Hartman v. Prince George's County

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The aim of the appellants, landowners in Prince George’s County, in filing a bill for declaratory and incidental injunctive relief was to avoid reconsideration by the District Council of Prince George’s County of its grant of a special exception and a variance which would enable appellants to use their land for a filling and automobile repair station. Judge Bowie said that although he was “of the belief that declaratory relief can obtain in certain instances, despite a failure to exhaust administrative remedies,” he felt no need to decide if this case presented one of these instances since he would refuse relief on the merits. He then ordered that the relief prayed for be denied. ³²² The facts are stipulated.

Appellants were granted a special exception and variance by the District Council on November 10, 1970. The Council may grant reconsideration provided it acts to do so within sixty days under § 28.16A of the Zoning Ordinance of Prince George’s County (1970). On petition of the Suitland Citizens Association, Inc. which asserts it was a party at the original zoning hearing, although the record seems to indicate it was not, the Council granted reconsideration on March 17, 1971, some one hundred twenty-six days from November 10, 1970. The claim is that the customary time for action was extended by a provision of the newly adopted County Charter which provided for a “Zoning Moratorium” between the time the charter took effect on December 3, 1970 and February 8, 1971 when the new County Council took office, so as to prevent “lame duck” zoning by the old and outgoing Council.

Section 1208 of the Charter provides: “No-application for a zoning map amendment or for a special exception to a zoning regulation as defined in Section 701 of this Charter, shall be finally acted upon between the effective date of this Charter and the time the first Council and first County Executive take office. This section shall not serve to result in the disapproval by operation of law of any application in a zoning case by virtue of the expiration of a deadline during the period of this moratorium. Deadlines occurring during this moratorium period shall be extended for a period of time equal to the time lost by virtue of this moratorium.” Appellants asked for a declaration that § 1208 of the Charter “be declared inapplicable to the time period allowed for granting a petition for reconsideration by the * * * District Council”; that, in the alternative § 1208 “be declared an unauthorized and ineffective legislative amendment to the Prince George’s County Zoning Ordinance”; that the granting of the special exception and ³²³ variance be affirmed and that the Council be enjoined from rehearing or reconsidering the special exception. Instead of considering and deciding the merits adversely to appellants, Judge Bowie should have remitted them to their rights under the applicable zoning ordinances.

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Code (1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 31A, § 6, sets out when declaratory relief may be granted and provides: “When, however, a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy must be followed: but the mere fact that an actual or threatened controversy is susceptible of relief through a general common-law remedy, or an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy, whether such remedy is recognized or regulated by statute or not, shall not debar a party from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory judgment or decree in any case in which the other essentials to such relief are present * * This Court consistently has applied the rule of § 6 that declarations will not be given where “a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case” because “that form of remedy must be followed.” See Reiling v. Comptroller, 201 Md. 384 ; Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569 (right to vote must be determined as Art. 33 provides and liability to income tax must be determined as the Income Tax Act provides) ; Albert v. Public Service Commission, 209 Md. 27, 41 ; Quinan v. Schneider, 247 Md. 310 (no declaration as to paternity once proceedings have been instituted against putative father under the paternity act) ; Lee v. Sec.