Hartman v. Meadows

Prescott, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The losing plaintiff in a motor tort case tried before a jury brings this appeal. His counsel, with great verve and vigor, denounce many alleged errors in the trial below, but, when analysed, the record fails to show that some of these alleged errors are presented by the record. In fact, the record discloses little more than a disputed question of fact, which was properly submitted to the jury for its decision.

As we view the case, the appeal can be decided by answering without undue elaboration, these simple questions: (1) should plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of defendant’s primary negligence have been granted; (2) should plaintiff’s “motion to suppress collateral issues” have been granted; (3) did defendant’s opening statement to the jury, wrongfully, create prejudice and bias against the plaintiff; (4) was it error to refuse to allow plaintiff’s counsel, in his summation, to refer to defendant’s opening statement; (S) was it error for the court ¹⁶¹ to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of defective brakes on defendant’s car; (6) and was plaintiff entitled to a new trial under our decision in Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121 ? I The facts, simply stated, were that the plaintiff, a county police officer, and a fellow officer were drinking beer at Pop’s Tavern on July 14, 1960, at about 1:45 a.m., when the bartender announced he was closing. 1 Appellant, according to his testimony, left the tavern and got into his automobile. The tavern has a parking area which merges into the adjacent public thoroughfare. The main question of fact in dispute at the trial was whether the appellant backed his automobile out of the parking area onto the main highway, or ran it forward toward said highway.

Plaintiff testified that he ran his car out to the highway and stopped at an angle nearly parallel thereto; his front wheel may or may not have been on the shoulder. His theory of the accident was that, when in this stopped position, the defendant drove his car off the highway, into the parking area, and struck his vehicle in the rear. Defendant’s theory was entirely different: it was that he was proceeding on the public highway, at a moderate speed, when suddenly the plaintiff backed out of the parking area directly in his path. He had no chance to stop, and the collision resulted.

The physical facts showed that plaintiff’s vehicle had been struck in the rear. It will be unnecessary to set forth other details of the attendant circumstances. The above discloses diametrically opposite claims pertaining to facts, the determination of which, in a jury trial, is peculiarly the province of the jury. The trial judge was clearly correct in denying plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of defendant’s primary negligence.

II and III These contentions, as they are presented in the brief and record extract, are difficult for us to state with full confidence of the complete accuracy of our statement of them. They seem to ¹⁶² be that the plaintiff filed a motion “to suppress issues collateral to the case,” a portion of which was granted, and a portion denied. The motion is included in the record extract, but there is no showing of how the denial of any part of the motion injured plaintiff, or how defendant’s opening statement was prejudicial, other than a statement in appellant’s brief that he did not obtain a fair and impartial trial because “collateral matters tending to impugn plaintiff’s character and veracity were thrust upon the jury by way of an opening statement [by defendant’s counsel] * * Counsel for defendant’s opening statement was not transcribed, no objections were made thereto, and the court instructed the jury that opening statements were not evidence, and that it should base its verdict on the sworn