Harris v. Housing Authority

WENNER, Judge. Appellant, Janie Harris, urges us to reverse a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which denied her the right to a jury trial and awarded appellee, The Housing Authority of Baltimore City, possession of the premises at 827 Seagull Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland. Specifically, appellant complains that: I. The trial court erred in holding that she had waived her right to a jury trial.

II

The trial court denied her the opportunity to litigate appellee’s claim by summarily entering judgment on appellee’s motion for judgment and warrant of possession. On the one hand, we shall hold that the circuit court correctly held that appellant had waived her right to a jury trial. On the other hand, we shall vacate the circuit court’s order for judgment and warrant of possession in favor of the appellee and remand the case for a hearing on the merits of the underlying dispute between the parties. Background Appellant occupied the premises at 827 Seagull Avenue pursuant to a lease between herself and appellee. 1 Believ ¹⁶³ ing that appellant was permitting her son to sell drugs from the premises, appellee notified her that it was terminating the lease as of April 30, 1986.

When appellant failed to vacate by that date, appellee filed a tenant holding over/breach of lease action in the District Court for Baltimore City. When the case was called for trial in the District Court, appellant requested a jury trial. The district court judge, pursuant to Ann. Code of Md. Real Property § 8-118, ordered appellant, pending trial, to pay rent into an escrow account 2 before the sixth (6th) day of each month, 3 and forwarded the case to the circuit court for trial. The record reflects that appellant was consistently late with her rent escrow payments and otherwise failed to comply with the term of the rent escrow order.

As a result, appellee moved for judgment and possession of the premises pursuant to § 8-118(c). [See note 2.) Appellee’s motion was heard by a judge in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The judge found that appellant had waived her right to a jury trial by failing to comply with a valid rent escrow order. The judge then scheduled a bench trial on the merits of the underlying dispute between the parties. At that trial, the judge concluded that, inasmuch as appellant had failed to comply with the valid rent escrow ¹⁶⁴ order, and despite our decision in Lucky Ned Pepper’s Limited v. Columbia Park Recreation Association, 64 Md.App. 222 , 494 A.2d 947 (1985), § 8-118(c) required him to award a judgment and possession of the premises to appellee without hearing the merits of the underlying dispute between the parties.

And, as we háve noted, after such an order was entered, this appeal ensued. I. Initially, appellant contends that, because she had legal justification for failing fully to comply with the rent escrow order, the trial judge erroneously concluded that she had waived her right to a jury trial. We see it otherwise. A. At the outset, we note that a civil litigant’s right to a jury trial is not protected by the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, but rather is guaranteed by Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 4 Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 344-45 , 335 A.2d 670 , application for stay of execution denied, 421 U.S. 983 , 95 S.Ct. 1986 , 44 L.Ed.2d 475 (1975); Md.Code Ann. Courts and Judicial Proceedings (1984 Repl.Vol.1988 Cum.Sup) § 4-402(e).

Nevertheless, Maryland Courts have frequently recognized that the right to a jury trial is not inviolate, and may be waived by non-compliance with reasonable statutory regulations and rules. Bringe, supra, 274 Md. at 347 , 335 A.2d 670 ; Houston v. Lloyds, 241 Md. 10 , 215 A.2d 192 (1965) (right to a jury trial not violated by rule requiring a timely, affirmative written election), see also Bettum v. Montgomery Federal Savings and Loan ¹⁶⁵ Association, Inc., 262 Md. 360 , 277 A.2d 600 (1971); Thompson v. Giordano, 16 Md.App. 264 , 295 A.2d 881 (1972); Fallon v. Agency Rent-A-Car System, et al., 268 Md. 585 , 303 A.2d 387 (1973) (party waived his right to a jury trial by failure to make a timely request); Maryland Community Developers, Inc. v. State Roads Commission of Maryland, 261 Md. 205 , 274 A.2d 641 , appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 62 , 30 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971) (reasonable regulation in the matter of court administration not unconstitutional). We are of course aware that the various “reasonable regulations” curtailing the right to a jury trial that Maryland courts have consistently upheld are to a great extent procedural rules. However that may be, there is authority for imposing reasonable financial burdens on a party seeking a jury trial.

For example, in Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry Co., 87 Md. 623 , 40 A. 890 (1898), the Court held constitutional the requirement that court costs be paid as “a condition precedent to a jury trial.” See also, Lucky Ned Pepper’s, supra. Similarly, we recently held the provisions of § 8-118 requiring payment of future rents into escrow upon a prayer for a jury trial in certain summary eviction proceedings to be constitutional. Id. Nonetheless, the focus of the ultimate inquiry is upon the reasonableness of the regulation.

Id. 64 Md.App. at 233 , 494 A.2d 947 . In the case sub judice, as did the tenant in Lucky Ned Pepper’s, appellant remained on the leased premises during the pendency of the jury trial. As we pointed out in Lucky Ned Pepper’s, under these and similar circumstances, the accelerated relief afforded landlords by repossession statutes is easily frustrated by a prayer for a jury trial. Id. at 232 , 497 A.2d 947 .

In this regard, we said that the clear import of § 8-118 was to ensure a ready fund for disbursement if the landlord prevails on his claim, and we went on to say that it was not unreasonable “to request the tenant pay for the privilege of remaining on the landlord’s premis ¹⁶⁶ es [pending resolution of a jury trial].” Id. at 234, 497 A.2d 947 . Of course, as to whether a tenant has complied with a rent escrow order, the language of § 8-118 is clear. Section 8-118(c) makes clear that the court is the final arbiter. In Lucky Ned Pepper’s, supra, we said that upon a showing by the landlord that (1) an escrow order is valid, and (2) a tenant, without legal justification, has failed to comply with the order, a court “may treat the tenant’s prayer for a jury trial as waived.” The record in the case sub judice reflects that the trial judge conducted a hearing on appellee’s motion for judgment, and found the escrow order valid and appellant’s failure to comply unjustified.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge did not err in holding that appellant had waived her right to a jury trial. B. Before we take up appellant’s second complaint, however, we shall deal with her explanation of why the trial judge should have forgiven her failure to comply fully with the rent escrow order. Specifically, appellant contends that section 2 of her lease which allows for the late payment of rent in “hardship circumstances” 5 is sufficient to justify her failure to comply fully with the rent escrow order. We disagree.

The rent escrow order did not incorporate the terms of appellant’s lease. Rather, by stipulation of the parties, the rent escrow order provided that appellant’s rent was to be paid “no later than the sixth (6th) day of each month.” Moreover, the remedial language of § 8-118(c) comes into play when a tenant fails to pay rent “as it comes due ¹⁶⁷ pursuant to the