (3) an injunction staying all further action on Maryland Reclamation's "appeal" to the Board of Appeals. Maryland Reclamation advanced numerous legal theories to support its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. ¹³⁵ The circuit court on June 28, 1991, issued an interlocutory injunction preventing enforcement of Bills 91-10, 91-16, and Resolution 15-91 against Maryland Reclamation. The order expressly allowed the Department of the Environment to continue its processing of Maryland ⁷⁶⁴ Reclamation's pending permit application. The order also stayed the processing of Maryland Reclamation's administrative "appeal" from the Director of Planning's "decision" contained in the Director's May 2, 1991, letter.

Finally, the interlocutory order prohibited Maryland Reclamation from starting any construction without court approval. On February 28, 1992, the State Department of the Environment issued to Maryland Reclamation a permit to operate a rubble landfill on its property. The Department expressly conditioned the permit upon Maryland Reclamation's compliance with all local land-use requirements. [Footnote omitted.] Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court on May 19, 1994, filed an opinion and judgment, declaring that Harford County was entitled to enact new zoning laws that may prevent Maryland Reclamation from operating a rubble landfill, and that Bills 91-10 and 91-16 were not invalid on the grounds asserted by the plaintiff. The court, however, declared that Resolution 15-91 was invalid on its face.

According to the circuit court, the Harford County Council was acting as a legislative body when it passed the resolution, and the passage of the resolution constituted an illegal attempt to interpret and apply the laws which the Council had previously enacted. Maryland Reclamation appealed to the Court of Special Appeals with respect to the circuit court's declaration that Bills 91-10 and 91-16 were not invalid. The County did not cross-appeal from the circuit court's declaration that Resolution 15-91 was invalid. Before any further proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari.

MRA II , supra , 342 Md. at 480 -86 . Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held in MRA II that "MRA had not exhausted its ¹³⁶ administrative remedies, including appealing the Zoning Administrator's ruling to the Board of Appeals, and applying to the Zoning Administrator for variances." MRA IV , supra , 414 Md. at 12 , 994 A.2d 842 (citing MRA II , supra , 342 Md. at 496 -97 , 677 A.2d 567 ). Thereafter MRA filed requests for interpretation with the Zoning Administrator, presenting nine issues. After receiving unfavorable rulings, MRA appealed to the Board of Appeals.

The Board, through its Zoning Hearing Examiner, conducted a hearing and issued a decision dated April 2, 2002 that the application of Bill 91-10 to the proposed rubble landfill did not violate federal, state, or local laws. As summarized by Judge Harrell in MRA III , the Hearing Examiner's findings and conclusions underlying this decision were as follows: 1. Bill 91-10 applies to MRA's property on Gravel Hill Road. 2. The requirements of Bill 91-10 can be validly applied to MRA's property on Gravel Hill road under the circumstances of this case and in light of the Environmental Article of the Maryland Code as well as other principles of Maryland law. 3.

MRA's operation of a rubble landfill on its property at Gravel Hill Road pursuant to its state permit will violate applicable Harford County Zoning law, particularly Harford County Code §§ 267-40.1, 267-28C, 267-28D(4) and 267-41. Moreover, the Hearing Examiner questions whether the permit issued to MRA by MDE is validly issued as it was based on misinformation provided to the State by MRA regarding the conformance ⁷⁶⁵ of the property and use with Harford County Zoning law. 4. MRA cannot obtain a grading permit unless it can meet the requirements of Harford County Zoning law. To the extent MRA does not meet specific standards it must seek a variance and obtain a variance from provisions with which it cannot comply.

MRA's ¹³⁷ reliance on site plan approvals that pre-date the enactment of Bill 91-10 is without merit. 5. MRA's operation of a rubble landfill on its property at Gravel Hill Road pursuant to its State-issued Refuse Disposal Permit No. 91-12-35-10-D and as renewed by Refuse Disposal Permit 1996-WRF-0517 will violate applicable Harford County zoning law. 6. Harford County is not prohibited by the principles of estoppel from applying the provisions of Harford County Bill 91-10 (section 267-40.1 of the Harford County Code) to MRA's property and specifically, to MRA's operation of a rubble landfill on its property. 7. MRA's rubble landfill did not acquire vested rights in its use that would insulate it from the application of Bill 91-10 to that use.

It is the vested rights doctrine itself that allows a landowner to rais[e] issues of constitutional protections. There is no constitutional infringement on the rights of MRA because a vested right was not established. Applying the provisions of Bill 91-10 to MRA's Gravel Hill Road property is, therefore, not prohibited by the United State[s'] Constitution and/or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 8. Harford County is not preempted by the Environmental Article of the Maryland Code, particularly sections 9-201 et seq. and 9-501 et seq., from applying Bill 91-10 to MRA's Gravel Hill Road property. 9.

MRA's operation of a rubble landfill on its Gravel Hill Road property is not a valid non-conforming use pursuant to Harford County Zoning Code. MRA III , 382 Md. at 359-60, 855 A.2d at 357-58. After the issuance of the Hearing Examiner's decision, the following transpired: On 11 June 2002, the County Council, sitting as the Board of Appeals, adopted the Zoning Hearing Examiner's decision. Harford County, therefore, refused to issue to MRA a grading permit or zoning certificate for the proposed rubble landfill because of the strictures of Bill ¹³⁸ 91-10.

Neither in response to the Board of Appeals's final decision, nor on a parallel course to its requests for interpretation or a zoning certificate, did MRA seek variances for relief from the requirements of Bill 91-10. On 21 June 2002, MRA ... petition[ed] the Circuit Court for Harford County for judicial review of the Board of Appeals's decision. The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals on 22 October 2003. It concluded that "all nine requests for interpretation were answered correctly ... in accordance with the law, and based on substantial evidence, and the decision was also correct when it upheld the zoning administrator's denial of Maryland Reclamations request for a zoning certificate." MRA III , 382 Md. at 360-61, 855 A.2d at 358.

On appeal to this Court, we held that MRA again had failed to exhaust its ⁷⁶⁶ available administrative remedies because it had not requested variances from the Code requirements at issue. Id. at 363, 855 A.2d at 359-60. On May 12, 2005 MRA requested the following variances to provisions of the Harford County Zoning Code ("HCC") before the zoning hearing examiner for Harford County ("Hearing Examiner"): • Variance pursuant to Section 267-28C to permit the disturbance of the 30 foot buffer yard. • Variance pursuant to Section 267-28D(4) to permit disturbance within the 200 foot buffer from adjoining property lines. • Variance to Section 267-40.1A, B, C, and D to permit the operation of a rubble landfill on less than 100 acres. • Variance to Section 267-40.1A, B, C and D to permit the operation of a landfill without satisfying the buffer requirement. • Variance to Section 267-40.1A, B, C, and D to permit the deposit of solid waste less than 500 feet from the flood plain district. ¹³⁹ • Variance to Section 267-40.1A, B, C, and D to permit the disturbance of the 1,000 foot buffer from a residential or institutional building. • Variances to Section 267-41D(2)(c); (3)(b); (5)(e); and (6) to permit the use of a landfill within a Natural Resource District, to permit the disturbance of the Natural resources District buffer, and to disturb the minimum 75 foot wetlands buffer in the Agricultural District. Over a span of 10 months, the Hearing Examiner, Robert F. Kahoe, Jr., presided over 17 nights of hearings, during which he heard testimony from 11 witnesses produced by MRA (eight of whom were experts); six experts offered by the Protestants; 16 residents from the community and members of St. James parish; and the acting director of the Harford County Department of Planning and Zoning.

The Hearing Examiner issued a decision dated February 28, 2007 that denied several of MRA's requests. * * * MRA appealed the Hearing Examiner's decision to the Board. On June 5, 2007, the Board voted 7-0 to deny the requested variances to these sections of the Code, and adopted the Hearing Examiner's decision. MRA then noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for Harford County. The Circuit Court affirmed the findings of the Board of Appeals in an order filed on July 11, 2008.

MRA IV , supra , 414 Md. at 12 -23 , 994 A.2d 842 . Thereafter, MRA filed an additional petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Harford County. In its petition, MRA asked the circuit court to reconsider its October 2003 decision, in which it affirmed the Board of Appeals' interpretation of Bill 91-10, i.e., that Bill 91-10 applied to MRA. On September 3, 2008, the circuit court affirmed its 2003 decision.

MRA then appealed both the circuit court's affirmance of its 2003 decision, and the variance denials to this Court. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari before we could review either appeal. ¹⁴⁰ In MRA IV , the Court first addressed whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board of Appeals' findings that "the requested variances would be substantially detrimental to adjacent properties" and "would negatively affect the health and welfare of the individuals in the surrounding area." 414 Md. at 24 , 33-34 , 994 A.2d 842 . Ultimately, ⁷⁶⁷ the Court held that the record contained sufficient evidence to support those findings, and as a result, affirmed the Board of Appeals' 2007 decision. Id. at 34 , 994 A.2d 842 .

The Court then considered MRA's argument that it should be permitted to proceed with its project to operate a rubble landfill, notwithstanding the applicable zoning regulations. Id. at 34-35 , 994 A.2d 842 . Primarily through the lens of zoning estoppel and preemption, the Court held that MRA is subject to the zoning regulations. As a result, MRA could not operate a rubble landfill on the property.

Id. at 34-64 , 994 A.2d 842 . Following the decision of the Court of Appeals in MRA IV , on February 19, 2013, MRA commenced this inverse condemnation action in the Circuit Court for Harford County. In its complaint, as amended in June 2015, MRA alleged that the County's zoning laws interfered with MRA's "investment backed business expectations" to operate a rubble landfill on its property, and that such interference constituted a regulatory taking under Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution, and Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Thereafter, the County filed both a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that MRA's takings claim was time-barred because it accrued in 2007, when MRA's requests for variances were denied by the Board of Appeals.

In the alternative, the County asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a per se takings claim brought under the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas , supra , 505 U.S. 1003 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 . In a memorandum opinion, Judge William O. Carr ruled that MRA's claim was timely because it accrued in 2010, when the Court of Appeals issued MRA IV . Judge Carr reasoned: ¹⁴¹ Irrespective of whether inverse condemnation is a continuing cause of action, this claim satisfies the three year statute of limitations because this court finds that the final decision issued by the Court of Appeals in MRA IV on March 11, 2010 was the final decision which foreclosed on any possibility of using the property in question for rubble fill. The Plaintiff filed this case on February 19, 2013 making the date of filing within the statute of limitations.

Nevertheless, Judge Carr ruled that MRA could not proceed on a per se takings claim because the property, at that time, retained a resale value. Thereafter, the case was tried before a jury in April 2018. At trial, an expert witness testified on behalf of MRA that the value of the property decreased by approximately $30 million after the alleged taking. After deliberating, the jury found in favor of MRA on its inverse condemnation claim and awarded damages in the amount of $45,420,076.

This amount accounted for $30,845,553 representing just compensation, plus $14,574,523 in interest. This timely appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW The County challenges both the circuit court's denial of a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that MRA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that its inverse condemnation claim is time-barred. 5 To the extent that these rulings were ⁷⁶⁸ premised on purely legal issues, we apply the same standard of review. "As the Court of Appeals has explained, where an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are 'legally correct[.]' " Elec.

Gen. Corp. v. Labonte , 229 Md. App. 187 , 196, 144 A.3d 856 (2016) ¹⁴² (citations and quotations omitted), aff'd , 454 Md. 113 , 164 A.3d 157 (2017). To determine whether the trial court's decision was legally correct, "we give no deference to the trial court findings and review the decision under a de novo standard of review." Lamson v. Montgomery County , 460 Md. 349 , 360, 190 A.3d 316 (2018). We, therefore, shall review the merits of the County's exhaustion of administrative remedies and statute of limitations arguments de novo .

In doing so, we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to MRA as the non-moving party. Schneider Elec. Bldgs. Critical Sys., Inc. v. W. Surety Co. , 454 Md. 698 , 705, 165 A.3d 485 (2017).

DISCUSSION The County raises six arguments in this appeal. First, the County contends that the case should not have proceeded to trial because MRA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Second, the County argues that MRA's takings claim was filed outside the three-year limitations period because the County's last action taken against MRA was in 2007 and MRA filed its complaint in 2013. Third, the County maintains that MRA's claim is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Fourth, and on the merits, the County asserts that MRA could not sufficiently allege an inverse condemnation claim because it did not have a vested property interest. Fifth, the County contends that the denial of MRA's requests for variances did not amount to an unconstitutional taking because the variances were denied to prevent public harm. Sixth, the County avers that MRA failed to present evidence of the property's fair market value and that the jury verdict was, therefore, defective. Conversely, MRA argues in its cross-appeal that the circuit court erred in granting the County judgment as a matter of law on its per se takings claim.

I. We address the County's assertion that MRA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies first because issues concerning ¹⁴³ primary jurisdiction and exhaustion are treated like jurisdictional questions. Bd. of Educ. for Dorchester Cty. v. Hubbard , 305 Md. 774 , 787, 506 A.2d 625 (1986) ; Priester v. Baltimore County , 232 Md. App. 178 , 190, 157 A.3d 301 (2017), cert. denied , 454 Md. 670 , 165 A.3d 469 . The County alleges that MRA was required to raise its inverse condemnation claim in an administrative proceeding before it could seek just compensation in the circuit court. Accordingly, the County argues that the circuit court should have dismissed the case.

We disagree. As we shall explain, MRA adhered to the prescribed administrative procedure before filing its inverse condemnation claim in the circuit court. "A fundamental precept of administrative law is the requirement that exclusive or primary administrative remedies ordinarily be exhausted before bringing an action in court." MRA III , supra , 382 Md. at 361 , 855 A.2d 351 . Administrative agencies have the first opportunity to consider constitutional issues when "those issues would be pertinent in the particular proceeding before the [agency]." MRA II , supra , 342 Md. at 491 -92 , 677 A.2d 567 .

Accordingly, circuit courts are not "authorized ⁷⁶⁹ to entertain [those] actions" when a party circumvents a prescribed administrative procedure. Hubbard , supra , 305 Md. at 787 , 506 A.2d 625 . This generally holds true in inverse condemnation cases. See Prince George's County v. Blumberg , 288 Md. 275 , 293, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980).

Indeed, the Court of Appeals "has held on many occasions, when faced with a claim of an agency's unconstitutional taking of property, that such issues must still go through the administrative process, particularly when judicial review is provided." Id. Moreover, it is "settled law on principle and authority that, absent most unusual circumstances, in zoning matters where there is full opportunity for a property owner to apply to the administrative agency for a special exception from the application of the general law to the particular property, with adequate provision for judicial review of the Board's action, the court will not take jurisdiction even though a constitutional issue is raised, until the ¹⁴⁴ administrative remedy has been exhausted." Poe v. City of Baltimore , 241 Md. 303 , 311, 216 A.2d 707 (1966). In our view, MRA did not fail to exhaust its administrative remedies. Indeed, MRA sought a ruling from the Harford County Hearing Examiner and the Board of Appeals that Bill 91-10 did not apply to MRA's property.

When that failed, MRA appealed the Board of Appeals' decision to the circuit court, this Court, and the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, MRA sought another administrative remedy by requesting variances so that it could operate a rubble landfill on its property notwithstanding Bill 91-10. Both the Harford County Hearing Examiner and the Board of Appeals denied the requested variances, and MRA again appealed to the courts. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held in MRA IV , supra that the Board of Appeals did not err in denying the requests for variances.

To the extent that an administrative remedy was available, MRA clearly pursued it. Moreover, the County presents us with no authority compelling a party to bring a claim for just compensation in an administrative forum before resorting to the courts. 6 In short, MRA's takings claim became justiciable after MRA was denied the requested variances. To hold otherwise would contradict case law from the United States Supreme Court. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency , 520 U.S. 725 , 737, 117 S.Ct. 1659 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997) (observing that a takings claim is justiciable once "the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question") (citation omitted).

The County arrived at a "final, definitive ¹⁴⁵ position" when the Board denied MRA's requested variances in June 2007. We, therefore, hold that MRA exhausted its administrative remedies.

II

We next address the County's contention that MRA's inverse condemnation claim is time-barred. The County argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that MRA's claim accrued after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in ⁷⁷⁰ MRA IV , supra . The circuit court denied the County's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, and ruled that MRA's inverse condemnation claim was timely filed. The time period in which an inverse condemnation claim must be filed is dictated by the Maryland Code: A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time with which an action shall be commenced.

Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"). See Electro-Nucleonics, Inc. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n , 315 Md. 361 , 374, 554 A.2d 804 (1989) (holding that CJ § 5-101 applies to inverse condemnation claims).

The rationale underlying the statute of limitations is well established: The adoption of statutes of limitation reflects a policy decision regarding what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of reasonable diligence to pursue a claim. Such statutes are designed to balance the competing interests of each of the potential parties as well as the societal interests involved. Thus, one of the purposes of such statutes is to assure fairness to a potential defendant by providing a certain degree of repose. This is accomplished by encouraging promptness in prosecuting actions; suppressing stale or fraudulent claims; avoiding inconvenience that may stem from delay, such as loss of evidence, fading of memories, ¹⁴⁶ and disappearance of witnesses; and providing the ability to plan for the future without the uncertainty inherent in potential liability.

Another basic purpose is to prevent unfairness to potential plaintiffs exercising reasonable diligence in pursuing a claim. Still another purpose is to promote judicial economy. Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc. , 423 Md. 91 , 130-31, 31 A.3d 212 (2011) (quoting Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. , 296 Md. 656 , 665, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983) ). Accordingly, MRA had three years from the date its cause of action accrued to file a timely complaint.

CJ § 5-101. We, therefore, must determine when MRA's inverse