Maryland case law › Harlan v. Lee

Harlan v. Lee

174 Md. 579 (1938) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedParke, J.✓ Good law
HoldingIda W.

Parke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Ida W. Hunter died testate in Harford County and her will was admitted to probate on October 29th, 1932. Her estate embraced real and personal property, and her executor, William H. Harlan, was given power to sell the real estate. After the payment of her debts and the charges incident to her burial and the administration of her estate, the testatrix directed by her will that her executor divide all her estate, real, personal and mixed, into three equal parts, and to dispose of the same as follows: (a) To transfer and pay over one of said parts to her daughter, Caroline W. Lee.

(b) To transfer and pay over another of said parts to her son, John Abel Hunter, Jr., absolutely, subject to the accounting by him of a debt of $1700 due by him to the testatrix, and to the charges against him of such moneys as the testatrix may be responsible for by reason of her endorsements. (c) To invest the remaining part and to pay to Martha 583 Abel Myers, a daughter of the testatrix, during the life of the daughter, the income therefrom, and such part of the corpus as the daughter might require from time to time; and, at the death of the daughter, to pay over the remaining corpus of such fund, and all income therefrom, to the children of the said Martha Abel Myers in equal shares, the children of a deceased child to take the parent’s share. Should any such children die without issue before the death of the daughter or after her death and before attaining majority, the share of the one so dying passed to the survivors. This statement of the will, without being a definitive construction, will serve to indicate its general scheme sufficiently for the purposes of the present appeal.

Having concluded that the real estate was not susceptible of division in kind so as to gratify the provisions of the will of his testatrix, the executor first sold the ground rents at private sale to himself as trustee under the will for the one-third of the estate to be held for the benefit of Martha Abel Myers and the remainder-men. On objections to this sale the Orphans’ Court of Harford County refused to ratify it on the ground of inadequacy of price and directed the executor to offer the rents at auction. In obedience to this order, the executor advertised the ground rents for sale at public auction, and so sold them, with the exception of one which had been duly redeemed, to Edwin H. W. Harlan for the aggregate sum of $6,195. On reporting the sale for ratification, and after the passage of the usual order nisi on sale, John A. Hunter, Martha Hunter Myers, two of the beneficiaries under the will, and John L. G. Lee, an assignee of Hunter’s interest, filed objections to the ratification of the sales so reported on the grounds— so far as they require mention—(1) that the advertisements did not state how the ground rent lots were improved, nor their value; (2) that the price was inadequate; (3) that the sales were not bona, fide as the buyer was the agent of the executor; (4) that the executor had no legal right to sell the ground rents; and (5) that 584 the legatees and devisees under the will were opposed to the sale and desired that they should be turned over to one of the beneficiaries who desired them to be partitioned in kind.

The executor answered these objections by a denial of every factual ground of objection, and questioned the jurisdiction of the court to entertain objections which went to the construction of the will. The objectors to the ratification of the sale thereupon prayed the Orphans’ Court to direct that issues be framed and transmitted to the Circuit Court for trial by a jury. The objections of the executor were overruled by the Orphans’ Court, which, omitting negligible phrases, framed and transmitted these issues: (1) whether the ground rents were adequately and properly advertised according to the usual custom of such sales; (2) whether the sales were fairly conducted; (3) whether the purchaser was acting as the agent of the executor of the estate; (4) whether the sale prices were fair and adequate; (5) whether the sales were to some one other than the highest bidder; and (6) if the finding was in the affirmative on the last preceding issue, what ground rents were so sold. In granting these issues, John L. G. Lee, assignee of John A. Hunter, and Martha Hunter Myers, were made the plaintiffs and the executor was declared the defendant.

The appeal is by the executor from the order which directed these issues to be sent to the Circuit Court for Harford County. In this order of the Orphans’ Court there is a preliminary determination that the objections to the ratification of sale, the answer of the executor and the petition of the objectors for issues to be sent to a court of law shall “be considered a plenary proceedings.” The propriety of this classification depends upon the fact that the procedure in the Orphans’ Court is not of a formal nature, and that technical pleading is not requisite. Although its practice tends to conform to the flexible standards of courts of equity, substance is sought rather than form, except in those instances where statute exacts 585 a specified modal compliance. Kealhofer v. Emmert, 79 Md. 248 , 29 A. 68 ; Long v. Long, 115 Md. 130, 134, 135 , 80 A. 699, 848 ; Long v. Long, 118 Md. 198, 201 , 84 A. 375 ; McComas v. Wiley, 132 Md. 406, 409 , 104 A. 52 .

In drawing a distinction between summary and plenary proceedings in the Orphans’ Court, it is said in Cannon v. Crook, 32 Md. 482, 484 , “the test of plenary proceedings is whether petition or bill is filed, and the parties against whom it is filed appear and answer.” Biddison v. Mosley, 57 Md. 89, 92 ; Hubbard v. Barcus, 38 Md. 166, 172 ; Pegg v. Warford, 4 Md. 385, 396; Barroll v. Peters, 20 Md. 172 ; Cover v. Stockdale, 16 Md. 1, 7, 9 ; Cain v. Warford, 3 Md. 454, 462 ; Bowling v. Estep, 56 Md. 564, 566 ; Flaks v. Flaks, 173 Md. 358 , 196 A. 116 . As was observed so recently as Kerby v. Peters, 172 Md. 1 , at page 9, 190 A. 511, 514 , “Under any definition of the term a plenary proceeding implies a complaint, a request for some definite relief and allegations of fact sufficient to justify the granting of that relief.” Within this rule, a report of the sale of real estate by an executor pursuant to the power contained in his testator’s will; an objection on relevant and material grounds to the ratification of the sale by the beneficiaries of the will, and an answer by the executor which is filed in denial of the grounds of the objection, would constitute plenary proceedings. The orphans’ court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide objections to the ratification of sales of land made in execution of a power in a will; and, after answer by the executor, a request of exceptants to the sale for issues to be framed by the orphans’ court on the facts in controversy would be a permissible procedure in plenary proceedings. Supra; Boccuti v. Spitznagle, 166 Md. 542, 544, 546 , 171 A. 35 .

The proceedings which have been mentioned are the equivalent of a bill or petition and answer. While the answer of the executor was not under oath, his report of sale was, and the except-ants made no point of the absence of an affidavit, but waived it by filing a petition for issues. On these pro 586 ceedings and depositions, or upon the findings of the jury, the orphans’ court would give judgment or decree. Code, art. 93, secs. 263-265; Bagby’s Executors and Administrators (2nd Ed.) sec. 154; see Holland v. Enright, 167 Md. 604, 608 , 175 A. 466 ; Id., 169 Md. 390, 394, 395 , 181 A. 836 ; Dulin v. Talbot Bank, 163 Md. 294 , 162 A. 663 .

All the issues which were ordered by the court were| within the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court to decide on the objections filed to the report of the sales of real estate made and reported to that court by the executor of a will in pursuance of the power granted by the testamentary paper. The statute prescribes that such sales shall not be valid or effective unless ratified and confirmed by the orphans’ court, after notice by publication has been given in the same manner as prescribed in cases of sales of land under decree in equity; and the bond of such executor shall be answerable for the proceeds of sale of real estate which may come into his possession to the same extent as if it were personal estate in his hands. The only exception made to the necessity for the orphans’ court to exercise its jurisdiction in the ratification of the sale is in the event that a court of equity of competent jurisdiction has assumed jurisdiction m relation to the sale of any such real estate. Code, art. 93, secs. 299-309; Ogle v. Reynolds, 75 Md. 145, 151 , 23 A. 137 ; Lochary v. Corrigan, 132 Md. 371, 373 , 103 A. 1006 ; Knapp v. Knapp, 149 Md. 217 , 131 A. 327 ; Warehime v. Graf, 83 Md. 98 , 34 A. 364 ; Murray v. Conley, 124 Md. 218, 222, 223 , 92 A. 476 .

The power of the orphans’ court to grant proper issues in the matter of the sale and ratification of sale of real estate is established. In the appeal of Montgomery v. Williamson, 37 Md. 421 , the executors under the authority conferred sold real estate of their testator as containing about one hundred acres at a specified price according to the acreage. After the sale, a survey was made, and the land was said to contain one hundred and twelve and one-half acres. The sale was then reported 587 to the Orphans’ Court, and it was therein represented that the survey had been made in the presence and under the direction of the purchaser, and the quantity thus determined had been adopted by the two women executors.

The sale was ratified as reported, but no deed was executed. Some years later the executors discovered through another survey that the tract contained ten acres, two roods and twenty-six perches of land more than had been represented to the executors by the purchaser as the correct area of the parcel. Thereupon the executors filed a petition and charged that they had been misled by the representations of the purchaser, and prayed that the order of ratification be rescinded in order that the executors might be allowed to amend their report so as to conform to actual facts, and that the sale might be ratified and the purchaser comply in accordance with the amended report. The purchaser filed an answer, which was an admission of some of the averments of the petition, and a denial of others.

The Orphans’ Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. On appeal, the dismissal was reversed. In the course of the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Alvey, it was said: “The great object in conferring this power of ratification upon the Orphans’ Court, was, doubtless, the protection of the estate, the prevention of fraud and collusion, and to secure entire fairness in the sale; and seeing that the entire proceeds of sale are to be accounted for to the Orphans’ Court for distribution under their discretion, it is difficult to perceive why that tribunal has not jurisdiction to aid and enforce that duty.” Montgomery v. Williamson, 37 Md. 421, 427, 428 . So, it was held that power to entertain this petition and to revoke, upon adequate proof, the sale was inherent in the power to ratify, on the theory that “it would be absurd to allow a court jurisdiction herein, and at the same time deprive them of the liberty of vacating and setting aside an act of their own, which was obtained from them by deceit and imposition.” At pages 427-429.

Accordingly, 588 the order was reversed and the cause remanded. After the -mandate was received, the purchaser filed his petition requesting that issues might be framed by the Orphans’ Court and sent to a court of law for trial in accordance with the provisions of the Code now under consideration. The purchaser tendered twelve issues. The executrices offered three issues.

After a hearing, the Orphans’ Court passed an order directing that the issues proposed by the executrices, and the first six tendered by the purchaser, be sent to the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City for trial. The case went up on an appeal by the purchaser from this order. The question for decision was the propriety of the order of the orphans’ court in the rejection of the last six of the issues presented by the purchaser. The court held these issues were properly rejected, since they were irrelevant and immaterial.

After stating that no error was discovered, the appellate court remarked: “There can be no question of the power of the Court to exercise its judgment in determining what facts were in issue between the parties, and material to be submitted to a jury for decision; and to refuse to send issues that were irrelevant and immaterial. Munn ikhuysen v. Magraw, 35 Md. 280 .” Williamson v. Montgomery, 40 Md. 373, 378 . What was thus stated was later repeated in a somewhat more comprehensive form in Bridge v. Dillard, 104 Md. 411 , at page 421, 65 A. 10 , 12: “It has long been settled in this state that it is not the right of the litigant in the orphans’ court, under the provisions of the statutes embodied in sections 253 and 254, art. 93, Code 1904, to have any question he may see fit to propose sent to a court of law for trial. The law directs that only such questions of fact as are properly m issue between the parties in that court shall be sent to a court of law upon the application of either party.

It is the duty of the orphans’ court before it takes action upon the issues presented to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or whether the questions raised by the issues are properly before the court 589 for decision, or whether the proposed issues are irrelevant or immaterial to the questions properly before the court. If the court has no jurisdiction in the premises, if the questions are not properly before the court, or not relevant or material, it is the duty of the court to refuse to send the issues. Smith v. Young, 5 Gill 197 ; Williamson v. Montgomery & Spencer, Executors, 40 Md. 373 ; Munnikhuysen v. Magraw, 35 Md. 280 ; Cain v. Warford, 3 Md. 462 .” In proper cases, the orphans’ court is required to grant relevant, material, and correctly drawn issues when presented. Price v. Taylor, 21 Md. 356, 363 ;

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